Motor Cost Influences Perceptual Decisions

Toward a neuroscience of natural behavior

One of the most exciting new developments in systems neuroscience is the progress being made toward neurophysiological experiments that move beyond simplified laboratory settings and address the richness of natural behavior. This is enabled by technological advances such as wireless recording in freely moving animals, automated quantification of behavior, and new methods for analyzing large data sets. Beyond new empirical methods and data, however, there is also a need for new theories and concepts to interpret that data. Such theories need to address the particular challenges of natural behavior, which often differ significantly from the scenarios studied in traditional laboratory settings. Here, we discuss some strategies for developing such novel theories and concepts and some example hypotheses being proposed.

Influence of age and cognitive demand on motor decision making under uncertainty: a study on goal directed reaching movements

In everyday life, we constantly make decisions about actions to be performed subsequently. Research on motor decision making has provided empirical evidence for an influence of decision uncertainty on movement execution in young adults. Further, decision uncertainty was suggested to be increased in older adults due to limited cognitive resources for the integration of information and the prediction of the decision outcomes. However, the influence of cognitive aging on decision uncertainty during motor decision making and movement execution has not been investigated, yet. Thus, in the current study, we presented young and older adults with a motor decision making task, in which participants had to decide on pointing towards one out of five potential targets under varying cognitive demands. Statistical analyses revealed stronger decreases in correctly deciding upon the pointing target, i.e. task performance, from low to higher cognitive demand in older as compared to young adults. Decision confidence also decreased more strongly in older adults with increasing cognitive demand, however, only when collapsing across correct and incorrect decision trials, but not when considering correct decision trials, only. Further, older adults executed reaching movements with longer reaction times and increased path length, though the latter, again, not when considering correct decision trials, only. Last, reaction time and variability in movement execution were both affected by cognitive demand. The outcomes of this study provide a differentiated picture of the distinct and joint effects of aging and cognitive demand during motor decision making.

Explicit effort may not influence perceptuomotor decision-making

Many decisions that humans make are enacted by the action system. For example, humans use reach-to-grasp movements when making perceptuomotor decisions between and obtaining fruits of varying quality from a pile. Recent work suggests that the characteristics of each action alternative may influence the decision itself-there may be a bias away from making perceptuomotor alternatives associated with high effort when participants are unaware of the effort differences between responses. The present study examined if perceptuomotor decisions were influenced by explicit reaching effort differences. Neurotypical human participants were presented with random dot motion stimuli in which most dots moved in random directions and varying percentages of remaining dots moved coherently left- or rightward. Participants reported leftward motion judgements by performing leftward (or left hand) reaching movements and rightward motion judgements by performing rightward (or right hand) reaching movements. A resistance band was affixed to participants' wrists and to the table in different configurations. The configurations allowed for one movement/motion direction judgement to always require stretching of the band and, therefore, require relatively more effort. Across a set of experiments, the response context (i.e. selecting directions within a limb or selecting between limbs) and the effort difference between responses were manipulated. Overall, no experiment revealed a bias away from the perceptuomotor decision associated with high effort. Based on these results, it is concluded that, in this biomechanical context, explicit effort may not influence perceptuomotor decision-making and may point to a contextual influence of action effort on perceptuomotor decision-making.

Beyond simple laboratory studies: Developing sophisticated models to study rich behavior

Psychology and neuroscience are concerned with the study of behavior, of internal cognitive processes, and their neural foundations. However, most laboratory studies use constrained experimental settings that greatly limit the range of behaviors that can be expressed. While focusing on restricted settings ensures methodological control, it risks impoverishing the object of study: by restricting behavior, we might miss key aspects of cognitive and neural functions. In this article, we argue that psychology and neuroscience should increasingly adopt innovative experimental designs, measurement methods, analysis techniques and sophisticated computational models to probe rich, ecologically valid forms of behavior, including social behavior. We discuss the challenges of studying rich forms of behavior as well as the novel opportunities offered by state-of-the-art methodologies and new sensing technologies, and we highlight the importance of developing sophisticated formal models. We exemplify our arguments by reviewing some recent streams of research in psychology, neuroscience and other fields (e.g., sports analytics, ethology and robotics) that have addressed rich forms of behavior in a model-based manner. We hope that these "success cases" will encourage psychologists and neuroscientists to extend their toolbox of techniques with sophisticated behavioral models - and to use them to study rich forms of behavior as well as the cognitive and neural processes that they engage.

Integrated control of non-motor and motor efforts during perceptual decision-making and action execution: a pilot study

Humans daily life is characterized by a succession of voluntary actions. Since energy resources are limited, the ability to invest the appropriate amount of effort for selecting and executing these actions is a hallmark of adapted behavior. Recent studies indicate that decisions and actions share important principles, including the optimization of their duration when the context requires it. In the present pilot study, we test the hypothesis that the management of effort-related energy resources is shared between decision and action too. Healthy human subjects performed a perceptual decision task where they had to choose between two levels of effort to invest in making the decision (i.e. two levels of perceptual difficulty), and report it with a reaching movement. Crucially, the movement accuracy requirement gradually increased from trial to trial depending on participants' decision performance. Results indicate an overall moderate and non-significant impact of the increasing motor difficulty on the choice of the non-motor (decision) effort to invest in each trial and on decision performance. By contrast, motor performance strongly decreased depending on both the motor and decisional difficulties. Together, the results support the hypothesis of an integrated management of the effort-related energy resources between decision and action. They also suggest that in the present task, the mutualized resources are primarily allocated to the decision-making process to the detriment of movements.

Abrupt, but not gradual, motor adaptation biases saccadic target selection

Motor costs influence movement selection. These costs could change when movements are adapted in response to errors. When the motor system attributes the encountered errors to an external cause, appropriate movement selection requires an update of the movement goal, which prompts the selection of a different control policy. However, when errors are attributed to an internal cause, the initially selected control policy could remain unchanged, but the internal forward model of the body needs to be updated, resulting in an online correction of the movement. We hypothesized that external attribution of errors leads to the selection of a different control policy, and thus to a change in the expected cost of movements. This should also affect subsequent motor decisions. Conversely, internal attribution of errors may (initially) only evoke online corrections, and thus is expected to leave the motor decision process unchanged. We tested this hypothesis using a saccadic adaptation paradigm, designed to change the relative motor cost of two targets. Motor decisions were measured using a target selection task between the two saccadic targets before and after adaptation. Adaptation was induced by either abrupt or gradual perturbation schedules, which are thought to induce more external or internal attribution of errors, respectively. By taking individual variability into account, our results show that saccadic decisions shift toward the least costly target after adaptation, but only when the perturbation is abruptly, and not gradually, introduced. We suggest that credit assignment of errors not only influences motor adaptation but also subsequent motor decisions.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Decisions between potential motor actions are influenced by their costs, but costs change when movements are adapted. Using a saccadic target selection task, we show that target preference shifts after abrupt, but not after gradual adaptation. We suggest that this difference emerges because abrupt adaptation results in target remapping, and thus directly influences cost calculations, whereas gradual adaptation is mainly driven by corrections to a forward model that is not involved in cost calculations.

Movement characteristics impact decision-making and vice versa

Previous studies suggest that humans are capable of coregulating the speed of decisions and movements if promoted by task incentives. It is unclear however whether such behavior is inherent to the process of translating decisional information into movements, beyond posing a valid strategy in some task contexts. Therefore, in a behavioral online study we imposed time constraints to either decision- or movement phases of a sensorimotor task, ensuring that coregulating decisions and movements was not promoted by task incentives. We found that participants indeed moved faster when fast decisions were promoted and decided faster when subsequent finger tapping movements had to be executed swiftly. These results were further supported by drift diffusion modelling and inspection of psychophysical kernels: Sensorimotor delays related to initiating the finger tapping sequence were shorter in fast-decision as compared to slow-decision blocks. Likewise, the decisional speed-accuracy tradeoff shifted in favor of faster decisions in fast-tapping as compared to slow-tapping blocks. These findings suggest that decisions not only impact movement characteristics, but that properties of movement impact the time taken to decide. We interpret these behavioral results in the context of embodied decision-making, whereby shared neural mechanisms may modulate decisions and movements in a joint fashion.

Does decision confidence reflect effort?

Goal directed behaviour requires transformation of sensory input to decision, and then to output action. How the sensory input is accumulated to form the decision has been extensively studied, however, the influence of output action on decision making has been largely dismissed. Although the recent emerging view postulates the reciprocal interaction between action and decision, still little is known about how the parameters of an action modulates the decision. In this study, we focused on the physical effort which necessarily entails with action. We tested if the physical effort during the deliberation period of the perceptual decision, not the effort required after deciding a particular option, can impact on the process of forming the decision. Here, we set up an experimental situation where investing effort is necessary for the initiation of the task, but importantly, is orthogonal to success in task performance. The study was pre-registered to test the hypothesis that the increased effort will decrease the metacognitive accuracy of decision, without affecting the decision accuracy. Participants judged the direction of a random-dot motion stimuli, while holding and maintaining the position of a robotic manipulandum with their right hand. In the key experimental condition, the manipulandum produced force to move away from its position, requiring the participants to resist the force while accumulating the sensory evidence for the decision. The decision was reported by a key-press using the left-hand. We found no evidence that such incidental (i.e., non-instrumental) effort may influence the subsequent decision process and most importantly decision confidence. The possible reason for this result and the future direction of the research are discussed.

The influence of movement-related costs when searching to act and acting to search

Real-world search behavior often involves limb movements, either during search or after search. Here we investigated whether movement-related costs influence search behavior in two kinds of search tasks. In our visual search tasks, participants made saccades to find a target object among distractors and then moved a cursor, controlled by the handle of a robotic manipulandum, to the target. In our manual search tasks, participants moved the cursor to perform the search, placing it onto objects to reveal their identity as either a target or a distractor. In all tasks, there were multiple targets. Across experiments, we manipulated either the effort or time costs associated with movement such that these costs varied across the search space. We varied effort by applying different resistive forces to the handle, and we varied time costs by altering the speed of the cursor. Our analysis of cursor and eye movements during manual and visual search, respectively, showed that effort influenced manual search but did not influence visual search. In contrast, time costs influenced both visual and manual search. Our results demonstrate that, in addition to perceptual and cognitive factors, movement-related costs can also influence search behavior.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Numerous studies have investigated the perceptual and cognitive factors that influence decision making about where to look, or move, in search tasks. However, little is known about how search is influenced by movement-related costs associated with acting on an object once it has been visually located or acting during manual search. In this article, we show that movement time costs can bias visual and manual search and that movement effort costs bias manual search.

Motor demands influence conflict processing in a mouse-tracking Simon task

Previous studies have shown incorrect motor activation when making perceptual decisions under conflict, but the potential involvement of motor processes in conflict resolution is still unclear. The present study tested whether the effects of distracting information may be reduced when anticipated motor processing demands increase. Specifically, across two mouse-tracking Simon experiments, we manipulated blockwise motor demands (high vs. low) by requiring participants to move a mouse cursor to either large versus small (Experiment 1) or near versus far (Experiment 2) response boxes presented on the screen. We reasoned that participants would increase action control in blocks with high versus low motor demands and that this would reduce the distracting effect of location-based activation. The results support this hypothesis: Simon effects were reduced under high versus low motor demands and this modulation held even when controlling for time-varying fluctuations in distractor-based activation via distributional analyses (i.e., delta plots). Thus, the present findings indicate that anticipation of different motor costs can influence conflict processing. We propose that the competition between distractor-based and target-based activation is biased at premotor and/or motor stages in anticipation of motor demands, but also discuss alternative implementations of action control.

The dynamics of decision-making and action during active sampling

Embodied Cognition Theories (ECTs) of decision-making propose that the decision process pervades the execution of choice actions and manifests itself in these actions. Decision-making scenarios where actions not only express the choice but also help sample information can provide a valuable, ecologically relevant model for this framework. We present a study to address this paradigmatic situation in humans. Subjects categorized (2AFC task) a central object image, blurred to different extents, by moving a cursor toward the left or right of the display. Upward cursor movements reduced the image blur and could be used to sample information. Thus, actions for decision and actions for sampling were orthogonal to each other. We analyzed response trajectories to test whether information-sampling movements co-occurred with the ongoing decision process. Trajectories were bimodally distributed, with one kind being direct towards one response option (non-sampling), and the other kind containing an initial upward component before veering off towards an option (sampling). This implies that there was an initial decision at the early stage of a trial, whether to sample information or not. Importantly, in sampling trials trajectories were not purely upward, but rather had a significant horizontal deviation early on. This result suggests that movements to sample information exhibit an online interaction with the decision process, therefore supporting the prediction of the ECTs under ecologically relevant constrains.

Dissociating the Impact of Movement Time and Energy Costs on Decision-Making and Action Initiation in Humans

Recent theories and data suggest that adapted behavior involves economic computations during which multiple trade-offs between reward value, accuracy requirement, energy expenditure, and elapsing time are solved so as to obtain rewards as soon as possible while spending the least possible amount of energy. However, the relative impact of movement energy and duration costs on perceptual decision-making and movement initiation is poorly understood. Here, we tested 31 healthy subjects on a perceptual decision-making task in which they executed reaching movements to report probabilistic choices. In distinct blocks of trials, the reaching duration (“Time” condition) and energy (“Effort” condition) costs were independently varied compared to a “Reference” block, while decision difficulty was maintained similar at the block level. Participants also performed a simple delayed-reaching (DR) task aimed at estimating movement initiation duration in each motor condition. Results in that DR task show that long duration movements extended reaction times (RTs) in most subjects, whereas energy-consuming movements led to mixed effects on RTs. In the decision task, about half of the subjects decreased their decision durations (DDs) in the Time condition, while the impact of energy on DDs were again mixed across subjects. Decision accuracy was overall similar across motor conditions. These results indicate that movement duration and, to a lesser extent, energy expenditure, idiosyncratically affect perceptual decision-making and action initiation. We propose that subjects who shortened their choices in the time-consuming condition of the decision task did so to limit a drop of reward rate.

The importance of urgency in decision making based on dynamic information

A standard view in the literature is that decisions are the result of a process that accumulates evidence in favor of each alternative until such accumulation reaches a threshold and a decision is made. However, this view has been recently questioned by an alternative proposal that suggests that, instead of accumulated, evidence is combined with an urgency signal. Both theories have been mathematically formalized and supported by a variety of decision-making tasks with constant information. However, recently, tasks with changing information have shown to be more effective to study the dynamics of decision making. Recent research using one of such tasks, the tokens task, has shown that decisions are better described by an urgency mechanism than by an accumulation one. However, the results of that study could depend on a task where all fundamental information was noiseless and always present, favoring a mechanism of non-integration, such as the urgency one. Here, we wanted to address whether the same conclusions were also supported by an experimental paradigm in which sensory evidence was removed shortly after it was provided, making working memory necessary to properly perform the task. Here, we show that, under such condition, participants' behavior could be explained by an urgency-gating mechanism that low-pass filters the mnemonic information and combines it with an urgency signal that grows with time but not by an accumulation process that integrates the same mnemonic information. Thus, our study supports the idea that, under certain situations with dynamic sensory information, decisions are better explained by an urgency-gating mechanism than by an accumulation one.

The road towards understanding embodied decisions

Most current decision-making research focuses on classical economic scenarios, where choice offers are prespecified and where action dynamics play no role in the decision. However, our brains evolved to deal with different choice situations: "embodied decisions". As examples of embodied decisions, consider a lion that has to decide which gazelle to chase in the savannah or a person who has to select the next stone to jump on when crossing a river. Embodied decision settings raise novel questions, such as how people select from time-varying choice options and how they track the most relevant choice attributes; but they have long remained challenging to study empirically. Here, we summarize recent progress in the study of embodied decisions in sports analytics and experimental psychology. Furthermore, we introduce a formal methodology to identify the relevant dimensions of embodied choices (present and future affordances) and to map them into the attributes of classical economic decisions (probabilities and utilities), hence aligning them. Studying embodied decisions will greatly expand our understanding of what decision-making is.

Action Costs Rapidly and Automatically Interfere with Reward-Based Decision-Making in a Reaching Task

It is widely assumed that we select actions we value the most. While the influence of rewards on decision-making has been extensively studied, evidence regarding the influence of motor costs is scarce. Specifically, how and when motor costs are integrated in the decision process is unclear. Twenty-two right-handed human participants performed a reward-based target selection task by reaching with their right arm toward one of two visual targets. Targets were positioned in different directions according to biomechanical preference, such that one target was systematically associated with a lower motor cost than the other. Only one of the two targets was rewarded, either in a congruent or incongruent manner with respect to the associated motor cost. A timed-response paradigm was used to manipulate participants' reaction times (RT). Results showed that when the rewarded target carried the highest motor cost, movements produced at short RT (<350 ms) were deviated toward the other (i.e., non-rewarded, low-cost (LC) target). In this context participants needed an additional 150-ms delay to reach the same percentage of rewarded trials as when the LC target was rewarded. Crucially, motor costs affected the total earnings of participants. These results demonstrate a robust interference of motor costs in a simple reward-based decision-making task. They point to the rapid and automatic integration of motor costs at an early stage of processing, potentially through the direct modulation of competing action representations in parieto-frontal regions. The progressive overcoming of this bias with increasing RT is likely achieved through top-down signaling pertaining to expected rewards.

Perspective determines the production and interpretation of pointing gestures

Pointing is a ubiquitous means of communication. Nevertheless, observers systematically misinterpret the location indicated by pointers. We examined whether these misunderstandings result from the typically different viewpoints of pointers and observers. Participants either pointed themselves or interpreted points while assuming the pointer's or a typical observer perspective in a virtual reality environment. The perspective had a strong effect on the relationship between pointing gestures and referents, whereas the task had only a minor influence. This suggests that misunderstandings between pointers and observers primarily result from their typically different viewpoints.

A Network Activity Reconfiguration Underlies the Transition from Goal to Action

Neurons in prefrontal cortex (PF) represent mnemonic information about current goals until the action can be selected and executed. However, the neuronal dynamics underlying the transition from goal into specific actions are poorly understood. Here, we show that the goal-coding PF network is dynamically reconfigured from mnemonic to action selection states and that such reconfiguration is mediated by cell assemblies with heterogeneous excitability. We recorded neuronal activity from PF while monkeys selected their actions on the basis of memorized goals. Many PF neurons encoded the goal, but only a minority of them did so across both memory retention and action selection stages. Interestingly, about half of this minority of neurons switched their goal preference across the goal-action transition. Our computational model led us to propose a PF network composed of heterogeneous cell assemblies with single-state and bistable local dynamics able to produce both dynamical stability and input susceptibility simultaneously.

Humans sacrifice decision-making for action execution when a demanding control of movement is required

A growing body of evidence suggests that decision-making and action execution are governed by partly overlapping operating principles. Especially, previous work proposed that a shared decision urgency/movement vigor signal, possibly computed in the basal ganglia, coordinates both deliberation and movement durations in a way that maximizes the reward rate. Recent data support one aspect of this hypothesis, indicating that the urgency level at which a decision is made influences the vigor of the movement produced to express this choice. Here we investigated whether, conversely, the motor context in which a movement is executed determines decision speed and accuracy. Twenty human subjects performed a probabilistic decision task in which perceptual choices were expressed by reaching movements toward targets whose size and distance from a starting position varied in distinct blocks of trials. We found strong evidence for an influence of the motor context on most of the subjects' decision policy, but contrary to the predictions of the "shared regulation" hypothesis, we observed that slow movements executed in the most demanding motor blocks in terms of accuracy were often preceded by faster and less accurate decisions compared with blocks of trials in which big targets allowed expression of choices with fast and inaccurate movements. These results suggest that decision-making and motor control are not regulated by one unique "invigoration" signal determining both decision urgency and action vigor, but more likely by independent, yet interacting, decision urgency and movement vigor signals.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Recent hypotheses propose that choices and movements share optimization principles derived from economy, possibly implemented by one unique context-dependent regulation signal determining both processes' speed. In the present behavioral study conducted on human subjects, we demonstrate that action properties indeed influence perceptual decision-making, but that decision duration and action vigor are actually independently set depending on the difficulty of the movement executed to report a choice.

Choices in a key press decision-making task are more optimal after gaining both aiming and reward experience

When presented with two different target-penalty configurations of similar maximum expected gain (MEG), participants prefer aiming to configurations with more advantageous spatial, rather than more advantageous gain parameters-perhaps due to the motor system's inherent prioritisation of spatial information during movements with high accuracy demands such as aiming. To test this hypothesis, participants in the present studies chose between target-penalty configurations via key presses to reduce the importance of spatial parameters of the response and performance-related feedback. Configurations varied in spatial (target-penalty region overlap) and gain parameters (negative penalty values) and could have similar or different MEG. Choices were made without prior aiming experience (Experiment 1), after aiming experience provided information of movement variability (Experiment 2), or after aiming experience provided information of movement variability and outcome feedback (Experiment 3). Overall, configurations with advantageous spatial or gain parameters were chosen equally (Both-Similar condition) in all experiments. However, average behaviour at the group level was not reflective of the behaviour of most individual participants with three subgroups emerging: those with a value preference, distance preference, or no preference. In Experiments 1 and 2, these individual differences cannot be explained by MEG differences between configurations or participants' movement variability, but these variables predicted choice behaviour in Experiment 3. Further in the Both-Different condition, participants only selected the larger MEG configuration at a level above chance when both variability and outcome information were given prior to the key press task (Experiment 3). In sum, the data indicate that prioritisation of spatial information did not emerge at the group level when performing key presses and more optimal behaviour emerged when information regarding movement variability and outcome feedback were given.

Beyond reach: Do symmetric changes in motor costs affect decision making? A registered report

Executing an important decision can be as easy as moving a mouse cursor or reaching towards the preferred option with a hand. But would we decide differently if choosing required walking a few steps towards an option? More generally, is our preference invariant to the means and motor costs of reporting it? Previous research demonstrated that asymmetric motor costs can nudge the decision-maker towards a less costly option. However, virtually all traditional decision-making theories predict that increasing motor costs symmetrically for all options should not affect choice in any way. This prediction is disputed by the theory of embodied cognition, which suggests that motor behavior is an integral part of cognitive processes, and that motor costs can affect our choices. In this registered report, we investigated whether varying motor costs can affect response dynamics and the final choices in an intertemporal choice task: choosing between a readily available small reward and a larger but delayed reward. Our study compared choices reported by moving a computer mouse cursor towards the preferred option with the choices executed via a more motor costly walking procedure. First, we investigated whether relative values of the intertemporal choice options affect walking trajectories in the same way as they affect mouse cursor dynamics. Second, we tested a hypothesis that, in the walking condition, increased motor costs of a preference reversal would decrease the number of changes-of-mind and therefore increase the proportion of impulsive, smaller-but-sooner choices. We confirmed the hypothesis that walking trajectories reflect covert dynamics of decision making, and rejected the hypothesis that increased motor costs of responding affect decisions in an intertemporal choice task. Overall, this study contributes to the empirical basis enabling the decision-making theories to address the complex interplay between cognitive and motor processes.

Reaching trajectories unravel modality-dependent temporal dynamics of the automatic process in the Simon task: a model-based approach

The Simon effect represents a phenomenon in which the location of the stimuli affects the speed and accuracy of the response, despite being irrelevant for the task demands. This is believed to be due to an automatic activation of a response corresponding to the location of the stimuli, which conflicts with the controlled decision process based on relevant stimuli features. Previously, differences in the nature of the Simon effect (i.e., the pattern of change of the effect across the distribution of response times) between visual and somatosensory stimuli were reported. We hypothesize that the temporal dynamics of visual and somatosensory automatic and controlled processes vary, thus driving the reported behavioral differences. While most studies have used response times to study the underlying mechanisms involved, in this study we had participants reach out to touch the targets and recorded their arm movements using a motion capture system. Importantly, the participants started their movements before a final decision was made. In this way, we could analyze the movements to gain insights into the competition between the automatic and controlled processes. We used this technique to describe the results in terms of a model assuming automatic activation due to location-based evidence, followed by inhibition. We found that for the somatosensory Simon effect, the decay of the automatic process is significantly slower than for the visual Simon effect, suggesting quantitative differences in this automatic process between the visual and somatosensory modalities.

The impact of anatomical and spatial distance between responses on response conflict

Different features of objects can be associated with different responses, so that their concurrent presence results in conflict. The Simon effect is a prominent example of this type of response conflict. In two experiments, we ask whether it is modulated by the anatomical or spatial relation between responses. Predictions were derived from an extended variant of the leaky, competing accumulator (LCA) model proposed by Usher and McClelland (Psychological Review, 108, 550-592, 2001). The relation between responses was represented by the lateral-inhibition parameter of the model. For the anatomical distance between responses the expectations were largely confirmed, but not for spatial distance. First, the Simon effect was stronger when responses were performed with two fingers of the same hand than with different hands. Second, the Simon effect was larger only for responses with different hands at short reaction times and disappeared at long ones, whereas for responses with fingers of the same hand, the Simon effect was essentially the same for shorter and longer reaction times. This difference resulted in smaller variability of reaction times in noncorresponding than in corresponding conditions. The dependence of decision processes, as modelled by the LCA model, on the anatomical relation between responses supports the broad hypothesis that the accumulation of evidence on the state of the world is intricately linked with the activation of response codes, that is, the selection of the appropriate actions.

Perceived effort for motor control and decision-making

How effort is internally quantified and how it influences both movement generation and decisions between potential movements are 2 difficult questions to answer. Physical costs are known to influence motor control and decision-making, yet we lack a general, principled characterization of how the perception of effort operates across tasks and conditions. Morel and colleagues introduce an insightful approach to that end, assessing effort indifference points and presenting a quadratic law between perceived effort and force production.

Perceptual Decision-Making: Picking the Low-Hanging Fruit?

How do we decide what we perceive? Obviously, we base our decisions on sensory evidence. However, a new and surprising study by Hagura et al. shows that our perceptual decisions are also biased by the action costs that are associated with our decisions.

Perceptual decisions are biased by the cost to act

Perceptual decisions are classically thought to depend mainly on the stimulus characteristics, probability and associated reward. However, in many cases, the motor response is considered to be a neutral output channel that only reflects the upstream decision. Contrary to this view, we show that perceptual decisions can be recursively influenced by the physical resistance applied to the response. When participants reported the direction of the visual motion by left or right manual reaching movement with different resistances, their reports were biased towards the direction associated with less effortful option. Repeated exposure to such resistance on hand during perceptual judgements also biased subsequent judgements using voice, indicating that effector-dependent motor costs not only biases the report at the stage of motor response, but also changed how the sensory inputs are transformed into decisions. This demonstrates that the cost to act can influence our decisions beyond the context of the specific action.

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.18422.001

Imagine you are in an orchard, trying to decide which of the many apples to pick. On what do you base your decision? Most research into this type of decision-making has focused on how the brain uses visual information – about features such as colour, size and shape – to make a choice. But what about the effort required to obtain the apple? Does an apple at the top of the tree look more or less tempting than the low-hanging fruit?

To answer this kind of question, Hagura et al. asked volunteers to decide whether dots on a screen were moving to the left or to the right. The volunteers indicated their choice by moving one of two levers. If they thought the dots were moving to the right, they moved a lever in their right hand. If they thought the dots were moving to the left, they moved a lever in their left hand. What the volunteers did not know, however, is that one of the levers was slightly heavier and therefore harder to move than the other.

Hagura et al. found that the volunteers biased their decisions away from the direction that would require the most effort. If the right-hand lever was heavier, the volunteers decided that dots with ambiguous motion were moving to the left. Those for whom the left-hand lever was heavier felt that the same dots were moving to the right. The participants showed this bias despite failing to notice that the levers had different weights. Moreover, they continued to show the bias even when subsequently asked to simply say their answers rather than use the levers.

These results indicate that the effort required to act on a decision can influence the decision itself. The fact that participants were biased even when responding verbally, and despite being unaware that the levers differed in weight, suggests that they were not deliberately choosing the easier option. Instead, the cost to act changed how they perceived the stimuli themselves. The findings also suggest that it might be possible to help people make better decisions by designing environments in which less favourable options require more effort.

DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.18422.002

Motor cortex activity predicts response alternation during sensorimotor decisions

Our actions are constantly guided by decisions based on sensory information. The motor cortex is traditionally viewed as the final output stage in this process, merely executing motor responses based on these decisions. However, it is not clear if, beyond this role, the motor cortex itself impacts response selection. Here, we report activity fluctuations over motor cortex measured using MEG, which are unrelated to choice content and predict responses to a visuomotor task seconds before decisions are made. These fluctuations are strongly influenced by the previous trial's response and predict a tendency to switch between response alternatives for consecutive decisions. This alternation behaviour depends on the size of neural signals still present from the previous response. Our results uncover a response-alternation bias in sensorimotor decision making. Furthermore, they suggest that motor cortex is more than an output stage and instead shapes response selection during sensorimotor decision making.

The motor cortex executes responses based on sensory choices, but it is unknown whether it also impacts response selection. Here, Pape and Siegel show that motor cortex activity present before decision making predicts responses and that this activity is influenced by previous button-presses.