The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory

Panpsychism and dualism in the science of consciousness

A resurgence of panpsychism and dualism is a matter of ongoing debate in modern neuroscience. Although metaphysically hostile, panpsychism and dualism both persist in the science of consciousness because the former is proposed as a straightforward answer to the problem of integrating consciousness into the fabric of physical reality, whereas the latter proposes a simple solution to the problem of free will by endowing consciousness with causal power as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. I take the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as a paradigmatic exemplar of a theory of consciousness (ToC) that makes its commitments to panpsychism and dualism within a unified framework. These features are not, however, unique for IIT. Many ToCs are implicitly prone to some degree of panpsychism whenever they strive to propose a universal definition of consciousness, associated with one or another known phenomenon. Yet, those ToCs that can be characterized as strongly emergent are at risk of being dualist. A remedy against both covert dualism and uncomfortable corollaries of panpsychism can be found in the evolutionary theory of life, called here "bioprotopsychism" and generalized in terms of autopoiesis and the free energy principle. Bioprotopsychism provides a biologically inspired basis for a minimalist approach to consciousness via the triad "chemotaxis-efference copy mechanism-counterfactual active inference" by associating the stream of weakly emergent conscious states with an amount of information (best guesses) of the brain, engaged in unconscious predictive processing.

Bridging flexible goal-directed cognition and consciousness: The Goal-Aligning Representation Internal Manipulation theory

Goal-directed manipulation of internal representations is a key element of human flexible behaviour, while consciousness is commonly associated with higher-order cognition and human flexibility. Current perspectives have only partially linked these processes, thus preventing a clear understanding of how they jointly generate flexible cognition and behaviour. Moreover, these limitations prevent an effective exploitation of this knowledge for technological scopes. We propose a new theoretical perspective that extends our 'three-component theory of flexible cognition' toward higher-order cognition and consciousness, based on the systematic integration of key concepts from Cognitive Neuroscience and AI/Robotics. The theory proposes that the function of conscious processes is to support the alignment of representations with multi-level goals. This higher alignment leads to more flexible and effective behaviours. We analyse here our previous model of goal-directed flexible cognition (validated with more than 20 human populations) as a starting GARIM-inspired model. By bridging the main theories of consciousness and goal-directed behaviour, the theory has relevant implications for scientific and technological fields. In particular, it contributes to developing new experimental tasks and interpreting clinical evidence. Finally, it indicates directions for improving machine learning and robotics systems and for informing real-world applications (e.g., in digital-twin healthcare and roboethics).

What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review

A recent development in the psychological and neuroscientific study of consciousness has been the tendency to conceptualize consciousness as a multidimensional phenomenon. This narrative review elucidates the notion of dimensionality of consciousness and outlines the key concepts and disagreements on this topic through the viewpoints of several theoretical proposals. The reviewed literature is critically evaluated, and the main issues to be resolved by future theoretical and empirical work are identified: the problems of dimension selection and dimension aggregation, as well as some ethical considerations. This narrative review is seemingly the first to comprehensively overview this specific aspect of consciousness science.

Measuring the dynamic balance of integration and segregation underlying consciousness, anesthesia, and sleep

Consciousness requires a dynamic balance of integration and segregation in functional brain networks. An optimal integration-segregation balance depends on two key aspects of functional connectivity: global efficiency (i.e., integration) and clustering (i.e., segregation). We developed a new fMRI-based measure, termed the integration-segregation difference (ISD), which captures both aspects. We used this metric to quantify changes in brain state from conscious wakefulness to loss of responsiveness induced by the anesthetic propofol. The observed changes in ISD suggest a profound shift to segregation in both whole brain and all brain subnetworks during anesthesia. Moreover, brain networks displayed similar sequences of disintegration and subsequent reintegration during, respectively, loss and return of responsiveness. Random forest machine learning models, trained with the integration and segregation of brain networks, identified the awake vs. unresponsive states and their transitions with accuracy up to 93%. We found that metastability (i.e., the dynamic recurrence of non-equilibrium transient states) is more effectively explained by integration, while complexity (i.e., diversity and intricacy of neural activity) is more closely linked with segregation. The analysis of a sleep dataset revealed similar findings. Our results demonstrate that the integration-segregation balance is a useful index that can differentiate among various conscious and unconscious states.

Bridging the gap between consciousness and matter: recurrent out-of-body projection of visual awareness revealed by the law of non-identity

Consciousness is the most precious function of brain; however, there is an explanatory gap between consciousness and matter, which is deemed to affect the scientific research on consciousness. We believe that a methodological trap commonly present in scientific research and the incompleteness of logic are the true reasons that affect the research on consciousness. Here, a novel logic tool, the non-identity law, was extracted from physics and applied into the analysis of the visual dynamics related to naturalistic observation of night-shot still life, whose methodological approach is consistent with Descartes' matter-body-mind approach, breaking free from the methodological trap of current research. We show that visual system, the representative sensory system, has a postponed, recurrent out-of-body projection pathway from brain to observed object, besides the well-known feedforward signaling pathway available in existing literature, suggesting that human possesses an instinct of not only subjectively imaging (brain-generated imagery) but also projecting the image back onto the original or a particular place according to the clue of the manipulated afferent messenger light pathway. This finding adds a key piece of puzzle to the visual system. The out-of-body projection, coupled with neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), bridges the gap between consciousness and matter. This study in a self-contained and systematic manner provides a foundation for understanding the subjectivity and intentionality of human consciousness from the angle of visual awareness as well as the isomorphic relationships between unknowable original, private experience, and shareable expression (recording, calculus and deduction), showing that consciousness is obedient to certain rules rather than being unruly. The result paves the way for scientific research on consciousness and facilitates the integration of humanities and natural science.

Carving Nature at Its Joints: A Comparison of CEMI Field Theory with Integrated Information Theory and Global Workspace Theory

The quest to comprehend the nature of consciousness has spurred the development of many theories that seek to explain its underlying mechanisms and account for its neural correlates. In this paper, I compare my own conscious electromagnetic information field (cemi field) theory with integrated information theory (IIT) and global workspace theory (GWT) for their ability to 'carve nature at its joints' in the sense of predicting the entities, structures, states and dynamics that are conventionally recognized as being conscious or nonconscious. I go on to argue that, though the cemi field theory shares features of both integrated information theory and global workspace theory, it is more successful at carving nature at its conventionally accepted joints between conscious and nonconscious systems, and is thereby a more successful theory of consciousness.

An implementation of integrated information theory in resting-state fMRI

Integrated Information Theory was developed to explain and quantify consciousness, arguing that conscious systems consist of elements that are integrated through their causal properties. This study presents an implementation of Integrated Information Theory 3.0, the latest version of this framework, to functional MRI data. Data were acquired from 17 healthy subjects who underwent sedation with propofol, a short-acting anaesthetic. Using the PyPhi software package, we systematically analyze how Φ^max, a measure of integrated information, is modulated by the sedative in different resting-state networks. We compare Φ^max to other proposed measures of conscious level, including the previous version of integrated information, Granger causality, and correlation-based functional connectivity. Our results indicate that Φ^max presents a variety of sedative-induced behaviours for different networks. Notably, changes to Φ^max closely reflect changes to subjects' conscious level in the frontoparietal and dorsal attention networks, which are responsible for higher-order cognitive functions. In conclusion, our findings present important insight into different measures of conscious level that will be useful in future implementations to functional MRI and other forms of neuroimaging.

On the non-uniqueness problem in integrated information theory

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 3.0 is among the leading theories of consciousness in contemporary neuroscience. The core of the theory relies on the calculation of a scalar mathematical measure of consciousness, Φ, which is inspired by the phenomenological axioms of the theory. Here, we show that despite its widespread application, Φ is not a well-defined mathematical concept in the sense that the value it specifies is non-unique. To demonstrate this, we introduce an algorithm that calculates all possible Φ values for a given system in strict accordance with the mathematical definition from the theory. We show that, to date, all published Φ values under consideration are selected arbitrarily from a multitude of equally valid alternatives. Crucially, both [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are often predicted simultaneously, rendering any interpretation of these systems as conscious or not, non-decidable in the current formulation of IIT.

Consciousness in a Rotor? Science and Ethics of Potentially Conscious Human Cerebral Organoids

Human cerebral organoids are three-dimensional biological cultures grown in the laboratory to mimic as closely as possible the cellular composition, structure, and function of the corresponding organ, the brain. For now, cerebral organoids lack blood vessels and other characteristics of the human brain, but are also capable of having coordinated electrical activity. They have been usefully employed for the study of several diseases and the development of the nervous system in unprecedented ways. Research on human cerebral organoids is proceeding at a very fast pace and their complexity is bound to improve. This raises the question of whether cerebral organoids will also be able to develop the unique feature of the human brain, consciousness. If this is the case, some ethical issues would arise. In this article, we discuss the necessary neural correlates and constraints for the emergence of consciousness according to some of the most debated neuroscientific theories. Based on this, we consider what the moral status of a potentially conscious brain organoid might be, in light of ethical and ontological arguments. We conclude by proposing a precautionary principle and some leads for further investigation. In particular, we consider the outcomes of some very recent experiments as entities of a potential new kind.

The why of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness: Its main functions and the mechanisms underpinning it

What distinguishes conscious information processing from other kinds of information processing is its phenomenal aspect (PAC), the-what-it-is-like for an agent to experience something. The PAC supplies the agent with a sense of self, and informs the agent on how its self is affected by the agent's own operations. The PAC originates from the activity that attention performs to detect the state of what I define "the self" (S). S is centered and develops on a hierarchy of innate and acquired values, and is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems; it maps the agent's body and cognitive capacities, and its interactions with the environment. The detection of the state of S by attention modulates the energy level of the organ of attention (OA), i.e., the neural substrate that underpins attention. This modulation generates the PAC. The PAC can be qualified according to five dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal and spatial. Each dimension can be traced back to a specific feature of the modulation of the energy level of the OA.

Self-organized criticality as a framework for consciousness: A review study

Objective

No current model of consciousness is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds, and the need for a solid unifying framework is evident. Special attention has been given to the premise that self-organized criticality (SOC) is a fundamental property of neural system. SOC provides a competitive model to describe the physical mechanisms underlying spontaneous brain activity, and thus, critical dynamics were proposed as general gauges of information processing representing a strong candidate for a surrogate measure of consciousness. As SOC could be a neurodynamical framework, which may be able to bring together existing theories and experimental evidence, the purpose of this work was to provide a comprehensive overview of progress of research on SOC in association with consciousness.

Methods

A comprehensive search of publications on consciousness and SOC published between 1998 and 2021 was conducted. The Web of Science database was searched, and annual number of publications and citations, type of articles, and applied methods were determined.

Results

A total of 71 publications were identified. The annual number of citations steadily increased over the years. Original articles comprised 50.7% and reviews/theoretical articles 43.6%. Sixteen studies reported on human data and in seven studies data were recorded in animals. Computational models were utilized in n = 12 studies. EcoG data were assessed in n = 4 articles, fMRI in n = 4 studies, and EEG/MEG in n = 10 studies. Notably, different analytical tools were applied in the EEG/MEG studies to assess a surrogate measure of criticality such as the detrended fluctuation analysis, the pair correlation function, parameters from the neuronal avalanche analysis and the spectral exponent.

Conclusion

Recent studies pointed out agreements of critical dynamics with the current most influencing theories in the field of consciousness research, the global workspace theory and the integrated information theory. Thus, the framework of SOC as a neurodynamical parameter for consciousness seems promising. However, identified experimental work was small in numbers, and a heterogeneity of applied analytical tools as a surrogate measure of criticality was observable, which limits the generalizability of findings.

A First Principles Approach to Subjective Experience

Understanding the neural bases of subjective experience remains one of the great challenges of the natural sciences. Higher-order theories of consciousness are typically defended by assessments of neural activity in higher cortical regions during perception, often with disregard to the nature of the neural computations that these regions execute. We have sought to refocus the problem toward identification of those neural computations that are necessary for subjective experience with the goal of defining the sorts of neural architectures that can perform these operations. This approach removes reliance on behaviour and brain homologies for appraising whether non-human animals have the potential to subjectively experience sensory stimuli. Using two basic principles—first, subjective experience is dependent on complex processing executing specific neural functions and second, the structure-determines-function principle—we have reasoned that subjective experience requires a neural architecture consisting of stacked forward models that predict the output of neural processing from inputs. Given that forward models are dependent on appropriately connected processing modules that generate prediction, error detection and feedback control, we define a minimal neural architecture that is necessary (but not sufficient) for subjective experience. We refer to this framework as the hierarchical forward models algorithm. Accordingly, we postulate that any animal lacking this neural architecture will be incapable of subjective experience.

First-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument

We recently put forward an argument, the Unfolding Argument (UA), that integrated information theory (IIT) and other causal structure theories are either already falsified or unfalsifiable, which provoked significant criticism. It seems that we and the critics agree that the main question in this debate is whether first-person experience, independent of third-person data, is a sufficient foundation for theories of consciousness. Here, we argue that pure first-person experience cannot be a scientific foundation for IIT because science relies on taking measurements, and pure first-person experience is not measurable except through reports, brain activity, and the relationship between them. We also argue that pure first-person experience cannot be taken as ground truth because science is about backing up theories with data, not about asserting that we have ground truth independent of data. Lastly, we explain why no experiment based on third-person data can test IIT as a theory of consciousness. IIT may be a good theory of something, but not of consciousness. We conclude by exposing a deeper reason for the above conclusions: IIT's consciousness is by construction fully dissociated from any measurable thing and, for this reason, IIT implies that both the level and content of consciousness are epiphenomenal, with no causal power. IIT and other causal structure theories end up in a form of dissociative epiphenomenalism, in which we cannot even trust reports about first-person experiences. But reports about first-person experiences are taken as ground truth and the foundation for IIT's axioms. Therefore, accepting IIT leads to rejecting its own axioms. We also respond to several other criticisms against the UA.

Integrated information as a common signature of dynamical and information-processing complexity

The apparent dichotomy between information-processing and dynamical approaches to complexity science forces researchers to choose between two diverging sets of tools and explanations, creating conflict and often hindering scientific progress. Nonetheless, given the shared theoretical goals between both approaches, it is reasonable to conjecture the existence of underlying common signatures that capture interesting behavior in both dynamical and information-processing systems. Here, we argue that a pragmatic use of integrated information theory (IIT), originally conceived in theoretical neuroscience, can provide a potential unifying framework to study complexity in general multivariate systems. By leveraging metrics put forward by the integrated information decomposition framework, our results reveal that integrated information can effectively capture surprisingly heterogeneous signatures of complexity-including metastability and criticality in networks of coupled oscillators as well as distributed computation and emergent stable particles in cellular automata-without relying on idiosyncratic, ad hoc criteria. These results show how an agnostic use of IIT can provide important steps toward bridging the gap between informational and dynamical approaches to complex systems.

The Electromagnetic Will

The conscious electromagnetic information (cemi) field theory proposes that the seat of consciousness is the brain’s electromagnetic (EM) field that integrates information from trillions of firing neurons. What we call free will is its output. The cemi theory also proposes that the brain has two streams. Most actions are initiated by the first non-conscious stream that is composed of neurons that are insulated from EM field influences. These non-conscious involuntary actions are thereby invisible to our EM field-located thoughts. The theory also proposes that voluntary actions are driven by neurons that receive EM field inputs and are thereby visible to our EM field-located thoughts. I review the extensive evidence for EM field/ephaptic coupling between neurons and the increasing evidence that EM fields in the brain are a cause of behaviour. I conclude by arguing that though this EM field-driven will is not free, in the sense of being acausal, it nevertheless corresponds to the very real experience of our conscious mind being in control of our voluntary actions. Will is not an illusion. It is our experience of control by our EM field-located mind. It is an immaterial, yet physical, will.

Psychedelics and Consciousness: Distinctions, Demarcations, and Opportunities

Psychedelic substances produce unusual and compelling changes in conscious experience that have prompted some to propose that psychedelics may provide unique insights explaining the nature of consciousness. At present, psychedelics, like other current scientific tools and methods, seem unlikely to provide information relevant to the so-called "hard problem of consciousness," which involves explaining how first-person experience can emerge. However, psychedelics bear on multiple "easy problems of consciousness," which involve relations between subjectivity, brain function, and behavior. In this review, we discuss common meanings of the term "consciousness" when used with regard to psychedelics and consider some models of the effects of psychedelics on the brain that have also been associated with explanatory claims about consciousness. We conclude by calling for epistemic humility regarding the potential for psychedelic research to aid in explaining the hard problem of consciousness while pointing to ways in which psychedelics may advance the study of many specific aspects of consciousness.

A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness

This paper assesses two different theories for explaining consciousness, a phenomenon that is widely considered amenable to scientific investigation despite its puzzling subjective aspects. I focus on Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which says that consciousness is integrated information (as ϕMax) and says even simple systems with interacting parts possess some consciousness. First, I evaluate IIT on its own merits. Second, I compare it to a more traditionally derived theory called Neurobiological Naturalism (NN), which says consciousness is an evolved, emergent feature of complex brains. Comparing these theories is informative because it reveals strengths and weaknesses of each, thereby suggesting better ways to study consciousness in the future. IIT's strengths are the reasonable axioms at its core; its strong logic and mathematical formalism; its creative "experience-first" approach to studying consciousness; the way it avoids the mind-body ("hard") problem; its consistency with evolutionary theory; and its many scientifically testable predictions. The potential weakness of IIT is that it contains stretches of logic-based reasoning that were not checked against hard evidence when the theory was being constructed, whereas scientific arguments require such supporting evidence to keep the reasoning on course. This is less of a concern for the other theory, NN, because it incorporated evidence much earlier in its construction process. NN is a less mature theory than IIT, less formalized and quantitative, and less well tested. However, it has identified its own neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and offers a roadmap through which these NNCs may answer the questions of consciousness using the hypothesize-test-hypothesize-test steps of the scientific method.

The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness: A case of mistaken identity

Giulio Tononi's Integrated Information Theory (IIT) proposes explaining consciousness by directly identifying it with integrated information. We examine the construct validity of IIT's measure of consciousness, phi (Φ), by analyzing its formal properties, its relation to key aspects of consciousness, and its co-variation with relevant empirical circumstances. Our analysis shows that IIT's identification of consciousness with the causal efficacy with which differentiated networks accomplish global information transfer (which is what Φ in fact measures) is mistaken. This misidentification has the consequence of requiring the attribution of consciousness to a range of natural systems and artifacts that include, but are not limited to, large-scale electrical power grids, gene-regulation networks, some electronic circuit boards, and social networks. Instead of treating this consequence of the theory as a disconfirmation, IIT embraces it. By regarding these systems as bearers of consciousness ex hypothesi, IIT is led towards the orbit of panpsychist ideation. This departure from science as we know it can be avoided by recognizing the functional misattribution at the heart of IIT's identity claim. We show, for example, what function is actually performed, at least in the human case, by the cortical combination of differentiation with integration that IIT identifies with consciousness. Finally, we examine what lessons may be drawn from IIT's failure to provide a credible account of consciousness for progress in the very active field of research concerned with exploring the phenomenon from formal and neural points of view.

Falsification and consciousness

The search for a scientific theory of consciousness should result in theories that are falsifiable. However, here we show that falsification is especially problematic for theories of consciousness. We formally describe the standard experimental setup for testing these theories. Based on a theory's application to some physical system, such as the brain, testing requires comparing a theory's predicted experience (given some internal observables of the system like brain imaging data) with an inferred experience (using report or behavior). If there is a mismatch between inference and prediction, a theory is falsified. We show that if inference and prediction are independent, it follows that any minimally informative theory of consciousness is automatically falsified. This is deeply problematic since the field's reliance on report or behavior to infer conscious experiences implies such independence, so this fragility affects many contemporary theories of consciousness. Furthermore, we show that if inference and prediction are strictly dependent, it follows that a theory is unfalsifiable. This affects theories which claim consciousness to be determined by report or behavior. Finally, we explore possible ways out of this dilemma.

Toy Models of Top Down Causation

Models in which causation arises from higher level structures as well as from microdynamics may be relevant to unifying quantum theory with classical physics or general relativity. They also give a way of defining a form of panprotopsychist property dualism, in which consciousness and material physics causally affect one another. I describe probabilistic toy models based on cellular automata that illustrate possibilities and difficulties with these ideas.

Scaling Behaviour and Critical Phase Transitions in Integrated Information Theory

Integrated Information Theory proposes a measure of conscious activity (Φ), characterised as the irreducibility of a dynamical system to the sum of its components. Due to its computational cost, current versions of the theory (IIT 3.0) are difficult to apply to systems larger than a dozen units, and, in general, it is not well known how integrated information scales as systems grow larger in size. In this article, we propose to study the scaling behaviour of integrated information in a simple model of a critical phase transition: an infinite-range kinetic Ising model. In this model, we assume a homogeneous distribution of couplings to simplify the computation of integrated information. This simplified model allows us to critically review some of the design assumptions behind the measure and connect its properties with well-known phenomena in phase transitions in statistical mechanics. As a result, we point to some aspects of the mathematical definitions of IIT that 3.0 fail to capture critical phase transitions and propose a reformulation of the assumptions made by integrated information measures.

Consciousness: New Concepts and Neural Networks

The definition of consciousness remains a difficult issue that requires urgent understanding and resolution. Currently, consciousness research is an intensely focused area of neuroscience. However, to establish a greater understanding of the concept of consciousness, more detailed, intrinsic neurobiological research is needed. Additionally, an accurate assessment of the level of consciousness may strengthen our awareness of this concept and provide new ideas for patients undergoing clinical treatment of consciousness disorders. In addition, research efforts that help elucidate the concept of consciousness have important scientific and clinical significance. This review presents the latest progress in consciousness research and proposes our assumptions with regard to the network of consciousness.

Exclusion and Underdetermined Qualia

Integrated information theory (IIT) asserts that both the level and the quality of consciousness can be explained by the ability of physical systems to integrate information. Although the scientific content and empirical prospects of IIT have attracted interest, this paper focuses on another aspect of IIT, its unique theoretical structure, which relates the phenomenological axioms with the ontological postulates. In particular, the relationship between the exclusion axiom and the exclusion postulate is unclear. Moreover, the exclusion postulate leads to a serious problem in IIT: the quale underdetermination problem. Therefore, in this paper, I will explore answers to the following three questions: (1) how does the exclusion axiom lead to the exclusion postulate? (2) How does the exclusion postulate cause the qualia underdetermination problem? (3) Is there a solution to this problem? I will provide proposals and arguments for each question. If successful, IIT can be confirmed with respect to, not only its theoretical foundation, but also its practical application.

Conflicting emergences. Weak vs. strong emergence for the modelling of brain function

The concept of "emergence" has become commonplace in the modelling of complex systems, both natural and man-made; a functional property" emerges" from a system when it cannot be readily explained by the properties of the system's sub-units. A bewildering array of adaptive and sophisticated behaviours can be observed from large ensembles of elementary agents such as ant colonies, bird flocks or by the interactions of elementary material units such as molecules or weather elements. Ultimately, emergence has been adopted as the ontological support of a number of attempts to model brain function. This manuscript aims to clarify the ontology of emergence and delve into its many facets, particularly into its "strong" and "weak" versions that underpin two different approaches to the modelling of behaviour. The first group of models is here represented by the "free energy" principle of brain function and the "integrated information theory" of consciousness. The second group is instead represented by computational models such as oscillatory networks that use mathematical scalable representations to generate emergent behaviours and are then able to bridge neurobiology with higher mental functions. Drawing on the epistemological literature, we observe that due to their loose mechanistic links with the underlying biology, models based on strong forms of emergence are at risk of metaphysical implausibility. This, in practical terms, translates into the over determination that occurs when the proposed model becomes only one of a large set of possible explanations for the observable phenomena. On the other hand, computational models that start from biologically plausible elementary units, hence are weakly emergent, are not limited by ontological faults and, if scalable and able to realistically simulate the hierarchies of brain output, represent a powerful vehicle for future neuroscientific research programmes.

What Does 'Information' Mean in Integrated Information Theory?

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) intends to provide a principled theoretical approach able to characterize consciousness both quantitatively and qualitatively. By starting off identifying the fundamental properties of experience itself, IIT develops a formal framework that relates those properties to the physical substratum of consciousness. One of the central features of ITT is the role that information plays in the theory. On the one hand, one of the self-evident truths about consciousness is that it is informative. On the other hand, mechanisms and systems of mechanics can contribute to consciousness only if they specify systems’ intrinsic information. In this paper, we will conceptually analyze the notion of information underlying ITT. Following previous work on the matter, we will particularly argue that information within ITT should be understood in the light of a causal-manipulabilist view of information (López and Lombardi 2018), conforming to which information is an entity that must be involved in causal links in order to be precisely defined. Those causal links are brought to light by means of interventionist procedures following Woodward’s and Pearl’s version of the manipulability theories of causation.

How Organisms Gained Causal Independence and How It Might Be Quantified

Two broad features are jointly necessary for autonomous agency: organisational closure and the embodiment of an objective-function providing a ‘goal’: so far only organisms demonstrate both. Organisational closure has been studied (mostly in abstract), especially as cell autopoiesis and the cybernetic principles of autonomy, but the role of an internalised ‘goal’ and how it is instantiated by cell signalling and the functioning of nervous systems has received less attention. Here I add some biological ‘flesh’ to the cybernetic theory and trace the evolutionary development of step-changes in autonomy: (1) homeostasis of organisationally closed systems; (2) perception-action systems; (3) action selection systems; (4) cognitive systems; (5) memory supporting a self-model able to anticipate and evaluate actions and consequences. Each stage is characterised by the number of nested goal-directed control-loops embodied by the organism, summarised as will-nestedness N. Organism tegument, receptor/transducer system, mechanisms of cellular and whole-organism re-programming and organisational integration, all contribute to causal independence.

CONCLUSION

organisms are cybernetic phenomena whose identity is created by the information structure of the highest level of causal closure (maximum N), which has increased through evolution, leading to increased causal independence, which might be quantifiable by ‘Integrated Information Theory’ measures.

Consciousness: a unique way of processing information

In this article, I argue that consciousness is a unique way of processing information, in that: it produces information, rather than purely transmitting it; the information it produces is meaningful for us; the meaning it has is always individuated. This uniqueness allows us to process information on the basis of our personal needs and ever-changing interactions with the environment, and consequently to act autonomously. Three main basic cognitive processes contribute to realize this unique way of information processing: the self, attention and working memory. The self, which is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems, maps our body, the environment, and our relations with the environment. It is the primary means by which the complexity inherent to our composite structure is reduced into the "single voice" of a unique individual. It provides a reference system that (albeit evolving) is sufficiently stable to define the variations that will be used as the raw material for the construction of conscious information. Attention allows for the selection of those variations in the state of the self that are most relevant in the given situation. Attention originates and is deployed from a single locus inside our body, which represents the center of the self, around which all our conscious experiences are organized. Whatever is focused by attention appears in our consciousness as possessing a spatial quality defined by this center and the direction toward which attention is focused. In addition, attention determines two other features of conscious experience: periodicity and phenomenal quality. Self and attention are necessary but not sufficient for conscious information to be produced. Complex forms of conscious experiences, such as the various modes of givenness of conscious experience and the stream of consciousness, need a working memory mechanism to assemble the basic pieces of information selected by attention.

Computing integrated information

Integrated information theory (IIT) has established itself as one of the leading theories for the study of consciousness. IIT essentially proposes that quantitative consciousness is identical to maximally integrated conceptual information, quantified by a measure called Φmax, and that phenomenological experience corresponds to the associated set of maximally irreducible cause-effect repertoires of a physical system being in a certain state. With the current work, we provide a general formulation of the framework, which comprehensively and parsimoniously expresses Φmax in the language of probabilistic models. Here, the stochastic process describing a system under scrutiny corresponds to a first-order time-invariant Markov process, and all necessary mathematical operations for the definition of Φmax are fully specified by a system's joint probability distribution over two adjacent points in discrete time. We present a detailed constructive rule for the decomposition of a system into two disjoint subsystems based on flexible marginalization and factorization of this joint distribution. Furthermore, we show that for a given joint distribution, virtualization is identical to a flexible factorization enforcing independence between variable subsets. We then validate our formulation in a previously established discrete example system, in which we also illustrate the previously unexplored theoretical issue of quale underdetermination due to non-unique maximally irreducible cause-effect repertoires. Moreover, we show that the current definition of Φ entails its sensitivity to the shape of the conceptual structure in qualia space, thus tying together IIT's measures of quantitative and qualitative consciousness, which we suggest be better disentangled. We propose several modifications of the framework in order to address some of these issues.

How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC)

Time and space are the basic building blocks of nature. As a unique existent in nature, our brain exists in time and takes up space. The brain's activity itself also constitutes and spreads in its own (intrinsic) time and space that is crucial for consciousness. Consciousness is a complex phenomenon including different dimensions: level/state, content/form, phenomenal aspects, and cognitive features. We propose a Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) focusing primarily on the temporal and spatial features of the brain activity. We postulate four different neuronal mechanisms accounting for the different dimensions of consciousness: (i) "temporo-spatial nestedness" of the spontaneous activity accounts for the level/state of consciousness as neural predisposition of consciousness (NPC); (ii) "temporo-spatial alignment" of the pre-stimulus activity accounts for the content/form of consciousness as neural prerequisite of consciousness (preNCC); (iii) "temporo-spatial expansion" of early stimulus-induced activity accounts for phenomenal consciousness as neural correlates of consciousness (NCC); (iv) "temporo-spatial globalization" of late stimulus-induced activity accounts for the cognitive features of consciousness as neural consequence of consciousness (NCCcon).

The difficult legacy of Turing's wager

Describing the human brain in mathematical terms is an important ambition of neuroscience research, yet the challenges remain considerable. It was Alan Turing, writing in 1950, who first sought to demonstrate how time-consuming such an undertaking would be. Through analogy to the computer program, Turing argued that arriving at a complete mathematical description of the mind would take well over a thousand years. In this opinion piece, we argue that — despite seventy years of progress in the field — his arguments remain both prescient and persuasive.

Integrated information and dimensionality in continuous attractor dynamics

There has been increasing interest in the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness, which hypothesizes that consciousness is integrated information within neuronal dynamics. However, the current formulation of IIT poses both practical and theoretical problems when empirically testing the theory by computing integrated information from neuronal signals. For example, measuring integrated information requires observing all the elements in a considered system at the same time, but this is practically very difficult. Here, we propose that some aspects of these problems are resolved by considering the topological dimensionality of shared attractor dynamics as an indicator of integrated information in continuous attractor dynamics. In this formulation, the effects of unobserved nodes on the attractor dynamics can be reconstructed using a technique called delay embedding, which allows us to identify the dimensionality of an embedded attractor from partial observations. We propose that the topological dimensionality represents a critical property of integrated information, as it is invariant to general coordinate transformations. We illustrate this new framework with simple examples and discuss how it fits with recent findings based on neural recordings from awake and anesthetized animals. This topological approach extends the existing notions of IIT to continuous dynamical systems and offers a much-needed framework for testing the theory with experimental data by substantially relaxing the conditions required for evaluating integrated information in real neural systems.

Synthetic consciousness: the distributed adaptive control perspective

Understanding the nature of consciousness is one of the grand outstanding scientific challenges. The fundamental methodological problem is how phenomenal first person experience can be accounted for in a third person verifiable form, while the conceptual challenge is to both define its function and physical realization. The distributed adaptive control theory of consciousness (DACtoc) proposes answers to these three challenges. The methodological challenge is answered relative to the hard problem and DACtoc proposes that it can be addressed using a convergent synthetic methodology using the analysis of synthetic biologically grounded agents, or quale parsing. DACtoc hypothesizes that consciousness in both its primary and secondary forms serves the ability to deal with the hidden states of the world and emerged during the Cambrian period, affording stable multi-agent environments to emerge. The process of consciousness is an autonomous virtualization memory, which serializes and unifies the parallel and subconscious simulations of the hidden states of the world that are largely due to other agents and the self with the objective to extract norms. These norms are in turn projected as value onto the parallel simulation and control systems that are driving action. This functional hypothesis is mapped onto the brainstem, midbrain and the thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical systems and analysed with respect to our understanding of deficits of consciousness. Subsequently, some of the implications and predictions of DACtoc are outlined, in particular, the prediction that normative bootstrapping of conscious agents is predicated on an intentionality prior. In the view advanced here, human consciousness constitutes the ultimate evolutionary transition by allowing agents to become autonomous with respect to their evolutionary priors leading to a post-biological Anthropocene.This article is part of the themed issue 'The major synthetic evolutionary transitions'.