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Lizza JP, Lazaridis C, Nowak PG. Defining Death: Toward a Biological and Ethical Synthesis. THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS : AJOB 2024:1-12. [PMID: 39018166 DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2024.2371124] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/19/2024]
Abstract
Much of the debate over the definition and criteria for determining our death has focused on disagreement over the correct biological account of death, i.e., what it means for any organism to die. In this paper, we argue that this exclusive focus on the biology of death is misguided, because it ignores ethical and social factors that bear on the acceptability of criteria for determining our death. We propose that attention shift from strictly biological considerations to ethical and social considerations that bear on the determination of what we call "civil death." We argue for acceptance of a neurological criterion for determining death on grounds that it is the most reasonable way to synthesize biological, ethical, and social considerations about our death..
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Eberl JT, Ely EW, Raphael RJJ. The Catholic Medical Association Should Not Officially Oppose The Utilization of Neurological Criteria to Determine Death-A Response to Joseph Eble. LINACRE QUARTERLY 2023; 90:13-14. [PMID: 36923672 PMCID: PMC10009140 DOI: 10.1177/00243639221117944] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 03/12/2023]
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Eberl JT. Losing One's Head or Gaining a New Body? THE JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND PHILOSOPHY 2022; 47:189-209. [PMID: 35435964 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhab047] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022] Open
Abstract
A surgical head-transplant technique, HEAVEN, promises to offer significantly improved quality of life for quadriplegics and others whose minds are functional, but whose bodies require artificial support to continue living. HEAVEN putatively actualizes a thought-experiment long debated by philosophers concerning the definition of personhood and criterion of personal identity through time and change. HEAVEN's advocates presume to preserve the identity of the person whose head is transplanted onto another's living body, leaving one's previous body behind as one would their corpse. Various classical and contemporary theories of personhood and personal identity would support this presumption, while others would contest it as providing an accurate or complete view of what is essential for a human person to persist through this procedure. This paper brings such theories to bear in analyzing whether HEAVEN can indeed deliver on its promise of complete ontological survival for the person whose head is transplanted.
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Iltis A. (Re)-Emerging Challenges in Christian Bioethics: Leading Voices in Christian Bioethics. CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 2022; 28:1-10. [PMID: 35992505 PMCID: PMC9383548 DOI: 10.1093/cb/cbab017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
This is the third installment in a Christian Bioethics series that gathers leading voices in Christian bioethics to examine the themes and issues they find most pressing. The papers address fundamental theoretical questions about the nature of Christian bioethics itself, long-standing ethical issues that remain significant today, including physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia, the definition of death, the allocation of scarce resources, and finally, more futuristic questions regarding transhumanism. The contributions underscore the enduring significance of Christian engagement in bioethics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ana Iltis
- Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina,USA
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Abstract
Double Effect Donation claims it is permissible for a person meeting brain death criteria to donate vital organs, even though such a person may be alive. The reason this act is permissible is that it does not aim at one's own death but rather at saving the lives of others and because saving the lives of others constitutes a proportionately serious reason for engaging in a behavior in which one foresees one's death as the outcome. Double Effect Donation, we argue, opens a novel position in debates surrounding brain death and organ donation and does so without compromising the sacredness and fundamental equality of human life. SUMMARY Recent cases and discussion have raised questions about whether brain death criteria successfully capture natural death. These questions are especially troubling since vital organs are often retrieved from individuals declared dead by brain death criteria. We therefore seem to be left with a choice: either salvage brain death criteria or else abandon current organ donation practices. In this article, we present a different way forward. In particular, we defend a view we call Double Effect Donation, according to which it is permissible for a person meeting brain death criteria to donate vital organs, even though such a person may be alive. Double Effect Donation, we argue, is not merely compatible with but grows out of a view that acknowledges the sacredness and fundamental equality of human life.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Joseph Vukov
- Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago, IL, USA
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Carrasco MA, Valera L. Diagnosing death: the "fuzzy area" between life and decomposition. THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 2021; 42:1-24. [PMID: 33851346 DOI: 10.1007/s11017-021-09541-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/03/2021] [Indexed: 06/12/2023]
Abstract
This paper aims to determine whether it is necessary to propose the extreme of putrefaction as the only unmistakable sign in diagnosing the death of the human organism, as David Oderberg does in a recent paper. To that end, we compare Oderberg's claims to those of other authors who align with him in espousing the so-called theory of hylomorphism but who defend either a neurological or a circulatory-respiratory criterion for death. We then establish which interpretation of biological phenomena is the most reasonable within the metaphysical framework of hylomorphism. In this regard, we hold that technology does not obscure the difference between life and death or confect metaphysically anomalous beings, such as living human bodies who are not organisms or animals of the human species who are informed by a vegetative soul, but instead demands a closer and more careful look at the "fuzzy area" between a healthy (living) organism and a decaying corpse. In the light of hylomorphism, we conclude that neurological and circulatory-respiratory criteria are not good instruments for diagnosing death, since they can offer only probabilistic prognoses of death. Of the two, brain death is further away from the moment of death as it merely predicts cardiac arrest that will likely result in death. Putrefaction, the criterion that Oderberg proposes, is at the opposite end of the fuzzy area. This is undoubtedly a true diagnosis of death, but it is not necessary to wait for putrefaction proper-a relatively late stage of decomposition-to be sure that death has already occurred. Rather, early cadaveric phenomena demonstrate that the matter composing a body is subject to the basic forces governing all matter in its environment and has thus succumbed to the universal current of entropy, meaning that the entropy-resisting activity has ceased to constitute an organismal unity. When this unity is lost, there is no possibility of return.
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Affiliation(s)
- María A Carrasco
- Centro de Bioética e Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile
| | - Luca Valera
- Centro de Bioética e Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago de Chile, Chile.
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Doran SE, Vukov JM. Organ Donation and Declaration of Death: Combined Neurologic and Cardiopulmonary Standards. LINACRE QUARTERLY 2020; 86:285-296. [PMID: 32431422 DOI: 10.1177/0024363919840129] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Prolonged survival after the declaration of death by neurologic criteria creates ambiguity regarding the validity of this methodology. This ambiguity has perpetuated the debate among secular and nondissenting Catholic authors who question whether the neurologic standards are sufficient for the declaration of death of organ donors. Cardiopulmonary criteria are being increasingly used for organ donors who do not meet brain death standards. However, cardiopulmonary criteria are plagued by conflict of interest issues, arbitrary standards for candidacy, and the lack of standardized protocols for organ procurement. Combining the neurological and cardiopulmonary standards into a single protocol would mitigate the weaknesses of both and provide greater biologic and moral certainty that a donor of unpaired vital organs is indeed dead. Summary Before a person's organs can be used for transplantation, he or she must be declared "brain-dead." However, sometimes when someone is declared brain-dead, that person can be maintained on life-support for days or even weeks. This creates some confusion about whether the person has truly died. For patients who have a severe neurologic injury but are not brain-dead, organ donation can also occur after his or her heart stops beating. However, this protocol is more ambiguous and lacks standardized protocols. We propose that before a person can donate organs, he or she must first be declared brain-dead, and then his or her heart must irreversibly stop beating before organs are taken.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stephen E Doran
- Section of Neurosurgery, University of Nebraska Medical Center, Omaha, NE, USA
| | - Joseph M Vukov
- Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago, Crown Center for the Humanities, Chicago, IL, USA
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Abstract
In this article, we provide an update to Catholic ethicists and clinicians about the current status of Catholic teaching and practice regarding brain death. We aim to challenge the notion that the question has been definitively settled, despite the widespread application of this concept in medical practice including at Catholic facilities. We first summarize some of the notable arguments for and against brain death in Catholic thought as well as the available magisterial teachings on this topic. Although Catholic bishops, theologians, and ethicists have generally signaled at least tentative approval of the neurological criteria for the determination of death, we contend that no definitive magisterial teaching on brain death currently exists; therefore, Catholics are not currently bound to uphold any position on these criteria. In the second part of the article, we describe how Catholics, particularly Catholic medical practitioners, must presently inform their consciences on this issue while awaiting a more definitive magisterial resolution. SUMMARY Some prominent Catholic theologians and physicians have argued against the validity of brain death; however, most Catholic ethicists and physicians accept the validity of brain death as true human death. In this paper, we argue that there is no definitive magisterial teaching on brain death, meaning that Catholics are not bound to uphold any position on brain death. Catholics in general, but especially Catholic medical practitioners, should inform their consciences on this intra-Catholic debate on brain death while awaiting more definitive magisterial teaching.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Kyle Karches
- Department of Internal Medicine, Saint Louis University, MO, USA
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Abstract
The dead donor rule holds that removing organs from living human beings without their consent is wrongful killing. The rule still prevails in most countries, and I assume it without argument in order to pose the question: is it possible to have a metaphysically correct, clinically relevant analysis of human death that makes organ donation ethically permissible? I argue that the two dominant criteria of death-brain death and circulatory death-are both empirically and metaphysically inadequate as definitions of human death and therefore hold no epistemic value in themselves. I first set out a neo-Aristotelian theory of death as separation of soul (understood as organising principle) and body, which is then fleshed out as loss of organismic integrity. The brain and circulatory criteria are shown to have severe weaknesses as physiological manifestations of loss of integrity. Given the mismatch between what death is, metaphysically speaking, and the dominant criteria accepted by clinicians and philosophers, it turns out that only actual bodily decomposition is a sure sign of death. In this I differ from Alan Shewmon, whose important work I discuss in detail.
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Affiliation(s)
- David S Oderberg
- Department of Philosophy, University of Reading, Reading, RG6 6AA, UK.
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Abstract
Humans often seek to improve themselves, whether through self-discipline or through the use of science and technology. At some point in the future, techniques might become available that will change humans to such a degree that they might have to be regarded as something other than human: posthuman. This essay tries to define the point at which such a human-to-posthuman metamorphosis may occur. This is achieved by discerning what is it that makes human substance distinct, i.e. what is the human essence. This is accomplished by examining the features of the human body, looking at the mode of human existence in society and trying to grasp the importance of the body-soul relationship. Throughout the process, humans are compared to animals as well as entities from literature, film, and the gaming world. These are used as case studies to shape and test the ideas developed throughout the essay. This essay's conclusions might become useful when decisions will have to be made as to the legal status of posthumans, by providing a tool for discerning when metamorphosis has occurred. Moreover, insights from this essay might also inform debates surrounding the ethical status of certain modalities of human enhancement.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michal Pruski
- a School of Healthcare Science, Faculty of Science and Engineering , Manchester Metropolitan University , Manchester , UK.,b Critical Care Laboratory, Critical Care Directorate , Manchester Royal Infirmary, Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust , Manchester , UK
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Nguyen D. Pope John Paul II and the neurological standard for the determination of death: A critical analysis of his address to the Transplantation Society. LINACRE QUARTERLY 2017; 84:155-186. [PMID: 28698708 PMCID: PMC5499224 DOI: 10.1080/00243639.2017.1307502] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
The introduction of the "brain death" criterion constitutes a significant paradigm shift in the determination of death. The perception of the public at large is that the Catholic Church has formally endorsed this neurological standard. However, a critical reading of the only magisterial document on this subject, Pope John Paul II's 2000 address, shows that the pope's acceptance of the neurological criterion is conditional in that it entails a twofold requirement. It requires that certain medical presuppositions of the neurological standard are fulfilled, and that its philosophical premise coheres with the Church's teaching on the body-soul union. This article demonstrates that the medical presuppositions are not fulfilled, and that the doctrine of the brain as the central somatic integrator of the body does not cohere either with the current holistic understanding of the human organism or with the Church's Thomistic doctrine of the soul as the form of the body. SUMMARY The concept of "brain death" (the neurological basis for legally declaring a person dead) has caused much controversy since its inception. In this regard, it has been generally perceived that the Catholic Church has officially affirmed the "brain death" criterion. The address of Pope John Paul II in 2000 shows, however, that he only gave it a conditional acceptance, one which requires that several medical and philosophical presuppositions of the "brain death" standard be fulfilled. This article demonstrates, taking into consideration both the empirical evidence and the Church's Thomistic anthropology, that the presuppositions have not been fulfilled.
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Affiliation(s)
- Doyen Nguyen
- Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas, Rome, Italy
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