Why We Should Develop a Regulated System of Kidney Sales: A Call for Action!: Table 1

Projecting the Economic Impact of Compensating Living Kidney Donors in the United States: Cost-Benefit Analysis Demonstrates Substantial Patient and Societal Gains

OBJECTIVES

The aim of this study was to show how the US government could save approximately 47 000 patients with chronic kidney failure each year from suffering on dialysis and premature death by compensating living kidney donors enough to completely end the kidney shortage.

METHODS

Supply and demand analysis was used to estimate the number of donated kidneys needed to end the kidney shortage and the level of compensation required to encourage this number of donations. These results were then input into a detailed cost-benefit analysis to estimate the economic value of kidney transplantation to (1) the average kidney recipient and their caregiver, (2) taxpayers, and (3) society in general.

RESULTS

We estimate half of patients diagnosed with kidney failure each year-approximately 62 000 patients-could be saved from suffering on dialysis and premature death if they could receive an average of 1½ kidney transplants. However, currently there are only enough donated kidneys to save approximately 15 000 patients. To encourage sufficient donations to save the other 47 000 patients, the government would have to compensate living kidney donors approximately $77 000 (±50%) per donor. The value of transplantation to an average kidney recipient (and caregiver) would be approximately $1.5 million, and the savings from the recipient not needing expensive dialysis treatments would be approximately $1.2 million.

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis reveals the huge benefit that compensating living kidney donors would provide to patients with kidney failure and their caregivers and, conversely, the huge cost that is being imposed on these patients and their families by the current legal prohibition against such compensation.

Kidneys for Sale: Empirical Evidence From Iran

The kidney market in Iran is the only legal market of this sort globally. Yet, it has not been empirically studied based on real data. For the first time, we obtained data on donors and recipients from the Kidney Foundation in Mashhad, April 2011 up to March 2018, and assessed which individualistic characteristics contribute to a kidney’s price. Our findings indicate that each year of education for both donors and recipients increases the kidney price. Moreover, old patients are willing to make a higher payment to young vendors. We have also provided some policy implications to improve the efficiency of kidney allocations.

Commodification of biomaterials and data when funding is contingent to transfer in biobank research

It is common practice for biobanks and biobank researchers to seek funding from agencies that are independent of the biobank that often stipulate conditions requiring researchers to grant access and share biomaterials and data as part of the agreement, in particular, in international collaborative health research. As yet, to the author's knowledge, there has been no study conducted to examine whether these conditions could result in the commercialization of biomaterials and data and whether such practice is considered ethical. This paper therefore seeks to answer the question of whether such sharing of biomaterials and data for biobank research in exchange for funding from sponsors and funders in collaborative health research is ethically justified. The central idea of this paper is based on an argument against commodification of the body and its parts, which includes biomaterials and data and holds that it is ethically wrong to commodify humans and their body parts. The arguments against commodification of biomaterials and data explored are the Kantian approach argument as it relates to interference of commodification with human dignity which is linked to a diminished sense of personhood, an argument against commodification that is based on a dilution of altruism and lastly the communitarian approach anti-commodification argument which emphasizes a social responsibility to the common good. Arguments in support of commodification based on liberal individualism and consequentialism are also discussed.

Radical actions to address UK organ shortage, enacting Iran’s paid donation programme: A discussion paper

Globally there is a shortage of organs available for transplant resulting in thousands of lives lost as a result. Recently in the United Kingdom 457 people died as a result of organ shortage in just 1 year. 1 NHS Blood and Transplant suggest national debates to test public attitudes to radical actions to increase organ donation should be considered in addressing organ shortage. The selling of organs for transplant in the United Kingdom is prohibited under the Human Tissue Act 2004. This discussion paper considers five ethical objections raised in the United Kingdom to paid donation and discusses how these objections are addressed within the only legal and regulated paid living unrelated renal donation programme in the world in Iran, where its kidney transplant list was eliminated within 2 years of its commencement. This article discusses whether paid living unrelated donation in Iran increases riskier donations and reduced altruistic donation as opponents of paid donation claim. The paper debates whether objections to paid donation based upon commodification arguments only oppose enabling financial ends, even if these ends enable beneficent acts. Discussions in relation to whether valid consent can be given by the donor will take place and will also debate the objection that donors will be coerced and exploited by a paid model. This article suggests that exploitation of the paid donor within the Iranian model exists within the legally permitted framework. However, paid living kidney donation should be discussed further and other models of paid donation considered in the United Kingdom as a radical means of increasing donation.

The present and future of transplant organ shortage: some potential remedies

Transplantation remains the modality of choice for patients with end stage renal disease (ESRD). However, while there has been a steady rise in the number of patients with ESRD the supply of donors (combine living and deceased) has fallen far behind the need, resulting in an increasing number of qualified patients remaining on the wait-list, and thousands being removed from the list every year because of death or becoming too sick for transplantation. This has also fed to transplant tourism around the world. Several countries have implemented a variety of policies to overcome their organ shortage that are presented in this article. There is an urgent need for developing policies geared to the cultural norms of different societies and universally accepted ethical principles to remedy this public health issue.

Would government compensation of living kidney donors exploit the poor? An empirical analysis

Government compensation of kidney donors would likely increase the supply of kidneys and prevent the premature deaths of tens of thousands of patients with kidney failure each year. The major argument against it is that it would exploit the poor who would be more likely to accept the offers of compensation. This overlooks the fact that many poor patients desperately need a kidney transplant and would greatly benefit from an increased supply of kidneys. The objective of this study is to empirically test the hypothesis that government compensation of kidney donors would exploit the poor. Exploitation is defined by economists and several noted ethicists as paying donors less than the fair market value of their kidney. Exploitation is expressed in monetary terms and compared with the economic benefit recipients receive from a transplant. Data are from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients and the United States Renal Data System annual data reports. Educational attainment is used as a proxy for income. We estimate that if the government rewards living donors with a package of non-cash benefits worth $75,000 per kidney, donors would not be exploited. Much more important, this compensation would likely end the kidney shortage, enabling many more patients with kidney failure to obtain transplants and live longer and healthier lives. The value of kidney transplantation to a U.S. recipient is about $1,330,000, which is an order of magnitude greater than any purported exploitation of a living donor (zero to $75,000). Consequently, the aggregate net benefit to the poor alone from kidney transplantation would increase to about $12 billion per year from $1 billion per year currently. Most of the benefit would accrue to poor kidney recipients. But poor donors would receive the fair market value of their kidney, and hence would not be exploited. If the government wanted to ensure that donors also received a net benefit, it could easily do so by increasing the compensation above $75,000 per donor.

Kidney sales and the analogy with dangerous employment

Proponents of permitting living kidney sales often argue as follows. Many jobs involve significant risks; people are and should be free to take these risks in exchange for money; the risks involved in giving up a kidney are no greater than the risks involved in acceptable hazardous jobs; so people should be free to give up a kidney for money, too. This paper examines this frequently invoked but rarely analysed analogy. Two objections are raised. First, it is far from clear that kidney sales and dangerous jobs involve comparable risks on an appropriately broad comparison. Second, and more importantly, even if they do involve comparable risks it does not follow that kidney sales must be permitted because dangerous jobs are. The analogy assumes that kidney sales are banned for paternalistic reasons. But there may be other, non-paternalistic reasons for the ban. And paternalists, too, can consistently defend the ban even if kidney sales are no riskier than occupations that they find acceptable. Soft paternalists may want to protect would-be vendors from harms that they have not voluntarily chosen. Egalitarian hard paternalists may want to protect already badly off vendors from further worsening their situation. For neither species of paternalist is the size of the risk prevented decisive. I conclude that the analogy with dangerous jobs, while rhetorically powerful, pulls little real argumentative weight. Future debates on living kidney sales should therefore proceed without it.

Focus group study of public opinion about paying living kidney donors in Australia

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The unmet demand for kidney transplantation has generated intense controversy about introducing incentives for living kidney donors to increase donation rates. Such debates may affect public perception and acceptance of living kidney donation. This study aims to describe the range and depth of public opinion on financial reimbursement, compensation, and incentives for living kidney donors.

DESIGN, SETTING, PARTICIPANTS, & MEASUREMENTS

Twelve focus groups were conducted with 113 participants recruited from the general public in three Australian states in February 2013. Thematic analysis was used to analyze the transcripts.

RESULTS

Five themes were identified: creating ethical impasses (commodification of the body, quandary of kidney valuation, pushing moral boundaries), corrupting motivations (exposing the vulnerable, inevitable abuse, supplanting altruism), determining justifiable risk (compromising kidney quality, undue harm, accepting a confined risk, trusting protective mechanisms, right to autonomy), driving access (urgency of organ shortage, minimizing disadvantage, guaranteeing cost-efficiency, providing impetus, counteracting black markets), and honoring donor deservingness (fairness and reason, reassurance and rewards, merited recompense). Reimbursement and justifiable recompense are considered by the Australian public as a legitimate way of supporting donors and reducing disadvantage. Financial payment beyond reimbursement is regarded as morally reprehensible, with the potential for exploitative commercialism. Some contend that regulated compensation could be a defensible strategy to increased donation rates provided that mechanisms are in place to protect donors.

CONCLUSIONS

The perceived threat to community values of human dignity, goodwill, and fairness suggests that there could be strong public resistance to any form of financial inducements for living kidney donors. Policy priorities addressing the removal of disincentives may be more acceptable to the public.

Between Scylla and Charybdis: charting an ethical course for research into financial incentives for living kidney donation

New approaches to address the kidney scarcity in the United States are urgently needed. The greatest potential source of kidneys is from living donors. Proposals to offer financial incentives to increase living kidney donation rates remain highly controversial. Despite repeated calls for a pilot study to assess the impact of financial compensation on living kidney donation rates, many fear that financial incentives will exploit vulnerable individuals and cast the field of transplantation in a negative public light, ultimately reducing donation rates. This paper provides an ethical justification for conducting a pilot study of a federally regulated approach to providing financial incentives to living kidney donors, with the goal of assessing donors' perceptions.

Human organ markets and inherent human dignity

It has been suggested that human organs should be bought and sold on a regulated market as any other material property belongingto an individual. This would have the advantage of both addressing the grave shortage of organs available for transplantation and respecting the freedom of individuals to choose to do whatever they want with their body parts. The old arguments against such a market in human organs are, therefore, being brought back into question. The article examines the different arguments both in favour and against the sale of human organs. It concludes that the body and any of its elements is a full expression of the whole person. As such, they cannot have a price if the individual is to retain his or her full inherent dignity and if society is to retain and protect this very important concept.

Altruism, gift giving and reciprocity in organ donation: a review of cultural perspectives and challenges of the concepts

Living and deceased organ donation are couched in altruism and gift discourse and this article reviews explores cultural views towards these concepts. Altruism and egoism theories and gift and reciprocity theories are outlined from a social exchange theory perspective to highlight the key differences between altruism and the gift and the wider implications of reciprocation. The notion of altruism as a selfless act without expectation or want for repayment juxtaposed with the Maussian gift where there are the obligations to give, receive and reciprocate. Lay perspectives of altruism and the gift in organ donation are outlined and illustrate that there are differences in motivations to donate in different programmes of living donation and for families who decide to donate their relative's organs. These motivations reflect cultural views of altruism and the gift and perceptions of the body and death.

Bioethics of organ transplantation

As the ability to transplant organs and tissues has grown, the demand for these procedures has increased as well--to the point at which it far exceeds the available supply creating the core ethical challenge for transplantation--rationing. The gap between supply and demand, although large, is worse than it appears to be. There are two key steps to gaining access to a transplant. First, one must gain access to a transplant center. Then, those waiting need to be selected for a transplant. Many potential recipients do not get admitted to a program. They are deemed too old, not of the right nationality, not appropriate for transplant as a result of severe mental impairment, criminal history, drug abuse, or simply because they do not have access to a competent primary care physician who can refer them to a transplant program. There are also financial obstacles to access to transplant waiting lists in the United States and other nations. In many poor nations, those needing transplants simply die because there is no capacity or a very limited capacity to perform transplants. Although the demand for organs now exceeds the supply, resulting in rationing, the size of waiting lists would quickly expand were there to suddenly be an equally large expansion in the number of organs available for transplantation. Still, even with the reality of unavoidable rationing, saving more lives by increasing organ supply is a moral good. Current public policies for obtaining organs from cadavers are not adequate in that they do not produce the number of organs that public polls of persons in the United States indicate people are willing to donate.

Kidney sales and the analogy with dangerous employment

Proponents of permitting living kidney sales often argue as follows. Many jobs involve significant risks; people are and should be free to take these risks in exchange for money; the risks involved in giving up a kidney are no greater than the risks involved in acceptable hazardous jobs; so people should be free to give up a kidney for money, too. This paper examines this frequently invoked but rarely analysed analogy. Two objections are raised. First, it is far from clear that kidney sales and dangerous jobs involve comparable risks on an appropriately broad comparison. Second, and more importantly, even if they do involve comparable risks it does not follow that kidney sales must be permitted because dangerous jobs are. The analogy assumes that kidney sales are banned for paternalistic reasons. But there may be other, non-paternalistic reasons for the ban. And paternalists, too, can consistently defend the ban even if kidney sales are no riskier than occupations that they find acceptable. Soft paternalists may want to protect would-be vendors from harms that they have not voluntarily chosen. Egalitarian hard paternalists may want to protect already badly off vendors from further worsening their situation. For neither species of paternalist is the size of the risk prevented decisive. I conclude that the analogy with dangerous jobs, while rhetorically powerful, pulls little real argumentative weight. Future debates on living kidney sales should therefore proceed without it.

In defense of a regulated system of compensation for living donation

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

The organ shortage is the major problem in kidney transplantation today. Despite aggressive organ procurement efforts, the supply of donated kidneys, living and deceased, has not matched the growing demand; as a consequence, more and more qualified candidates are suffering on dialysis and then dying before being transplanted. Herein, we provide justification for a regulated system of compensation for donation.

RECENT FINDINGS

The main argument in favor of compensation is simple-financial incentives will increase donation, so fewer transplant candidates will suffer and die while waiting. In addition, development of a regulated system of compensation is the most effective means of crippling the core economic support for transplant tourism. Because dialysis is so much more expensive than a transplant, compensated donation could be cost-neutral to the healthcare system. Importantly, opinion polls suggest that the public would support compensation. As uncompensated kidney donation is widely accepted, persuasive arguments against compensation must explain why such a system would be morally distinguishable from uncompensated donation.

SUMMARY

We suggest that the potential advantages of a regulated system of compensation for donation far outweigh any potential disadvantages. It is time to advocate for a change in the law so that trials can be done.

The Iranian model of living renal transplantation

Organ shortage for transplantation remains a worldwide serious problem for kidney patients with end-stage renal failure, and several countries have tried different models to address this issue. Iran has 20 years of experience with one such model that involves the active role of the government and charity foundations. Patients with a desperate demand for a kidney have given rise to a black market of brokers and other forms of organ commercialism only accessible to those with sufficient financial resources. The current Iranian model has enabled most of the Iranian kidney transplant candidates, irrespective of socioeconomic class, to have access to kidney transplantation. The Iranian government has committed a large budget through funding hospital and staff at the Ministry of Health and Medical Education by supporting the brain death donation (BDD) program or redirecting part of the budget of living unrelated renal donation (LURD) to the BDD program. It has been shown that it did not prevent the development and progression of a BDD program. However, the LURD program is characterized by several controversial procedures (e.g., confrontation of donor and recipient at the end of the evaluation procedure along with some financial interactions) that should be ethically reviewed. Operational weaknesses such as the lack of a registration system and long-term follow-up of the donors are identified as the 'Achilles heel of the model'.

How different conceptions of risk are used in the organ market debate

The success of kidney and liver transplantation is hindered by a shortage of organs available for transplantation. Although currently illegal in nearly all parts of the world, a living 'donor' or 'vendor' kidney market has been proposed as a means to reduce or even end this shortage. Physician members of the American Society of Transplantation, the American Society of Transplant Surgeons and the American Association for the Study of Liver Disease were surveyed regarding organ markets for both living kidney and living liver transplantation. The survey queried respondents about their attitudes toward directed living donation, nondirected living donation, the potential legalization of living donor organ markets and the reasons for their support or opposition to organ markets. Partial or completed surveys were returned by 346 of 697 eligible respondents (50%). While virtually all supported or strongly supported directed living donation (98% and 95% for kidney and liver lobes, respectively), the vast majority disagreed or strongly disagreed with the legalization of living donor organ markets (80% for kidneys and 90% for liver lobes). Both those who support and those who oppose a legalized living donor organ market rate risk to the donor among the most important factors to justify their position.

Incentivizing living organ donation

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

The number of organs available for the patients on the transplant waitlist remains at a disproportionate low. All possible methods to curtail this shortage, including providing donors with incentives, have been proposed. This article reviews recent publications addressing the benefits and risks involved in incentivizing living donation.

RECENT FINDINGS

The debate about the ethics, feasibility, and possible models for compensating organ donors has been prominent in recent literature. As certain countries take lead on this initiative, others are cautiously weighing in on the impact implementations of such policies may have on the society, especially on the underprivileged.

SUMMARY

The shortage of organs has resulted in proposal of strategies that encroach on certain moral and ethical principles. Providing incentives to donors is one such strategy that is likely to receive a lot of attention in the next few years.

Trends in unrelated-donor kidney transplantation in the developing world

Living unrelated donors (LUDs) constitute an incremental source of kidneys for transplantation at a global level. Excellent outcomes are reported, superior to those of deceased-donor transplantation and comparable to related donor transplantation. LUD include six categories: spouses, distant relatives, paired-exchange, living-deceased exchange, and non-directed and directed donors. Although a financial reward may be involved in any of these categories, it is in the declared selling of organs that ethical concerns have intensified. There are three patterns of paid LUDs in the developing world: organized, erratic and commercial. The only model of organized LUDs is in Iran, where a central agency assigns and compensates the donors. Erratic LUD transplantation has been experienced, and subsequently banned, in the development of transplant programmes in most developing countries. However, the tightness and enforcement of the official ban are geographically different, providing variable room for uncontrolled trafficking. Commercial transplantation has, thus, become phenomenal in a few countries, gradually evolving into an organized business that follows market dynamics, including advertisement, brokerage, commissions, auctions and tourism. While most international organizations and activist groups condemn commercial transplantation, it is often perceived, in certain cultures and under particular socioeconomic standards, as a human right that meets the demands of all stakeholders, and should be organized rather than declined just for the purpose of meeting the values of a third party.