Protective measures and H5N1-seroprevalence among personnel tasked with bird collection during an outbreak of avian influenza A/H5N1 in wild birds, Ruegen, Germany, 2006

Preventive, safety and control measures against Avian Influenza A(H5N1) in occupationally exposed groups: A scoping review

Introduction

During the outbreak of avian influenza, A (H5N1) (IA) in wild and domestic birds recorded in January 2023, the epidemiological alert has been extended due to its potential contagion to humans, particularly in those exposed occupational groups.

Objective

to identify the primary occupational risk groups, as well as the preventive, safety, and control measures against IA intended or implemented in these positions.

Material and methods

A systematic search was conducted in Pubmed, Scopus, Web of science, Scielo and literature databases. Scientific articles, normative documents, and technical reports identifying vulnerable occupational groups and preventive measures against IA were included. Two authors conducted a full-text review, extracting information independently, and findings were summarized narratively.

Results

A total of 5518 documents were identified, and 30 reports were included. 20% of the reports were published in 2023, 13/30 were affiliated to a university institution. Occupationally exposed groups were identified both directly and indirectly. 63.3% of reports identified breeders, poultry farmers and sellers as the most concerning occupational group, while 60% identified biosecurity practices (use of PPE, handwashing) as the primary measure against IA, followed by strategies such as education (training and capacity-building).

Conclusion

Occupational groups of interest were identified, primarily those involved in sales, commerce, and the handling of bird waste with potential exposure to IA. Furthermore, the maintenance of biosecurity measures, cleaning-disinfection practices, and educational strategies in workplace settings are recommended.

Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses

BACKGROUND

Viral epidemics or pandemics of acute respiratory infections (ARIs) pose a global threat. Examples are influenza (H1N1) caused by the H1N1pdm09 virus in 2009, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by SARS-CoV-2 in 2019. Antiviral drugs and vaccines may be insufficient to prevent their spread. This is an update of a Cochrane Review last published in 2020. We include results from studies from the current COVID-19 pandemic.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the effectiveness of physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of acute respiratory viruses.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, PubMed, Embase, CINAHL, and two trials registers in October 2022, with backwards and forwards citation analysis on the new studies.

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included randomised controlled trials (RCTs) and cluster-RCTs investigating physical interventions (screening at entry ports, isolation, quarantine, physical distancing, personal protection, hand hygiene, face masks, glasses, and gargling) to prevent respiratory virus transmission.  DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: We used standard Cochrane methodological procedures.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 11 new RCTs and cluster-RCTs (610,872 participants) in this update, bringing the total number of RCTs to 78. Six of the new trials were conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic; two from Mexico, and one each from Denmark, Bangladesh, England, and Norway. We identified four ongoing studies, of which one is completed, but unreported, evaluating masks concurrent with the COVID-19 pandemic. Many studies were conducted during non-epidemic influenza periods. Several were conducted during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, and others in epidemic influenza seasons up to 2016. Therefore, many studies were conducted in the context of lower respiratory viral circulation and transmission compared to COVID-19. The included studies were conducted in heterogeneous settings, ranging from suburban schools to hospital wards in high-income countries; crowded inner city settings in low-income countries; and an immigrant neighbourhood in a high-income country. Adherence with interventions was low in many studies. The risk of bias for the RCTs and cluster-RCTs was mostly high or unclear. Medical/surgical masks compared to no masks We included 12 trials (10 cluster-RCTs) comparing medical/surgical masks versus no masks to prevent the spread of viral respiratory illness (two trials with healthcare workers and 10 in the community). Wearing masks in the community probably makes little or no difference to the outcome of influenza-like illness (ILI)/COVID-19 like illness compared to not wearing masks (risk ratio (RR) 0.95, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.84 to 1.09; 9 trials, 276,917 participants; moderate-certainty evidence. Wearing masks in the community probably makes little or no difference to the outcome of laboratory-confirmed influenza/SARS-CoV-2 compared to not wearing masks (RR 1.01, 95% CI 0.72 to 1.42; 6 trials, 13,919 participants; moderate-certainty evidence). Harms were rarely measured and poorly reported (very low-certainty evidence). N95/P2 respirators compared to medical/surgical masks We pooled trials comparing N95/P2 respirators with medical/surgical masks (four in healthcare settings and one in a household setting). We are very uncertain on the effects of N95/P2 respirators compared with medical/surgical masks on the outcome of clinical respiratory illness (RR 0.70, 95% CI 0.45 to 1.10; 3 trials, 7779 participants; very low-certainty evidence). N95/P2 respirators compared with medical/surgical masks may be effective for ILI (RR 0.82, 95% CI 0.66 to 1.03; 5 trials, 8407 participants; low-certainty evidence). Evidence is limited by imprecision and heterogeneity for these subjective outcomes. The use of a N95/P2 respirators compared to medical/surgical masks probably makes little or no difference for the objective and more precise outcome of laboratory-confirmed influenza infection (RR 1.10, 95% CI 0.90 to 1.34; 5 trials, 8407 participants; moderate-certainty evidence). Restricting pooling to healthcare workers made no difference to the overall findings. Harms were poorly measured and reported, but discomfort wearing medical/surgical masks or N95/P2 respirators was mentioned in several studies (very low-certainty evidence).  One previously reported ongoing RCT has now been published and observed that medical/surgical masks were non-inferior to N95 respirators in a large study of 1009 healthcare workers in four countries providing direct care to COVID-19 patients.  Hand hygiene compared to control Nineteen trials compared hand hygiene interventions with controls with sufficient data to include in meta-analyses. Settings included schools, childcare centres and homes. Comparing hand hygiene interventions with controls (i.e. no intervention), there was a 14% relative reduction in the number of people with ARIs in the hand hygiene group (RR 0.86, 95% CI 0.81 to 0.90; 9 trials, 52,105 participants; moderate-certainty evidence), suggesting a probable benefit. In absolute terms this benefit would result in a reduction from 380 events per 1000 people to 327 per 1000 people (95% CI 308 to 342). When considering the more strictly defined outcomes of ILI and laboratory-confirmed influenza, the estimates of effect for ILI (RR 0.94, 95% CI 0.81 to 1.09; 11 trials, 34,503 participants; low-certainty evidence), and laboratory-confirmed influenza (RR 0.91, 95% CI 0.63 to 1.30; 8 trials, 8332 participants; low-certainty evidence), suggest the intervention made little or no difference. We pooled 19 trials (71, 210 participants) for the composite outcome of ARI or ILI or influenza, with each study only contributing once and the most comprehensive outcome reported. Pooled data showed that hand hygiene may be beneficial with an 11% relative reduction of respiratory illness (RR 0.89, 95% CI 0.83 to 0.94; low-certainty evidence), but with high heterogeneity. In absolute terms this benefit would result in a reduction from 200 events per 1000 people to 178 per 1000 people (95% CI 166 to 188). Few trials measured and reported harms (very low-certainty evidence). We found no RCTs on gowns and gloves, face shields, or screening at entry ports.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

The high risk of bias in the trials, variation in outcome measurement, and relatively low adherence with the interventions during the studies hampers drawing firm conclusions. There were additional RCTs during the pandemic related to physical interventions but a relative paucity given the importance of the question of masking and its relative effectiveness and the concomitant measures of mask adherence which would be highly relevant to the measurement of effectiveness, especially in the elderly and in young children. There is uncertainty about the effects of face masks. The low to moderate certainty of evidence means our confidence in the effect estimate is limited, and that the true effect may be different from the observed estimate of the effect. The pooled results of RCTs did not show a clear reduction in respiratory viral infection with the use of medical/surgical masks. There were no clear differences between the use of medical/surgical masks compared with N95/P2 respirators in healthcare workers when used in routine care to reduce respiratory viral infection. Hand hygiene is likely to modestly reduce the burden of respiratory illness, and although this effect was also present when ILI and laboratory-confirmed influenza were analysed separately, it was not found to be a significant difference for the latter two outcomes. Harms associated with physical interventions were under-investigated. There is a need for large, well-designed RCTs addressing the effectiveness of many of these interventions in multiple settings and populations, as well as the impact of adherence on effectiveness, especially in those most at risk of ARIs.

Serological evidence of human infections with highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus: a systematic review and meta-analysis

BACKGROUND

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus poses a global public health threat given severe and fatal zoonotic infections since 1997 and ongoing A(H5N1) virus circulation among poultry in several countries. A comprehensive assessment of the seroprevalence of A(H5N1) virus antibodies remains a gap and limits understanding of the true risk of A(H5N1) virus infection.

METHODS

We conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis of published serosurveys to assess the risk of subclinical and clinically mild A(H5N1) virus infections. We assessed A(H5N1) virus antibody titers and changes in titers among populations with variable exposures to different A(H5N1) viruses.

RESULTS

Across studies using the World Health Organization-recommended seropositive definition, the point estimates of the seroprevalence of A(H5N1) virus-specific antibodies were higher in poultry-exposed populations (range 0-0.6%) and persons exposed to both human A(H5N1) cases and infected birds (range 0.4-1.8%) than in close contacts of A(H5N1) cases or the general population (none to very low frequencies). Seroprevalence was higher in persons exposed to A(H5N1) clade 0 virus (1.9%, range 0.7-3.2%) than in participants exposed to other clades of A(H5N1) virus (range 0-0.5%) (p < 0.05). Seroprevalence was higher in poultry-exposed populations (range 0-1.9%) if such studies utilized antigenically similar A(H5N1) virus antigens in assays to A(H5N1) viruses circulating among poultry.

CONCLUSIONS

These low seroprevalences suggest that subclinical and clinically mild human A(H5N1) virus infections are uncommon. Standardized serological survey and laboratory methods are needed to fully understand the extent and risk of human A(H5N1) virus infections.

Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses

BACKGROUND

Viral epidemics or pandemics of acute respiratory infections (ARIs) pose a global threat. Examples are influenza (H1N1) caused by the H1N1pdm09 virus in 2009, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by SARS-CoV-2 in 2019. Antiviral drugs and vaccines may be insufficient to prevent their spread. This is an update of a Cochrane Review published in 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2011. The evidence summarised in this review does not include results from studies from the current COVID-19 pandemic.

OBJECTIVES

To assess the effectiveness of physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of acute respiratory viruses.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched CENTRAL, PubMed, Embase, CINAHL on 1 April 2020. We searched ClinicalTrials.gov, and the WHO ICTRP on 16 March 2020. We conducted a backwards and forwards citation analysis on the newly included studies.

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included randomised controlled trials (RCTs) and cluster-RCTs of trials investigating physical interventions (screening at entry ports, isolation, quarantine, physical distancing, personal protection, hand hygiene, face masks, and gargling) to prevent respiratory virus transmission. In previous versions of this review we also included observational studies. However, for this update, there were sufficient RCTs to address our study aims.   DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. We used GRADE to assess the certainty of the evidence. Three pairs of review authors independently extracted data using a standard template applied in previous versions of this review, but which was revised to reflect our focus on RCTs and cluster-RCTs for this update. We did not contact trialists for missing data due to the urgency in completing the review. We extracted data on adverse events (harms) associated with the interventions.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 44 new RCTs and cluster-RCTs in this update, bringing the total number of randomised trials to 67. There were no included studies conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic. Six ongoing studies were identified, of which three evaluating masks are being conducted concurrent with the COVID pandemic, and one is completed. Many studies were conducted during non-epidemic influenza periods, but several studies were conducted during the global H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009, and others in epidemic influenza seasons up to 2016. Thus, studies were conducted in the context of lower respiratory viral circulation and transmission compared to COVID-19. The included studies were conducted in heterogeneous settings, ranging from suburban schools to hospital wards in high-income countries; crowded inner city settings in low-income countries; and an immigrant neighbourhood in a high-income country. Compliance with interventions was low in many studies. The risk of bias for the RCTs and cluster-RCTs was mostly high or unclear. Medical/surgical masks compared to no masks We included nine trials (of which eight were cluster-RCTs) comparing medical/surgical masks versus no masks to prevent the spread of viral respiratory illness (two trials with healthcare workers and seven in the community). There is low certainty evidence from nine trials (3507 participants) that wearing a mask may make little or no difference to the outcome of influenza-like illness (ILI) compared to not wearing a mask (risk ratio (RR) 0.99, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.82 to 1.18. There is moderate certainty evidence that wearing a mask probably makes little or no difference to the outcome of laboratory-confirmed influenza compared to not wearing a mask (RR 0.91, 95% CI 0.66 to 1.26; 6 trials; 3005 participants). Harms were rarely measured and poorly reported. Two studies during COVID-19 plan to recruit a total of 72,000 people. One evaluates medical/surgical masks (N = 6000) (published Annals of Internal Medicine, 18 Nov 2020), and one evaluates cloth masks (N = 66,000). N95/P2 respirators compared to medical/surgical masks We pooled trials comparing N95/P2 respirators with medical/surgical masks (four in healthcare settings and one in a household setting). There is uncertainty over the effects of N95/P2 respirators when compared with medical/surgical masks on the outcomes of clinical respiratory illness (RR 0.70, 95% CI 0.45 to 1.10; very low-certainty evidence; 3 trials; 7779 participants) and ILI (RR 0.82, 95% CI 0.66 to 1.03; low-certainty evidence; 5 trials; 8407 participants). The evidence is limited by imprecision and heterogeneity for these subjective outcomes. The use of a N95/P2 respirator compared to a medical/surgical mask probably makes little or no difference for the objective and more precise outcome of laboratory-confirmed influenza infection (RR 1.10, 95% CI 0.90 to 1.34; moderate-certainty evidence; 5 trials; 8407 participants). Restricting the pooling to healthcare workers made no difference to the overall findings. Harms were poorly measured and reported, but discomfort wearing medical/surgical masks or N95/P2 respirators was mentioned in several studies. One ongoing study recruiting 576 people compares N95/P2 respirators with medical surgical masks for healthcare workers during COVID-19. Hand hygiene compared to control Settings included schools, childcare centres, homes, and offices. In a comparison of hand hygiene interventions with control (no intervention), there was a 16% relative reduction in the number of people with ARIs in the hand hygiene group (RR 0.84, 95% CI 0.82 to 0.86; 7 trials; 44,129 participants; moderate-certainty evidence), suggesting a probable benefit. When considering the more strictly defined outcomes of ILI and laboratory-confirmed influenza, the estimates of effect for ILI (RR 0.98, 95% CI 0.85 to 1.13; 10 trials; 32,641 participants; low-certainty evidence) and laboratory-confirmed influenza (RR 0.91, 95% CI 0.63 to 1.30; 8 trials; 8332 participants; low-certainty evidence) suggest the intervention made little or no difference. We pooled all 16 trials (61,372 participants) for the composite outcome of ARI or ILI or influenza, with each study only contributing once and the most comprehensive outcome reported. The pooled data showed that hand hygiene may offer a benefit with an 11% relative reduction of respiratory illness (RR 0.89, 95% CI 0.84 to 0.95; low-certainty evidence), but with high heterogeneity. Few trials measured and reported harms. There are two ongoing studies of handwashing interventions in 395 children outside of COVID-19. We identified one RCT on quarantine/physical distancing. Company employees in Japan were asked to stay at home if household members had ILI symptoms. Overall fewer people in the intervention group contracted influenza compared with workers in the control group (2.75% versus 3.18%; hazard ratio 0.80, 95% CI 0.66 to 0.97). However, those who stayed at home with their infected family members were 2.17 times more likely to be infected. We found no RCTs on eye protection, gowns and gloves, or screening at entry ports.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

The high risk of bias in the trials, variation in outcome measurement, and relatively low compliance with the interventions during the studies hamper drawing firm conclusions and generalising the findings to the current COVID-19 pandemic. There is uncertainty about the effects of face masks. The low-moderate certainty of the evidence means our confidence in the effect estimate is limited, and that the true effect may be different from the observed estimate of the effect. The pooled results of randomised trials did not show a clear reduction in respiratory viral infection with the use of medical/surgical masks during seasonal influenza. There were no clear differences between the use of medical/surgical masks compared with N95/P2 respirators in healthcare workers when used in routine care to reduce respiratory viral infection. Hand hygiene is likely to modestly reduce the burden of respiratory illness. Harms associated with physical interventions were under-investigated. There is a need for large, well-designed RCTs addressing the effectiveness of many of these interventions in multiple settings and populations, especially in those most at risk of ARIs.

Brief literature review for the WHO global influenza research agenda--highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 risk in humans

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A H5N1 viruses remain a significant health threat to humans given the continued rare occurrence of human cases with a high case fatality rate. This brief literature review summarizes available evidence of risk factors for H5N1 infection in humans and updates a recent systematic review published in early 2011. Several epidemiologic studies have been published to evaluate the risk factors for H5N1 infection in humans, including contact with poultry and poultry products and non-poultry-related contact such as from H5N1-contaminated water. While most H5N1 cases are attributed to exposure to sick poultry, it is unclear how many may be due to human-to-human transmission. The collective results of published literature suggest that transmission risk of H5N1 from poultry to humans may be highest among individuals who may have been in contact with the highest potential concentrations of virus shed by poultry. This suggests that there may be a threshold of virus concentration needed for effective transmission and that circulating H5N1 strains have not yet mutated to transmit readily from either poultry to human or from human to human. However, the mode of potential transmission can be quite varied throughout different countries and by study with exposures ranging from visiting a wet market, preparing infected poultry for consumption, to swimming or bathing in ponds frequented by poultry. Several important data gaps remain in the understanding of the epidemiology of H5N1 in humans and limit our ability to interpret the results of the available H5N1 seroepidemiologic studies.

Assessment of serosurveys for H5N1

BACKGROUND

It has been suggested that the true case-fatality rate of human H5N1 influenza infection is appreciably less than the figure of approximately 60% that is based on official World Health Organization (WHO)-confirmed case reports because asymptomatic cases may have been missed. A number of seroepidemiologic studies have been conducted in an attempt to identify such missed cases.

METHODS

We conducted a comprehensive literature review of all English-language H5N1 human serology surveys with detailed attention to laboratory methodology used (including whether investigators used criteria set by the WHO to define positive cases), laboratory controls used, and the clades/genotypes involved.

RESULTS

Twenty-nine studies were included in the analysis. Few reported using unexposed control groups and one-third did not apply WHO criteria. Of studies that used WHO criteria, only 4 found any seropositive results to clades/genotypes of H5N1 that are currently circulating. No studies reported seropositive results to the clade 2/genotype Z viruses that have spread throughout Eurasia and Africa.

CONCLUSIONS

This review suggests that the frequency of positive H5 serology results is likely to be low; therefore, it is essential that future studies adhere to WHO criteria and include unexposed controls in their laboratory assays to limit the likelihood of false-positive results.

Seroevidence for H5N1 influenza infections in humans: meta-analysis

The prevalence of avian H5N1 influenza A infections in humans has not been definitively determined. Cases of H5N1 infection in humans confirmed by the World Health Organization (WHO) are fewer than 600 in number, with an overall case fatality rate of >50%. We hypothesize that the stringent criteria for confirmation of a human case of H5N1 by WHO do not account for a majority of infections but rather the select few hospitalized cases that are more likely to be severe and result in poor clinical outcome. Meta-analysis shows that 1 to 2% of more than 12,500 study participants from 20 studies had seroevidence for prior H5N1 infection.

Is H5N1 really highly lethal?

Medicine for Policymakers is a Journal column that provides decision makers with brief explanations of the meaning and implications for biosecurity of clinical issues. The articles describe, for a nonmedical audience, hospital practices, medical challenges, healthcare delivery issues, and other topics of current interest. Readers may submit ideas to the column's editor, Amesh A. Adalja, MD, through the Journal's editorial office at jfox@upmc-biosecurity.org .

Mammalian-transmissible H5N1 influenza: facts and perspective

Two recently submitted (but as yet unpublished) studies describe success in creating mutant isolates of H5N1 influenza A virus that can be transmitted via the respiratory route between ferrets; concern has been raised regarding human-to-human transmissibility of these or similar laboratory-generated influenza viruses. Furthermore, the potential release of methods used in these studies has engendered a great deal of controversy around publishing potential dual-use data and also has served as a catalyst for debates around the true case-fatality rate of H5N1 influenza and the capability of influenza vaccines and antivirals to impact any future unintentional or intentional release of H5N1 virus. In this report, we review available seroepidemiology data for H5N1 infection and discuss how case-finding strategies may influence the overall case-fatality rate reported by the WHO. We also provide information supporting the position that if an H5N1 influenza pandemic occurred, available medical countermeasures would have limited impact on the associated morbidity and mortality.

Use of personal protective measures by Thai households in areas with avian influenza outbreaks

Thailand has had multiple poultry outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 since its first emergence in 2004. Twenty-five human cases of HPAI H5N1 avian influenza have been reported in the country, including 17 fatalities, and contact with infected dead or dying poultry has been identified as a risk factor for human infection. This study assessed the use of protective equipment and hand hygiene measures by Thai poultry-owning households during activities involving poultry contact. Surveys conducted in 2008 included questions regarding poultry-related activities and protective measures used during an HPAI outbreak (2005) and 3 years after the study location's last reported outbreak (2008). For both time periods, poultry owners reported limited use of personal protective equipment (PPE) during all activities and inconsistent hand washing practices after carrying poultry and gathering eggs. This is the first time that PPE use in Thailand has been quantified for a large study group. These data are important for ongoing characterization of HPAI risk and for the crafting of educational messages.

Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses

BACKGROUND

Viral epidemics or pandemics of acute respiratory infections like influenza or severe acute respiratory syndrome pose a global threat. Antiviral drugs and vaccinations may be insufficient to prevent their spread.

OBJECTIVES

To review the effectiveness of physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses.

SEARCH STRATEGY

We searched The Cochrane Library, the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL 2010, Issue 3), which includes the Acute Respiratory Infections Group's Specialised Register, MEDLINE (1966 to October 2010), OLDMEDLINE (1950 to 1965), EMBASE (1990 to October 2010), CINAHL (1982 to October 2010), LILACS (2008 to October 2010), Indian MEDLARS (2008 to October 2010) and IMSEAR (2008 to October 2010).

SELECTION CRITERIA

In this update, two review authors independently applied the inclusion criteria to all identified and retrieved articles and extracted data. We scanned 3775 titles, excluded 3560 and retrieved full papers of 215 studies, to include 66 papers of 67 studies. We included physical interventions (screening at entry ports, isolation, quarantine, social distancing, barriers, personal protection, hand hygiene) to prevent respiratory virus transmission. We included randomised controlled trials (RCTs), cohorts, case-controls, before-after and time series studies.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

We used a standardised form to assess trial eligibility. We assessed RCTs by randomisation method, allocation generation, concealment, blinding and follow up. We assessed non-RCTs for potential confounders and classified them as low, medium and high risk of bias.

MAIN RESULTS

We included 67 studies including randomised controlled trials and observational studies with a mixed risk of bias. A total number of participants is not included as the total would be made up of a heterogenous set of observations (participant people, observations on participants and countries (object of some studies)). The risk of bias for five RCTs and most cluster-RCTs was high. Observational studies were of mixed quality. Only case-control data were sufficiently homogeneous to allow meta-analysis. The highest quality cluster-RCTs suggest respiratory virus spread can be prevented by hygienic measures, such as handwashing, especially around younger children. Benefit from reduced transmission from children to household members is broadly supported also in other study designs where the potential for confounding is greater. Nine case-control studies suggested implementing transmission barriers, isolation and hygienic measures are effective at containing respiratory virus epidemics. Surgical masks or N95 respirators were the most consistent and comprehensive supportive measures. N95 respirators were non-inferior to simple surgical masks but more expensive, uncomfortable and irritating to skin. Adding virucidals or antiseptics to normal handwashing to decrease respiratory disease transmission remains uncertain. Global measures, such as screening at entry ports, led to a non-significant marginal delay in spread. There was limited evidence that social distancing was effective, especially if related to the risk of exposure.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Simple and low-cost interventions would be useful for reducing transmission of epidemic respiratory viruses. Routine long-term implementation of some measures assessed might be difficult without the threat of an epidemic.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1): pathways of exposure at the animal-human interface, a systematic review

BACKGROUND

The threat posed by highly pathogenic avian influenza A H5N1 viruses to humans remains significant, given the continued occurrence of sporadic human cases (499 human cases in 15 countries) with a high case fatality rate (approximately 60%), the endemicity in poultry populations in several countries, and the potential for reassortment with the newly emerging 2009 H1N1 pandemic strain. Therefore, we review risk factors for H5N1 infection in humans.

METHODS AND FINDINGS

Several epidemiologic studies have evaluated the risk factors associated with increased risk of H5N1 infection among humans who were exposed to H5N1 viruses. Our review shows that most H5N1 cases are attributed to exposure to sick poultry. Most cases are sporadic, while occasional limited human-to-human transmission occurs. The most commonly identified factors associated with H5N1 virus infection included exposure through contact with infected blood or bodily fluids of infected poultry via food preparation practices; touching and caring for infected poultry; [corrected] exposure to H5N1 via swimming or bathing in potentially virus laden ponds; and exposure to H5N1 at live bird markets.

CONCLUSIONS

Research has demonstrated that despite frequent and widespread contact with poultry, transmission of the H5N1 virus from poultry to humans is rare. Available research has identified several risk factors that may be associated with infection including close direct contact with poultry and transmission via the environment. However, several important data gaps remain that limit our understanding of the epidemiology of H5N1 in humans. Although infection in humans with H5N1 remains rare, human cases continue to be reported and H5N1 is now considered endemic among poultry in parts of Asia and in Egypt, providing opportunities for additional human infections and for the acquisition of virus mutations that may lead to more efficient spread among humans and other mammalian species. Collaboration between human and animal health sectors for surveillance, case investigation, virus sharing, and risk assessment is essential to monitor for potential changes in circulating H5N1 viruses and in the epidemiology of H5N1 in order to provide the best possible chance for effective mitigation of the impact of H5N1 in both poultry and humans.

DISCLAIMER

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions or organizations with which they are affiliated.