The social modulation of imitation fidelity in school-age children

Variation in pedagogy affects overimitation in children and adolescents

Children are strong imitators, which sometimes leads to overimitation of causally unnecessary actions. Here, we tested whether learning from a peer decreases this tendency. First, 65 7- to 10-year-old children performed the Hook task (i.e., retrieve a reward from a jar with tools) with child or adult demonstrators. The overimitation rate was lower after watching a peer versus an adult. Second, we tested whether experiencing peer-to-peer learning versus adult-driven learning (i.e., Montessori or traditional pedagogy) affected overimitation. Here, 66 4- to 18-year-old children and adolescents performed the Hook task with adult demonstrators only. Montessori-schooled children had a lower propensity to overimitate. These findings emphasize the importance of the teaching model across the school years. Whereas peer models favor selective imitation, adult models encourage overimitation.

Imitation fidelity increases with age in boys, but not in girls: An intriguing finding in a cohort of children aged 3 to 6 years

Imitation that entails faithful reproduction of demonstrated behavior by reenacting a sequence of actions accurately is a fast and efficient way to acquire new skills as well as to conform to social norms. Previous studies reported that both culture and gender might impinge on young children's fidelity of imitation. We analyzed the imitative behavior of 87 children whose ages ranged from 3 to 6 years. An instrumental task was administered that offered partial (opaque apparatus) or total (transparent apparatus) information about causal connection between the demonstrated actions and their effect in achieving a desired reward. Imitative fidelity (imitating the actions that were demonstrated by an adult model yet were unnecessary for achieving the instrumental goal) increased as a function of age in boys, whereas no differences were found in girls. This lack of increase in girls can be ascribed to their displaying higher degrees of imitation fidelity at an earlier age.

Brain mechanisms of social signalling in live social interactions with autistic and neurotypical adults

The simple act of watching another person can change a person's behaviour in subtle but important ways; the individual being watched is now capable of signalling to the watcher, and may use this opportunity to communicate to the watcher. Recent data shows that people will spontaneously imitate more when being watched. Here, we examine the neural and cognitive mechanisms of being watched during spontaneous social imitation in autistic and neurotypical adults using fNIRS brain imaging. Participants (n = 44) took part in a block-moving task where they were instructed only to copy the block sequence which people normally do using a straight low action trajectory. Here, the demonstrator sometimes used an atypical 'high' action trajectory, giving participants the opportunity to spontaneously copy the high trajectory even if this slowed their performance. The confederate who demonstrated each block sequence could watch the participant's actions or close her eyes, giving a factorial design with factors of trajectory (high/low) and watched (watched/unwatched). Throughout the task, brain signals were captured from bilateral temporal/parietal/occipital cortex using fNIRS. We found that all participants performed higher actions when being watched by the confederate than when not being watched, with no differences between autistic and neurotypical participants. The unwatched conditions were associated with higher activity of the right inferior parietal lobule in all participants and also engagement of left STS only in autistic participants. These findings are consistent with the claim that people engage different neural mechanisms when watched and unwatched and that participants with autism may engage additional brain mechanisms to match neurotypical behaviour and compensate for social difficulties. However, further studies will be needed to replicate these results in a larger sample of participants.

Empirical challenges from the comparative and developmental literature to the Shared Intentionality Theory - a review of alternative data on recursive mind reading, prosociality, imitation and cumulative culture

Humans have an irresistible inclination to coordinate actions with others, leading to species-unique forms of cooperation. According to the highly influential Shared Intentionality Theory (SITh), human cooperation is made possible by shared intentionality (SI), typically defined as a suite of socio-cognitive and motivational traits for sharing psychological states with others, thereby enabling individuals to engage in joint action in the mutually aware pursuit of shared goals. SITh theorises that SI evolved as late as 400,000 years ago, when our ancestors (in particular, Homo heidelbergensis) turned to a kind of food procurement that obligatorily required joint coordinated action. SI is, thus, hypothesized to be absent in other extant species, including our closest genetic relatives, the nonhuman great apes ("apes"). According to SITh, ape psychology is exclusively driven by individualistic motivations, as opposed to human psychology which is uniquely driven by altruistic motivations. The evolutionary scenario proposed by SITh builds on a series of findings from socio-cognitive research with apes and human children, and on the assumption that abilities expressed early in human development are human universals, unlikely to have been shaped by socio-cultural influences. Drawing on the primatological and developmental literature, we provide a systematic - albeit selective - review of SITh-inconsistent findings concerning psychological and behavioural traits theorised to be constitutive of SI. The findings we review pertain to all three thematic clusters typically addressed in SITh: (i) recursive mind reading; (ii) prosociality; (iii) imitation and cumulative culture. We conclude that such alternative data undermine two core SITh claims: the late evolutionary emergence of SI and the radical divide between ape and human psychology. We also discuss several conceptual and methodological limitations that currently hamper reliable comparative research on SI, in particular those engendered by Western-centric biases in the social sciences, where an overreliance on Western samples has promoted the formulation of Western-centric conceptualisations, operationalisations and methodologies.

Young children use imitation communicatively

There is growing evidence that children imitate not just to learn from others but also to affiliate socially with them. However, although imitation can convey a wealth of affiliative information to others, it is not yet known whether imitators intend for this to be the case. In particular, we do not know whether children imitate communicatively in some contexts, expending extra effort to make sure that the demonstrator sees their imitation. Here, in two experiments (N = 20 and N = 48, respectively), we tested whether preschool-age children modify their imitation when needed to ensure that the demonstrator sees it. In each trial, children were shown a demonstration. Then, for their response, in one condition a barrier obscured the demonstrator's view of children's imitation unless children raised their arms above the barrier while imitating. In the other condition the demonstrator was able to see children's imitation without any additional effort from children. Results from both experiments showed that children were significantly more likely to imitate with their arms raised when their actions would otherwise be obscured from view. In the second experiment, we also coded for other communicative behaviors (e.g., social smiles, eye contact, showing gestures) and found that children often displayed communicative behaviors while imitating, as expected, in both conditions. Thus, young children actively use imitation communicatively in some contexts.

Children over-imitate adults and peers more than puppets

Researchers commonly use puppets in development science. Amongst other things, puppets are employed to reduce social hierarchies between child participants and adult experimenters akin to peer interactions. However, it remains controversial whether children treat puppets like real-world social partners in these settings. This study investigated children's imitation of causally irrelevant actions (i.e., over-imitation) performed by puppet, adult, or child models. Seventy-two German children (Age_Range  = 4.6-6.5 years; 36 girls) from urban, socioeconomically diverse backgrounds observed a model retrieving stickers from reward containers. The model performed causally irrelevant actions either in contact with the reward container or not. Children were more likely to over-imitate adults' and peers' actions as compared to puppets' actions. Across models, they copied contact actions more than no-contact actions. While children imitate causally irrelevant actions from puppet models to some extent, their social learning from puppets does not necessarily match their social learning from real-world social agents, such as children or adults. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: We examined children's over-imitation from adult, child, and puppet models to validate puppetry as an approach to simulate non-hierarchical interactions. Children imitated adults and child models at slightly higher rates than puppets. This effect was present regardless of whether the irrelevant actions involved physical contact to the reward container or not. In our study children's social learning from puppets does not match their social learning from human models.

Carry-over effects of tool functionality and previous unsuccessfulness increase overimitation in children

Children 'overimitate' causally irrelevant actions in experiments where both irrelevant and relevant actions involve a single common tool. This study design may make it harder for children to recognize the irrelevant actions, as the perceived functionality of the tool during the demonstration of the relevant action may be carried over to the irrelevant action, potentially increasing overimitation. Moreover, little is known how overimitation is affected by the demonstrator's expressed emotions and the child's prior success with the task. Here, 131 nine- to ten-year-old French and German children first engaged in a tool-based task, being successful or unsuccessful, and then watched an adult demonstrating the solution involving one irrelevant and one relevant action before smiling or remaining neutral. These actions were performed with the same tool or with two separate tools, testing potential carry-over effects of the functionality of the relevant action on the irrelevant action. We show that overimitation was higher when the same tool was used for both actions and when children were previously unsuccessful, but was not affected by the demonstrator's displayed emotion. Our results suggest that future overimitation research should account for the number of tools used in a demonstration and participants' previous task experience.

Social learning from media: The need for a culturally diachronic developmental psychology

Since the proliferation of television sets into households began over half a century ago there has been widespread interest in the impact that viewing has on young children's development. Such interest has grown with the increasing availability of smart phones and tablets. In this review we examine the literature documenting human social learning and how this learning is impacted when the instructing agent appears on a screen instead of face-to-face. We then explore the shifting nature of screen-based media, with a focus on the increasingly socio-normative manner information is portrayed. We discuss how the changing nature of screen technology might be altering how children interpret what they see, and raise the possibility that this may render prevailing evidence as historical documentation, rather than setting out established developmental milestones that transcend the period in which they were documented. We contend that recognizing the significance of historically changing contexts in developmental psychology is timely when the COVID-19 climate is pushing data collection on-line for many labs, often using tasks that were developed primarily for face-to-face contexts.

Cross-cultural variation in how much, but not whether, children overimitate

Children from Western industrialized populations tend to copy actions modeled by an adult with high fidelity even if these actions are functionally irrelevant. This so-called overimitation has been argued to be an important driver of cumulative cultural learning. However, cross-cultural and developmental evidence on overimitation is controversial, likely due to diverging task demands regarding children's attention and memory capabilities. Here, children from a recent hunter-gatherer population (Hai||om in Namibia) were compared with urban Western children (Germany) using an overimitation procedure with minimal cognitive task demands. Although the proportion of children engaging in any overimitation was similar across the two populations, German overimitators copied irrelevant actions more persistently across tasks. These results suggest that the influence of culture on children's overimitation may be one of degree, not kind.

A model's natural group membership affects over-imitation in 6-year-olds

The phenomenon of "over-imitation"-the copying of causally irrelevant actions-has influenced research of the past decade. Yet, the mechanisms underlying and factors affecting over-imitation are still under debate. This study aimed to contribute to this debate by investigating the role of the model's natural group membership in children's tendency to imitate irrelevant actions using a two-phase design. In Phase 1, 6-year-olds (N = 64) observed either an in-group model or an out-group model presenting a sequence of irrelevant actions, with only the last action bringing about the goal (target action) and retrieving a token. In Phase 2, the alternative model-the one that children had not seen in Phase 1-retrieved the token by performing the target action only. After the presentation in each phase, children were given the chance to retrieve the token themselves. Results indicated that children imitated the irrelevant actions to comparable levels from both models in Phase 1. In Phase 2, in contrast, over-imitation declined in children who observed the in-group model being successful with the target action only but not in children who observed the out-group model do so. Thus, children adapted their imitative behavior after observing the model of their own cultural group demonstrating a more efficient strategy. These findings speak for an integration of both social and instrumental accounts to explain the phenomenon of over-imitation.

The role of context in "over-imitation": Evidence of movement-based goal inference in young children

Children, as well as adults, often imitate causally unnecessary actions. Three experiments investigated whether such "over-imitation" occurs because these actions are interpreted as performed for the movement's sake (i.e., having a "movement-based" goal). Experiment 1 (N = 30, 2-5-year-olds) replicated previous findings; children imitated actions with no goal more precisely than actions with external goals. Experiment 2 (N = 58, 2-5-year-olds) confirmed that the difference between these conditions was not due to the absence/presence of external goals but rather was also found when actions brought about external goals in a clearly inefficient way. Experiment 3 (N = 36, 3-5-year-olds) controlled for the possibility that imitation fidelity was affected by the number of actions and objects present during the demonstration and confirmed that identical actions were imitated more precisely when they appeared to be more inefficient toward an external goal. Our findings suggest that movement-based goal inference encourages over-imitation.

Are you watching me? The role of audience and object novelty in overimitation

This study tested whether overimitation is subject to an audience effect, and whether it is modulated by object novelty. A sample of 86 4- to 11-year-old children watched a demonstrator open novel and familiar boxes using sequences of necessary and unnecessary actions. The experimenter then observed the children, turned away, or left the room while the children opened the box. Children copied unnecessary actions more when the experimenter watched or when she left, but they copied less when she turned away. This parallels infant studies suggesting that turning away is interpreted as a signal of disengagement. Children displayed increased overimitation and reduced efficiency discrimination when opening novel boxes compared with familiar boxes. These data provide important evidence that object novelty is a critical component of overimitation.

Evidence for a sex effect during overimitation: boys copy irrelevant modelled actions more than girls across cultures

Children are skilful at acquiring tool-using skills by faithfully copying relevant and irrelevant actions performed by others, but poor at innovating tools to solve problems. Five- to twelve-year-old urban French and rural Serbian children (N = 208) were exposed to a Hook task; a jar containing a reward in a bucket and a pipe cleaner as potential recovering tool material. In both countries, few children under the age of 10 made a hook from the pipe cleaner to retrieve the reward on their own. However, from five onward, the majority of unsuccessful children succeeded after seeing an adult model manufacturing a hook without completing the task. Additionally, a third of the children who observed a similar demonstration including an irrelevant action performed with a second object, a string, replicated this meaningless action. Children's difficulty with innovation and early capacity for overimitation thus do not depend on socio-economic background. Strikingly, we document a sex difference in overimitation across cultures, with boys engaging more in overimitation than girls, a finding that may result from differences regarding explorative tool-related behaviour. This male-biased sex effect sheds new light on our understanding of overimitation, and more generally, on how human tool culture evolved.

Young children copy cumulative technological design in the absence of action information

The ratchet effect - the accumulation of beneficial changes in cultural products beyond a level that individuals could reach on their own - is a topic of increasing interest. It is currently debated which social learning mechanisms allow for the generation and transmission of cumulative culture. This study focused on transmission, investigating whether 4- to 6-year-old children were able to copy cumulative technological design and whether they could do so without action information (emulation). We adapted the spaghetti tower task, previously used to test for accumulation of culture in human adults. A baseline condition established that the demonstrated tower design was beyond the innovation skills of individual children this age and so represented a culture-dependent product for them. There were 2 demonstration conditions: a full demonstration (actions plus (end-)results) and an endstate- demonstration (end-results only). Children in both demonstration conditions built taller towers than those in the baseline. Crucially, in both demonstration conditions some children also copied the demonstrated tower. We provide the first evidence that young children learn from, and that some of them even copy, cumulative technological design, and that - in line with some adult studies - action information is not always necessary to transmit culture-dependent traits.

The role of parietal cortex in overimitation: a study with fNIRS

Previous studies have shown right parietal activation in response to observing irrational actions. Behavioral studies show that people sometimes imitate irrational actions, a phenomenon called overimitation. However, limitations on movement in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) mean that the neural basis of overimitation has not been studied. To address this, our study employed a less restrictive neuroimaging technique, functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). Measurements were taken while participants observed either rational or irrational movements before performing movements on a computerized puzzle task. Observing irrational actions produced greater activation in right anterior inferior parietal lobule (aIPL), replicating results from the fMRI literature. This is a proof of principle that fNIRS can be used as an alternative to fMRI in social cognition experiments, and that parietal cortex has a core role in responding to irrational actions.

Imitative and Direct Learning as Interacting Factors in Life History Evolution

The idea that lifetime learning can have a significant effect on life history evolution has recently been explored using a series of artificial life simulations. These involved populations of competing individuals evolving by natural selection to learn to perform well on simplified abstract tasks, with the learning consisting of identifying regularities in their environment. In reality, there is more to learning than that type of direct individual experience, because it often includes a substantial degree of social learning that involves various forms of imitation of what other individuals have learned before them. This article rectifies that omission by incorporating memes and imitative learning into revised versions of the previous approach. To do this reliably requires formulating and testing a general framework for meme-based simulations that will enable more complete investigations of learning as a factor in any life history evolution scenarios. It does that by simulating imitative information transfer in terms of memes being passed between individuals, and developing a process for merging that information with the (possibly inconsistent) information acquired by direct experience, leading to a consistent overall body of learning. The proposed framework is tested on a range of learning variations and a representative set of life history factors to confirm the robustness of the approach. The simulations presented illustrate the types of interactions and tradeoffs that can emerge, and indicate the kinds of species-specific models that could be developed with this approach in the future.

Why developmental psychology is incomplete without comparative and cross-cultural perspectives

As a discipline, developmental psychology has a long history of relying on animal models and data collected among distinct cultural groups to enrich and inform theories of the ways social and cognitive processes unfold through the lifespan. However, approaches that draw together developmental, cross-cultural and comparative perspectives remain rare. The need for such an approach is reflected in the papers by Heyes (2015 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 371, 20150069. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0069)), Schmelz & Call (2015 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 371, 20150067. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0067)) and Keller (2015 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 371, 20150070. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0070)) in this theme issue. Here, we incorporate these papers into a review of recent research endeavours covering a range of core aspects of social cognition, including social learning, cooperation and collaboration, prosociality, and theory of mind. In so doing, we aim to highlight how input from comparative and cross-cultural empiricism has altered our perspectives of human development and, in particular, led to a deeper understanding of the evolution of the human cultural mind.

Young children with autism spectrum disorders imitate in the context of others’ prior intention

Many studies have shown that children with autism spectrum disorder have some understanding of intentions behind others’ goal-directed actions on objects. It is not clear whether they understand intentions at a high level of abstraction reliant on the context in which the actions occur. This study tested their understanding of others’ prior intentions with typically developing and developmentally delayed children. We replicated Carpenter et al.’s test of the ability to understand prior intentions embedded in the social situation with an additional context of no prior intention. Results showed that when the experimenter’s intention was made known before the demonstration, children without autism spectrum disorder performed not only better than the autism spectrum disorder children but also better than themselves when there was no information about prior intention. No between-condition difference was found in the autism spectrum disorder group. It thus appears that children with autism spectrum disorder have difficulty decoupling intentions from the context of the situation. The present findings, together with previous evidence for the intactness of the ability to understand and to imitate goal-directed actions, suggest that asymmetrical imitation performance occurs at different levels of understanding of intention by children with autism spectrum disorder.

The role of consensus and culture in children's imitation of inefficient actions

A significant body of work has demonstrated children's imitative abilities when learning novel actions. Although some research has examined the role of cultural background in children's imitation of inefficient actions, to our knowledge no research has explored how culture and conformity interact when engaging in imitation. In Study 1, 87 Caucasian American and Chinese American preschoolers were presented with either one model or three models performing an inefficient action. Whereas there were no cultural differences in imitation in the Single Model condition, Chinese Americans were significantly more likely to copy the model's preference for an inefficient tool in the Consensus condition. Children's tool choice was associated with their justification for their choice as well as their memory for the model's action. Study 2 explored the impact of immigration status on the cultural differences in children's tool choice by including 16 first-generation Caucasian American children. When comparing the findings with the rates from Study 1, both groups of Caucasian American preschoolers imitated at rates significantly lower than the Chinese American preschoolers. We suggest that the tool choices of Caucasian American children relate to a tendency to engage in a perceptually driven mode of learning, whereas the choices of the Chinese American children reflect a greater likelihood to use a socially driven mode.

Direct cost does not impact on young children's spontaneous helping behavior

The propensity of humans to engage in prosocial behavior is unlike that of any other species. Individuals will help others even when it comes at a cost to themselves, and even when the others are complete strangers. However, to date, scant empirical evidence has been forthcoming on young children's altruistic tendencies. To investigate this 45 4-year-olds were presented with a task in which they had opportunity to help an adult confederate retrieve a reward from a novel box. In a control condition children were given no information about the effect of potential helping behavior. Alternatively they were informed that helping would either cost them (i.e., they would miss out on getting the reward) or benefit them (i.e., they would get the reward). It was hypothesized that children would be less likely, and slower, to help in the cost condition, compared to the other two conditions. This hypothesis was not supported: children across all conditions provided help at near ceiling levels.

Cognitive underpinnings of social interaction

Human social interaction is part of what defines us. Here I present an overview of recent studies of imitation, a subdomain of social interaction that can be dissected and examined in a scientific fashion. I use these studies to test two core claims: (a) that there is more than one copying mechanism in the human brain and (b) that mimicry (a form of copying) is particularly relevant for understanding social behaviour. Evidence in favour of the first claim comes from neuroimaging studies that show distinct brain systems for understanding action kinematics, action goals, and irrational actions. Further studies of participants with autism show abnormal copying of irrational actions. Evidence in favour of the second claim comes from behavioural studies of the social cues that prime mimicry and from neuroimaging studies of the pathways involved in this priming. These studies suggest that medial prefrontal cortex has a core role in controlling mimicry responses and support the STORM (social top-down response modulation) model. Future work should determine what organizing principles govern the control of social responses and how these critical mechanisms for interpersonal connection differ in autism.

Where culture takes hold: "overimitation" and its flexible deployment in Western, Aboriginal, and Bushmen children

Children often "overimitate," comprehensively copying others' actions despite manifest perceptual cues to their causal ineffectuality. The inflexibility of this behavior renders its adaptive significance difficult to apprehend. This study explored the boundaries of overimitation in 3- to 6-year-old children of three distinct cultures: Westernized, urban Australians (N = 64 in Experiment 1; N = 19 in Experiment 2) and remote communities of South African Bushmen (N = 64) and Australian Aborigines (N = 19). Children overimitated at high frequency in all communities and generalized what they had learned about techniques and object affordances from one object to another. Overimitation thus provides a powerful means of acquiring and flexibly deploying cultural knowledge. The potency of such social learning was also documented compared to opportunities for exploration and practice.