Multisensory oddity detection as bayesian inference

Metacognitive awareness in the sound-induced flash illusion

Hundreds (if not thousands) of multisensory studies provide evidence that the human brain can integrate temporally and spatially discrepant stimuli from distinct modalities into a singular event. This process of multisensory integration is usually portrayed in the scientific literature as contributing to our integrated, coherent perceptual reality. However, missing from this account is an answer to a simple question: how do confidence judgements compare between multisensory information that is integrated across multiple sources, and multisensory information that comes from a single, congruent source in the environment? In this paper, we use the sound-induced flash illusion to investigate if confidence judgements are similar across multisensory conditions when the numbers of auditory and visual events are the same, and the numbers of auditory and visual events are different. Results showed that congruent audiovisual stimuli produced higher confidence than incongruent audiovisual stimuli, even when the perceptual report was matched across the two conditions. Integrating these behavioural findings with recent neuroimaging and theoretical work, we discuss the role that prefrontal cortex may play in metacognition, multisensory causal inference and sensory source monitoring in general. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.

Bayesian causal inference: A unifying neuroscience theory

Understanding of the brain and the principles governing neural processing requires theories that are parsimonious, can account for a diverse set of phenomena, and can make testable predictions. Here, we review the theory of Bayesian causal inference, which has been tested, refined, and extended in a variety of tasks in humans and other primates by several research groups. Bayesian causal inference is normative and has explained human behavior in a vast number of tasks including unisensory and multisensory perceptual tasks, sensorimotor, and motor tasks, and has accounted for counter-intuitive findings. The theory has made novel predictions that have been tested and confirmed empirically, and recent studies have started to map its algorithms and neural implementation in the human brain. The parsimony, the diversity of the phenomena that the theory has explained, and its illuminating brain function at all three of Marr's levels of analysis make Bayesian causal inference a strong neuroscience theory. This also highlights the importance of collaborative and multi-disciplinary research for the development of new theories in neuroscience.

Aberrant causal inference and presence of a compensatory mechanism in autism spectrum disorder

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by a panoply of social, communicative, and sensory anomalies. As such, a central goal of computational psychiatry is to ascribe the heterogenous phenotypes observed in ASD to a limited set of canonical computations that may have gone awry in the disorder. Here, we posit causal inference - the process of inferring a causal structure linking sensory signals to hidden world causes - as one such computation. We show that audio-visual integration is intact in ASD and in line with optimal models of cue combination, yet multisensory behavior is anomalous in ASD because this group operates under an internal model favoring integration (vs. segregation). Paradoxically, during explicit reports of common cause across spatial or temporal disparities, individuals with ASD were less and not more likely to report common cause, particularly at small cue disparities. Formal model fitting revealed differences in both the prior probability for common cause (p-common) and choice biases, which are dissociable in implicit but not explicit causal inference tasks. Together, this pattern of results suggests (i) different internal models in attributing world causes to sensory signals in ASD relative to neurotypical individuals given identical sensory cues, and (ii) the presence of an explicit compensatory mechanism in ASD, with these individuals putatively having learned to compensate for their bias to integrate in explicit reports.

Perceptual Inference, Learning, and Attention in a Multisensory World

Adaptive behavior in a complex, dynamic, and multisensory world poses some of the most fundamental computational challenges for the brain, notably inference, decision-making, learning, binding, and attention. We first discuss how the brain integrates sensory signals from the same source to support perceptual inference and decision-making by weighting them according to their momentary sensory uncertainties. We then show how observers solve the binding or causal inference problem-deciding whether signals come from common causes and should hence be integrated or else be treated independently. Next, we describe the multifarious interplay between multisensory processing and attention. We argue that attentional mechanisms are crucial to compute approximate solutions to the binding problem in naturalistic environments when complex time-varying signals arise from myriad causes. Finally, we review how the brain dynamically adapts multisensory processing to a changing world across multiple timescales.

Multisensory neural processing: from cue integration to causal inference

Neurophysiological studies of multisensory processing have largely focused on how the brain integrates information from different sensory modalities to form a coherent percept. However, in the natural environment, an important extra step is needed: the brain faces the problem of causal inference, which involves determining whether different sources of sensory information arise from the same environmental cause, such that integrating them is advantageous Behavioral and computational studies have provided a strong foundation for studying causal inference, but studies of its neural basis have only recently been undertaken. This review focuses on recent advances regarding how the brain infers the causes of sensory inputs and uses this information to make robust perceptual estimates.

Task-uninformative visual stimuli improve auditory spatial discrimination in humans but not the ideal observer

In order to survive and function in the world, we must understand the content of our environment. This requires us to gather and parse complex, sometimes conflicting, information. Yet, the brain is capable of translating sensory stimuli from disparate modalities into a cohesive and accurate percept with little conscious effort. Previous studies of multisensory integration have suggested that the brain’s integration of cues is well-approximated by an ideal observer implementing Bayesian causal inference. However, behavioral data from tasks that include only one stimulus in each modality fail to capture what is in nature a complex process. Here we employed an auditory spatial discrimination task in which listeners were asked to determine on which side they heard one of two concurrently presented sounds. We compared two visual conditions in which task-uninformative shapes were presented in the center of the screen, or spatially aligned with the auditory stimuli. We found that performance on the auditory task improved when the visual stimuli were spatially aligned with the auditory stimuli—even though the shapes provided no information about which side the auditory target was on. We also demonstrate that a model of a Bayesian ideal observer performing causal inference cannot explain this improvement, demonstrating that humans deviate systematically from the ideal observer model.

Bayesian comparison of explicit and implicit causal inference strategies in multisensory heading perception

The precision of multisensory perception improves when cues arising from the same cause are integrated, such as visual and vestibular heading cues for an observer moving through a stationary environment. In order to determine how the cues should be processed, the brain must infer the causal relationship underlying the multisensory cues. In heading perception, however, it is unclear whether observers follow the Bayesian strategy, a simpler non-Bayesian heuristic, or even perform causal inference at all. We developed an efficient and robust computational framework to perform Bayesian model comparison of causal inference strategies, which incorporates a number of alternative assumptions about the observers. With this framework, we investigated whether human observers' performance in an explicit cause attribution and an implicit heading discrimination task can be modeled as a causal inference process. In the explicit causal inference task, all subjects accounted for cue disparity when reporting judgments of common cause, although not necessarily all in a Bayesian fashion. By contrast, but in agreement with previous findings, data from the heading discrimination task only could not rule out that several of the same observers were adopting a forced-fusion strategy, whereby cues are integrated regardless of disparity. Only when we combined evidence from both tasks we were able to rule out forced-fusion in the heading discrimination task. Crucially, findings were robust across a number of variants of models and analyses. Our results demonstrate that our proposed computational framework allows researchers to ask complex questions within a rigorous Bayesian framework that accounts for parameter and model uncertainty.

Neural coding of uncertainty and probability

Organisms must act in the face of sensory, motor, and reward uncertainty stemming from a pandemonium of stochasticity and missing information. In many tasks, organisms can make better decisions if they have at their disposal a representation of the uncertainty associated with task-relevant variables. We formalize this problem using Bayesian decision theory and review recent behavioral and neural evidence that the brain may use knowledge of uncertainty, confidence, and probability.

A modular theory of multisensory integration for motor control

To control targeted movements, such as reaching to grasp an object or hammering a nail, the brain can use divers sources of sensory information, such as vision and proprioception. Although a variety of studies have shown that sensory signals are optimally combined according to principles of maximum likelihood, increasing evidence indicates that the CNS does not compute a single, optimal estimation of the target's position to be compared with a single optimal estimation of the hand. Rather, it employs a more modular approach in which the overall behavior is built by computing multiple concurrent comparisons carried out simultaneously in a number of different reference frames. The results of these individual comparisons are then optimally combined in order to drive the hand. In this article we examine at a computational level two formulations of concurrent models for sensory integration and compare this to the more conventional model of converging multi-sensory signals. Through a review of published studies, both our own and those performed by others, we produce evidence favoring the concurrent formulations. We then examine in detail the effects of additive signal noise as information flows through the sensorimotor system. By taking into account the noise added by sensorimotor transformations, one can explain why the CNS may shift its reliance on one sensory modality toward a greater reliance on another and investigate under what conditions those sensory transformations occur. Careful consideration of how transformed signals will co-vary with the original source also provides insight into how the CNS chooses one sensory modality over another. These concepts can be used to explain why the CNS might, for instance, create a visual representation of a task that is otherwise limited to the kinesthetic domain (e.g., pointing with one hand to a finger on the other) and why the CNS might choose to recode sensory information in an external reference frame.

A biologically inspired neural model for visual and proprioceptive integration including sensory training

Humans perceive the surrounding world by integration of information through different sensory modalities. Earlier models of multisensory integration rely mainly on traditional Bayesian and causal Bayesian inferences for single causal (source) and two causal (for two senses such as visual and auditory systems), respectively. In this paper a new recurrent neural model is presented for integration of visual and proprioceptive information. This model is based on population coding which is able to mimic multisensory integration of neural centers in the human brain. The simulation results agree with those achieved by casual Bayesian inference. The model can also simulate the sensory training process of visual and proprioceptive information in human. Training process in multisensory integration is a point with less attention in the literature before. The effect of proprioceptive training on multisensory perception was investigated through a set of experiments in our previous study. The current study, evaluates the effect of both modalities, i.e., visual and proprioceptive training and compares them with each other through a set of new experiments. In these experiments, the subject was asked to move his/her hand in a circle and estimate its position. The experiments were performed on eight subjects with proprioception training and eight subjects with visual training. Results of the experiments show three important points: (1) visual learning rate is significantly more than that of proprioception; (2) means of visual and proprioceptive errors are decreased by training but statistical analysis shows that this decrement is significant for proprioceptive error and non-significant for visual error, and (3) visual errors in training phase even in the beginning of it, is much less than errors of the main test stage because in the main test, the subject has to focus on two senses. The results of the experiments in this paper is in agreement with the results of the neural model simulation.

Organizing probabilistic models of perception

Probability has played a central role in models of perception for more than a century, but a look at probabilistic concepts in the literature raises many questions. Is being Bayesian the same as being optimal? Are recent Bayesian models fundamentally different from classic signal detection theory models? Do findings of near-optimal inference provide evidence that neurons compute with probability distributions? This review aims to disentangle these concepts and to classify empirical evidence accordingly.

Computational characterization of visually induced auditory spatial adaptation

Recent research investigating the principles governing human perception has provided increasing evidence for probabilistic inference in human perception. For example, human auditory and visual localization judgments closely resemble that of a Bayesian causal inference observer, where the underlying causal structure of the stimuli are inferred based on both the available sensory evidence and prior knowledge. However, most previous studies have focused on characterization of perceptual inference within a static environment, and therefore, little is known about how this inference process changes when observers are exposed to a new environment. In this study we aimed to computationally characterize the change in auditory spatial perception induced by repeated auditory–visual spatial conflict, known as the ventriloquist aftereffect. In theory, this change could reflect a shift in the auditory sensory representations (i.e., shift in auditory likelihood distribution), a decrease in the precision of the auditory estimates (i.e., increase in spread of likelihood distribution), a shift in the auditory bias (i.e., shift in prior distribution), or an increase/decrease in strength of the auditory bias (i.e., the spread of prior distribution), or a combination of these. By quantitatively estimating the parameters of the perceptual process for each individual observer using a Bayesian causal inference model, we found that the shift in the perceived locations after exposure was associated with a shift in the mean of the auditory likelihood functions in the direction of the experienced visual offset. The results suggest that repeated exposure to a fixed auditory–visual discrepancy is attributed by the nervous system to sensory representation error and as a result, the sensory map of space is recalibrated to correct the error.

A comprehensive model of audiovisual perception: both percept and temporal dynamics

The sparse information captured by the sensory systems is used by the brain to apprehend the environment, for example, to spatially locate the source of audiovisual stimuli. This is an ill-posed inverse problem whose inherent uncertainty can be solved by jointly processing the information, as well as introducing constraints during this process, on the way this multisensory information is handled. This process and its result - the percept - depend on the contextual conditions perception takes place in. To date, perception has been investigated and modeled on the basis of either one of two of its dimensions: the percept or the temporal dynamics of the process. Here, we extend our previously proposed audiovisual perception model to predict both these dimensions to capture the phenomenon as a whole. Starting from a behavioral analysis, we use a data-driven approach to elicit a Bayesian network which infers the different percepts and dynamics of the process. Context-specific independence analyses enable us to use the model's structure to directly explore how different contexts affect the way subjects handle the same available information. Hence, we establish that, while the percepts yielded by a unisensory stimulus or by the non-fusion of multisensory stimuli may be similar, they result from different processes, as shown by their differing temporal dynamics. Moreover, our model predicts the impact of bottom-up (stimulus driven) factors as well as of top-down factors (induced by instruction manipulation) on both the perception process and the percept itself.

Signal detection theory, uncertainty, and Poisson-like population codes

The juxtaposition of established signal detection theory models of perception and more recent claims about the encoding of uncertainty in perception is a rich source of confusion. Are the latter simply a rehash of the former? Here, we make an attempt to distinguish precisely between optimal and probabilistic computation. In optimal computation, the observer minimizes the expected cost under a posterior probability distribution. In probabilistic computation, the observer uses higher moments of the likelihood function of the stimulus on a trial-by-trial basis. Computation can be optimal without being probabilistic, and vice versa. Most signal detection theory models describe optimal computation. Behavioral data only provide evidence for a neural representation of uncertainty if they are best described by a model of probabilistic computation. We argue that single-neuron activity sometimes suffices for optimal computation, but never for probabilistic computation. A population code is needed instead. Not every population code is equally suitable, because nuisance parameters have to be marginalized out. This problem is solved by Poisson-like, but not by Gaussian variability. Finally, we build a dictionary between signal detection theory quantities and Poisson-like population quantities.

Causal inference in perception

Until recently, the question of how the brain performs causal inference has been studied primarily in the context of cognitive reasoning. However, this problem is at least equally crucial in perceptual processing. At any given moment, the perceptual system receives multiple sensory signals within and across modalities and, for example, has to determine the source of each of these signals. Recently, a growing number of studies from various fields of cognitive science have started to address this question and have converged to very similar computational models. Therefore, it seems that a common computational strategy, which is highly consistent with a normative model of causal inference, is exploited by the perceptual system in a variety of domains.