How cognitive enhancement can change our duties

Cognitive Enhancement, Hyperagency, and Responsibility Explosion

Hyperagency objections appeal to the risk that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by giving us too much control. I charitably formulate and engage with a prominent version of this objection due to  Sandel (2009)-viz., that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by creating an "explosion" of responsibilities. I first outline why this worry might look prima facie persuasive, and then I show that it can ultimately be defended against. At the end of the day, if we are to resist cognitive enhancement, it should not be based on a Sandel-style hyperagency argument.

Human Enhancements and Voting: Towards a Declaration of Rights and Responsibilities of Beings

The phenomenon and ethics of “voting” will be explored in the context of human enhancements. “Voting” will be examined for enhanced humans with moderate and extreme enhancements. Existing patterns of discrimination in voting around the globe could continue substantially “as is” for those with moderate enhancements. For extreme enhancements, voting rights could be challenged if the very humanity of the enhanced was in doubt. Humans who were not enhanced could also be disenfranchised if certain enhancements become prevalent. Voting will be examined using a theory of engagement articulated by Professor Sophie Loidolt that emphasizes the importance of legitimization and justification by “facing the appeal of the other” to determine what is “right” from a phenomenological first-person perspective. Seeking inspiration from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, voting rights and responsibilities will be re-framed from a foundational working hypothesis that all enhanced and non-enhanced humans should have a right to vote directly. Representative voting will be considered as an admittedly imperfect alternative or additional option. The framework in which voting occurs, as well as the processes, temporal cadence, and role of voting, requires the participation from as diverse a group of humans as possible. Voting rights delivered by fiat to enhanced or non-enhanced humans who were excluded from participation in the design and ratification of the governance structure is not legitimate. Applying and extending Loidolt’s framework, we must recognize the urgency that demands the impossible, with openness to that universality in progress (or universality to come) that keeps being constituted from the outside.

Public Opinion on Cognitive Enhancement Varies across Different Situations

People vary widely in their acceptance of the use of pharmacological cognitive enhancement (CE). We tested the hypothesis that the acceptability of CE is malleable, by varying the context in which CE use takes place, by framing the use of CE with positive and negative metaphors, and by distinguishing between self and other CE use. 2,519 US-based participants completed 2 surveys using Amazon's Mechanical Turk. First, participants responded to vignettes describing a fictional character, which varied by framing metaphor (Pandora's box that releases brain performance vs. key that unlocks brain potential), role/setting (student/educational vs. employee/professional), and activity type (blue vs. white collar). Second, participants viewed personalized vignettes describing their own situations. Across both surveys, participants generally found CE use more acceptable for employees than students, while the effects of framing metaphors were unreliable and smaller than previously reported. People were more accepting of CE use by others than by themselves. Participants also found CE use more acceptable if more peers used CE, the environment was less competitive, and authority figures encouraged CE use. Our findings suggest that opinions about CE are indeed malleable, and concerns that peer pressure, the influence of authority figures, and competition might affect CE use are not unfounded.

Modafinil potentiates cocaine self-administration by a dopamine-independent mechanism: possible involvement of gap junctions

Modafinil and methylphenidate are medications that inhibit the neuronal reuptake of dopamine, a mechanism shared with cocaine. Their use as "smart drugs" by healthy subjects poses health concerns and requires investigation. We show that methylphenidate, but not modafinil, maintained intravenous self-administration in Sprague-Dawley rats similar to cocaine. Both modafinil and methylphenidate pretreatments potentiated cocaine self-administration. Cocaine, at self-administered doses, stimulated mesolimbic dopamine levels. This effect was potentiated by methylphenidate, but not by modafinil pretreatments, indicating dopamine-dependent actions for methylphenidate, but not modafinil. Modafinil is known to facilitate electrotonic neuronal coupling by actions on gap junctions. Carbenoxolone, a gap junction inhibitor, antagonized modafinil, but not methylphenidate potentiation of cocaine self-administration. Our results indicate that modafinil shares mechanisms with cocaine and methylphenidate but has a unique pharmacological profile that includes facilitation of electrotonic coupling and lower abuse liability, which may be exploited in future therapeutic drug design for cocaine use disorder.

Motives and Side-Effects of Microdosing With Psychedelics Among Users

BACKGROUND

Microdosing with psychedelics has gained considerable media attention where it is portrayed as a performance enhancer, especially popular on the work floor. While reports are in general positive, scientific evidence about potential negative effects is lacking aside from the prevalence and motives for use. The present study addressed this gap by surveying psychedelic users about their experience with microdosing including their dosing schedule, motivation, and potential experienced negative effects.

METHODS

An online questionnaire was launched on several websites and fora between March and July 2018. Respondents who had consented, were 18 years of age or older, and had experience with microdosing were included in the analyses.

RESULTS

In total, 1116 of the respondents were either currently microdosing (79.5%) or microdosed in the past (20.5%). Lysergic acid diethylamide (10 mcg) and psilocybin (0.5 g) were the most commonly used psychedelics with a microdosing frequency between 2 and 4 times per week. The majority of users, however, were oblivious about the consumed dose. Performance enhancement was the main motive to microdose (37%). The most reported negative effects were of psychological nature and occurred acutely while under the influence.

CONCLUSION

In line with media reports and anecdotes, the majority of our respondents microdosed to enhance performance. Negative effects occurred mostly acutely after substance consumption. However, the main reason to have stopped microdosing was that it was not effective. Future experimental placebo-controlled studies are needed to test whether performance enhancement can be quantified and to assess potential negative effects after longer term microdosing.

Freedom of Thought and Mental Integrity: The Moral Requirements for Any Neural Prosthesis

There are many kinds of neural prostheses available or being researched today. In most cases they are intended to cure or improve the condition of patients affected by some cerebral deficiency. In other cases, their goal is to provide new means to maintain or improve an individual's normal performance. In all these circumstances, one of the possible risks is that of violating the privacy of brain contents (which partly coincide with mental contents) or of depriving individuals of full control over their thoughts (mental states), as the latter are at least partly detectable by new prosthetic technologies. Given the (ethical) premise that the absolute privacy and integrity of the most relevant part of one's brain data is (one of) the most valuable and inviolable human right(s), I argue that a (technical) principle should guide the design and regulation of new neural prostheses. The premise is justified by the fact that whatever the coercion, the threat or the violence undergone, the person can generally preserve a "private repository" of thought in which to defend her convictions and identity, her dignity, and autonomy. Without it, the person may end up in a state of complete subjection to other individuals. The following functional principle is that neural prostheses should be technically designed and built so as to prevent such outcomes. They should: (a) incorporate systems that can find and signal the unauthorized detection, alteration, and diffusion of brain data and brain functioning; (b) be able to stop any unauthorized detection, alteration, and diffusion of brain data. This should not only regard individual devices, but act as a general (technical) operating principle shared by all interconnected systems that deal with decoding brain activity and brain functioning.

Toward a Method for Exposing and Elucidating Ethical Issues with Human Cognitive Enhancement Technologies

To develop a method for exposing and elucidating ethical issues with human cognitive enhancement (HCE). The intended use of the method is to support and facilitate open and transparent deliberation and decision making with respect to this emerging technology with great potential formative implications for individuals and society. Literature search to identify relevant approaches. Conventional content analysis of the identified papers and methods in order to assess their suitability for assessing HCE according to four selection criteria. Method development. Amendment after pilot testing on smart-glasses. Based on three existing approaches in health technology assessment a method for exposing and elucidating ethical issues in the assessment of HCE technologies was developed. Based on a pilot test for smart-glasses, the method was amended. The method consists of six steps and a guiding list of 43 questions. A method for exposing and elucidating ethical issues in the assessment of HCE was developed. The method provides the ground work for context specific ethical assessment and analysis. Widespread use, amendments, and further developments of the method are encouraged.

Can Neuromodulation also Enhance Social Inequality? Some Possible Indirect Interventions of the State

There is evidence that noninvasive brain stimulation (NIBS), and especially transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), can improve some cognitive functions, at least temporarily. However, as the improvement only applies to some “lucky” people, it may raise ethical, social and legal issues related to fairness in selective contexts (exams, competitions, job interviews). In this regard, an important element tends to be overlooked: the variability in individual response to tDCS in particular. If intensive study or practice and massive doses of chemical enhancers can have slightly different effects over different people, tDCS can sometimes be completely ineffective. The variability in individual response, if tDCS were widely used, could add to the already present natural inequalities between people, or even create new ones, leaving some in a disadvantaged condition. The discussion of the various ethical, social and legal consequences of different individual responses to tDCS might also address a potential indirect intervention by the State. In fact, if NIBS were to be widespread in competitive contexts, those who do not benefit from tDCS would be disadvantaged compared to those able to enhance their skills thanks to neuromodulation technologies. The most disadvantaged people for their lower response to tDCS could then acquire the right to receive and use free and safe cognitive enhancing drugs or other forms of bettering cognitive skills and functions, so as to reduce the gap between them and those who respond well to tDCS, in the light of the principle of equal opportunity.

Sleep Deprivation Impairs and Caffeine Enhances My Performance, but Not Always Our Performance

What effects do factors that impair or enhance performance in individuals have when these individuals act in groups? We provide a framework, called the GIE ("Effects of Grouping on Impairments and Enhancements") framework, for investigating this question. As prominent examples for individual-level impairments and enhancements, we discuss sleep deprivation and caffeine. Based on previous research, we derive hypotheses on how they influence performance in groups, specifically process gains and losses in motivation, individual capability, and coordination. We conclude that the effect an impairment or enhancement has on individual-level performance is not necessarily mirrored in group performance: grouping can help or hurt. We provide recommendations on how to estimate empirically the effects individual-level performance impairments and enhancements have in groups. By comparing sleep deprivation to stress and caffeine to pharmacological cognitive enhancement, we illustrate that we cannot readily generalize from group results on one impairment or enhancement to another, even if they have similar effects on individual-level performance.

Moral and social reasons to acknowledge the use of cognitive enhancers in competitive-selective contexts

BACKGROUND

Although some of the most radical hypothesis related to the practical implementations of human enhancement have yet to become even close to reality, the use of cognitive enhancers is a very tangible phenomenon occurring with increasing popularity in university campuses as well as in other contexts. It is now well documented that the use of cognitive enhancers is not only increasingly common in Western countries, but also gradually accepted as a normal procedure by the media as well. In fact, its implementation is not unusual in various professional contexts and it has its peak in colleges (where the trend has been characterized as "academic doping"). Even when certain restrictions in the legislation of a country are indeed in place (i.e. through prescriptions requirements), they are without doubts easy to overcome. The legitimacy and appropriateness of such restrictions will not be the focus of our investigation.

DISCUSSION

Our concern is instead related to the moral and social reasons to publicly acknowledge the use of cognitive enhancers in competitive-selective contexts. These reasons are linked to a more neutral analysis of contemporary Western society: it is a fact that an increasing number of competitive-selective contexts have a substantial number of contenders using cognitive enhancers. Through the use of five explicative examples, in this paper we want to analyse the problems related to its use. In particular, it will be our aim to show the tension between one of the main argument used by bio-liberals (the use of cognitive enhancers is an eligible procedure that society does not impose on anyone) and the actual implementation of the drugs in competitive, or semi-competitive contexts.

Why is Cognitive Enhancement Deemed Unacceptable? The Role of Fairness, Deservingness, and Hollow Achievements

We ask why pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE) is generally deemed morally unacceptable by lay people. Our approach to this question has two core elements. First, we employ an interdisciplinary perspective, using philosophical rationales as base for generating psychological models. Second, by testing these models we investigate how different normative judgments on PCE are related to each other. Based on an analysis of the relevant philosophical literature, we derive two psychological models that can potentially explain the judgment that PCE is unacceptable: the "Unfairness-Undeservingness Model" and the "Hollowness-Undeservingness Model." The Unfairness-Undeservingness Model holds that people judge PCE to be unacceptable because they take it to produce unfairness and to undermine the degree to which PCE-users deserve reward. The Hollowness-Undeservingness Model assumes that people judge PCE to be unacceptable because they find achievements realized while using PCE hollow and undeserved. We empirically test both models against each other using a regression-based approach. When trying to predict judgments regarding the unacceptability of PCE using judgments regarding unfairness, hollowness, and undeservingness, we found that unfairness judgments were the only significant predictor of the perceived unacceptability of PCE, explaining about 36% of variance. As neither hollowness nor undeservingness had explanatory power above and beyond unfairness, the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model proved superior to the Hollowness-Undeservingness Model. This finding also has implications for the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model itself: either a more parsimonious single-factor "Fairness Model" should replace the Unfairness-Undeservingness-Model or fairness fully mediates the relationship between undeservingness and unacceptability. Both explanations imply that participants deemed PCE unacceptable because they judged it to be unfair. We conclude that concerns about unfairness play a crucial role in the subjective unacceptability of PCE and discuss the implications of our approach for the further investigation of the psychology of PCE.

Pills or Push-Ups? Effectiveness and Public Perception of Pharmacological and Non-Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement

We review work on the effectiveness of different forms of cognitive enhancement, both pharmacological and non-pharmacological. We consider caffeine, methylphenidate, and modafinil for pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE) and computer training, physical exercise, and sleep for non-pharmacological cognitive enhancement (NPCE). We find that all of the techniques described can produce significant beneficial effects on cognitive performance. However, effect sizes are moderate, and consistently dependent on individual and situational factors as well as the cognitive domain in question. Although meta-analyses allowing a quantitative comparison of effectiveness across techniques are lacking to date, we can conclude that PCE is not more effective than NPCE. We discuss the physiological reasons for this limited effectiveness. We then propose that even though their actual effectiveness seems similar, in the general public PCE is perceived as fundamentally different from NPCE, in terms of effectiveness, but also in terms of acceptability. We illustrate the potential consequences such a misperception of PCE can have.

The impact of neuroscience on society: cognitive enhancement in neuropsychiatric disorders and in healthy people

In addition to causing distress and disability to the individual, neuropsychiatric disorders are also extremely expensive to society and governments. These disorders are both common and debilitating and impact on cognition, functionality and wellbeing. Cognitive enhancing drugs, such as cholinesterase inhibitors and methylphenidate, are used to treat cognitive dysfunction in Alzheimer's disease and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, respectively. Other cognitive enhancers include specific computerized cognitive training and devices. An example of a novel form of cognitive enhancement using the technological advancement of a game on an iPad that also acts to increase motivation is presented. Cognitive enhancing drugs, such as methylphenidate and modafinil, which were developed as treatments, are increasingly being used by healthy people. Modafinil not only affects 'cold' cognition, but also improves 'hot' cognition, such as emotion recognition and task-related motivation. The lifestyle use of 'smart drugs' raises both safety concerns as well as ethical issues, including coercion and increasing disparity in society. As a society, we need to consider which forms of cognitive enhancement (e.g. pharmacological, exercise, lifelong learning) are acceptable and for which groups (e.g. military, doctors) under what conditions (e.g. war, shift work) and by what methods we would wish to improve and flourish.