Neural components of altruistic punishment

Brain responses to self- and other- unfairness under resource distribution context: Meta-analysis of fMRI studies

Under resource distribution context, individuals have a strong aversion to unfair treatment not only toward themselves but also toward others. However, there is no clear consensus regarding the commonality and distinction between these two types of unfairness. Moreover, many neuroimaging studies have investigated how people evaluate and respond to unfairness in the abovementioned two contexts, but the consistency of the results remains to be investigated. To resolve these two issues, we sought to summarize existing findings regarding unfairness to self and others and to further elucidate the neural underpinnings related to distinguishing evaluation and response processes through meta-analyses of previous neuroimaging studies. Our results indicated that both types of unfairness consistently activate the affective and conflict-related anterior insula (AI) and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex/supplementary motor area (dACC/SMA), but the activations related to unfairness to self appeared stronger than those related to others, suggesting that individuals had negative reactions to both unfairness and a greater aversive response toward unfairness to self. During the evaluation process, unfairness to self activated the bilateral AI, dACC, and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), regions associated with unfairness aversion, conflict, and cognitive control, indicating reactive, emotional and automatic responses. In contrast, unfairness to others activated areas associated with theory of mind, the inferior parietal lobule and temporoparietal junction (IPL-TPJ), suggesting that making rational judgments from the perspective of others was needed. During the response, unfairness to self activated the affective-related left AI and striatum, whereas unfairness to others activated cognitive control areas, the left DLPFC and the thalamus. This indicated that the former maintained the traits of automaticity and emotionality, whereas the latter necessitated cognitive control. These findings provide a fine-grained description of the common and distinct neurocognitive mechanisms underlying unfairness to self and unfairness to others. Overall, this study not only validates the inequity aversion model but also provides direct evidence of neural mechanisms for neurobiological models of fairness.

The Roots of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics: What Are the Evolutionary and Neural Bases of Human Mathematics and Technology?

INTRODUCTION

Neural exaptations represent descent via transitions to novel neural functions. A primary transition in human cognitive and neural evolution was from a predominantly socially oriented primate brain to a brain that also instantiates and subserves science, technology, and engineering, all of which depend on mathematics. Upon what neural substrates and upon what evolved cognitive mechanisms did human capacities for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), and especially its mathematical underpinnings, emerge? Previous theory focuses on roles for tools, language, and arithmetic in the cognitive origins of STEM, but none of these factors appears sufficient to support the transition.

METHODS

In this article, I describe and evaluate a novel hypothesis for the neural origins and substrates of STEM-based cognition: that they are based in human kinship systems and human maximizing of inclusive fitness.

RESULTS

The main evidence for this hypothesis is threefold. First, as demonstrated by anthropologists, human kinship systems exhibit complex mathematical and geometrical structures that function under sets of explicit rules, and such systems and rules pervade and organize all human cultures. Second, human kinship underlies the core algebraic mechanism of evolution, maximization of inclusive fitness, quantified as personal reproduction plus the sum of all effects on reproduction of others, each multiplied by their coefficient of relatedness to self. This is the only "natural" equation expected to be represented in the human brain. Third, functional imaging studies show that kinship-related cognition activates frontal-parietal regions that are also activated in STEM-related tasks. In turn, the decision-making that integrates kinship levels with costs and benefits from alternative behaviors has recently been shown to recruit the lateral septum, a hub region that combines internal (from the prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and other regions) and external information relevant to social behavior, using a dedicated subsystem of neurons specific to kinship.

CONCLUSIONS

Taken together, these lines of evidence suggest that kinship systems and kin-associated behaviors may represent exaptations for the origin of human STEM.

Strengths of social ties modulate brain computations for third-party punishment

Costly punishment of social norm transgressors by third-parties has been considered as a decisive stage in the evolution of human cooperation. An important facet of social relationship knowledge concerns the strength of the social ties between individuals, as measured by social distance. Yet, it is unclear how the enforcement of social norms is influenced by the social distance between a third-party and a norm violator at the behavioral and the brain system levels. Here, we investigated how social distance between punishers and norm-violators influences third-party punishment. Participants as third-party punished norm violators more severely as social distance between them increased. Using model-based fMRI, we disentangled key computations contributing to third-party punishment: inequity aversion, social distance between participant and norm violator and integration of the cost to punish with these signals. Inequity aversion increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and bilateral insula, and processing social distance engaged a bilateral fronto-parietal cortex brain network. These two brain signals and the cost to punish were integrated in a subjective value signal of sanctions that modulated activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Together, our results reveal the neurocomputational underpinnings of third-party punishment and how social distance modulates enforcement of social norms in humans.

Optimizing the social utility of judicial punishment: An evolutionary biology and neuroscience perspective

Punishment as a response to impairment of individual or group welfare may be found not only among humans but also among a wide range of social animals. In some cases, acts of punishment serve to increase social cooperation among conspecifics. Such phenomena motivate the search for the biological foundations of punishment among humans. Of special interest are cases of pro-social punishment of individuals harming others. Behavioral studies have shown that in economic games people punish exploiters even at a cost to their own welfare. Additionally, neuroimaging studies have reported activity during the planning of such punishment in brain areas involved in the anticipation of reward. Such findings hint that there is an evolutionarily honed basic drive to punish social offenders. I argue that the transfer of punishment authority from the individual to the group requires that social offenders be punished as a public good, even if such punishment is not effective as retribution or deterrent. Furthermore, the social need for punishment of offenders has implications for alternatives to incarceration, publicity of punishment, and judicial structure.

Dynamic influences on the neural encoding of social valence

Social signals can serve as potent emotional triggers with powerful impacts on processes from cognition to valence processing. How are social signals dynamically and flexibly associated with positive or negative valence? How do our past social experiences and present social standing shape our motivation to seek or avoid social contact? We discuss a model in which social attributes, social history, social memory, social rank and social isolation can flexibly influence valence assignment to social stimuli, termed here as 'social valence'. We emphasize how the brain encodes each of these four factors and highlight the neural circuits and mechanisms that play a part in the perception of social attributes, social memory and social rank, as well as how these factors affect valence systems associated with social stimuli. We highlight the impact of social isolation, dissecting the neural and behavioural mechanisms that mediate the effects of acute versus prolonged periods of social isolation. Importantly, we discuss conceptual models that may account for the potential shift in valence of social stimuli from positive to negative as the period of isolation extends in time. Collectively, this Review identifies factors that control the formation and attribution of social valence - integrating diverse areas of research and emphasizing their unique contributions to the categorization of social stimuli as positive or negative.

A meta-analysis on shared and distinct neural correlates of the decision-making underlying altruistic and retaliatory punishment

Individuals who violate social norms will most likely face social punishment sanctions. Those sanctions are based on different motivation aspects, depending on the context. Altruistic punishment occurs if punishment aims to re‐establish the social norms even at cost for the punisher. Retaliatory punishment is driven by anger or spite and aims to harm the other. While neuroimaging research highlighted the neural networks supporting decision‐making in both types of punishment in isolation, it remains unclear whether they rely on the same or distinct neural systems. We ran an activation likelihood estimation meta‐analysis on functional magnetic resonance imaging data on 24 altruistic and 19 retaliatory punishment studies to investigate the neural correlates of decision‐making underlying social punishment and whether altruistic and retaliatory punishments share similar brain networks. Social punishment reliably activated the bilateral insula, inferior frontal gyrus, midcingulate cortex (MCC), and superior and medial frontal gyri. This network largely overlapped with activation clusters found for altruistic punishment. However, retaliatory punishment revealed only one cluster in a posterior part of the MCC, which was not recruited in altruistic punishment. Our results support previous models on social punishment and highlight differential involvement of the MCC in altruistic and retaliatory punishments, reflecting the underlying different motivations.

Moral cognition, the missing link between psychotic symptoms and acts of violence: a cross-sectional national forensic cohort study

BACKGROUND

People with schizophrenia are ten times more likely to commit homicide than a member of the general population. The relationship between symptoms of schizophrenia and acts of violence is unclear. There has also been limited research on what determines the seriousness and form of violence, such as reactive or instrumental violence. Moral cognition may play a paradoxical role in acts of violence for people with schizophrenia. Thoughts which have moral content arising from psychotic symptoms may be a cause of serious violence.

METHOD

We investigated if psychotic symptoms and moral cognitions at the time of a violent act were associated with acts of violence using a cross-sectional national forensic cohort (n = 55). We examined whether moral cognitions were associated with violence when controlling for neurocognition and violence proneness. We explored the association between all psychotic symptoms present at the time of the violent act, psychotic symptoms judged relevant to the violent act and moral cognitions present at that time. Using mediation analysis, we examined whether moral cognitions were the missing link between symptoms and the relevance of symptoms for violence. We also investigated if specific moral cognitions mediated the relationship between specific psychotic symptoms, the seriousness of violence (including homicide), and the form of violence.

RESULTS

Psychotic symptoms generally were not associated with the seriousness or form of violence. However, specific moral cognitions were associated with the seriousness and form of violence even when controlling for neurocognition and violence proneness. Specific moral cognitions were associated with specific psychotic symptoms present and relevant to violence. Moral cognitions mediated the relationship between the presence of specific psychotic symptoms and their relevance for violence, homicide, seriousness of violence, and the form of violence.

CONCLUSIONS

Moral cognitions including the need to reduce suffering, responding to an act of injustice or betrayal, the desire to comply with authority, or the wish to punish impure or disgusting behaviour, may be a key mediator explaining the relationship between psychotic symptoms and acts of violence. Our findings may have important implications for risk assessment, treatment and violence prevention.

The Neural Basis of and a Common Neural Circuitry in Different Types of Pro-social Behavior

Pro-social behaviors are voluntary behaviors that benefit other people or society as a whole, such as charitable donations, cooperation, trust, altruistic punishment, and fairness. These behaviors have been widely described through non self-interest decision-making in behavioral experimental studies and are thought to be increased by social preference motives. Importantly, recent studies using a combination of neuroimaging and brain stimulation, designed to reveal the neural mechanisms of pro-social behaviors, have found that a wide range of brain areas, specifically the prefrontal cortex, anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex, and amygdala, are correlated or causally related with pro-social behaviors. In this review, we summarize the research on the neural basis of various kinds of pro-social behaviors and describe a common shared neural circuitry of these pro-social behaviors. We introduce several general ways in which experimental economics and neuroscience can be combined to develop important contributions to understanding social decision-making and pro-social behaviors. Future research should attempt to explore the neural circuitry between the frontal lobes and deeper brain areas.

Psilocybin and MDMA reduce costly punishment in the Ultimatum Game

Disruptions in social decision-making are becoming evident in many psychiatric conditions. These are studied using paradigms investigating the psychological mechanisms underlying interpersonal interactions, such as the Ultimatum Game (UG). Rejection behaviour in the UG represents altruistic punishment – the costly punishment of norm violators – but the mechanisms underlying it require clarification. To investigate the psychopharmacology of UG behaviour, we carried out two studies with healthy participants, employing serotonergic agonists: psilocybin (open-label, within-participant design, N = 19) and 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA; placebo-controlled, double-blind, crossover design, N = 20). We found that both MDMA and psilocybin reduced rejection of unfair offers (odds ratio: 0.57 and 0.42, respectively). The reduction in rejection rate following MDMA was associated with increased prosociality (R² = 0.26, p = 0.025). In the MDMA study, we investigated third-party decision-making and proposer behaviour. MDMA did not reduce rejection in the third-party condition, but produced an increase in the amount offered to others (Cohen’s d = 0.82). We argue that these compounds altered participants’ conceptualisation of ‘social reward’, placing more emphasis on the direct relationship with interacting partners. With these compounds showing efficacy in drug-assisted psychotherapy, these studies are an important step in the further characterisation of their psychological effects.

Social comparison in the brain: A coordinate-based meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies on the downward and upward comparisons

Social comparison is ubiquitous across human societies with dramatic influence on people's well-being and decision making. Downward comparison (comparing to worse-off others) and upward comparison (comparing to better-off others) constitute two types of social comparisons that produce different neuropsychological consequences. Based on studies exploring neural signatures associated with downward and upward comparisons, the current study utilized a coordinate-based meta-analysis to provide a refinement of understanding about the underlying neural architecture of social comparison. We identified consistent involvement of the ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex in downward comparison and consistent involvement of the anterior insula and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex in upward comparison. These findings fit well with the "common-currency" hypothesis that neural representations of social gain or loss resemble those for non-social reward or loss processing. Accordingly, we discussed our findings in the framework of general reinforcement learning (RL) hypothesis, arguing how social gain/loss induced by social comparisons could be encoded by the brain as a domain-general signal (i.e., prediction errors) serving to adjust people's decisions in social settings. Although the RL account may serve as a heuristic framework for the future research, other plausible accounts on the neuropsychological mechanism of social comparison were also acknowledged. Hum Brain Mapp 39:440-458, 2018. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Neural Basis of Strategic Decision Making

Human choice behaviors during social interactions often deviate from the predictions of game theory. This might arise partly from the limitations in the cognitive abilities necessary for recursive reasoning about the behaviors of others. In addition, during iterative social interactions, choices might change dynamically as knowledge about the intentions of others and estimates for choice outcomes are incrementally updated via reinforcement learning. Some of the brain circuits utilized during social decision making might be general-purpose and contribute to isomorphic individual and social decision making. By contrast, regions in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and temporal parietal junction (TPJ) might be recruited for cognitive processes unique to social decision making.