Active inference unifies intentional and conflict-resolution imperatives of motor control

Slow but flexible or fast but rigid? Discrete and continuous processes compared

A tradeoff exists when dealing with complex tasks composed of multiple steps. High-level cognitive processes can find the best sequence of actions to achieve a goal in uncertain environments, but they are slow and require significant computational demand. In contrast, lower-level processing allows reacting to environmental stimuli rapidly, but with limited capacity to determine optimal actions or to replan when expectations are not met. Through reiteration of the same task, biological organisms find the optimal tradeoff: from action primitives, composite trajectories gradually emerge by creating task-specific neural structures. The two frameworks of active inference - a recent brain paradigm that views action and perception as subject to the same free energy minimization imperative - well capture high-level and low-level processes of human behavior, but how task specialization occurs in these terms is still unclear. In this study, we compare two strategies on a dynamic pick-and-place task: a hybrid (discrete-continuous) model with planning capabilities and a continuous-only model with fixed transitions. Both models rely on a hierarchical (intrinsic and extrinsic) structure, well suited for defining reaching and grasping movements, respectively. Our results show that continuous-only models perform better and with minimal resource expenditure but at the cost of less flexibility. Finally, we propose how discrete actions might lead to continuous attractors and compare the two frameworks with different motor learning phases, laying the foundations for further studies on bio-inspired task adaptation.

The Many Roles of Precision in Action

Active inference describes (Bayes-optimal) behaviour as being motivated by the minimisation of surprise of one's sensory observations, through the optimisation of a generative model (of the hidden causes of one's sensory data) in the brain. One of active inference's key appeals is its conceptualisation of precision as biasing neuronal communication and, thus, inference within generative models. The importance of precision in perceptual inference is evident-many studies have demonstrated the importance of ensuring precision estimates are correct for normal (healthy) sensation and perception. Here, we highlight the many roles precision plays in action, i.e., the key processes that rely on adequate estimates of precision, from decision making and action planning to the initiation and control of muscle movement itself. Thereby, we focus on the recent development of hierarchical, "mixed" models-generative models spanning multiple levels of discrete and continuous inference. These kinds of models open up new perspectives on the unified description of hierarchical computation, and its implementation, in action. Here, we highlight how these models reflect the many roles of precision in action-from planning to execution-and the associated pathologies if precision estimation goes wrong. We also discuss the potential biological implementation of the associated message passing, focusing on the role of neuromodulatory systems in mediating different kinds of precision.

The functional role of conscious sensation of movement

This paper proposes a new framework for investigating neural signals sufficient for a conscious sensation of movement and their role in motor control. We focus on signals sufficient for proprioceptive awareness, particularly from muscle spindle activation and from primary motor cortex (M1). Our review of muscle vibration studies reveals that afferent signals alone can induce conscious sensations of movement. Similarly, studies employing peripheral nerve blocks suggest that efferent signals from M1 are sufficient for sensations of movement. On this basis, we show that competing theories of motor control assign different roles to sensation of movement. According to motor command theories, sensation of movement corresponds to an estimation of the current state based on afferent signals, efferent signals, and predictions. In contrast, within active inference architectures, sensations correspond to proprioceptive predictions driven by efferent signals from M1. The focus on sensation of movement provides a way to critically compare and evaluate the two theories. Our analysis offers new insights into the functional roles of movement sensations in motor control and consciousness.

In Case of Doubt, One Follows One's Self: The Implicit Guidance of the Embodied Self-Avatar

The sense of embodiment in virtual reality (VR) is commonly understood as the subjective experience that one's physical body is substituted by a virtual counterpart, and is typically achieved when the avatar's body, seen from a first-person view, moves like one's physical body. Embodiment can also be experienced in other circumstances (e.g., in third-person view) or with imprecise or distorted visuo-motor coupling. It was moreover observed, in various cases of small or progressive temporal and spatial manipulations of avatars' movements, that participants may spontaneously follow the movement shown by the avatar. The present work investigates whether, in some specific contexts, participants would follow what their avatar does even when large movement discrepancies occur, thereby extending the scope of understanding of the self-avatar follower effect beyond subtle changes of motion or speed manipulations. We conducted an experimental study in which we introduced uncertainty about which movement to perform at specific times and analyzed participants' movements and subjective feedback after their avatar showed them an incorrect movement. Results show that, when in doubt, participants were influenced by their avatar's movements, leading them to perform that particular error twice more often than normal. Importantly, results of the embodiment score indicate that participants experienced a dissociation with their avatar at those times. Overall, these observations not only demonstrate the possibility of provoking situations in which participants follow the guidance of their avatar for large motor distortions, despite their awareness about the avatar movement disruption and on the possible influence it had on their choice, and, importantly, exemplify how the cognitive mechanism of embodiment is deeply rooted in the necessity of having a body.

Collective behavior from surprise minimization

Collective motion is ubiquitous in nature; groups of animals, such as fish, birds, and ungulates appear to move as a whole, exhibiting a rich behavioral repertoire that ranges from directed movement to milling to disordered swarming. Typically, such macroscopic patterns arise from decentralized, local interactions among constituent components (e.g., individual fish in a school). Preeminent models of this process describe individuals as self-propelled particles, subject to self-generated motion and "social forces" such as short-range repulsion and long-range attraction or alignment. However, organisms are not particles; they are probabilistic decision-makers. Here, we introduce an approach to modeling collective behavior based on active inference. This cognitive framework casts behavior as the consequence of a single imperative: to minimize surprise. We demonstrate that many empirically observed collective phenomena, including cohesion, milling, and directed motion, emerge naturally when considering behavior as driven by active Bayesian inference-without explicitly building behavioral rules or goals into individual agents. Furthermore, we show that active inference can recover and generalize the classical notion of social forces as agents attempt to suppress prediction errors that conflict with their expectations. By exploring the parameter space of the belief-based model, we reveal nontrivial relationships between the individual beliefs and group properties like polarization and the tendency to visit different collective states. We also explore how individual beliefs about uncertainty determine collective decision-making accuracy. Finally, we show how agents can update their generative model over time, resulting in groups that are collectively more sensitive to external fluctuations and encode information more robustly.

Deep kinematic inference affords efficient and scalable control of bodily movements

Performing goal-directed movements requires mapping goals from extrinsic (workspace-relative) to intrinsic (body-relative) coordinates and then to motor signals. Mainstream approaches based on optimal control realize the mappings by minimizing cost functions, which is computationally demanding. Instead, active inference uses generative models to produce sensory predictions, which allows a cheaper inversion to the motor signals. However, devising generative models to control complex kinematic chains like the human body is challenging. We introduce an active inference architecture that affords a simple but effective mapping from extrinsic to intrinsic coordinates via inference and easily scales up to drive complex kinematic chains. Rich goals can be specified in both intrinsic and extrinsic coordinates using attractive or repulsive forces. The proposed model reproduces sophisticated bodily movements and paves the way for computationally efficient and biologically plausible control of actuated systems.

Brain-inspired bodily self-perception model for robot rubber hand illusion

The core of bodily self-consciousness involves perceiving ownership of one's body. A central question is how body illusions like the rubber hand illusion (RHI) occur. Existing theoretical models still lack satisfying computational explanations from connectionist perspectives, especially for how the brain encodes body perception and generates illusions from neuronal interactions. Moreover, the integration of disability experiments is also neglected. Here, we integrate biological findings of bodily self-consciousness to propose a brain-inspired bodily self-perception model by which perceptions of bodily self are autonomously constructed without any supervision signals. We successfully validated the model with six RHI experiments and a disability experiment on an iCub humanoid robot and simulated environments. The results show that our model can not only well-replicate the behavioral and neural data of monkeys in biological experiments but also reasonably explain the causes and results of RHI at the neuronal level, thus contributing to the revelation of mechanisms underlying RHI.

Enhanced efficiency in visually guided online motor control for actions redirected towards the body midline

Reaching objects in a dynamic environment requires fast online corrections that compensate for sudden object shifts or postural changes. Previous studies revealed the key role of visually monitoring the hand-to-target distance throughout action execution. In the current study, we investigate how sensorimotor asymmetries associated with space perception, brain lateralization and biomechanical constraints, affect the efficiency of online corrections. Participants performed reaching actions in virtual reality, where the virtual hand was progressively displaced from the real hand to trigger online corrections, for which it was possible to control the total amount of the redirection and the region of space in which the action unfolded. The efficiency of online corrections and the degree of awareness of the ensuing motor corrections were taken as assessment variables. Results revealed more efficient visuo-motor corrections for actions redirected towards, rather than away from the body midline. The effect is independent on the reaching hand and the hemispace of action, making explanations associated with laterality effects and biomechanical constraints improbable. The result cannot either be accounted for by the visual processing advantage in the straight-ahead region. An explanation may be found in the finer sensorimotor representations characterizing the frontal space proximal to body, where a preference for visual processing has been documented, and where high-value functional actions, like fine manipulative skills, typically take place. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'New approaches to 3D vision'.

Skilled motor control of an inverted pendulum implies low entropy of states but high entropy of actions

The mastery of skills, such as balancing an inverted pendulum, implies a very accurate control of movements to achieve the task goals. Traditional accounts of skilled action control that focus on either routinization or perceptual control make opposite predictions about the ways we achieve mastery. The notion of routinization emphasizes the decrease of the variance of our actions, whereas the notion of perceptual control emphasizes the decrease of the variance of the states we visit, but not of the actions we execute. Here, we studied how participants managed control tasks of varying levels of difficulty, which consisted of controlling inverted pendulums of different lengths. We used information-theoretic measures to compare the predictions of alternative accounts that focus on routinization and perceptual control, respectively. Our results indicate that the successful performance of the control task strongly correlates with the decrease of state variability and the increase of action variability. As postulated by perceptual control theory, the mastery of skilled pendulum control consists in achieving stable control of goals by flexible means.