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Ng DW, Lee JC, Lovibond PF. Unidirectional rating scales overestimate the illusory causation phenomenon. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2024; 77:551-562. [PMID: 37114953 PMCID: PMC10880420 DOI: 10.1177/17470218231175003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/13/2022] [Revised: 02/28/2023] [Accepted: 04/21/2023] [Indexed: 04/29/2023]
Abstract
Illusory causation is a phenomenon in which people mistakenly perceive a causal relationship between a cue and outcome even though the contingency between them is actually zero. Illusory causation studies typically use a unidirectional causal rating scale, where one endpoint refers to no relationship and the other to a strongly positive causal relationship. This procedure may bias mean causal ratings in a positive direction, either by censoring negative ratings or by discouraging participants from giving the normative rating of zero which is at the bottom extreme of the scale. To test this possibility, we ran two experiments that directly compared the magnitude of causal illusions when assessed with a unidirectional (zero-positive) versus a bidirectional (negative-zero-positive) rating scale. Experiment 1 used high cue and outcome densities (both 75%), whereas Experiment 2 used neutral cue and outcome densities (both 50%). Across both experiments, we observed a larger illusory causation effect in the unidirectional group compared with the bidirectional group, despite both groups experiencing the same training trials. The causal illusions in Experiment 2 were observed despite participants accurately learning the conditional probabilities of the outcome occurring in both the presence and absence of the cue, suggesting that the illusion is driven by the inability to accurately integrate conditional probabilities to infer causal relationships. Our results indicate that although illusory causation is a genuine phenomenon that is observable with either a undirectional or a bidirectional rating scale, its magnitude may be overestimated when unidirectional rating scales are used.
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2
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Martínez N, Rodríguez-Ferreiro J, Barberia I, Matute H. A debiasing intervention to reduce the causality bias in undergraduates: the role of a bias induction phase. CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY 2023. [DOI: 10.1007/s12144-022-04197-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/15/2023]
Abstract
Abstract
The causality bias, or causal illusion, occurs when people believe that there is a causal relationship between events that are actually uncorrelated. This bias is associated with many problems in everyday life, including pseudoscience, stereotypes, prejudices, and ideological extremism. Some evidence-based educational interventions have been developed to reduce causal illusions. To the best of our knowledge, these interventions have included a bias induction phase prior to the training phase, but the role of this bias induction phase has not yet been investigated. The aim of the present research was to examine it. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups (induction + training, training, and control, as a function of the phases they received before assessment). We evaluated their causal illusion using a standard contingency judgment task. In a null contingency scenario, the causal illusion was reduced in the training and induction-training groups as compared to the control group, suggesting that the intervention was effective regardless of whether or not the induction phase was included. In addition, in a positive contingency scenario, the induction + training group generated lower causal judgments than the control group, indicating that sometimes the induction phase may produce an increase in general skepticism. The raw data of this experiment are available at the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/k9nes/
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Daprati E, Nico D. Vulnerability factors and neuropsychiatric disorders: What could be learned from individual variability in cognitive functions. Front Psychol 2022; 13:1019030. [PMID: 36619098 PMCID: PMC9815448 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1019030] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/14/2022] [Accepted: 12/07/2022] [Indexed: 12/24/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Elena Daprati
- Dipartimento di Medicina dei Sistemi and CBMS, Università di Roma Tor Vergata, Rome, Italy,*Correspondence: Elena Daprati ✉
| | - Daniele Nico
- Dipartimento di Psicologia, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Rome, Italy
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4
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Causal illusion in the core of pseudoscientific beliefs: The role of information interpretation and search strategies. PLoS One 2022; 17:e0272201. [PMID: 36084028 PMCID: PMC9462769 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0272201] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/14/2021] [Accepted: 07/14/2022] [Indexed: 12/05/2022] Open
Abstract
The prevalence of pseudoscientific beliefs in our societies negatively influences relevant areas such as health or education. Causal illusions have been proposed as a possible cognitive basis for the development of such beliefs. The aim of our study was to further investigate the specific nature of the association between causal illusion and endorsement of pseudoscientific beliefs through an active contingency detection task. In this task, volunteers are given the opportunity to manipulate the presence or absence of a potential cause in order to explore its possible influence over the outcome. Responses provided are assumed to reflect both the participants’ information interpretation strategies as well as their information search strategies. Following a previous study investigating the association between causal illusion and the presence of paranormal beliefs, we expected that the association between causal illusion and pseudoscientific beliefs would disappear when controlling for the information search strategy (i.e., the proportion of trials in which the participants decided to present the potential cause). Volunteers with higher pseudoscientific beliefs also developed stronger causal illusions in active contingency detection tasks. This association appeared irrespective of the participants with more pseudoscientific beliefs showing (Experiment 2) or not (Experiment 1) differential search strategies. Our results suggest that both information interpretation and search strategies could be significantly associated to the development of pseudoscientific (and paranormal) beliefs.
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5
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Reasoning strategies and prior knowledge effects in contingency learning. Mem Cognit 2022; 50:1269-1283. [DOI: 10.3758/s13421-022-01319-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/21/2022] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
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6
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Dean CE, Akhtar S, Gale TM, Irvine K, Grohmann D, Laws KR. Paranormal beliefs and cognitive function: A systematic review and assessment of study quality across four decades of research. PLoS One 2022; 17:e0267360. [PMID: 35507572 PMCID: PMC9067702 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0267360] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/12/2021] [Accepted: 04/06/2022] [Indexed: 01/13/2023] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Research into paranormal beliefs and cognitive functioning has expanded considerably since the last review almost 30 years ago, prompting the need for a comprehensive review. The current systematic review aims to identify the reported associations between paranormal beliefs and cognitive functioning, and to assess study quality. METHOD We searched four databases (Scopus, ScienceDirect, SpringerLink, and OpenGrey) from inception until May 2021. Inclusion criteria comprised papers published in English that contained original data assessing paranormal beliefs and cognitive function in healthy adult samples. Study quality and risk of bias was assessed using the Appraisal tool for Cross-Sectional Studies (AXIS) and results were synthesised through narrative review. The review adhered to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines and was preregistered as part of a larger registration on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/uzm5v). RESULTS From 475 identified studies, 71 (n = 20,993) met our inclusion criteria. Studies were subsequently divided into the following six categories: perceptual and cognitive biases (k = 19, n = 3,397), reasoning (k = 17, n = 9,661), intelligence, critical thinking, and academic ability (k = 12, n = 2,657), thinking style (k = 13, n = 4,100), executive function and memory (k = 6, n = 810), and other cognitive functions (k = 4, n = 368). Study quality was rated as good-to-strong for 75% of studies and appears to be improving across time. Nonetheless, we identified areas of methodological weakness including: the lack of preregistration, discussion of limitations, a-priori justification of sample size, assessment of nonrespondents, and the failure to adjust for multiple testing. Over 60% of studies have recruited undergraduates and 30% exclusively psychology undergraduates, which raises doubt about external validity. Our narrative synthesis indicates high heterogeneity of study findings. The most consistent associations emerge for paranormal beliefs with increased intuitive thinking and confirmatory bias, and reduced conditional reasoning ability and perception of randomness. CONCLUSIONS Although study quality is good, areas of methodological weakness exist. In addressing these methodological issues, we propose that authors engage with preregistration of data collection and analysis procedures. At a conceptual level, we argue poorer cognitive performance across seemingly disparate cognitive domains might reflect the influence of an over-arching executive dysfunction.
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Affiliation(s)
- Charlotte E. Dean
- Department of Psychology, School of Life and Medical Sciences, Sport and Geography, University of Hertfordshire, Hertfordshire, United Kingdom
| | - Shazia Akhtar
- Department of Psychology, School of Life and Medical Sciences, Sport and Geography, University of Hertfordshire, Hertfordshire, United Kingdom
| | - Tim M. Gale
- Department of Psychology, School of Life and Medical Sciences, Sport and Geography, University of Hertfordshire, Hertfordshire, United Kingdom
| | - Karen Irvine
- Department of Psychology, School of Life and Medical Sciences, Sport and Geography, University of Hertfordshire, Hertfordshire, United Kingdom
| | - Dominique Grohmann
- Department of Psychology, School of Life and Medical Sciences, Sport and Geography, University of Hertfordshire, Hertfordshire, United Kingdom
| | - Keith R. Laws
- Department of Psychology, School of Life and Medical Sciences, Sport and Geography, University of Hertfordshire, Hertfordshire, United Kingdom
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7
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Hartmann M, Müller P. Acceptance and Adherence to COVID-19 Preventive Measures are Shaped Predominantly by Conspiracy Beliefs, Mistrust in Science and Fear - A Comparison of More than 20 Psychological Variables. Psychol Rep 2022:332941211073656. [PMID: 35212558 PMCID: PMC8883133 DOI: 10.1177/00332941211073656] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/10/2023]
Abstract
The global coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic sparked a great interest in psychological factors that determine or explain peoples' responses to the novel threatening situation and the preventive measures (e.g. wearing masks, social distancing). In this study, we focused on contaminated mindware (conspiracy and paranormal beliefs) and investigated its relationship with both acceptance of and adherence to COVID-19 preventive measures, along with other variables from the domains of emotion (trait anxiety, fear), traditional personality traits (Big 5, locus of control, optimism/pessimism) and motivation (self-control, dispositional regulatory focus). A total of 22 variables were measured in an online survey (N = 374) that took place during the second wave of COVID-19 (Nov. 2020 – March 2021) in Switzerland. Of all variables, the endorsement of specific COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs was most strongly associated with lower acceptance and adherence to the preventive measures, together with mistrust in science and a more right-wing political orientation. In contrast, fear of COVID-19 and prevention regulatory focus were positively associated with acceptance and adherence. Our results therefore highlight the importance of fighting (conspiratorial) misinformation and of increasing the perceived credibility of science in reducing the spread of the coronavirus. Moreover, when acceptance was used as predictor for adherence, agreeableness and dispositional prevention regulatory focus still explained unique variance in adherence, suggesting that such personality and motivational variables play an important role in adhering and regulating preventive behaviour independent from the attitude towards the preventive measures themselves.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Hartmann
- Faculty of Psychology, 197131UniDistance Suisse, Brig, Switzerland.,Institute of Psychology, 27210University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
| | - Petra Müller
- Faculty of Psychology, 197131UniDistance Suisse, Brig, Switzerland.,Institute of Psychology, 27210University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
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8
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Chow JYL, Colagiuri B, Rottman BM, Goldwater M, Livesey EJ. Pseudoscientific Health Beliefs and the Perceived Frequency of Causal Relationships. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH 2021; 18:ijerph182111196. [PMID: 34769714 PMCID: PMC8583395 DOI: 10.3390/ijerph182111196] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/17/2021] [Revised: 10/20/2021] [Accepted: 10/20/2021] [Indexed: 12/04/2022]
Abstract
Beliefs about cause and effect, including health beliefs, are thought to be related to the frequency of the target outcome (e.g., health recovery) occurring when the putative cause is present and when it is absent (treatment administered vs. no treatment); this is known as contingency learning. However, it is unclear whether unvalidated health beliefs, where there is no evidence of cause–effect contingency, are also influenced by the subjective perception of a meaningful contingency between events. In a survey, respondents were asked to judge a range of health beliefs and estimate the probability of the target outcome occurring with and without the putative cause present. Overall, we found evidence that causal beliefs are related to perceived cause–effect contingency. Interestingly, beliefs that were not predicted by perceived contingency were meaningfully related to scores on the paranormal belief scale. These findings suggest heterogeneity in pseudoscientific health beliefs and the need to tailor intervention strategies according to underlying causes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Julie Y. L. Chow
- School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia; (B.C.); (M.G.); (E.J.L.)
- School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
- Correspondence:
| | - Ben Colagiuri
- School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia; (B.C.); (M.G.); (E.J.L.)
| | - Benjamin M. Rottman
- Department of Psychology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA;
| | - Micah Goldwater
- School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia; (B.C.); (M.G.); (E.J.L.)
| | - Evan J. Livesey
- School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia; (B.C.); (M.G.); (E.J.L.)
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9
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Coelho CM, Zsido AN, Suttiwan P, Clasen M. Super-natural fears. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2021; 128:406-414. [PMID: 34186152 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.06.036] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/22/2020] [Revised: 06/04/2021] [Accepted: 06/23/2021] [Indexed: 01/11/2023]
Abstract
Supernatural fears, although common, are not as well-understood as natural fears and phobias (e.g., social, blood, and animal phobias) which are prepared by evolution, such that they are easily acquired through direct experience and relatively immune to cognitive mediation. In contrast, supernatural fears do not involve direct experience but seem to be related to sensory or cognitive biases in the interpretation of stimuli as well as culturally driven cognitions and beliefs. In this multidisciplinary synthesis and collaborative review, we claim that supernatural beliefs are "super natural." That is, they occur spontaneously and are easy to acquire, possibly because such beliefs rest on intuitive concepts such as mind-body dualism and animism, and may inspire fear in believers as well as non-believers. As suggested by psychological and neuroscientific evidence, they tap into an evolutionarily prepared fear of potential impending dangers or unknown objects and have their roots in "prepared fears" as well as "cognitively prepared beliefs," making fear of supernatural agents a fruitful research avenue for social, anthropological, and psychological inquires.
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Affiliation(s)
- Carlos M Coelho
- Faculty of Psychology, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 10330, Thailand; University Institute of Maia, Maia, Portugal; Center for Psychology at University of Porto, Porto, Portugal
| | - Andras N Zsido
- Institute of Psychology, University of Pécs, Pécs, 7622, Hungary
| | - Panrapee Suttiwan
- Faculty of Psychology, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 10330, Thailand; Life Di Center, Faculty of Psychology, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 10330, Thailand.
| | - Mathias Clasen
- School of Communication and Culture, Aarhus University, 8000, Aarhus C, Denmark
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10
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Moreno-Fernández MM, Blanco F, Matute H. The tendency to stop collecting information is linked to illusions of causality. Sci Rep 2021; 11:3942. [PMID: 33594129 PMCID: PMC7887230 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-82075-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/05/2020] [Accepted: 01/12/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Previous research proposed that cognitive biases contribute to produce and maintain the symptoms exhibited by deluded patients. Specifically, the tendency to jump to conclusions (i.e., to stop collecting evidence soon before making a decision) has been claimed to contribute to delusion formation. Additionally, deluded patients show an abnormal understanding of cause-effect relationships, often leading to causal illusions (i.e., the belief that two events are causally connected, when they are not). Both types of bias appear in psychotic disorders, but also in healthy individuals. In two studies, we test the hypothesis that the two biases (jumping to conclusions and causal illusions) appear in the general population and correlate with each other. The rationale is based on current theories of associative learning that explain causal illusions as the result of a learning bias that tends to wear off as additional information is incorporated. We propose that participants with higher tendency to jump to conclusions will stop collecting information sooner in a causal learning study than those participants with lower tendency to jump to conclusions, which means that the former will not reach the learning asymptote, leading to biased judgments. The studies provide evidence in favour that the two biases are correlated but suggest that the proposed mechanism is not responsible for this association.
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Affiliation(s)
- María Manuela Moreno-Fernández
- Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Granada, Granada, Spain. .,Department of Methods and Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Education, University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain.
| | - Fernando Blanco
- Department of Methods and Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Education, University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain.,Department of Social Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Granada, Granada, Spain
| | - Helena Matute
- Department of Methods and Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Education, University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
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11
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The more, the merrier: Treatment frequency influences effectiveness perception and further treatment choice. Psychon Bull Rev 2020; 28:665-675. [PMID: 33123843 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-020-01832-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 10/15/2020] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Causal illusions have been postulated as cognitive mediators of pseudoscientific beliefs, which, in turn, might lead to the use of pseudomedicines. However, while the laboratory tasks aimed to explore causal illusions typically present participants with information regarding the consequences of administering a fictitious treatment versus not administering any treatment, real-life decisions frequently involve choosing between several alternative treatments. In order to mimic these realistic conditions, participants in two experiments received information regarding the rate of recovery when each of two different fictitious remedies were administered. The fictitious remedy that was more frequently administered was given higher effectiveness ratings than the low-frequency one, independent of the absence or presence of information about the spontaneous recovery rate. Crucially, we also introduced a novel dependent variable that involved imagining new occasions in which the ailment was present and asking participants to decide which treatment they would opt for. The inclusion of information about the base rate of recovery significantly influenced participants' choices. These results imply that the mere prevalence of popular treatments might make them seem particularly effective. It also suggests that effectiveness ratings should be interpreted with caution as they might not accurately reflect real treatment choices. Materials and datasets are available at the Open Science Framework [https://osf.io/fctjs/].
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12
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Weinberger AB, Gallagher NM, Warren ZJ, English GA, Moghaddam FM, Green AE. Implicit pattern learning predicts individual differences in belief in God in the United States and Afghanistan. Nat Commun 2020; 11:4503. [PMID: 32908145 PMCID: PMC7481241 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-020-18362-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/17/2019] [Accepted: 08/13/2020] [Indexed: 11/11/2022] Open
Abstract
Most humans believe in a god, but many do not. Differences in belief have profound societal impacts. Anthropological accounts implicate bottom-up perceptual processes in shaping religious belief, suggesting that individual differences in these processes may help explain variation in belief. Here, in findings replicated across socio-religiously disparate samples studied in the U.S. and Afghanistan, implicit learning of patterns/order within visuospatial sequences (IL-pat) in a strongly bottom-up paradigm predict 1) stronger belief in an intervening/ordering god, and 2) increased strength-of-belief from childhood to adulthood, controlling for explicit learning and parental belief. Consistent with research implicating IL-pat as a basis of intuition, and intuition as a basis of belief, mediation models support a hypothesized effect pathway whereby IL-pat leads to intuitions of order which, in turn, lead to belief in ordering gods. The universality and variability of human IL-pat may thus contribute to the global presence and variability of religious belief.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam B Weinberger
- Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 20057, USA.
- University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA.
| | - Natalie M Gallagher
- Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 20057, USA
- Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA
| | - Zachary J Warren
- Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 20057, USA
- The Asia Foundation, 1779 Massachusetts Ave NW #815, Washington, DC, 20036, USA
| | - Gwendolyn A English
- Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 20057, USA
- ETH Zurich, 8092, Zurich, CH-8092, Switzerland
| | | | - Adam E Green
- Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 20057, USA.
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13
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Moreno-Fernández MM, Matute H. Biased Sampling and Causal Estimation of Health-Related Information: Laboratory-Based Experimental Research. J Med Internet Res 2020; 22:e17502. [PMID: 32706735 PMCID: PMC7414405 DOI: 10.2196/17502] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/19/2019] [Revised: 05/03/2020] [Accepted: 05/14/2020] [Indexed: 12/14/2022] Open
Abstract
Background The internet is a relevant source of health-related information. The huge amount of information available on the internet forces users to engage in an active process of information selection. Previous research conducted in the field of experimental psychology showed that information selection itself may promote the development of erroneous beliefs, even if the information collected does not. Objective The aim of this study was to assess the relationship between information searching strategy (ie, which cues are used to guide information retrieval) and causal inferences about health while controlling for the effect of additional information features. Methods We adapted a standard laboratory task that has previously been used in research on contingency learning to mimic an information searching situation. Participants (N=193) were asked to gather information to determine whether a fictitious drug caused an allergic reaction. They collected individual pieces of evidence in order to support or reject the causal relationship between the two events by inspecting individual cases in which the drug was or was not used or in which the allergic reaction appeared or not. Thus, one group (cause group, n=105) was allowed to sample information based on the potential cause, whereas a second group (effect group, n=88) was allowed to sample information based on the effect. Although participants could select which medical records they wanted to check—cases in which the medicine was used or not (in the cause group) or cases in which the effect appeared or not (in the effect group)—they all received similar evidence that indicated the absence of a causal link between the drug and the reaction. After observing 40 cases, they estimated the drug–allergic reaction causal relationship. Results Participants used different strategies for collecting information. In some cases, participants displayed a biased sampling strategy compatible with positive testing, that is, they required a high proportion of evidence in which the drug was administered (in the cause group) or in which the allergic reaction appeared (in the effect group). Biased strategies produced an overrepresentation of certain pieces of evidence at the detriment of the representation of others, which was associated with the accuracy of causal inferences. Thus, how the information was collected (sampling strategy) demonstrated a significant effect on causal inferences (F1,185=32.53, P<.001, η2p=0.15) suggesting that inferences of the causal relationship between events are related to how the information is gathered. Conclusions Mistaken beliefs about health may arise from accurate pieces of information partially because of the way in which information is collected. Patient or person autonomy in gathering health information through the internet, for instance, may contribute to the development of false beliefs from accurate pieces of information because search strategies can be biased.
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Affiliation(s)
- María Manuela Moreno-Fernández
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Faculty of Psychology and Education, University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Helena Matute
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Faculty of Psychology and Education, University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
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14
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Are the symptoms really remitting? How the subjective interpretation of outcomes can produce an illusion of causality. JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 2020. [DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500007506] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/04/2023]
Abstract
AbstractJudgments of a treatment’s effectiveness are usually biased by the probability with which the outcome (e.g., symptom relief) appears: even when the treatment is completely ineffective (i.e., there is a null contingency between cause and outcome), judgments tend to be higher when outcomes appear with high probability. In this research, we present ambiguous stimuli, expecting to find individual differences in the tendency to interpret them as outcomes. In Experiment 1, judgments of effectiveness of a completely ineffective treatment increased with the spontaneous tendency of participants to interpret ambiguous stimuli as outcome occurrences (i.e., healings). In Experiment 2, this interpretation bias was affected by the overall treatment-outcome contingency, suggesting that the tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli as outcomes is learned and context-dependent. In conclusion, we show that, to understand how judgments of effectiveness are affected by outcome probability, we need to also take into account the variable tendency of people to interpret ambiguous information as outcome occurrences.
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15
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Torres MN, Barberia I, Rodríguez-Ferreiro J. Causal illusion as a cognitive basis of pseudoscientific beliefs. Br J Psychol 2020; 111:840-852. [PMID: 32040216 DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12441] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/02/2019] [Revised: 01/15/2020] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Causal illusion has been proposed as a cognitive mediator of pseudoscientific beliefs. However, previous studies have only tested the association between this cognitive bias and a closely related but different type of unwarranted beliefs, those related to superstition and paranormal phenomena. Participants (n = 225) responded to a novel questionnaire of pseudoscientific beliefs designed for this study. They also completed a contingency learning task in which a possible cause, infusion intake, and a desired effect, headache remission, were actually non-contingent. Volunteers with higher scores on the questionnaire also presented stronger causal illusion effects. These results support the hypothesis that causal illusions might play a fundamental role in the endorsement of pseudoscientific beliefs.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marta N Torres
- Departament de Cognició, Desenvolupament i Psicologia de l'Educació, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain.,Institut de Neurociències, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
| | - Itxaso Barberia
- Departament de Cognició, Desenvolupament i Psicologia de l'Educació, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
| | - Javier Rodríguez-Ferreiro
- Departament de Cognició, Desenvolupament i Psicologia de l'Educació, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain.,Institut de Neurociències, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain.,Grup de Recerca en Cognició i Llenguatge, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
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16
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Daprati E, Sirigu A, Desmurget M, Nico D. Superstitious beliefs and the associative mind. Conscious Cogn 2019; 75:102822. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2019.102822] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/26/2019] [Revised: 08/07/2019] [Accepted: 09/12/2019] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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17
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Moderation analysis in two-instance repeated measures designs: Probing methods and multiple moderator models. Behav Res Methods 2019; 51:61-82. [PMID: 30306409 PMCID: PMC6420436 DOI: 10.3758/s13428-018-1088-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 99] [Impact Index Per Article: 19.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Moderation hypotheses appear in every area of psychological science, but the methods for testing and probing moderation in two-instance repeated measures designs are incomplete. This article begins with a short overview of testing and probing interactions in between-participant designs. Next I review the methods outlined in Judd, McClelland, and Smith (Psychological Methods 1; 366-378, 1996) and Judd, Kenny, and McClelland (Psychological Methods 6; 115-134, 2001) for estimating and conducting inference on an interaction between a repeated measures factor and a single between-participant moderator using linear regression. I extend these methods in two ways: First, the article shows how to probe interactions in a two-instance repeated measures design using both the pick-a-point approach and the Johnson-Neyman procedure. Second, I extend the models described by Judd et al. (1996) to multiple-moderator models, including additive and multiplicative moderation. Worked examples with a published dataset are included, to demonstrate the methods described throughout the article. Additionally, I demonstrate how to use Mplus and MEMORE (Mediation and Moderation for Repeated Measures; available at http://akmontoya.com ), an easy-to-use tool available for SPSS and SAS, to estimate and probe interactions when the focal predictor is a within-participant factor, reducing the computational burden for researchers. I describe some alternative methods of analysis, including structural equation models and multilevel models. The conclusion touches on some extensions of the methods described in the article and potentially fruitful areas of further research.
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Blanco F, Matute H. Base-rate expectations modulate the causal illusion. PLoS One 2019; 14:e0212615. [PMID: 30835775 PMCID: PMC6400408 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0212615] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/13/2018] [Accepted: 02/06/2019] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Previous research revealed that people's judgments of causality between a target cause and an outcome in null contingency settings can be biased by various factors, leading to causal illusions (i.e., incorrectly reporting a causal relationship where there is none). In two experiments, we examined whether this causal illusion is sensitive to prior expectations about base-rates. Thus, we pretrained participants to expect either a high outcome base-rate (Experiment 1) or a low outcome base-rate (Experiment 2). This pretraining was followed by a standard contingency task in which the target cause and the outcome were not contingent with each other (i.e., there was no causal relation between them). Subsequent causal judgments were affected by the pretraining: When the outcome base-rate was expected to be high, the causal illusion was reduced, and the opposite was observed when the outcome base-rate was expected to be low. The results are discussed in the light of several explanatory accounts (associative and computational). A rational account of contingency learning based on the evidential value of information can predict our findings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Fernando Blanco
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Helena Matute
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
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Barberia I, Vadillo MA, Rodríguez-Ferreiro J. Persistence of Causal Illusions After Extensive Training. Front Psychol 2019; 10:24. [PMID: 30733692 PMCID: PMC6353834 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/21/2018] [Accepted: 01/07/2019] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
We carried out an experiment using a conventional causal learning task but extending the number of learning trials participants were exposed to. Participants in the standard training group were exposed to 48 learning trials before being asked about the potential causal relationship under examination, whereas for participants in the long training group the length of training was extended to 288 trials. In both groups, the event acting as the potential cause had zero correlation with the occurrence of the outcome, but both the outcome density and the cause density were high, therefore providing a breeding ground for the emergence of a causal illusion. In contradiction to the predictions of associative models such the Rescorla-Wagner model, we found moderate evidence against the hypothesis that extending the learning phase alters the causal illusion. However, assessing causal impressions recurrently did weaken participants’ causal illusions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Itxaso Barberia
- Departament de Cognició, Desenvolupament y Psicologia de la Educació, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
| | - Miguel A Vadillo
- Departamento de Psicología Básica, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
| | - Javier Rodríguez-Ferreiro
- Departament de Cognició, Desenvolupament y Psicologia de la Educació, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain.,Institut de Neurociències, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
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Griffiths O, Shehabi N, Murphy RA, Le Pelley ME. Superstition predicts perception of illusory control. Br J Psychol 2018; 110:499-518. [DOI: 10.1111/bjop.12344] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/23/2017] [Revised: 06/04/2018] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Oren Griffiths
- School of Psychology Flinders University Bedford Park South Australia Australia
| | | | - Robin A. Murphy
- Department of Experimental Psychology University of Oxford UK
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Blanco F, Gómez-Fortes B, Matute H. Causal Illusions in the Service of Political Attitudes in Spain and the United Kingdom. Front Psychol 2018; 9:1033. [PMID: 30002636 PMCID: PMC6032155 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01033] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/17/2017] [Accepted: 06/01/2018] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
The causal illusion is a cognitive bias that results in the perception of causality where there is no supporting evidence. We show that people selectively exhibit the bias, especially in those situations where it favors their current worldview as revealed by their political orientation. In our two experiments (one conducted in Spain and one conducted in the United Kingdom), participants who self-positioned themselves on the ideological left formed the illusion that a left-wing ruling party was more successful in improving city indicators than a right-wing party, while participants on the ideological right tended to show the opposite pattern. In sum, despite the fact that the same information was presented to all participants, people developed the causal illusion bias selectively, providing very different interpretations that aligned with their previous attitudes. This result occurs in situations where participants inspect the relationship between the government's actions and positive outcomes (improving city indicators) but not when the outcomes are negative (worsening city indicators).
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Affiliation(s)
- Fernando Blanco
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | | | - Helena Matute
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
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van Elk M, Lodder P. Experimental Manipulations of Personal Control do Not Increase Illusory Pattern Perception. COLLABRA-PSYCHOLOGY 2018. [DOI: 10.1525/collabra.155] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
We report seven experiments to investigate the effects of control threat manipulations on different measures of illusory pattern perception: magical thinking (Study 1–3), conspiracy beliefs (Study 4), paranormal beliefs (Study 5) and agent detection (Study 6 and 7). Overall we did not find evidence for an effect of control threat on any of our relevant dependent measures. By using Bayesian analyses we obtained positive evidence for the null-hypothesis that an experimentally induced loss of control does not affect illusory pattern perception. Finally, by re-conducting a recent meta-analysis we found strong evidence for publication bias and a relatively small effect size for control-threat manipulations. Together, these results cast doubt on the potential efficacy of experimental autobiographical recall manipulations to manipulate feelings of control.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michiel van Elk
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, NL
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Center, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, NL
| | - Paul Lodder
- Department of Methodology and Statistics, Tilburg University, Tilburg, NL
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Abstract
The purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of a foreign language
on the causality bias (i.e., the illusion that two events are causally related
when they are not). We predict that using a foreign language could reduce the
illusions of causality. A total of 36 native English speakers participated in
Experiment 1, 80 native Spanish speakers in Experiment 2. They performed a
standard contingency learning task, which can be used to detect causal
illusions. Participants who performed the task in their native tongue replicated
the illusion of causality effect, whereas those performing the task in their
foreign language were more accurate in detecting that the two events were
causally unrelated. Our results suggest that presenting the information in a
foreign language could be used as a strategy to debias individuals against
causal illusions, thereby facilitating more accurate judgements and decisions in
non-contingent situations. They also contribute to the debate on the nature and
underlying mechanisms of the foreign language effect, given that the illusion of
causality is rooted in basic associative processes.
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Barberia I, Tubau E, Matute H, Rodríguez-Ferreiro J. A short educational intervention diminishes causal illusions and specific paranormal beliefs in undergraduates. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0191907. [PMID: 29385184 PMCID: PMC5792014 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0191907] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/04/2017] [Accepted: 01/12/2018] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
Cognitive biases such as causal illusions have been related to paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs and, thus, pose a real threat to the development of adequate critical thinking abilities. We aimed to reduce causal illusions in undergraduates by means of an educational intervention combining training-in-bias and training-in-rules techniques. First, participants directly experienced situations that tend to induce the Barnum effect and the confirmation bias. Thereafter, these effects were explained and examples of their influence over everyday life were provided. Compared to a control group, participants who received the intervention showed diminished causal illusions in a contingency learning task and a decrease in the precognition dimension of a paranormal belief scale. Overall, results suggest that evidence-based educational interventions like the one presented here could be used to significantly improve critical thinking skills in our students.
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Affiliation(s)
- Itxaso Barberia
- Departament de Cognició, Desenvolupament y Psicologia de la Educació, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
| | - Elisabet Tubau
- Departament de Cognició, Desenvolupament y Psicologia de la Educació, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
- Institut de Neurociències, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
| | - Helena Matute
- Departamento de Fundamentos y Métodos de la Psicología, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain
| | - Javier Rodríguez-Ferreiro
- Departament de Cognició, Desenvolupament y Psicologia de la Educació, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
- Institut de Neurociències, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
- * E-mail:
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Blanco F. Positive and negative implications of the causal illusion. Conscious Cogn 2017; 50:56-68. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2016.08.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/12/2016] [Revised: 08/09/2016] [Accepted: 08/17/2016] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
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van Elk M. The self-attribution bias and paranormal beliefs. Conscious Cogn 2017; 49:313-321. [PMID: 28236749 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2017.02.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/08/2016] [Revised: 02/02/2017] [Accepted: 02/02/2017] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
The present study investigated the relation between paranormal beliefs, illusory control and the self-attribution bias, i.e., the motivated tendency to attribute positive outcomes to oneself while negative outcomes are externalized. Visitors of a psychic fair played a card guessing game and indicated their perceived control over randomly selected cards as a function of the congruency and valence of the card. A stronger self-attribution bias was observed for paranormal believers compared to skeptics and this bias was specifically related to traditional religious beliefs and belief in superstition. No relation between paranormal beliefs and illusory control was found. Self-report measures indicated that paranormal beliefs were associated to being raised in a spiritual family and to anomalous experiences during childhood. Thereby this study suggests that paranormal beliefs are related to specific cognitive biases that in turn are shaped by socio-cultural factors.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michiel van Elk
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Center, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
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