Neuro-cognitive mechanisms of conscious and unconscious visual perception: From a plethora of phenomena to general principles

Metacognitive Awareness and the Subjective Experience of Remembering in Aphantasia

Individuals with aphantasia, a nonclinical condition typically characterized by mental imagery deficits, often report reduced episodic memory. However, findings have hitherto rested largely on subjective self-reports, with few studies experimentally investigating both objective and subjective aspects of episodic memory in aphantasia. In this study, we tested both aspects of remembering in aphantasic individuals using a custom 3-D object and spatial memory task that manipulated visuospatial perspective, which is considered to be a key factor determining the subjective experience of remembering. Objective and subjective measures of memory performance were taken for both object and spatial memory features under different perspective conditions. Surprisingly, aphantasic participants were found to be unimpaired on all objective memory measures, including those for object memory features, despite reporting weaker overall mental imagery experience and lower subjective vividness ratings on the memory task. These results add to newly emerging evidence that aphantasia is a heterogenous condition, where some aphantasic individuals may lack metacognitive awareness of mental imagery rather than mental imagery itself. In addition, we found that both participant groups remembered object memory features with greater precision when encoded and retrieved in the first person versus third person, suggesting a first-person perspective might facilitate subjective memory reliving by enhancing the representational quality of scene contents.

Subjective and objective measures of visual awareness converge

Within consciousness research, the most appropriate assessment of visual awareness is matter of a controversial debate: Subjective measures rely on introspections of the observer related to perceptual experiences, whereas objective measures are based on performance of the observer to accurately detect or discriminate the stimulus in question across a series of trials. In the present study, we compared subjective and objective awareness measurements across different stimulus feature and contrast levels using a temporal two-alternative forced choice task. This task has the advantage to provide an objective psychophysical performance measurement, while minimizing biases from unconscious processing. Thresholds based on subjective ratings with the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) and on performance accuracy were determined for detection (stimulus presence) and discrimination (letter case) tasks at high and low stimulus contrast. We found a comparable pattern of thresholds across tasks and contrasts for objective and subjective measurements of awareness. These findings suggest that objective performance measures based on accuracy and subjective ratings of the visual experience can provide similar information on the feature-content of a percept. The observed similarity of thresholds validates psychophysical and subjective approaches to awareness as providing converging and thus most likely veridical measures of awareness.

Recognition of Empathy from Synchronization between Brain Activity and Eye Movement

In the era of user-generated content (UGC) and virtual interactions within the metaverse, empathic digital content has become increasingly important. This study aimed to quantify human empathy levels when exposed to digital media. To assess empathy, we analyzed brain wave activity and eye movements in response to emotional videos. Forty-seven participants watched eight emotional videos, and we collected their brain activity and eye movement data during the viewing. After each video session, participants provided subjective evaluations. Our analysis focused on the relationship between brain activity and eye movement in recognizing empathy. The findings revealed the following: (1) Participants were more inclined to empathize with videos depicting pleasant-arousal and unpleasant-relaxed emotions. (2) Saccades and fixation, key components of eye movement, occurred simultaneously with specific channels in the prefrontal and temporal lobes. (3) Eigenvalues of brain activity and pupil changes showed synchronization between the right pupil and certain channels in the prefrontal, parietal, and temporal lobes during empathic responses. These results suggest that eye movement characteristics can serve as an indicator of the cognitive empathic process when engaging with digital content. Furthermore, the observed changes in pupil size result from a combination of emotional and cognitive empathy elicited by the videos.

The role of conscious perception in semantic processing: Testing the action trigger hypothesis

Finding that invisible primes affect categorization of visible targets (response priming) is held to demonstrate that semantic processing does not require conscious perception. However, the effects are typically very small, they do not indicate whether conscious perception enhances response priming and they often reflect visuo-motor rather than semantic processing. Here, we compared response priming elicited by liminal words when these were clearly seen vs missed, while participants categorized target animals' names. We varied task demands to induce visuo-motor vs semantic processing. Conscious perception strongly enhanced both visuo-motor and semantic response priming. In line with the Action Trigger Hypothesis, task demands modulated processing of both missed and consciously perceived primes. Finally, conscious and unconscious response priming showed diverging patterns on fast and on slow trials, a dissociation suggesting that priming was not contaminated by conscious priming. We conclude that the impact of unconscious stimuli is small and task-dependent.

Inattentive Perception, Time, and the Incomprehensibility of Consciousness

Cerebral energy supply is insufficient to support continuous neuronal processing of the plethora of time-constant objects that we are aware of. As a result, the brain is forced to limit processing resources to (the most relevant) cases of change. The neuronally generated world is thus temporally discontinuous. This parallels the fact that, in all relevant microscopic fundamental equations of nature, temporal change plays a dominant role. When a scientist calculates a "solution" to such an equation, integration over time is an essential step. The present Hypothesis expresses that the step from neuronal activity to phenomenal content of consciousness is reflective of a (phenomenal) "solution:" the main source of the incomprehensibility of consciousness is proposed to result from the introduction of phenomenal time-constant entities. These are "filled-in" via integration, even though neuronal data only exists for changes to these entities. In this way, a temporally continuous picture of the world phenomenally appears. Qualia are "initial conditions," which are required for integration and cannot be deduced from present data. Phenomenal "identity" (vs. "high similarity") is related to qualia. Inattentive visual perception, which is only rarely investigated, offers insights into these relationships. Introspectively, unattended vision appears rich because percepts are cumulated over long time spans, whereas attentive perception relies purely on present neuronal signals. The present Hypothesis is that a brief neuronal activity can signify long-lasting and constant phenomenal content of consciousness. Experimental support is presented that comes from discrepancies between neuronal activity and perception: transient neuronal responses to sustained stimuli, "filling-in," change blindness, identity vs. close resemblance.

Pupil Dilation and the Slow Wave ERP Reflect Surprise about Choice Outcome Resulting from Intrinsic Variability in Decision Confidence

Central to human and animal cognition is the ability to learn from feedback in order to optimize future rewards. Such a learning signal might be encoded and broadcasted by the brain's arousal systems, including the noradrenergic locus coeruleus. Pupil responses and the positive slow wave component of event-related potentials reflect rapid changes in the arousal level of the brain. Here, we ask whether and how these variables may reflect surprise: the mismatch between one's expectation about being correct and the outcome of a decision, when expectations fluctuate due to internal factors (e.g., engagement). We show that during an elementary decision task in the face of uncertainty both physiological markers of phasic arousal reflect surprise. We further show that pupil responses and slow wave event-related potential are unrelated to each other and that prediction error computations depend on feedback awareness. These results further advance our understanding of the role of central arousal systems in decision-making under uncertainty.

Towards New Diagnostic Approaches in Disorders of Consciousness: A Proof of Concept Study on the Promising Use of Imagery Visuomotor Task

Background: advanced paraclinical approaches using functional neuroimaging and electroencephalography (EEG) allow identifying patients who are covertly aware despite being diagnosed as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS). Bedside detection of covert awareness employing motor imagery tasks (MI), which is a universally accepted clinical indicator of awareness in the absence of overt behavior, may miss some of these patients, as they could still have a certain level of awareness. We aimed at assessing covert awareness in patients with UWS using a visuomotor-guided motor imagery task (VMI) during EEG recording. Methods: nine patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS), 11 patients in a UWS, and 15 healthy individuals (control group—CG) were provided with an VMI (imagine dancing while watching a group dance video to command), a simple-MI (imagine squeezing their right hand to command), and an advanced-MI (imagine dancing without watching a group dance video to command) to detect command-following. We analyzed the command-specific EEG responses (event-related synchronization/desynchronization—ERS/ERD) of each patient, assessing whether these responses were appropriate, consistent, and statistically similar to those elicited in the CG, as reliable markers of motor imagery. Results: All patients in MCS, all healthy individuals and one patient in UWS repeatedly and reliably generated appropriate EEG responses to distinct commands of motor imagery with a classification accuracy of 60–80%. Conclusions: VMI outperformed significantly MI tasks. Therefore, patients in UWS may be still misdiagnosed despite a rigorous clinical assessment and an appropriate MI assessment. It is thus possible to suggest that motor imagery tasks should be delivered to patients with chronic disorders of consciousness in visuomotor-aided modality (also in the rehabilitation setting) to greatly entrain patient’s participation. In this regard, the EEG approach we described has the clear advantage of being cheap, portable, widely available, and objective. It may be thus considered as, at least, a screening tool to identify the patients who deserve further, advanced paraclinical approaches.

The Presynaptic Regulation of Dopamine and Norepinephrine Synthesis Has Dissociable Effects on Different Kinds of Cognitive Conflicts

Goal-directed behavior requires the ability to resolve subliminally or consciously induced response conflicts, both of which may benefit from catecholamine-induced increases in gain control. We investigated the effects of presynaptic differences in dopamine and norepinephrine synthesis with the help of the tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) rs10770141 and the dopamine-β-hydroxylase (DBH) rs1611115, rs6271, and rs1611122 polymorphisms. Conscious and subliminal response conflicts were induced with flanker and prime distractors in (n = 207) healthy young participants while neurophysiological data (EEG) was recorded. The results demonstrated that the increased presynaptic catecholamine synthesis associated with the TH rs10770141 TT genotype improves cognitive control in case of consciously perceived (flanker) conflicts, but not in case of subliminally processed (prime) conflicts. Only norepinephrine seemed to also modulate subliminal conflict processing, as evidenced by better performance of the DBH rs1611122 CC genotype in case of high subliminal conflict load. Better performance was linked to larger conflict-induced modulations in post-response alpha band power arising from parietal and inferior frontal regions, which likely helps to suppress the processing of distracting information. In summary, presynaptic catecholamine synthesis benefits consciously perceived conflicts by improving the suppression of distracting information following a conflict. Subliminal conflicts were modulated via the same mechanism, but only by norepinephrine.

The Intensity of Early Attentional Processing, but Not Conflict Monitoring, Determines the Size of Subliminal Response Conflicts

Response conflicts hamper goal-directed behavior and may be evoked by both consciously and subliminally (unconsciously) processed information. Yet, not much is known about the mechanisms and brain regions driving the size of subliminally induced conflicts. We hence combined a response conflict paradigm featuring subliminal primes and conscious flankers with in-depth neurophysiological (EEG) analyses, including source localization in a sample of N = 243 healthy subjects. Intra-individual differences in the size of subliminal conflicts were reflected both during early attentional stimulus processing (prime-associated N1 and target-associated P1 and N1 amplitudes) and conflict monitoring (N2 amplitudes). On the neuroanatomical level, this was reflected by activity modulations in the TPJ (BA39, BA40) and V2 (BA18), which are known to be involved in attentional stimulus processing and task set maintenance. In addition to a "standard" analysis of event-related potentials, we also conducted a purely data-driven machine learning approach using support vector machines (SVM) in order to identify neurophysiological features which do not only reflect the size of subliminal conflict, but actually allow to classify/predict it. This showed that only extremely early information processing (about 65 ms after the onset of the prime) was predictive of subliminal conflict size. Importantly, this predictive feature occurred before target information could even be processed and was reflected by activity in the left middle frontal gyrus (BA6) and insula (BA13). We conclude that differences in task set maintenance and potentially also in subliminal attentional processing of task-relevant features, but not conflict monitoring, determine the size of subliminally induced response conflicts.

Subliminal (latent) processing of pain and its evolution to conscious awareness

By unconscious or covert processing of pain we refer to nascent interactions that affect the eventual deliverance of pain awareness. Thus, internal processes (viz., repeated nociceptive events, inflammatory kindling, reorganization of brain networks, genetic) or external processes (viz., environment, socioeconomic levels, modulation of epigenetic status) contribute to enhancing or inhibiting the presentation of pain awareness. Here we put forward the notion that for many patients, ongoing sub-conscious changes in brain function are significant players in the eventual manifestation of chronic pain. In this review, we provide clinical examples of nascent or what we term pre-pain processes and the neurobiological mechanisms of how these changes may contribute to pain, but also potential opportunities to define the process for early therapeutic interventions.

What's past is past: Neither perceptual preactivation nor prior motivational relevance decrease subsequent inattentional blindness

Inattentional blindness-the phenomenon that clearly visible, yet currently unexpected objects go unnoticed when our attention is focused elsewhere-is an ecologically valid failure of awareness. It is currently subject to debate whether previous events and experiences determine whether or not inattentional blindness occurs. Using a simple two-phase paradigm in the present study, we found that the likelihood of missing an unexpected object due to inattention did not change when its defining characteristic (its color) was perceptually preactivated (Experiment 1; N = 188). Likewise, noticing rates were not significantly reduced if the object's color was previously motivationally relevant during an unrelated detection task (Experiment 2; N = 184). These results corroborate and extend recent findings questioning the influence of previous experience on subsequent inattentional blindness. This has implications for possible countermeasures intended to thwart the potentially harmful effects of inattention.

A Multi-Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness

In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and we propose a novel multi-factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented, less salient, too generic, or flash-like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations-their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability-and argue that the mechanisms that affect these features are what ultimately modulate the degree of awareness. We conclude the paper by demonstrating why the original interpretations of certain empirical findings that apparently pose problems for our account are, in fact, flawed.

The Emergence of Visual Awareness: Temporal Dynamics in Relation to Task and Mask Type

One aspect of consciousness phenomena, the temporal emergence of visual awareness, has been subject of a controversial debate. How can visual awareness, that is the experiential quality of visual stimuli, be characterized best? Is there a sharp discontinuous or dichotomous transition between unaware and fully aware states, or does awareness emerge gradually encompassing intermediate states? Previous studies yielded conflicting results and supported both dichotomous and gradual views. It is well conceivable that these conflicting results are more than noise, but reflect the dynamic nature of the temporal emergence of visual awareness. Using a psychophysical approach, the present research tested whether the emergence of visual awareness is context-dependent with a temporal two-alternative forced choice task. During backward masking of word targets, it was assessed whether the relative temporal sequence of stimulus thresholds is modulated by the task (stimulus presence, letter case, lexical decision, and semantic category) and by mask type. Four masks with different similarity to the target features were created. Psychophysical functions were then fitted to the accuracy data in the different task conditions as a function of the stimulus mask SOA in order to determine the inflection point (conscious threshold of each feature) and slope of the psychophysical function (transition from unaware to aware within each feature). Depending on feature-mask similarity, thresholds in the different tasks were highly dispersed suggesting a graded transition from unawareness to awareness or had less differentiated thresholds indicating that clusters of features probed by the tasks quite simultaneously contribute to the percept. The latter observation, although not compatible with the notion of a sharp all-or-none transition between unaware and aware states, suggests a less gradual or more discontinuous emergence of awareness. Analyses of slopes of the fitted psychophysical functions also indicated that the emergence of awareness of single features is variable and might be influenced by the continuity of the feature dimensions. The present work thus suggests that the emergence of awareness is neither purely gradual nor dichotomous, but highly dynamic depending on the task and mask type.

Involuntary attentional orienting in the absence of awareness speeds up early sensory processing

A long-standing controversy in the field of human neuroscience has revolved around the question whether attended stimuli are processed more rapidly compared to unattended stimuli. We conducted two event-related potential (ERP) experiments employing a temporal order judgment procedure in order to assess whether involuntary attention accelerates sensory processing, as indicated by latency modulations of early visual ERP components. A non-reportable exogenous cue could precede the first target with equal probability at the same (compatible) or opposite (incompatible) location. The use of non-reportable cues promoted automatic, bottom-up attentional capture, and ensured the elimination of any confounds related to the use of stimulus features that are common to both cue and target. Behavioral results confirmed involuntary exogenous orienting towards the unaware cue. ERP results showed that the N1pc, an electrophysiological measure of attentional orienting, was smaller and peaked earlier in compatible as opposed to incompatible trials, indicating cue-dependent changes in magnitude and speed of first target processing in extrastriate visual areas. Complementary Bayesian analysis confirmed the presence of this effect regardless of whether participants were actively looking for the cue (Experiment 1) or were not informed of it (Experiment 2), indicating purely automatic, stimulus-driven orienting mechanisms.

Identifying neural correlates of visual consciousness with ALE meta-analyses

Neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) have been a topic of study for nearly two decades. In functional imaging studies, several regions have been proposed to constitute possible candidates for NCC, but as of yet, no quantitative summary of the literature on NCC has been done. The question whether single (striate or extrastriate) regions or a network consisting of extrastriate areas that project directly to fronto-parietal regions are necessary and sufficient neural correlates for visual consciousness is still highly debated [e.g., Rees et al., 2002, Nat Rev. Neurosci 3, 261-270; Tong, 2003, Nat Rev. Neurosci 4, 219-229]. The aim of this work was to elucidate this issue and give a synopsis of the present state of the art by conducting systematic and quantitative meta-analyses across functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using several standard paradigms for conscious visual perception. In these paradigms, consciousness is operationalized via perceptual changes, while the visual stimulus remains invariant. An activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis was performed, representing the best approach for voxel-wise meta-analyses to date. In addition to computing a meta-analysis across all paradigms, separate meta-analyses on bistable perception and masking paradigms were conducted to assess whether these paradigms show common or different NCC. For the overall meta-analysis, we found significant clusters of activation in inferior and middle occipital gyrus; fusiform gyrus; inferior temporal gyrus; caudate nucleus; insula; inferior, middle, and superior frontal gyri; precuneus; as well as in inferior and superior parietal lobules. These results suggest a subcortical-extrastriate-fronto-parietal network rather than a single region that constitutes the necessary NCC. The results of our exploratory paradigm-specific meta-analyses suggest that this subcortical-extrastriate-fronto-parietal network might be differentially activated as a function of the paradigms used to probe for NCC.

Supraliminal but not subliminal distracters bias working memory recall

Information of which observers are not consciously aware can nevertheless influence perceptual processes. Whether subliminal information might exert an influence on working memory (WM) representations is less clear, and relatively few studies have examined the interactions between subliminal and supraliminal information in WM. We present 3 experiments examining this issue. Experiments 1a and b replicated the finding that orientation stimuli can influence behavior subliminally in a visuomotor priming task. Experiments 2 and 3 used the same orientation stimuli, but participants had to remember a target orientation and report it back by adjusting a probe orientation after a memory delay. Before or after presentation of the target orientation, a subliminal or supraliminal distracter orientation was presented that was either irrelevant for task completion and never had to be reported (Experiment 2), or was relevant for task completion because it had to be reported on some trials (Experiment 3). In both experiments, presentation of a supraliminal distracter influenced WM recall of the target orientation. When the distracter was presented subliminally, however, there was no bias in orientation recall. These results suggest that information stored in WM is protected from influences of subliminal stimuli, while online information processing is modulated by subliminal information.

Unconscious vision and executive control: how unconscious processing and conscious action control interact

Research on unconscious or unaware vision has demonstrated that unconscious processing can be flexibly adapted to the current goals of human agents. The present review focuses on one area of research, masked visual priming. This method uses visual stimuli presented in a temporal sequence to lower the visibility of one of these stimuli. In this way, a stimulus can be masked and even rendered invisible. Despite its invisibility, a masked stimulus if used as a prime can influence a variety of executive functions, such as response activation, semantic processing, or attention shifting. There are also limitations on the processing of masked primes. While masked priming research demonstrates the top-down dependent usage of unconscious vision during task-set execution it also highlights that the set-up of a new task-set depends on conscious vision as its input. This basic distinction captures a major qualitative difference between conscious and unconscious vision.

Sustained perceptual invisibility of solid shapes following contour adaptation to partial outlines

Contour adaptation (CA) is a recently described paradigm that renders otherwise salient visual stimuli temporarily perceptually invisible. Here we investigate whether this illusion can be exploited to study visual awareness. We found that CA can induce seconds of sustained invisibility following similarly long periods of uninterrupted adaptation. Furthermore, even fragmented adaptors are capable of producing CA, with the strength of CA increasing monotonically as the adaptors encompass a greater fraction of the stimulus outline. However, different types of adaptor patterns, such as distinctive shapes or illusory contours, produce equivalent levels of CA suggesting that the main determinants of CA are low-level stimulus characteristics, with minimal modulation by higher-order visual processes. Taken together, our results indicate that CA has desirable properties for studying visual awareness, including the production of prolonged periods of perceptual dissociation from stimulation as well as parametric dependencies of that dissociation on a host of stimulus parameters.

The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago

Vertebrates evolved in the Cambrian Period before 520 million years ago, but we do not know when or how consciousness arose in the history of the vertebrate brain. Here we propose multiple levels of isomorphic or somatotopic neural representations as an objective marker for sensory consciousness. All extant vertebrates have these, so we deduce that consciousness extends back to the group's origin. The first conscious sense may have been vision. Then vision, coupled with additional sensory systems derived from ectodermal placodes and neural crest, transformed primitive reflexive systems into image forming brains that map and perceive the external world and the body's interior. We posit that the minimum requirement for sensory consciousness and qualia is a brain including a forebrain (but not necessarily a developed cerebral cortex/pallium), midbrain, and hindbrain. This brain must also have (1) hierarchical systems of intercommunicating, isomorphically organized, processing nuclei that extensively integrate the different senses into representations that emerge in upper levels of the neural hierarchy; and (2) a widespread reticular formation that integrates the sensory inputs and contributes to attention, awareness, and neural synchronization. We propose a two-step evolutionary history, in which the optic tectum was the original center of multi-sensory conscious perception (as in fish and amphibians: step 1), followed by a gradual shift of this center to the dorsal pallium or its cerebral cortex (in mammals, reptiles, birds: step 2). We address objections to the hypothesis and call for more studies of fish and amphibians. In our view, the lamprey has all the neural requisites and is likely the simplest extant vertebrate with sensory consciousness and qualia. Genes that pattern the proposed elements of consciousness (isomorphism, neural crest, placodes) have been identified in all vertebrates. Thus, consciousness is in the genes, some of which are already known.

Unconscious automatic brain activation of acoustic and action-related conceptual features during masked repetition priming

Classical theories of semantic memory assume that concepts are represented in a unitary amodal memory system. In challenging this classical view, pure or hybrid modality-specific theories propose that conceptual representations are grounded in the sensory-motor brain areas, which typically process sensory and action-related information. Although neuroimaging studies provided evidence for a functional-anatomical link between conceptual processing of sensory or action-related features and the sensory-motor brain systems, it has been argued that aspects of such sensory-motor activation may not directly reflect conceptual processing but rather strategic imagery or postconceptual elaboration. In the present ERP study, we investigated masked effects of acoustic and action-related conceptual features to probe unconscious automatic conceptual processing in isolation. Subliminal feature-specific ERP effects at frontocentral electrodes were observed, which differed with regard to polarity, topography, and underlying brain electrical sources in congruency with earlier findings under conscious viewing conditions. These findings suggest that conceptual acoustic and action representations can also be unconsciously accessed, thereby excluding any postconceptual strategic processes. This study therefore further substantiates a grounding of conceptual and semantic processing in action and perception.

Ethanol regulation of serum glucocorticoid kinase 1 expression in DBA2/J mouse prefrontal cortex

Background

We previously identified a group of glucocorticoid-responsive genes, including Serum Glucocorticoid kinase 1 (Sgk1), regulated by acute ethanol in prefrontal cortex of DBA2/J mice. Acute ethanol activates the hypothalamic pituitary adrenal axis (HPA) causing release of glucocorticoids. Chronic ethanol dysregulates the HPA response in both humans and rodents, possibly contributing to important interactions between stress and alcoholism. Because Sgk1 regulates ion channels and learning and memory, we hypothesized that Sgk1 contributes to HPA-dependent acute and adaptive neuronal responses to ethanol. These studies characterized acute and chronic ethanol regulation of Sgk1 mRNA and protein and their relationship with ethanol actions on the HPA axis.

Results

Acute ethanol increased Sgk1 mRNA expression in a dose and time dependent manner. Three separate results suggested that ethanol regulated Sgk1 via circulating glucocorticoids: acute ethanol increased glucocorticoid receptor binding to the Sgk1 promoter; adrenalectomy blocked ethanol induction of Sgk1 mRNA; and chronic ethanol exposure during locomotor sensitization down-regulated HPA axis activation and Sgk1 induction by acute ethanol. SGK1 protein had complex temporal responses to acute ethanol with rapid and transient increases in Ser422 phosphorylation at 15 min. following ethanol administration. This activating phosphorylation had functional consequences, as suggested by increased phosphorylation of the known SGK1 target, N-myc downstream-regulated gene 1 (NDRG1). After repeated ethanol administration during locomotor sensitization, basal SGK1 protein phosphorylation increased despite blunting of Sgk1 mRNA induction by ethanol.

Conclusions

These results suggest that HPA axis and glucocorticoid receptor signaling mediate acute ethanol induction of Sgk1 transcription in mouse prefrontal cortex. However, acute ethanol also causes complex changes in SGK1 protein expression and activity. Chronic ethanol modifies both SGK1 protein and HPA-mediated induction of Sgk1 mRNA. These adaptive molecular responses of glucocorticoid-responsive gene expression and SGK1 in prefrontal cortex may contribute to mechanisms underlying behavioral responses to chronic ethanol exposure.

Masked priming of conceptual features reveals differential brain activation during unconscious access to conceptual action and sound information

Previous neuroimaging studies suggested an involvement of sensory-motor brain systems during conceptual processing in support of grounded cognition theories of conceptual memory. However, in these studies with visible stimuli, contributions of strategic imagery or semantic elaboration processes to observed sensory-motor activity cannot be entirely excluded. In the present study, we therefore investigated the electrophysiological correlates of unconscious feature-specific priming of action- and sound-related concepts within a novel feature-priming paradigm to specifically probe automatic processing of conceptual features without the contribution of possibly confounding factors such as orthographic similarity or response congruency. Participants were presented with a masked subliminal prime word and a subsequent visible target word. In the feature-priming conditions primes as well as targets belonged to the same conceptual feature dimension (action or sound, e.g., typewriter or radio) whereas in the two non-priming conditions, either the primes or the targets consisted of matched control words with low feature relevance (e.g., butterfly or candle). Event-related potential analyses revealed unconscious feature-specific priming effects at fronto-central electrodes within 100 to 180 ms after target stimulus onset that differed with regard to topography and underlying neural generators. In congruency with previous findings under visible stimulation conditions, these differential subliminal ERP feature-priming effects demonstrate an unconscious automatic access to action versus sound features of concepts. The present results therefore support grounded cognition theory suggesting that activity in sensory and motor areas during conceptual processing can also occur unconsciously and is not mandatorily accompanied by a vivid conscious experience of the conceptual content such as in imagery.

Executive control over unconscious cognition: attentional sensitization of unconscious information processing

Unconscious priming is a prototypical example of an automatic process, which is initiated without deliberate intention. Classical theories of automaticity assume that such unconscious automatic processes occur in a purely bottom-up driven fashion independent of executive control mechanisms. In contrast to these classical theories, our attentional sensitization model of unconscious information processing proposes that unconscious processing is susceptible to executive control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. It is assumed that unconscious processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways as a function of task sets. This article provides an overview of the latest research on executive control influences on unconscious information processing. I introduce refined theories of automaticity with a particular focus on the attentional sensitization model of unconscious cognition which is specifically developed to account for various attentional influences on different types of unconscious information processing. In support of the attentional sensitization model, empirical evidence is reviewed demonstrating executive control influences on unconscious cognition in the domains of visuo-motor and semantic processing: subliminal priming depends on attentional resources, is susceptible to stimulus expectations and is influenced by action intentions and task sets. This suggests that even unconscious processing is flexible and context-dependent as a function of higher-level executive control settings. I discuss that the assumption of attentional sensitization of unconscious information processing can accommodate conflicting findings regarding the automaticity of processes in many areas of cognition and emotion. This theoretical view has the potential to stimulate future research on executive control of unconscious processing in healthy and clinical populations.