QuantumIS: A Qualia Consciousness Awareness and Information Theory Quale Approach to Reducing Strategic Decision-Making Entropy

This paper investigates the underlying driving force in strategic decision-making. From a conceptual standpoint, few studies empirically studied the decision-maker's intrinsic state composed of entropy and uncertainty. This study examines a mutual information theory approach integrated into a state of qualia complexity that minimizes exclusion and maximizes the interactions of the information system and its dynamic environment via logical metonymy, illusion, and epigenetics. The article questions whether decision-makers at all levels of the organization are responding from the consciousness of an objective quale from a more subjective qualia awareness in the narrow-sense perspective of individual instances of their conscious experience. To quantify this research question, we explore several hypotheses revolving around strategic information system decisions. In this research, we posit that the eigenvalues of factor analysis along with the reduction in the uncertainty coefficients of the qualia entropy will be balanced by the quale enthalpy of our information theory structural equation model of trust, flexibility, expertise, top management support, and competitive advantage performance. We operationalize the integration of the aforementioned top management support, information systems competencies, and competitive advantage performance concepts into the qualia consciousness awareness and information theory quale framework.

The Epistemological Meaning of Constraints in the Development of Domain Knowledge

This article explores the meaning of the category of `constraint' and the role it plays in contemporary psychological research. First, Chomsky's influential use of this concept is briefly reviewed. Second, the concept of `constraint' is discussed from a metatheoretical point of view. Cognitive approaches usually see constraints as internal to the mind and as logically prior to the process of specific knowledge acquisition. Contextualist approaches consider knowledge processes in terms of a complementary interplay of innate and cultural constraining factors. Third, a reinterpretation of the concept of `constraint' from a constructivist perspective is proposed. A constructivist approach should consider constraints not as `givens', but as dynamic components that may be transformed by the cognitive process itself and that can be made the object of an explicitly epistemological analysis. The argument supports the plausibility and legitimacy of a dialectic or non-dualist approach for interpreting the role of constraints in cognitive development.

Domain-specific constraints of conceptual development

Although we have made much progress in understanding the growth of mind by shifting from Piagetian theory to a variety of views of conceptual development as the domain-specific construction of knowledge under constraints, the key notion of “constraints” is not yet well articulated. As a result, the views have not yet constituted a coherent theory that replaces Piagetian theory. In this article, after summarising “dominant” views of conceptual development, we reconceptualise the notion of “innate constraints”, more specifically as preferences and biases that serve as learning mechanisms, not as innate knowledge or representational contents. We then propose to expand the notion of “constraints” to include interactive, sociocultural constraints as well as internal, cognitive ones, which enable even young children to acquire knowledge in uniquely human ways. We believe that these formulations make the current views of conceptual development better specified and more comprehensive. Finally we offer our prospect for the future of conceptual development theories.

Conceptual influences on induction: A case for a late onset

This research examines the mechanism of early induction, the development of induction, and the ways attentional and conceptual factors contribute to induction across development. Different theoretical views offer different answers to these questions. Six experiments with 4- and 5-year-olds, 7-year-olds and adults (N=208) test these competing theories by teaching categories for which category membership and perceptual similarity are in conflict, and varying orthogonally conceptual and attentional factors that may potentially affect inductive inference. The results suggest that early induction is similarity-based; conceptual information plays a negligible role in early induction, but its role increases gradually, with the 7-year-olds being a transitional group. And finally, there is substantial contribution of attention to the development of induction: only adults, but not children, could perform category-based induction without attentional support. Therefore, category-based induction exhibits protracted development, with attentional factors contributing early in development and conceptual factors contributing later in development. These results are discussed in relation to existing theories of development of inductive inference and broader theoretical views on cognitive development.

The epigenetic landscape in the course of time: Conrad Hal Waddington's methodological impact on the life sciences

It seems that the reception of Conrad Hal Waddington's work never really gathered speed in mainstream biology. This paper, offering a transdisciplinary survey of approaches using his epigenetic landscape images, argues that (i) Waddington's legacy is much broader than is usually recognized--it is widespread across the life sciences (e.g. stem cell biology, developmental psychology and cultural anthropology). In addition, I will show that (ii) there exist as yet unrecognized heuristic roles, especially in model building and theory formation, which Waddington's images play within his work. These different methodological facets envisioned by Waddington are used as a natural framework to analyze and classify the manners of usage of epigenetic landscape images in post-Waddingtonian 'landscape approaches'. This evaluation of Waddington's pictorial legacy reveals that there are highly diverse lines of traditions in the life sciences, which are deeply rooted in Waddington's methodological work.

Language acquisition in the absence of experience

A fundamental goal of linguistic theory is to explain how natural languages are acquired. This paper describes some recent findings on how learners acquire syntactic knowledge for which there is little, if any, decisive evidence from the environment. The first section presents several general observations about language acquisition that linguistic theory has tried to explain and discusses the thesis that certain linguistic properties are innate because they appear universally and in the absence of corresponding experience. A third diagnostic for innateness, early emergence, is the focus of the second section of the paper, in which linguistic theory is tested against recent experimental evidence on children's acquisition of syntax.

Domain-creating constraints

The contributions to this special issue on cognitive development collectively propose ways in which learning involves developing constraints that shape subsequent learning. A learning system must be constrained to learn efficiently, but some of these constraints are themselves learnable. To know how something will behave, a learner must know what kind of thing it is. Although this has led previous researchers to argue for domain-specific constraints that are tied to different kinds/domains, an exciting possibility is that kinds/domains themselves can be learned. General cognitive constraints, when combined with rich inputs, can establish domains, rather than these domains necessarily preexisting prior to learning. Knowledge is structured and richly differentiated, but its "skeleton" must not always be preestablished. Instead, the skeleton may be adapted to fit patterns of co-occurrence, task requirements, and goals. Finally, we argue that for models of development to demonstrate genuine cognitive novelty, it will be helpful for them to move beyond highly preprocessed and symbolic encodings that limit flexibility. We consider two physical models that learn to make tone discriminations. They are mechanistic models that preserve rich spatial, perceptual, dynamic, and concrete information, allowing them to form surprising new classes of hypotheses and encodings.

Why did the savant syndrome not spread in the population? A psychiatric example of a developmental constraint

A developmental constraint is a mechanism that limits the possibility of a phenotype to evolve. There is growing evidence for the existence of developmental constraints in the biological literature. We hypothesize that a developmental constraint prevents the savant syndrome, despite its positive aspects, from spreading in the population. Here, the developmental constraint is the result of the high interactivity among body parts in an early stage in embryological development, namely early organogenesis or the phylotypic stage. The interactivity during this stage involves all components of the embryo, and as a result mutations that affect one part of the embryo also affect other parts. We hypothesize that a mutation, which gives rise to the development of the positive aspects of the savant syndrome (e.g., an impressive memory capacity), will virtually always have a deleterious effect on the development of other phenotypic traits (e.g., resulting in autism and/or impaired motor coordination). Thus, our hypothesis states that the savant syndrome cannot spread in the population because of this developmental constraint. The finding that children with savant syndrome often have autism and physical anomalies, which are known to be established during early organogenesis, supports our hypothesis.

When learners surpass their models: the acquisition of American Sign Language from inconsistent input

The present study examines the impact of highly inconsistent input on language acquisition. The American deaf community provides a unique opportunity to observe children exposed to nonnative language models as their only linguistic input. This research is a detailed case study of one child acquiring his native language in such circumstances. It asks whether this child is capable of organizing a natural language out of input data that are not representative of certain natural language principles. Simon is a deaf child whose deaf parents both learned American Sign Language (ASL) after age 15. Simon's only ASL input is provided by his late-learner parents. The study examines Simon's performance at age 7 on an ASL morphology task, compared with eight children who have native signing parents, and also compared with Simon's own parents. The results show that Simon's production of ASL substantially surpasses that of his parents. Simon's parents, like other late learners of ASL, perform below adult native signing criteria, with many inconsistencies and errors in their use of ASL morphology. In contrast, Simon's performance is much more regular, and in fact on most ASL morphemes is equal to that of children exposed to a native signing model. The results thus indicate that Simon is capable of acquiring a regular and orderly morphological rule system for which his input provides only highly inconsistent and noisy data. In addition, the results provide some insight into the mechanisms by which such learning may occur. Although the ASL situation is rare, it reveals clues that may contribute to our understanding of the human capacity for language learning.

When astronomy, biology, and culture converge: children's conceptions about birthdays

The authors investigated the development of children's understanding of birthdays using structured interviews of 102 Israeli children aged 4 to 9 years. To fully comprehend the concept of birthday, children must grasp the relationship between the social occasion (the birthday party), irreversible biological growth, and the cyclical nature of the calendar. The authors' findings affirmed that a child's early conception is wholly social and self-contained (birthday parties confer a new age) and that young children believe that age can be affected by multiplying or skipping birthdays. The mature conception is socially based, but it is integrated with additional conceptual subsystems: the irreversible and independent unfolding of biological growth and the cyclical aspect of time. This enables the child to go beyond a magical approach to birthday rituals.

Reconceptualizing Learning

“Learning” is a key psychological notion surrounded by some conceptual confusion. It is conceptualized in various different ways, it is notoriously difficult to define, and the notion and ways in which it is used sit uneasily with current conceptualizations of cognition. This article analyzes the concept of learning and the domain that it helps carve up to highlight its problems and then argues that learning is an inherently poor category that is best abandoned. Its use creates problems, separates research areas, and suggests poor questions. Its domain is better divided up with the notion of representation creation and alteration, which resolves various problems, simplifies the field, and better connects traditional work in learning theory with current work on cognition.

Calibration-based reasoning about collision events in 11-month-old infants

Previous research indicates that, when a moving object collides with a stationary object, infants expect the stationary object to be displaced. The present experiment examined whether infants believe that the size of the moving object affects how far the stationary object is displaced. In the experiment, 11-month-old infants sat in front of a horizontal track; to the left of the track was an inclined ramp. A wheeled toy bug rested on the track at the bottom of the ramp. The infants in the midpoint condition were first familiarized with an event in which a medium-sized cylinder rolled down the ramp and hit the bug, causing it to roll to the middle of the track. Next, the infants saw one of two test events. In both events, novel cylinders were introduced, and the bug now rolled to the end of the track. The two test cylinders were identical to the familiarization cylinder in material but not in size: one was larger (large-cylinder event) and one was smaller (small-cylinder event) than the familiarization cylinder. The infants in the endpoint condition saw the same familiarization and test events as the infants in the midpoint condition except that the bug rolled to the end rather than to the middle of the track in the familiarization event. The infants in the midpoint condition looked reliably longer at the small-than at the large-cylinder event, whereas the infants in the endpoint condition tended to look equally at the two events. These results indicated that the infants (a) believed that the size of the cylinder affected the length of the bug's displacement and (b) used the familiarization event to calibrate their predictions about the test events. After watching the bug roll to the middle of the track when hit by the medium cylinder, the infants were surprised to see the bug roll to the end of the track with the small but not the large cylinder. After watching the bug roll to the end of the track when hit by the medium cylinder, however, the infants were not surprised to see the bug do the same with either the small or the large cylinder. Parallel results were obtained with adult subjects. The present findings have implications for research on the nature and development of infants' physical reasoning as well as for assessments of causal reasoning in infancy.