Seeing what you want to see: priors for one's own actions represent exaggerated expectations of success

Systematic bias in representation of reaction time distribution

A correct perception of one's own abilities is essential for making appropriate decisions. A well-known bias in probability perception is that rare events are overestimated. Here, we examined whether such a bias also exists for action outcomes using a simple reaction task. In Experiment 1, after completing a set of 30 trials of the simple reaction task, participants were required to judge the probability that they would be able to respond before a given reference time when performing the task next. We assessed the difference between the actual reaction times and the probability judgement and found that the represented probability distribution was more widely distributed than the actual one, suggesting that low-probability events were overestimated and high-probability events were underestimated. Experiment 2 confirmed the presence of such a bias in the representation of both one's own and another's reaction times. In addition, Experiment 3 showed the presence of such a bias regardless of the difference between the representation of another's reaction times and the mere numerical representation. Furthermore, Experiment 4 found the presence of such a bias even when the information regarding actual reaction times was visually shown before the representation. The present results reveal the existence of a highly robust bias in the representation of motor performance, which reflects the ubiquitous bias in probability perception and is difficult to eliminate.

What Is Mental Effort: A Clinical Perspective

Although mental effort is a frequently used term, it is poorly defined and understood. Consequently, its usage is frequently loose and potentially misleading. In neuroscience research, the term is used to mean both the cognitive work that is done to meet task demands and the subjective experience of performing that work. We argue that conflating these two meanings hampers progress in understanding cognitive impairments in neuropsychiatric conditions because cognitive work and the subjective experience of it have distinct underlying mechanisms. We suggest that the most coherent and clinically useful perspective on mental effort is that it is a subjective experience. This makes a clear distinction between cognitive impairments that arise from changes in the cognitive apparatus, as in dementia and brain injury, and those that arise from subjective difficulties in carrying out the cognitive work, as in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, depression, and other motivational disorders. We review recent advances in neuroscience research that suggests that the experience of effort has emerged to control task switches so as to minimize costs relative to benefits. We consider how these advances can contribute to our understanding of the experience of increased effort perception in clinical populations. This more specific framing of mental effort will offer a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of cognitive impairments in differing clinical groups and will ultimately facilitate better therapeutic interventions.

Motor outcomes congruent with intentions may sharpen metacognitive representations

We can monitor our intentional movements and form explicit representations about our movements, allowing us to describe how we move our bodies. But it is unclear which information this metacognitive monitoring relies on. For example, when throwing a ball to hit a target, we might use the visual information about how the ball flew to metacognitively assess our performance. Alternatively, we might disregard the ball trajectory - given that it is not directly relevant to our goal - and metacognitively assess our performance based solely on whether we reached the goal of hitting the target. In two experiments we aimed to distinguish between these two alternatives and asked whether the distal outcome of a goal-directed action (hitting or missing a target) informs the metacognitive representations of our own movements. Participants performed a semi-virtual task where they moved their arm to throw a virtual ball at a target. After each throw, participants discriminated which of two ball trajectories displayed on the screen corresponded to the flight path of their throw and then rated their confidence in this decision. The task included two conditions that differed on whether the distal outcome of the two trajectories shown matched (congruent) or differed (incongruent). Participants were significantly more accurate in discriminating between the two trajectories, and responded faster in the incongruent condition and, accordingly, were significantly more confident on these trials. Crucially, we found significant differences in metacognitive performance (measured as meta-d'/d') between the two conditions only on successful trials, where the virtual ball had hit the target. These results indicate that participants successfully incorporated information about the outcome of the movement into both their discrimination and confidence responses. However, information about the outcome selectively sharpened the precision of confidence ratings only when the outcome of their throw matched their intention. We argue that these findings underline the separation between the different levels of information that may contribute to body monitoring, and we provide evidence that intentions might play a central role in metacognitive motor representations.

Noradrenergic deficits contribute to apathy in Parkinson's disease through the precision of expected outcomes

Apathy is a debilitating feature of many neuropsychiatric diseases, that is typically described as a reduction of goal-directed behaviour. Despite its prevalence and prognostic importance, the mechanisms underlying apathy remain controversial. Degeneration of the locus coeruleus-noradrenaline system is known to contribute to motivational deficits, including apathy. In healthy people, noradrenaline has been implicated in signalling the uncertainty of expectations about the environment. We proposed that noradrenergic deficits contribute to apathy by modulating the relative weighting of prior beliefs about action outcomes. We tested this hypothesis in the clinical context of Parkinson's disease, given its associations with apathy and noradrenergic dysfunction. Participants with mild-to-moderate Parkinson's disease (N = 17) completed a randomised double-blind, placebo-controlled, crossover study with 40 mg of the noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor atomoxetine. Prior weighting was inferred from psychophysical analysis of performance in an effort-based visuomotor task, and was confirmed as negatively correlated with apathy. Locus coeruleus integrity was assessed in vivo using magnetisation transfer imaging at ultra-high field 7T. The effect of atomoxetine depended on locus coeruleus integrity: participants with a more degenerate locus coeruleus showed a greater increase in prior weighting on atomoxetine versus placebo. The results indicate a contribution of the noradrenergic system to apathy and potential benefit from noradrenergic treatment of people with Parkinson's disease, subject to stratification according to locus coeruleus integrity. More broadly, these results reconcile emerging predictive processing accounts of the role of noradrenaline in goal-directed behaviour with the clinical symptom of apathy and its potential pharmacological treatment.

Changes in Error-Correction Behavior According to Visuomotor Maps in Goal-Directed Projection Tasks

Humans can move objects to target positions, out of their reach with certain accuracy by throwing or hitting them with tools. However, the outcome - the final object position - after the same movement varies due to various internal and external factors. Therefore, to improve outcome accuracy, humans correct their movements in the following trial as necessary by estimating the relationship between movement and visual outcome (visuomotor map). In the present study, we compared participants' error-correction behaviors to visual errors under three conditions, wherein the relationship between joystick movement direction and cursor projection direction on the monitor covertly differed. This allowed us to examine whether the error-correction behavior changed depending on the visuomotor map. Moreover, to determine whether participants maintain the visuomotor map regardless of the visual error size (cursor projection) and proprioceptive errors (joystick movement), we for the first time focused on whether temporary visual errors deviating from the conventional relationship between joystick movement direction and cursor projection direction (i.e., visual perturbation) are ignored. The visual information was occasionally perturbed in two ways to create a situation wherein the visual error was larger or smaller than the proprioceptive error. We found that participants changed their error-correction behaviors according to the conditions and could ignore visual perturbations. This suggests that humans can be implicitly aware of differences in visuomotor maps and adapt accordingly to visual errors.

Modulation of initial movement for double potential targets with specific time constraints

In goal-directed behavior, individuals are often required to plan and execute a movement with multiple competing reach targets simultaneously. The time constraint assigned to the target is an important factor that affect the initial movement planning, but the adjustments made to the starting behavior considering the time constraints specific to each target have not yet been clarified. The current study examined how humans adjusted their motor planning for double potential targets with independent time constraints under a go-before-you-know situation. The results revealed that the initial movements were modulated depending on the time constraints for potential targets. However, under tight time constraints, the performance in the double-target condition was lower than the single-target condition, which was a control condition implemented to estimate performance when one target is ignored. These results indicate that the initial movement for multiple potential targets with independent time constraints can be modified, but the planning is suboptimal.

Toward the unity of pathological and exertional fatigue: A predictive processing model

Fatigue is a common experience in both health and disease. Yet, pathological (i.e., prolonged or chronic) and transient (i.e., exertional) fatigue symptoms are traditionally considered distinct, compounding a separation between interested research fields within the study of fatigue. Within the clinical neurosciences, nascent frameworks position pathological fatigue as a product of inference derived through hierarchical predictive processing. The metacognitive theory of dyshomeostasis (Stephan et al., 2016) states that pathological fatigue emerges from the metacognitive mechanism in which the detection of persistent mismatches between prior interoceptive predictions and ascending sensory evidence (i.e., prediction error) signals low evidence for internal generative models, which undermine an agent’s feeling of mastery over the body and is thus experienced phenomenologically as fatigue. Although acute, transient subjective symptoms of exertional fatigue have also been associated with increasing interoceptive prediction error, the dynamic computations that underlie its development have not been clearly defined. Here, drawing on the metacognitive theory of dyshomeostasis, we extend this account to offer an explicit description of the development of fatigue during extended periods of (physical) exertion. Accordingly, it is proposed that a loss of certainty or confidence in control predictions in response to persistent detection of prediction error features as a common foundation for the conscious experience of both pathological and nonpathological fatigue.

Interacting with volatile environments stabilizes hidden-state inference and its brain signatures

Making accurate decisions in uncertain environments requires identifying the generative cause of sensory cues, but also the expected outcomes of possible actions. Although both cognitive processes can be formalized as Bayesian inference, they are commonly studied using different experimental frameworks, making their formal comparison difficult. Here, by framing a reversal learning task either as cue-based or outcome-based inference, we found that humans perceive the same volatile environment as more stable when inferring its hidden state by interaction with uncertain outcomes than by observation of equally uncertain cues. Multivariate patterns of magnetoencephalographic (MEG) activity reflected this behavioral difference in the neural interaction between inferred beliefs and incoming evidence, an effect originating from associative regions in the temporal lobe. Together, these findings indicate that the degree of control over the sampling of volatile environments shapes human learning and decision-making under uncertainty.

Here, the authors show that humans perceive uncertain environments as more stable when actively interacting with them than when observing them. Magnetoencephalographic signals in the temporal lobe were associated with the increased stability of beliefs during active sampling.

Apathy is associated with reduced precision of prior beliefs about action outcomes

Apathy is a debilitating syndrome that is associated with reduced goal-directed behavior. Although apathy is common and detrimental to prognosis in many neuropsychiatric diseases, its underlying mechanisms remain controversial. We propose a new model of apathy, in the context of Bayesian theories of brain function, whereby actions require predictions of their outcomes to be held with sufficient precision for "explaining away" differences in sensory inputs. In the active inference model, apathy results from reduced precision of prior beliefs about action outcomes. We tested this hypothesis using a visuomotor task in healthy adults (N = 47), with experimental manipulation of physical effort and financial reward. Bayesian modeling of performance and participants' perception of their performance was used to infer the precision of their priors. We confirmed that the perception of performance was biased toward the target, which was accounted for by relatively precise prior beliefs about action outcomes. These priors were consistently more precise than the corresponding performance distribution, and were scaled to effort and reward. Crucially, prior precision was negatively associated with trait apathy, suggesting that apathetic individuals had less precise prior beliefs about action outcomes. The results support a Bayesian account of apathy that could inform future studies of clinical populations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Sub-optimality in motor planning is not improved by explicit observation of motor uncertainty

To make optimal decisions under risk, one must correctly weight potential rewards and penalties by the probabilities of receiving them. In motor decision tasks, the uncertainty in outcome is a consequence of motor uncertainty. When participants perform suboptimally as they often do in such tasks, it could be because they have insufficient information about their motor uncertainty: with more information, their performance could converge to optimal as they learn their own motor uncertainty. Alternatively, their suboptimal performance may reflect an inability to make use of the information they have or even to perform the correct computations. To discriminate between these two possibilities, we performed an experiment spanning two days. On the first day, all participants performed a reaching task with trial-by-trial feedback of motor error. At the end of the day, their aim points were still typically suboptimal. On the second day participants were divided into two groups one of which repeated the task of the first day and the other of which repeated the task but were intermittently given additional information summarizing their motor errors. Participants receiving additional information did not perform significantly better than those who did not.

Center of Pressure Feedback Modulates the Entrainment of Voluntary Sway to the Motion of a Visual Target

Visually guided weight shifting is widely employed in balance rehabilitation, but the underlying visuo-motor integration process leading to balance improvement is still unclear. In this study, we investigated the role of center of pressure (CoP) feedback on the entrainment of active voluntary sway to a moving visual target and on sway’s dynamic stability as a function of target predictability. Fifteen young and healthy adult volunteers (height 175 ± 7 cm, body mass 69 ± 12 kg, age 32 ± 5 years) tracked a vertically moving visual target by shifting their body weight antero-posteriorly under two target motion and feedback conditions, namely, predictable and less predictable target motion, with or without visual CoP feedback. Results revealed lower coherence, less gain, and longer phase lag when tracking the less predictable compared to the predictable target motion. Feedback did not affect CoP-target coherence, but feedback removal resulted in greater target overshooting and a shorter phase lag when tracking the less predictable target. These adaptations did not affect the dynamic stability of voluntary sway. It was concluded that CoP feedback improves spatial perception at the cost of time delays, particularly when tracking a less predictable moving target.

The Bayesian causal inference model benefits from an informed prior to predict proprioceptive drift in the rubber foot illusion

Bayesian cognitive modeling has become a prominent tool for the cognitive sciences aiming at a deeper understanding of the human mind and applications in cognitive systems, e.g., humanoid or wearable robotics. Such approaches can capture human behavior adequately with a focus on the crossmodal processing of sensory information. The rubber foot illusion is a paradigm in which such integration is relevant. After experimental stimulation, many participants perceive their real limb closer to an artificial replicate than it actually is. A measurable effect of this recalibration on localization is called the proprioceptive drift. We investigate whether the Bayesian causal inference model can estimate the proprioceptive drift observed in empirical studies. Moreover, we juxtapose two models employing informed prior distributions on limb location against an existing model assuming uniform prior distribution. The model involving empirically informed prior information yields better predictions of the proprioceptive drift regarding the rubber foot illusion when evaluated with separate experimental data. Contrary, the uniform model produces implausibly narrow position estimates that seem due to the precision ratio between the contributing sensory channels. We conclude that an informed prior on limb localization is a plausible and necessary modification to the Bayesian causal inference model when applied to limb illusions. Future research could overcome the remaining discrepancy between model predictions and empirical observation by investigating the changes in sensory precision as a function of distance between the eyes and respective limbs.

Risk aversion in the adjustment of speed-accuracy tradeoff depending on time constraints

Humans are often required to make decisions under time constraints and to adjust speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) based on time constraints. Previous studies have investigated how humans adjust SAT depending on the time discount rate of expected gain. Although the expected gain of actions can be determined by both gain and probability, only situations where gain decreases over time have been tested. Considering the effect of risk on decision-making, the difference in time discount factors may modulate the response strategies for SAT, since temporal changes in variance of possible outcomes differ when gain or probability decreases over time. Here, we investigated the response strategies for SAT under different time discount factors. Participants were required to select one of the two options with different initial values in situations where the expected gain of options declined over time by a linear decrease in gain or probability. Comparison of response strategies between conditions revealed that response times in the gain condition were longer than those in the probability condition, possibly due to risk-aversion. These findings indicate the existence of common rules underpinning sensorimotor and economic decision-making.

Sensory attenuation in Parkinson's disease is related to disease severity and dopamine dose

Abnormal initiation and control of voluntary movements are among the principal manifestations of Parkinson's disease (PD). However, the processes underlying these abnormalities and their potential remediation by dopamine treatment remain poorly understood. Normally, movements depend on the integration of sensory information with the predicted consequences of action. This integration leads to a suppression in the intensity of predicted sensations, reflected in a 'sensory attenuation'. We examined this integration process and its relation to dopamine in PD, by measuring sensory attenuation. Patients with idiopathic PD (n = 18) and population-derived controls (n = 175) matched a set of target forces applied to their left index finger by a torque motor. To match the force, participants either pressed with their right index finger ('Direct' condition) or moved a knob that controlled a motor through a linear potentiometer ('Slider' condition). We found that despite changes in sensitivity to different forces, overall sensory attenuation did not differ between medicated PD patients and controls. Importantly, the degree of attenuation was negatively related to PD motor severity but positively related to individual patient dopamine dose, as measured by levodopa dose equivalent. The results suggest that dopamine could regulate the integration of sensorimotor prediction with sensory information to facilitate the control of voluntary movements.

The neuroanatomical and neurochemical basis of apathy and impulsivity in frontotemporal lobar degeneration

Apathy and impulsivity are common and often coexistent consequences of frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD). They increase patient morbidity and carer distress, but remain under-estimated and poorly treated. Recent trans-diagnostic approaches that span the spectrum of clinical presentations of FTLD and parkinsonism, indicate that apathy and impulsivity can be fractionated into multiple neuroanatomical and pharmacological systems. These include ventral/dorsal fronto-striatal circuits for reward-sensitivity, response-inhibition, and decision-making; moderated by noradrenaline, dopamine, and serotonin. Improved assessment tools, formal models of cognition and behavior, combined with brain imaging and psycho-pharmacology, are creating new therapeutic targets and establishing principles for stratification in future clinical trials.

Neurobiological Evidence for the Primacy of Mania Hypothesis

BACKGROUND

Athanasios Koukopoulos proposed the primacy of mania hypothesis (PoM) in a 2006 book chapter and later, in two peer-reviewed papers with Nassir Ghaemi and other collaborators. This hypothesis supports that in bipolar disorder, mania leads to depression, while depression does not lead to mania.

OBJECTIVE

To identify evidence in literature that supports or falsifies this hypothesis.

METHOD

We searched the medical literature (PubMed, Embase, PsycINFO, and the Cochrane Library) for peer-reviewed papers on the primacy of mania, the default mode function of the brain in normal people and in bipolar disorder patients, and on illusion superiority until 6 June, 2016. Papers resulting from searches were considered for appropriateness to our objective. We adopted the PRISMA method for our review. The search for consistency with PoM was filtered through the neurobiological results of superiority illusion studies.

RESULTS

Out of a grand total of 139 records, 59 were included in our analysis. Of these, 36 were of uncertain value as to the primacy of mania hypothesis, 22 favoured it, and 1 was contrary, but the latter pooled patients in their manic and depressive phases, so to invalidate possible conclusions about its consistency with regard to PoM. All considered studies were not focused on PoM or superiority illusion, hence most of their results were, as expected, unrelated to the circuitry involved in superiority illusion. A considerable amount of evidence is consistent with the hypothesis, although indirectly so.

LIMITATIONS

Only few studies compared manic with depressive phases, with the majority including patients in euthymia.

CONCLUSION

It is possible that humans have a natural tendency for elation/optimism and positive self-consideration, that are more akin to mania; the depressive state could be a consequence of frustrated or unsustainable mania. This would be consistent with PoM.

Cognitive Bias for the Distribution of Ball Landing Positions in Amateur Tennis Players (Cognitive Bias for the Motor Variance in Tennis)

This study aimed to investigate whether the isotropy bias (estimating one's own motor variance as an approximately circular distribution rather than a vertically elongated distribution) arises in tennis players for the estimation of the two-dimensional variance for forehand strokes in tennis (Experiment 1), as well as the process underlying the isotropy bias (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, 31 tennis players were asked to estimate prospectively their distribution of ball landing positions. They were then instructed to hit 50 forehand strokes. We compared the eccentricity of the ellipse calculated from estimated and observed landing positions. Eccentricity was significantly smaller in the estimated ellipse than in the observed ellipse. We assumed that the isotropy bias for the estimated ellipse comes from the process of variance estimation. In Experiment 2, nine participants estimated the 95% confidence interval of 300 dots. Eccentricity was significantly smaller in their estimated ellipses than it was in the ellipses for the dots, though the magnitude of bias decreased for the estimation of dots. These results suggest that the isotropy bias in tennis ball landing position includes the bias of recognizing landing position and the bias of estimating the ellipse confidence interval from the recognized landing position.

Testosterone facilitates the sense of agency

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to feelings of being in control of one's actions. Evidence suggests that SoA might contribute towards higher-order feelings of personal control - a key attribute of powerful individuals. Whether testosterone, a steroid hormone linked to power in dominance hierarchies, also influences the SoA is not yet established. In a repeated-measures design, 26 females participated in a double-blind, placebo-controlled trial to test the effects of 0.5 mg testosterone on SoA, using an implicit measure based upon perceived shifts in time between a voluntary action and its outcome. Illusions of control, as operationalized by optimism in affective forecasting, were also assessed. Testosterone increased action binding but there was no significant effect on tone binding. Affective forecasting was found to be significantly more positive on testosterone. SoA and optimistic expectations are basic manifestations of power which may contribute to feelings of infallibility often associated with dominance and testosterone.

Ageing increases reliance on sensorimotor prediction through structural and functional differences in frontostriatal circuits

The control of voluntary movement changes markedly with age. A critical component of motor control is the integration of sensory information with predictions of the consequences of action, arising from internal models of movement. This leads to sensorimotor attenuation-a reduction in the perceived intensity of sensations from self-generated compared with external actions. Here we show that sensorimotor attenuation occurs in 98% of adults in a population-based cohort (n=325; 18-88 years; the Cambridge Centre for Ageing and Neuroscience). Importantly, attenuation increases with age, in proportion to reduced sensory sensitivity. This effect is associated with differences in the structure and functional connectivity of the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), assessed with magnetic resonance imaging. The results suggest that ageing alters the balance between the sensorium and predictive models, mediated by the pre-SMA and its connectivity in frontostriatal circuits. This shift may contribute to the motor and cognitive changes observed with age.

Computations underlying sensorimotor learning

The study of sensorimotor learning has a long history. With the advent of innovative techniques for studying learning at the behavioral and computational levels new insights have been gained in recent years into how the sensorimotor system acquires, retains, represents, retrieves and forgets sensorimotor tasks. In this review we highlight recent advances in the field of sensorimotor learning from a computational perspective. We focus on studies in which computational models are used to elucidate basic mechanisms underlying adaptation and skill acquisition in human behavior.

Dopaminergic modulation of positive expectations for goal-directed action: evidence from Parkinson's disease

Parkinson's disease (PD) impairs the control of movement and cognition, including the planning of action and its consequences. This provides the opportunity to study the dopaminergic influences on the perception and awareness of action. Here we examined the perception of the outcome of a goal-directed action made by medicated patients with PD. A visuomotor task probed the integration of sensorimotor signals with the positive expectations of outcomes (Self priors), which in healthy adults bias perception toward success in proportion to trait optimism. We tested the hypotheses that (i) the priors on the perception of the consequences of one's own actions differ between patients and age- and sex-matched controls, and (ii) that these priors are modulated by the levodopa dose equivalent (LDEs) in patients. There was no overall difference between patients and controls in the perceptual priors used. However, the precision of patient priors was inversely related to their LDE. Patients with high LDE showed more accurate priors, representing predictions that were closer to the true distribution of performance. Such accuracy has previously been demonstrated when observing the actions of others, suggesting abnormal awareness of action in these patients. These results confirm a link between dopamine and the positive expectation of the outcome of one's own actions, and may have implications for the management of PD.

The basal ganglia select the expected sensory input used for predictive coding

While considerable evidence supports the notion that lower-level interpretation of incoming sensory information is guided by top-down sensory expectations, less is known about the source of the sensory expectations or the mechanisms by which they are spread. Predictive coding theory proposes that sensory expectations flow down from higher-level association areas to lower-level sensory cortex. A separate theory of the role of prediction in cognition describes "emulations" as linked representations of potential actions and their associated expected sensation that are hypothesized to play an important role in many aspects of cognition. The expected sensations in active emulations are proposed to be the top-down expectation used in predictive coding. Representations of the potential action and expected sensation in emulations are claimed to be instantiated in distributed cortical networks. Combining predictive coding with emulations thus provides a theoretical link between the top-down expectations that guide sensory expectations and the cortical networks representing potential actions. Now moving to theories of action selection, the basal ganglia has long been proposed to select between potential actions by reducing inhibition to the cortical network instantiating the desired action plan. Integration of these isolated theories leads to the novel hypothesis that reduction in inhibition from the basal ganglia selects not just action plans, but entire emulations, including the sensory input expected to result from the action. Basal ganglia disinhibition is hypothesized to both initiate an action and also allow propagation of the action's associated sensory expectation down towards primary sensory cortex. This is a novel proposal for the role of the basal ganglia in biasing perception by selecting the expected sensation, and initiating the top-down transmission of those expectations in predictive coding.

Computations in Sensorimotor Learning

Our cognitive abilities can only be expressed on the world through our actions. Here we review the computations underlying the way that the sensorimotor system converts both low-level sensory signals and high-level decisions into action, focusing on the behavioral evidence for the theoretical frameworks. We review recent work that determines how motor memories underlying sensorimotor learning are activated and protected from interference, the role of Bayesian decision theory in sensorimotor control including sources of suboptimality, the role of risk sensitivity in guiding action, and how rapid motor responses may underlie the robustness of the motor system to the vagaries of the world.

Costs and benefits of realism and optimism

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

What is the relationship between rationality and mental health? By considering the psychological literature on depressive realism and unrealistic optimism, it was hypothesized that, in the context of judgments about the self, accurate cognitions are psychologically maladaptive and inaccurate cognitions are psychologically adaptive. Recent studies recommend being cautious in drawing any general conclusion about the style of thinking and mental health.

RECENT FINDINGS

Recent investigations suggest that people with depressive symptoms are more accurate than controls in tasks involving time perception and estimates of personal circumstances, but not in other tasks. Unrealistic optimism remains a robust phenomenon across a variety of tasks and domains, and researchers are starting to explore its neural bases. However, the challenge is to determine to what extent and in what way unrealistic optimism is beneficial.

SUMMARY

We should revisit the hypothesis that optimistic cognitions are psychologically adaptive, whereas realistic thinking is not. Realistic beliefs and expectations can be conducive to wellbeing and good functioning, and wildly optimistic cognitions have considerable psychological costs.