Memory bias in the temporal bisection point

The Feeling of Time Passing Is Associated with Recurrent Sustained Activity and Theta Rhythms Across the Cortex

Introduction: We are constantly estimating how much time has passed, and yet know little about the brain mechanisms through which this process occurs. In this pilot study, we evaluated so-called subjective time estimation with the temporal bisection task, while recording brain activity from electroencephalography (EEG). Methods: Nine adult participants were trained to distinguish between two durations of visual stimuli as either "short" (400 msec) or "long" (1600 msec). They were then presented with stimulus durations in between the long and short stimuli. EEG data from 128 electrodes were examined with a novel analytical method that identifies segments of sustained cortical activity during the task. Results: Participants tended to categorize intermediate durations as "long" more frequently than "short" and were thus experiencing time as moving faster while overestimating the amount of time passing. Their mean bisection point (during which frequency of selecting short vs. long is equal) was closer to the geometric mean of task stimuli (800 msec) rather than the arithmetic mean (1000 msec). In contrast, sustained brain activity occurred closer to the arithmetic mean. The recurrence rate of this activity was highly related to the bisection point, especially when analyzed within naturally occurring theta oscillations (4-8 Hz) (r = -0.90). Discussion: Sustained activity across the cortex within the theta range may reflect temporal durations, whereas its repeated appearance relates to the subjective feeling of time passing.

Parkinson’s disease deficits in time perception to auditory as well as visual stimuli – A large online study

Cognitive deficits are common in Parkinson’s disease (PD) and range from mild cognitive impairment to dementia, often dramatically reducing quality of life. Physiological models have shown that attention and memory are predicated on the brain’s ability to process time. Perception has been shown to be increased or decreased by activation or deactivation of dopaminergic neurons respectively. Here we investigate differences in time perception between patients with PD and healthy controls. We have measured differences in sub-second- and second-time intervals. Sensitivity and error in perception as well as the response times are calculated. Additionally, we investigated intra-individual response variability and the effect of participant devices on both reaction time and sensitivity. Patients with PD have impaired sensitivity in discriminating between durations of both visual and auditory stimuli compared to healthy controls. Though initially designed as an in-person study, because of the pandemic the experiment was adapted into an online study. This adaptation provided a unique opportunity to enroll a larger number of international participants and use this study to evaluate the feasibility of future virtual studies focused on cognitive impairment. To our knowledge this is the only time perception study, focusing on PD, which measures the differences in perception using both auditory and visual stimuli. The cohort involved is the largest to date, comprising over 800 participants.

Why has evolution not selected for perfect self-control?

Self-control refers to the ability to deliberately reject tempting options and instead select ones that produce greater long-term benefits. Although some apparent failures of self-control are, on closer inspection, reward maximizing, at least some self-control failures are clearly disadvantageous and non-strategic. The existence of poor self-control presents an important evolutionary puzzle because there is no obvious reason why good self-control should be more costly than poor self-control. After all, a rock is infinitely patient. I propose that self-control failures result from cases in which well-learned (and thus routinized) decision-making strategies yield suboptimal choices. These mappings persist in the decision-makers' repertoire because they result from learning processes that are adaptive in the broader context, either on the timescale of learning or of evolution. Self-control, then, is a form of cognitive control and the subjective feeling of effort likely reflects the true costs of cognitive control. Poor self-control, in this view, is ultimately a result of bounded optimality. This article is part of the theme issue 'Risk taking and impulsive behaviour: fundamental discoveries, theoretical perspectives and clinical implications.

A Bayesian Perspective on Accumulation in the Magnitude System

Several theoretical and empirical work posit the existence of a common magnitude system in the brain. Such a proposal implies that manipulating stimuli in one magnitude dimension (e.g. duration in time) should interfere with the subjective estimation of another magnitude dimension (e.g. size in space). Here, we asked whether a generalized Bayesian magnitude estimation system would sample sensory evidence using a common, amodal prior. Two psychophysical experiments separately tested participants on their perception of duration, surface, and numerosity when the non-target magnitude dimensions and the rate of sensory evidence accumulation were manipulated. First, we found that duration estimation was resilient to changes in surface and numerosity, whereas lengthening (shortening) the duration yielded under- (over-) estimations of surface and numerosity. Second, the perception of surface and numerosity were affected by changes in the rate of sensory evidence accumulation, whereas duration was not. Our results suggest that a generalized magnitude system based on Bayesian computations would minimally necessitate multiple priors.

The hunt for the perfect discounting function and a reckoning of time perception

Making decisions that factor the cost of time is fundamental to survival. Yet, while it is readily appreciated that our perception of time is intimately involved in this process, theories regarding intertemporal decision-making and theories regarding time perception are treated, largely, independently. Even within these respective domains, models providing good fits to data fail to provide insight as to why, from a normative sense, those fits should take their apparent form. Conversely, normative models that proffer a rationalization for why an agent should weigh options in a particular way, or to perceive time in a particular way, fail to account for the full body of well-established experimental evidence. Here we review select, yet key advances in our understanding, identifying conceptual breakthroughs in the fields of intertemporal decision-making and in time perception, as well as their limits and failings in the face of hard-won experimental observation. On this background of accrued knowledge, a new conception unifying the domains of decision-making and time perception is put forward (Training-Integrated Maximization of Reinforcement Rate, TIMERR) to provide a better fit to observations and a more parsimonious reckoning of why we make choices, and thereby perceive time, the way we do.

Timescale- and Sensory Modality-Dependency of the Central Tendency of Time Perception

When individuals are asked to reproduce intervals of stimuli that are intermixedly presented at various times, longer intervals are often underestimated and shorter intervals overestimated. This phenomenon may be attributed to the central tendency of time perception, and suggests that our brain optimally encodes a stimulus interval based on current stimulus input and prior knowledge of the distribution of stimulus intervals. Two distinct systems are thought to be recruited in the perception of sub- and supra-second intervals. Sub-second timing is subject to local sensory processing, whereas supra-second timing depends on more centralized mechanisms. To clarify the factors that influence time perception, the present study investigated how both sensory modality and timescale affect the central tendency. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to reproduce sub- or supra-second intervals, defined by visual or auditory stimuli. In the sub-second range, the magnitude of the central tendency was significantly larger for visual intervals compared to auditory intervals, while visual and auditory intervals exhibited a correlated and comparable central tendency in the supra-second range. In Experiment 2, the ability to discriminate sub-second intervals in the reproduction task was controlled across modalities by using an interval discrimination task. Even when the ability to discriminate intervals was controlled, visual intervals exhibited a larger central tendency than auditory intervals in the sub-second range. In addition, the magnitude of the central tendency for visual and auditory sub-second intervals was significantly correlated. These results suggest that a common modality-independent mechanism is responsible for the supra-second central tendency, and that both the modality-dependent and modality-independent components of the timing system contribute to the central tendency in the sub-second range.

Analytical Calculation of Errors in Time and Value Perception Due to a Subjective Time Accumulator: A Mechanistic Model and the Generation of Weber’s Law

It has been previously shown (Namboodiri, Mihalas, Marton, & Hussain Shuler, 2014 ) that an evolutionary theory of decision making and time perception is capable of explaining numerous behavioral observations regarding how humans and animals decide between differently delayed rewards of differing magnitudes and how they perceive time. An implementation of this theory using a stochastic drift-diffusion accumulator model (Namboodiri, Mihalas, & Hussain Shuler, 2014a ) showed that errors in time perception and decision making approximately obey Weber’s law for a range of parameters. However, prior calculations did not have a clear mechanistic underpinning. Further, these calculations were only approximate, with the range of parameters being limited. In this letter, we provide a full analytical treatment of such an accumulator model, along with a mechanistic implementation, to calculate the expression of these errors for the entirety of the parameter space. In our mechanistic model, Weber’s law results from synaptic facilitation and depression within the feedback synapses of the accumulator. Our theory also makes the prediction that the steepness of temporal discounting can be affected by requiring the precise timing of temporal intervals. Thus, by presenting exact quantitative calculations, this work provides falsifiable predictions for future experimental testing.