Towards new human rights in the age of neuroscience and neurotechnology

The ethical significance of user-control in AI-driven speech-BCIs: a narrative review

AI-driven brain-computed interfaces aimed at restoring speech for individuals living with locked-in-syndrome are paired with ethical implications for user's autonomy, privacy and responsibility. Embedding options for sufficient levels of user-control in speech-BCI design has been proposed to mitigate these ethical challenges. However, how user-control in speech-BCIs is conceptualized and how it relates to these ethical challenges is underdetermined. In this narrative literature review, we aim to clarify and explicate the notion of user-control in speech-BCIs, to better understand in what way user-control could operationalize user's autonomy, privacy and responsibility and explore how such suggestions for increasing user-control can be translated to recommendations for the design or use of speech-BCIs. First, we identified types of user control, including executory control that can protect voluntariness of speech, and guidance control that can contribute to semantic accuracy. Second, we identified potential causes for a loss of user-control, including contributions of predictive language models, a lack of ability for neural control, or signal interference and external control. Such a loss of user control may have implications for semantic accuracy and mental privacy. Third we explored ways to design for user-control. While embedding initiation signals for users may increase executory control, they may conflict with other aims such as speed and continuity of speech. Design mechanisms for guidance control remain largely conceptual, similar trade-offs in design may be expected. We argue that preceding these trade-offs, the overarching aim of speech-BCIs needs to be defined, requiring input from current and potential users. Additionally, conceptual clarification of user-control and other (ethical) concepts in this debate has practical relevance for BCI researchers. For instance, different concepts of inner speech may have distinct ethical implications. Increased clarity of such concepts can improve anticipation of ethical implications of speech-BCIs and may help to steer design decisions.

Right to mental integrity and neurotechnologies: implications of the extended mind thesis

The possibility of neurotechnological interference with our brain and mind raises questions about the moral rights that would protect against the (mis)use of these technologies. One such moral right that has received recent attention is the right to mental integrity. Though the metaphysical boundaries of the mind are a matter of live debate, most defences of this moral right seem to assume an internalist (brain-based) view of the mind. In this article, we will examine what an extended account of the mind might imply for the right to mental integrity and the protection it provides against neurotechnologies. We argue that, on an extended account of the mind, the scope of the right to mental integrity would expand significantly, implying that neurotechnologies would no longer pose a uniquely serious threat to the right. In addition, some neurotechnologies may even be protected by the right to mental integrity, as the technologies would become part of the mind. We conclude that adopting an extended account of the mind has significant implications for the right to mental integrity in terms of its protective scope and capacity to protect against neurotechnologies, demonstrating that metaphysical assumptions about the mind play an important role in determining the moral protection provided by the right.

Mental Privacy, Cognitive Liberty, and Hog-tying

As the science and technology of the brain and mind develop, so do the ways in which brains and minds may be surveilled and manipulated. Some cognitive libertarians worry that these developments undermine cognitive liberty or "freedom of thought." I argue that protecting an individual's cognitive liberty undermines others' ability to use their own cognitive liberty. Given that the threatening devices and processes are not relevantly different from ordinary and frequent intrusions upon one's brain and mind, strong protections of cognitive liberty may proscribe neurotechnological intrusions but also ordinary intrusions. Thus, the cognitive libertarian position "hog-ties" others' use of their own liberties. This problem for the cognitive libertarian is the same problem that ordinary libertarianism faces in protecting individual rights to property and person. But the libertarian strategies for resolving the problem don't work for the cognitive libertarian. I conclude that the right to mental privacy is weaker than what cognitive libertarians want it to be.

A healthcare approach to mental integrity

The current human rights framework can shield people from many of the risks associated with neurotechnological applications. However, it has been argued that we need either to articulate new rights or reconceptualise existing ones in order to prevent some of these risks. In this paper, we would like to address the recent discussion about whether current reconceptualisations of the right to mental integrity identify an ethical dimension that is not covered by existing moral and/or legal rights. The main challenge of these proposals is that they make mental integrity indistinguishable from autonomy. They define mental integrity in terms of the control we can have over our mental states, which seems to be part of the authenticity condition for autonomous action. Based on a fairly comprehensive notion of mental health (ie, a notion that is not limited to the mere absence of illness), we propose an alternative view according to which mental integrity can be characterised both as a positive right to (medical and non-medical) interventions that restore and sustain mental and neural function, and promote its development and a negative right protecting people from interventions that threaten or undermine these functions or their development. We will argue that this notion is dissociated from cognitive control and therefore can be adequately distinguished from autonomy.

Free will, quarantines, and moral enhancements: neuroabolitionism as an alternative to criminal law

This article critically navigates the complex debate surrounding free will and criminal justice, challenging traditional assumptions of moral responsibility and culpability. By exploring hard incompatibilism, which denies free will, I question the ethical justification of punitive sanctions and critically analyze the alternative models such as the public health-quarantine and nonconsensual neurobiological "moral" enhancements. These alternatives, however, introduce practical and ethical concerns. Advocating for a neuro-abolitionist perspective, through the proposition of five initial principles/debates, the article suggests a shift in integrating sociological abolitionism with insights from neuroscience. The discussion extends to the implications of hard incompatibilism and the pursuit of more humane and effective approaches to deviant behavior, ultimately calling for the abolition of punitive models and criminal law itself.

Brain-to-brain interface technology: A brief history, current state, and future goals

A brain-to-brain interface (BBI), defined as a combination of neuroimaging and neurostimulation methods to extract and deliver information between brains directly without the need for the peripheral nervous system, is a budding communication technique. A BBI system is made up of two parts known as the brain-computer interface part, which reads a sender's brain activity and digitalizes it, and the computer-brain interface part, which writes the delivered brain activity to a receiving brain. As with other technologies, BBI systems have gone through an evolutionary process since they first appeared. The BBI systems have been employed for numerous purposes, including rehabilitation for post-stroke patients, communicating with patients suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, locked-in syndrome and speech problems following stroke. Also, it has been proposed that a BBI system could play an important role on future battlefields. This technology was not only employed for communicating between two human brains but also for making a direct communication path among different species through which motor or sensory commands could be sent and received. However, the application of BBI systems has provoked significant challenges to human rights principles due to their ability to access and manipulate human brain information. In this study, we aimed to review the brain-computer interface and computer-brain interface technologies as components of BBI systems, the development of BBI systems, applications of this technology, arising ethical issues and expectations for future use.

Applying the IEEE BRAIN neuroethics framework to intra-cortical brain-computer interfaces

Objective. Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are neuroprosthetic devices that allow for direct interaction between brains and machines. These types of neurotechnologies have recently experienced a strong drive in research and development, given, in part, that they promise to restore motor and communication abilities in individuals experiencing severe paralysis. While a rich literature analyzes the ethical, legal, and sociocultural implications (ELSCI) of these novel neurotechnologies, engineers, clinicians and BCI practitioners often do not have enough exposure to these topics.Approach. Here, we present the IEEE Neuroethics Framework, an international, multiyear, iterative initiative aimed at developing a robust, accessible set of considerations for diverse stakeholders.Main results. Using the framework, we provide practical examples of ELSCI considerations for BCI neurotechnologies. We focus on invasive technologies, and in particular, devices that are implanted intra-cortically for medical research applications.Significance. We demonstrate the utility of our framework in exposing a wide range of implications across different intra-cortical BCI technology modalities and conclude with recommendations on how to utilize this knowledge in the development and application of ethical guidelines for BCI neurotechnologies.

Developer perspectives on the ethics of AI-driven neural implants: a qualitative study

Convergence of neural implants with artificial intelligence (AI) presents opportunities for the development of novel neural implants and improvement of existing neurotechnologies. While such technological innovation carries great promise for the restoration of neurological functions, they also raise ethical challenges. Developers of AI-driven neural implants possess valuable knowledge on the possibilities, limitations and challenges raised by these innovations; yet their perspectives are underrepresented in academic literature. This study aims to explore perspectives of developers of neurotechnology to outline ethical implications of three AI-driven neural implants: a cochlear implant, a visual neural implant, and a motor intention decoding speech-brain-computer-interface. We conducted semi-structured focus groups with developers (n = 19) of AI-driven neural implants. Respondents shared ethically relevant considerations about AI-driven neural implants that we clustered into three themes: (1) design aspects; (2) challenges in clinical trials; (3) impact on users and society. Developers considered accuracy and reliability of AI-driven neural implants conditional for users' safety, authenticity, and mental privacy. These needs were magnified by the convergence with AI. Yet, the need for accuracy and reliability may also conflict with potential benefits of AI in terms of efficiency and complex data interpretation. We discuss strategies to mitigate these challenges.

Brain Data in Context: Are New Rights the Way to Mental and Brain Privacy?

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to "mental privacy." In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are-at least for now-no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum's "contextual integrity" theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts-healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy.

What an International Declaration on Neurotechnologies and Human Rights Could Look like: Ideas, Suggestions, Desiderata

International institutions such as UNESCO are deliberating on a new standard setting instrument for neurotechnologies. This will likely lead to the adoption of a soft law document which will be the first global document specifically tailored to neurotechnologies, setting the tone for further international or domestic regulations. While some stakeholders have been consulted, these developments have so far evaded the broader attention of the neuroscience, neurotech, and neuroethics communities. To initiate a broader debate, this target article puts to discussion twenty-five considerations and desiderata for recognition by a future instrument. They are formulated at different levels of abstraction, from the big picture to technical details, seek to widen the perspective of preparatory reports and transcend the narrow debate about "neurorights" which overshadows many richer and more relevant aspects. These desiderata are not an exhaustive enumeration but a starting point for discussions about what deserves and what requires protection by an international instrument.

Chilean Supreme Court ruling on the protection of brain activity: neurorights, personal data protection, and neurodata

This paper discusses a landmark ruling by the Chilean Supreme Court of August 9, 2023 dealing with the right to mental privacy, originated with an action for constitutional protection filed on behalf of Guido Girardi Lavin against Emotiv Inc., a North American company based in San Francisco, California that is commercializing the device "Insight." This wireless device functions as a headset with sensors that collect information about the brain's electrical activity (i.e., neurodata). The discussion revolves around whether neurodata can be considered personal data and whether they could be classified into a special category. The application of the present legislation on data (the most obsolete, such as the Chilean law, and the most recent EU law) does not seem adequate to protect neurodata. The use of neurodata raises ethical and legal concerns that are not fully addressed by current regulations on personal data protection. Despite not being necessarily considered personal data, neurodata represent the most intimate aspects of human personality and should be protected in light of potential new risks. The unique characteristics of neurodata, including their interpretive nature and potential for revealing thoughts and intentions, pose challenges for regulation. Current data protection laws do not differentiate between different types of data based on their informational content, which is relevant for protecting individual rights. The development of new technologies involving neurodata requires particular attention and careful consideration to prevent possible harm to human dignity. The regulation of neurodata must account for their specific characteristics and the potential risks they pose to privacy, confidentiality, and individual rights. The answer lies in the reconfiguration of human rights known as "neurorights" that goes beyond the protection of personal data.

Ethical considerations for integrating multimodal computer perception and neurotechnology

Background

Artificial intelligence (AI)-based computer perception technologies (e.g., digital phenotyping and affective computing) promise to transform clinical approaches to personalized care in psychiatry and beyond by offering more objective measures of emotional states and behavior, enabling precision treatment, diagnosis, and symptom monitoring. At the same time, passive and continuous nature by which they often collect data from patients in non-clinical settings raises ethical issues related to privacy and self-determination. Little is known about how such concerns may be exacerbated by the integration of neural data, as parallel advances in computer perception, AI, and neurotechnology enable new insights into subjective states. Here, we present findings from a multi-site NCATS-funded study of ethical considerations for translating computer perception into clinical care and contextualize them within the neuroethics and neurorights literatures.

Methods

We conducted qualitative interviews with patients (n = 20), caregivers (n = 20), clinicians (n = 12), developers (n = 12), and clinician developers (n = 2) regarding their perspective toward using PC in clinical care. Transcripts were analyzed in MAXQDA using Thematic Content Analysis.

Results

Stakeholder groups voiced concerns related to (1) perceived invasiveness of passive and continuous data collection in private settings; (2) data protection and security and the potential for negative downstream/future impacts on patients of unintended disclosure; and (3) ethical issues related to patients' limited versus hyper awareness of passive and continuous data collection and monitoring. Clinicians and developers highlighted that these concerns may be exacerbated by the integration of neural data with other computer perception data.

Discussion

Our findings suggest that the integration of neurotechnologies with existing computer perception technologies raises novel concerns around dignity-related and other harms (e.g., stigma, discrimination) that stem from data security threats and the growing potential for reidentification of sensitive data. Further, our findings suggest that patients' awareness and preoccupation with feeling monitored via computer sensors ranges from hypo- to hyper-awareness, with either extreme accompanied by ethical concerns (consent vs. anxiety and preoccupation). These results highlight the need for systematic research into how best to implement these technologies into clinical care in ways that reduce disruption, maximize patient benefits, and mitigate long-term risks associated with the passive collection of sensitive emotional, behavioral and neural data.

The Conditions for Ethical Chemical Restraints

The practice of medicine frequently involves the unconsented restriction of liberty. The reasons for unilateral liberty restrictions are typically that being confined, strapped down, or sedated are necessary to prevent the person from harming themselves or others. In this paper, we target the ethics of chemical restraints, which are medications that are used to intentionally restrict the mental states associated with the unwanted behaviors, and are typically not specifically indicated for the condition for which the patient is being treated. Specifically, we aim to identify the conditions under which chemical restraints are ethically permissible. It is wrong to assume that what is morally true of physical restraints is also true of chemical restraints. Our aim is thus to identify the conditions under which chemical restraints are permissible while distinguishing these conditions from those of the application of physical restraints.

Ethics and regulation of neuronal optogenetics in the European Union

Neuronal optogenetics is a technique to control the activity of neurons with light. This is achieved by artificial expression of light-sensitive ion channels in the target cells. By optogenetic methods, cells that are naturally light-insensitive can be made photosensitive and addressable by illumination and precisely controllable in time and space. So far, optogenetics has primarily been a basic research tool to better understand the brain. However, initial studies are already investigating the possibility of using optogenetics in humans for future therapeutic approaches for neuronal based diseases such as Parkinson's disease, epilepsy, or to promote stroke recovery. In addition, optogenetic methods have already been successfully applied to a human in an experimental setting. Neuronal optogenetics also raises ethical and legal issues, e.g., in relation to, animal experiments, and its application in humans. Additional ethical and legal questions may arise when optogenetic methods are investigated on cerebral organoids. Thus, for the successful translation of optogenetics from basic research to medical practice, the ethical and legal questions of this technology must also be answered, because open ethical and legal questions can hamper the translation. The paper provides an overview of the ethical and legal issues raised by neuronal optogenetics. In addition, considering the technical prerequisites for translation, the paper shows consistent approaches to address these open questions. The paper also aims to support the interdisciplinary dialogue between scientists and physicians on the one hand, and ethicists and lawyers on the other, to enable an interdisciplinary coordinated realization of neuronal optogenetics.

Virtual emotions and Criminal Law

This article examines the role that Criminal Law should play in regulating the non-therapeutic use of immersive Virtual Reality (VR), specifically its massive use by consumers. The starting point has been to consider VR as an intermediate risk scenario, for the purposes of Criminal Law, between the criminality entirely generated in the physical world and that developed in the 2D digital environments [cybercrimes and criminality linked to social networks and persuasive Artificial Intelligence (AI)]. Firstly, specialize literature has been analyzed to establish the nature of virtual reality. From a technical standpoint, virtual reality is a neurotechnology infused with high-risk artificial intelligence; an inseparable synthesis of non-invasive neurotechnology and a set of AI systems, considered high-risk for the fundamental rights of citizens. From the perspective of its functioning, VR is a "transformative" neurotechnology capable of altering what people perceive as reality. This is possible, because its realism lies in the emotional immersion of the user in the virtual experience, similarly to how our brain functions. Therefore, the key idea in the immersive functioning of virtual reality is its capacity to evoke and modify human emotions, which results its greater harmful potential compared to the 2D environment. From there, three central and specific areas of (legally unaddressed) risk arise: (1) the special comprehensive nature of the data collected and stored during its use; (2) its ability to mentally reproduce the "physical" experience of the avatar in the user; and (3) its significant capacity to manipulate individuals. Secondly, the paper examines both the reported cases and the foreseeable criminality in virtual worlds or "proto-metaverse," focusing on the three risk areas, and exemplifying them with attacks on mental privacy, sexual freedom, and consumer manipulation. Finally, it is proposed that Criminal Law should also intervene (as soon as possible) to define the "red lines" of massive virtual reality use by citizens. With a democratic and human-centered approach, a basic legal framework is outlined for the criminalization of specific harms and risks associated with virtual reality, adapting the existing legal framework as necessary.

Advocating for neurodata privacy and neurotechnology regulation

The ability to record and alter brain activity by using implantable and nonimplantable neural devices, while poised to have significant scientific and clinical benefits, also raises complex ethical concerns. In this Perspective, we raise awareness of the ability of artificial intelligence algorithms and data-aggregation tools to decode and analyze data containing highly sensitive information, jeopardizing personal neuroprivacy. Voids in existing regulatory frameworks, in fact, allow unrestricted decoding and commerce of neurodata. We advocate for the implementation of proposed ethical and human rights guidelines, alongside technical options such as data encryption, differential privacy and federated learning to ensure the protection of neurodata privacy. We further encourage regulatory bodies to consider taking a position of responsibility by categorizing all brain-derived data as sensitive health data and apply existing medical regulations to all data gathered via pre-registered neural devices. Lastly, we propose that a technocratic oath may instill a deontology for neurotechnology practitioners akin to what the Hippocratic oath represents in medicine. A conscientious societal position that thoroughly rejects the misuse of neurodata would provide the moral compass for the future development of the neurotechnology field.

Contextual and Cultural Perspectives on Neurorights: Reflections Toward an International Consensus

The development and use of advanced and innovative neuroscience, neurotechnology and some forms of artificial intelligence have exposed potential threats to the human condition, including human rights. As a result, reconceptualizing or creating human rights (i.e. neurorights) has been proposed to address specific brain and mind issues like free will, personal identity and cognitive liberty. However, perceptions, interpretations and meanings of these issues-and of neurorights-may vary between countries, contexts and cultures, all relevant for an international-consensus definition and implementation of neurorights. Thus, we encourage reflecting on the proactive inclusion of transnational, cross-cultural and contextual considerations and concerns to contribute to the global discourse. This inclusion does not mean endorsing ethical relativism but rather a call to foster a universal understanding of key concepts and concerns. Including contextual and cultural perspectives may truly anticipate global concerns which could be addressed while developing and implementing neurorights. Consequently, any ethical and/or legal regulatory framework(s) for the translational and transnational use of advanced neuroscience, neurotechnology and some forms of artificial intelligence intended to protect and safeguard human dignity should be contextually and culturally mindful, responsible, respectful and inclusive of not only human rights and fundamental freedoms but also of neurocognitive cultural diversity.

What does it mean to call a medical device invasive?

Medical devices are often referred to as being invasive or non-invasive. Though invasiveness is relevant, and central, to how devices are understood and regarded in medicine and bioethics, a consensus concept or definition of invasiveness is lacking. To begin to address this problem, this essay explores four possible descriptive meanings of invasiveness: how devices are introduced to the body, where they are located in the body, whether they are foreign to the body, and how they change the body. An argument is offered that invasiveness is not purely descriptive, but implicates normative concepts of danger, intrusion, and disruption. In light of this, a proposal is offered for how to understand use of the concept of invasiveness in discussions of medical devices.

The Mystery of Mental Integrity: Clarifying Its Relevance to Neurotechnologies

The concept of mental integrity is currently a significant topic in discussions concerning the regulation of neurotechnologies. Technologies such as deep brain stimulation and brain-computer interfaces are believed to pose a unique threat to mental integrity, and some authors have advocated for a legal right to protect it. Despite this, there remains uncertainty about what mental integrity entails and why it is important. Various interpretations of the concept have been proposed, but the literature on the subject is inconclusive. Here we consider a number of possible interpretations and argue that the most plausible one concerns neurotechnologies that bypass one's reasoning capacities, and do so specifically in ways that reliably lead to alienation from one's mental states. This narrows the scope of what constitutes a threat to mental integrity and offers a more precise role for the concept to play in the ethical evaluation of neurotechnologies.

Human primary motor cortex indexes the onset of subjective intention in brain-machine-interface mediated actions

Self-initiated behavior is accompanied by the experience of willing our actions. Here, we leverage the unique opportunity to examine the full intentional chain - from will (W) to action (A) to environmental effects (E) - in a tetraplegic person fitted with a primary motor cortex (M1) brain machine interface (BMI) generating hand movements via neuromuscular electrical stimulation (NMES). This combined BMI-NMES approach allowed us to selectively manipulate each element of the intentional chain (W, A, and E) while performing extra-cellular recordings and probing subjective experience. Our results reveal single-cell, multi-unit, and population-level dynamics in human M1 that encode W and may predict its subjective onset. Further, we show that the proficiency of a neural decoder in M1 reflects the degree of W-A binding, tracking the participant's subjective experience of intention in (near) real time. These results point to M1 as a critical node in forming the subjective experience of intention and demonstrate the relevance of intention-related signals for translational neuroprosthetics.

On pharmacological neuroenhancement as part of the new neurorights' pioneering legislation in Chile: a perspective

The so-called neurorights are emerging human rights, or rather reconfigurations of already existing human rights, seeking to address the impact of the possible misuse of neurotechnologies, which have the potential to become more invasive and harmful in the future if not regulated. The aim of specifying neurorights is to protect the dignity and autonomy of the individual in the face of neurotechnological advances. Recently, Chile proposed a Constitutional reform inspired by the neurorights, opening a debate. One of the proposed neurorights is fair and equitable access to cognitive enhancement, which will be the specific object of this perspective article. Starting from the legal proposal, we analyse and discuss some perspectives on cognitive enhancement, or "neuroenhancement", which could be considered as part of enhancement neurotechnologies, pointing out that pharmacological enhancers, or "smart drugs", might be considered as part of these enhancers. We present a classification of the different types of cognitive enhancements as it has been proposed in the literature, into which pharmacological cognitive enhancement can be included, concluding that there is currently no agreement amongst scholars and lawyers about the ethical consideration of pharmacological cognitive enhancement. We therefore argue that it is necessary for the legislator to explicitly address the issue in the proposed regulations, in order to take a clear position on the topic, as it has been done in the United Kingdom, where the pharmacological neuroenhancers have been explicitly excluded from the regulation. If pharmacological neuroenhancers are going to be considered neurotechnologies, then new law proposals should seek harmonization with the already existing legislation regulating pharmacological health and consumer rights (both globally, taking into account international drug laws, and locally, according to each country's internal regulations) and of course, with the whole system of fundamental rights. Finally, we briefly discuss the ethical problem of equitable access to this new type of neurotechnologies (as part of the neurorights) and leave the debate open for new insights from the scientific community on the possible consequences of including (or not) pharmacological neuroenhancers as neurotechnologies for cognitive enhancement in the framework of the ethical and legal debate.

Persuasive Technology and computational manipulation: hypernudging out of mental self-determination

Artificial Intelligence, unperceived, can acquire the user's data, find connections not visible by a human being, profile the users, and aim at persuading them, resulting in Persuasive Technology (PT). During the persuasive process, PT can use manipulation, finding and using routes to affect System 1, the primordial brain of individuals, in the absence of their awareness, undermining their decision-making processes. Multiple international and European bodies recognized that AI systems could use manipulation at an unprecedented degree via second-generation dark patterns such as the hypernudge and that computational manipulation constitutes a risk for autonomy and different, overlapping, fundamental rights such as privacy, informational self-determination and freedom of thought. However, there is a lack of shared ideas regarding which fundamental rights are violated by computational manipulation and which fundamental rights can protect individuals against it. The right to be let alone and the right to hold and express a thought differ from the right to create a thought, being in control of the decision-making process and free from cognitive interferences operated by computational manipulation. Therefore, this paper argues in favor of recognizing a newly emerged fundamental right, the right to mental self-determination, tailored to the unprecedented abilities of AI-driven manipulative technologies.

Minding Rights: Mapping Ethical and Legal Foundations of 'Neurorights'

The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty - often framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.

How I became myself after merging with a computer: Does human-machine symbiosis raise human rights issues?

Novel usages of brain stimulation combined with artificially intelligent (AI) systems promise to address a large range of diseases. These new conjoined technologies, such as brain-computer interfaces (BCI), are increasingly used in experimental and clinical settings to predict and alleviate symptoms of various neurological and psychiatric disorders. Due to their reliance on AI algorithms for feature extraction and classification, these BCI systems enable a novel, unprecedented, and direct connection between human cognition and artificial information processing. In this paper, we present the results of a study that investigates the phenomenology of human-machine symbiosis during a first-in-human experimental BCI trial designed to predict epileptic seizures. We employed qualitative semi-structured interviews to collect user experience data from a participant over a six-years period. We report on a clinical case where a specific embodied phenomenology emerged: namely, after BCI implantation, the patient reported experiences of increased agential capacity and continuity; and after device explantation, the patient reported persistent traumatic harms linked to agential discontinuity. To our knowledge, this is the first reported clinical case of a patient experiencing persistent agential discontinuity due to BCI explantation and potential evidence of an infringement on patient right, where the implanted person was robbed of her de novo agential capacities when the device was removed.

Data, Metadata, Mental Data? Privacy and the Extended Mind

It has been recently suggested that if the Extended Mind thesis is true, mental privacy might be under serious threat. In this paper, I look into the details of this claim and propose that one way of dealing with this emerging threat requires that data ontology be enriched with an additional kind of data-viz., mental data. I explore how mental data relates to both data and metadata and suggest that, arguably, and by contrast with these existing categories of informational content, mental data should not be merely legally protected. Rather, if we value mental privacy as we know it, technological measures should be employed to ensure that one's mental data are practically-not just legally-impossible for others to obtain.

Neurorights – Do we Need New Human Rights? A Reconsideration of the Right to Freedom of Thought

Progress in neurotechnology and Artificial Intelligence (AI) provides unprecedented insights into the human brain. There are increasing possibilities to influence and measure brain activity. These developments raise multifaceted ethical and legal questions. The proponents of neurorights argue in favour of introducing new human rights to protect mental processes and brain data. This article discusses the necessity and advantages of introducing new human rights focusing on the proposed new human right to mental self-determination and the right to freedom of thought as enshrined in Art.18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Art. 9 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). I argue that the right to freedom of thought can be coherently interpreted as providing comprehensive protection of mental processes and brain data, thus offering a normative basis regarding the use of neurotechnologies. Besides, I claim that an evolving interpretation of the right to freedom of thought is more convincing than introducing a new human right to mental self-determination.

Neurorights as Hohfeldian Privileges

This paper argues that calls for neurorights propose an overcomplicated approach. It does this through analysis of ‘rights’ using the influential framework provided by Wesley Hohfeld, whose analytic jurisprudence is still well regarded in its clarificatory approach to discussions of rights. Having disentangled some unclarities in talk about rights, the paper proposes the idea of ‘novel human rights’ is not appropriate for what is deemed worth protecting in terms of mental integrity and cognitive liberty. That is best thought of in terms of Hohfeld’s account of ‘right’ as privilege. It goes on to argue that as privileges, legal protections are not well suited to these cases. As such, they cannot be ‘novel human rights’. Instead, protections for mental integrity and cognitive liberty are best accounted for in terms of familiar and established rational and discursive norms. Mental integrity is best thought of as evaluable in terms of familiar rational norms, and cognitive freedom is constrained by appraisals of sense-making. Concerns about how neurotechnologies might pose particular challenges to mental integrity and cognitive liberty are best protected through careful use of existing legislation on data protection, not novel rights, as it is via data that risks to integrity and liberty are manifested.

Neurotechnology to reduce recidivism: Ethical and legal challenges

Crime comes with enormous costs, not only financial but also in terms of loss of mental and physical health and, in some cases, even loss of life. Recidivism is responsible for a considerable percentage of the crimes, and therefore, society deems reducing recidivism a priority. To reduce recidivism, several types of interventions can be used, such as education and employment-focused rehabilitation programs which are intended to improve psychological and social factors. Another way to prevent reoffending is to influence the offender's brain functions. For example, medication can be offered to treat delusions or to diminish sexual drive. In the near future, innovative neurotechnologies are expected to improve prediction and prevention of reoffending. Potential positive effects of such neurotechniques include a safer society and earlier release of prisoners who are no longer "at high risk" to relapse into criminal behavior. Meanwhile, employing these neurotechniques in the criminal justice system raises fundamental concerns, for example, about autonomy, privacy and mental integrity. This chapter aims to identify some of the ethical and legal challenges of using neurotechnologies to reduce recidivism.

Emulating future neurotechnology using magic

Recent developments in neuroscience and artificial intelligence have allowed machines to decode mental processes with growing accuracy. Neuroethicists have speculated that perfecting these technologies may result in reactions ranging from an invasion of privacy to an increase in self-understanding. Yet, evaluating these predictions is difficult given that people are poor at forecasting their reactions. To address this, we developed a paradigm using elements of performance magic to emulate future neurotechnologies. We led 59 participants to believe that a (sham) neurotechnological machine could infer their preferences, detect their errors, and reveal their deep-seated attitudes. The machine gave participants randomly assigned positive or negative feedback about their brain's supposed attitudes towards charity. Around 80% of participants in both groups provided rationalisations for this feedback, which shifted their attitudes in the manipulated direction but did not influence donation behaviour. Our paradigm reveals how people may respond to prospective neurotechnologies, which may inform neuroethical frameworks.

Educational neurotechnology: Where do we go from here?

Recent educational trends point to an interest in educational neurotechnology. While these tools have the potential to change education, little is known about whether their use improves educational outcomes. Additionally, their adoption may be negatively impacted by teachers' lack of knowledge about the brain. In this paper we outline the potential of educational neurotechnology including what we know, what we do not yet know, and additional considerations for the ethical, successful adoption of these tools in classrooms around the world. Special consideration is given to the training needs of pre- and in-service educators whose support will be essential to the successful adoption of educational neurotechnology.

Temporal and electroencephalography dynamics of surreal marketing

Event-related spectral perturbation analysis was employed in this study to explore whether surreal image designs containing metaphors could influence product marketing effects, including consumers' product curiosity, product comprehension, product preference, and purchase intention. A total of 30 healthy participants aged 21-30 years were recruited. Neurophysiological findings revealed that lower gamma, beta, and theta spectral powers were evoked in the right insula (Brodmann Area 13) by surreal marketing images. This was associated, behaviorally, with the manifestation of higher product curiosity and purchase intention. Based on previous research, the brain functions of this area include novelty, puzzle-solving, and cravings for reward caused by cognitive overload.

The present and future of neural interfaces

The 2020's decade will likely witness an unprecedented development and deployment of neurotechnologies for human rehabilitation, personalized use, and cognitive or other enhancement. New materials and algorithms are already enabling active brain monitoring and are allowing the development of biohybrid and neuromorphic systems that can adapt to the brain. Novel brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) have been proposed to tackle a variety of enhancement and therapeutic challenges, from improving decision-making to modulating mood disorders. While these BCIs have generally been developed in an open-loop modality to optimize their internal neural decoders, this decade will increasingly witness their validation in closed-loop systems that are able to continuously adapt to the user's mental states. Therefore, a proactive ethical approach is needed to ensure that these new technological developments go hand in hand with the development of a sound ethical framework. In this perspective article, we summarize recent developments in neural interfaces, ranging from neurohybrid synapses to closed-loop BCIs, and thereby identify the most promising macro-trends in BCI research, such as simulating vs. interfacing the brain, brain recording vs. brain stimulation, and hardware vs. software technology. Particular attention is devoted to central nervous system interfaces, especially those with application in healthcare and human enhancement. Finally, we critically assess the possible futures of neural interfacing and analyze the short- and long-term implications of such neurotechnologies.

Good scientific practice in EEG and MEG research: Progress and perspectives

Good scientific practice (GSP) refers to both explicit and implicit rules, recommendations, and guidelines that help scientists to produce work that is of the highest quality at any given time, and to efficiently share that work with the community for further scrutiny or utilization. For experimental research using magneto- and electroencephalography (MEEG), GSP includes specific standards and guidelines for technical competence, which are periodically updated and adapted to new findings. However, GSP also needs to be regularly revisited in a broader light. At the LiveMEEG 2020 conference, a reflection on GSP was fostered that included explicitly documented guidelines and technical advances, but also emphasized intangible GSP: a general awareness of personal, organizational, and societal realities and how they can influence MEEG research. This article provides an extensive report on most of the LiveMEEG contributions and new literature, with the additional aim to synthesize ongoing cultural changes in GSP. It first covers GSP with respect to cognitive biases and logical fallacies, pre-registration as a tool to avoid those and other early pitfalls, and a number of resources to enable collaborative and reproducible research as a general approach to minimize misconceptions. Second, it covers GSP with respect to data acquisition, analysis, reporting, and sharing, including new tools and frameworks to support collaborative work. Finally, GSP is considered in light of ethical implications of MEEG research and the resulting responsibility that scientists have to engage with societal challenges. Considering among other things the benefits of peer review and open access at all stages, the need to coordinate larger international projects, the complexity of MEEG subject matter, and today's prioritization of fairness, privacy, and the environment, we find that current GSP tends to favor collective and cooperative work, for both scientific and for societal reasons.

Neuroderecho y envejecimiento: una aproximación bioética a la mejora cognitiva

Los avances de la neurociencia están determinando cambios decisivos en la vida de las personas, aunque también en campo de la ética y del derecho. En este contexto, el desarrollo y las aplicaciones neurotecnológicas aparecen llamados a mejorar la calidad de vida y el bienestar de los seres humanos, de un modo particular en la población mayor, en la medida en que medios como la tecnología de mejora se configuran como herramientas eficaces en el combate frente al deterioro de las funciones cognitivas. Sin embargo, el empleo de tales recursos puede generar riesgos para la intimidad y la integridad mental humana, lo que hace necesario el reconocimiento de neuroderechos, a fin de evitar injerencias no consentidas.

Towards a Governance Framework for Brain Data

The increasing availability of brain data within and outside the biomedical field, combined with the application of artificial intelligence (AI) to brain data analysis, poses a challenge for ethics and governance. We identify distinctive ethical implications of brain data acquisition and processing, and outline a multi-level governance framework. This framework is aimed at maximizing the benefits of facilitated brain data collection and further processing for science and medicine whilst minimizing risks and preventing harmful use. The framework consists of four primary areas of regulatory intervention: binding regulation, ethics and soft law, responsible innovation, and human rights.

[Cybersecurity of brain-computer interfaces]

Brain-computer interfaces inspire visions of superhuman powers, enabling users to control protheses and other devices solely with their thoughts. But the rapid development and commercialization of this technology also brings security risks. Attacks on brain-computer interfaces may cause harrowing consequences for users, from eavesdropping on neurological data to manipulating brain activity. At present, data protection law, the regulation of medical devices, and the new rules on the sale of goods with digital elements all govern aspects of cybersecurity. There are, nevertheless, significant gaps. The article analyzes how the legal system currently addresses the risks of cyberattacks on brain-computer interfaces-and how policymakers could address such risks in the future.

International data governance for neuroscience

As neuroscience projects increase in scale and cross international borders, different ethical principles, national and international laws, regulations, and policies for data sharing must be considered. These concerns are part of what is collectively called data governance. Whereas neuroscience data transcend borders, data governance is typically constrained within geopolitical boundaries. An international data governance framework and accompanying infrastructure can assist investigators, institutions, data repositories, and funders with navigating disparate policies. Here, we propose principles and operational considerations for how data governance in neuroscience can be navigated at an international scale and highlight gaps, challenges, and opportunities in a global brain data ecosystem. We consider how to approach data governance in a way that balances data protection requirements and the need for open science, so as to promote international collaboration through federated constructs such as the International Brain Initiative (IBI).

Novel Neurorights: From Nonsense to Substance

This paper analyses recent calls for so called “neurorights”, suggested novel human rights whose adoption is allegedly required because of advances in neuroscience, exemplified by a proposal of the Neurorights Initiative. Advances in neuroscience and technology are indeed impressive and pose a range of challenges for the law, and some novel applications give grounds for human rights concerns. But whether addressing these concerns requires adopting novel human rights, and whether the proposed neurorights are suitable candidates, are a different matter. This paper argues that the proposed rights, as individuals and a class, should not be adopted and lobbying on their behalf should stop. The proposal tends to promote rights inflationism, is tainted by neuroexceptionalism and neuroessentialism, and lacks grounding in relevant scholarship. None of the proposed individual rights passes quality criteria debated in the field. While understandable from a moral perspective, the proposal is fundamentally flawed from a legal perspective. Rather than conjuring up novel human rights, existing rights should be further developed in face of changing societal circumstances and technological possibilities.