Memory Integration as a Challenge to the Consolidation/Reconsolidation Hypothesis: Similarities, Differences and Perspectives

Proust and involuntary retrieval

Proust was undoubtedly a pioneer in exploring cognitive processes engaged in memory. The analysis of the episode of the madeleine, as well as the study of Proust's statements on the goals of his work, clearly reveal the visionary side of this author. Long before several concepts entered into mainstream scientific thought, Proust proposed, among other things, that recall was a reconstruction, that a sensory cue could provoke a memory recall, and that we should distinguish between voluntary and involuntary memory. Through numerous episodes of "involuntary reminiscence" scattered throughout his work, Proust illustrates a particular form of autobiographic memory recall: a recall that does not involve consciousness and whose starting point is an emotion provoked by a specific cue. This recall, which leads, according to Proust, to a more intense revival of the memory than voluntary recall, has only reached prominence in cognitive science more than 80 years later. Additionaly, Proust underlined the determinant role that emotion may have in this particular form of recall. On the other hand, studies on animals have shown that the presentation of a retrieval cue could induce emotional reactions followed by a facilitation of the memory retrieval associated with the cue. The existence of these data, which support Proust's proposals, should encourage the neuroscience community to further explore, in humans and animals, this form of cue elicited emotion that initiated involuntary recall of autobiographical memory.

Retrograde amnesia for the stress-induced impairment of extinction: time-dependent and not so forgotten

We investigated whether retrograde amnesia for the stress-induced impairment of extinction retrieval shares similar characteristics with original acquisition memories. The first experiment demonstrated that cycloheximide administered shortly after a single restraint stress session alleviated the impairment of extinction retrieval but not when administered following a longer delay (i.e., the amnesia for stress is time-dependent). A second experiment showed that the retrograde amnesia for stress could be alleviated by a second brief exposure to the stressor. These results demonstrating that amnesia for stress shares characteristics similar to original memories are explained using a retrieval-based memory integration model of retrograde amnesia.

The Illusion of Pure Reason in Science: A Cautionary Note

Introspection tells people that their behavior is both consciously reasoned and functional (i.e., rational), at least based on the evidence available to them. In contrast, research has found that much human behavior reported to be consciously determined, is strongly influenced by heuristics and the mechanistic principles of associative learning that usually function unconsciously and are sometimes sub-optimal. Scientists are trained to base their conclusions on a rational analysis of evidence, which enhances the scientific validity of their conclusions. But scientific training appears to do little to constrain the role of unconscious heuristics. The present point is that scientists are humans and, as such, they are subject to the influence of heuristics in their scientific conclusions just as laypeople are in their everyday behavior. As an example, the availability heuristic and how it seemingly feeds the repetition-induced truth effect are described. One consequence of this is that failures to replicate frequently cited papers do little to devalue the irreplicable reports. Although unconscious heuristics influence the scientific thinking of researchers, scientists are typically unaware of the role of these heuristics due to their operating below the horizon of introspection. This appears to explain the persistence, in light of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, of the views by many researchers that 'a prediction error is necessary for learning' and that 'reactivated memories have to be reconsolidated to be retained for future access.'

Dissociative Amnesia? It Might be Organic Memory Loss!

This article discusses the possibility of practitioners who mistake organic memory loss for dissociative amnesia. It starts with the case of a young man with complete retrograde amnesia due to a traumatic head injury. Because he did not show any gross neurological abnormalities, a neurologist thought his amnesia had a psychological origin. An extensive neuropsychological examination revealed that the man did have an organic reason for his amnesia. Next, the existence of dissociative memory loss as well as isolated organic retrograde amnesia is considered. While cases of organic memory loss are well-documented, there is hardly any evidence for dissociative amnesia. It is argued that organic memory loss might be mistakenly taken for dissociative amnesia. In line with the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, practitioners are advised to rule out the possibility of organic memory loss, before diagnosing a patient with dissociative amnesia.

The time window of reconsolidation: A replication

Reconsolidation is a process by which a consolidated memory that has been destabilized by reactivation is updated, strengthened, or weakened by the restabilization of the trace. A critical assumption of the reconsolidation theory is that reconsolidation is a time-dependent process. Hupbach, Gomez, Hardt, and Nadel (2007, Learning & Memory, 14, 47–53) conducted a set of experiments demonstrating that memory updating is only found when the reconsolidation process has time to complete. This finding strengthens reconsolidation theory and poses a challenge to other accounts of memory updating (e.g., context and interference accounts). Because this finding is so critical to the reconsolidation theory, we attempted to directly replicate these experiments, which showed memory updating in a 3-day paradigm (when reconsolidation has time to complete), but not in a 2-day paradigm (when reconsolidation does not have time to complete). We replicated these results, thereby bolstering the reconsolidation theory of memory updating.

Mechanisms of Memory Updating: State Dependency vs. Reconsolidation

Reactivating a memory trace has been argued to put it in a fragile state where it must undergo a stabilization process known as reconsolidation. During this process, memories are thought to be susceptible to interference and can be updated with new information. In the spatial context paradigm, memory updating has been shown to occur when new information is presented in the same spatial context as old information, an effect attributed to a reconsolidation process. However, the integration concept holds that memory change can only occur when reactivation and test states are the same, similar to a state-dependent effect. Thus, in human episodic memory, memory updating should only be found when state is the same across the study, reactivation, and test sessions. We investigated whether memory updating can be attributed to state dependency in two experiments using mood as a state. We found evidence of memory updating only when mood was the same across all sessions of the experiments, lending support to the integration concept and posing a challenge to a reconsolidation explanation.

Revisiting systems consolidation and the concept of consolidation

For more than 50 years, knowledge of memory processes has been based on the consolidation hypothesis, which postulates that new memories require time to become stabilized. Two forms of the consolidation model exist. The Cellular Consolidation concept is based upon retrograde amnesia induced by amnesic treatments, the severity of which decreases as the learning to treatment increases over minutes or hours. In contrast, The Systems Consolidation model is based on post-training hippocampal lesions, which produce more severe retrograde amnesia when induced after days than after weeks. Except for the temporal parameters, Cellular and Systems Consolidation show many similarities. Here we propose that Systems consolidation, much as Cellular Consolidation (see Gisquet- Verrier and Riccio, 2018), can be explained in terms of a form of state-dependency. Accordingly, lesions of the hippocampus induce a change in the internal state of the animal, which disrupts retrieval processes. But the effect of contextual change is known to decrease with the length of the retention intervals, consistent with time-dependent retrograde amnesia. We provide evidence supporting this new view.

Short-term memory reactivation of a weak CS-US association promotes long-term memory persistence in conditioned odor aversion

In conditioned odor aversion (COA), the association of a tasteless odorized solution (the conditioned stimulus [CS]) with an intraperitoneal injection of LiCl (the unconditioned stimulus [US[), which produces visceral malaise, results in its future avoidance. The strength of this associative memory is mainly dependent on two parameters, that is, the strength of the US and the interstimuli interval (ISI). In rats, COA has been observed only with ISIs of ≤15 min and LiCl (0.15 M) doses of 2.0% of bodyweight, when tested 48 h after acquisition (long-term memory [LTM]). However, we previously reported a robust aversion in rats trained with ISIs up to 60 min when tested 4 h after acquisition (short-term memory [STM]). Since memories get reactivated during retrieval, in the current study we hypothesized that testing for STM would reactivate this COA trace, strengthening its LTM. For this, we compared the LTM of rats trained with long ISIs or low doses of LiCl initially tested for STM with that of rats tested for LTM only. Interestingly, rats conditioned under parameters sufficient to produce STM, but not LTM, showed a reliable LTM when first tested for STM. These observations suggest that under suboptimal training conditions, such as long ISIs or low US intensities, a CS-US association is established but requires reactivation in the short-term in order to persist in the long-term.

Failures of memory and the fate of forgotten memories

This review is intended primarily to provide cognitive benchmarks and perhaps a new mindset for behavioral neuroscientists who study memory. Forgetting, defined here broadly as all types of decreases in acquired responding to stimulus-specific eliciting cues, is commonly attributed to one or more of the following families of mechanisms: (1) (4) associative interference by information similar to, but different from the target information, (2) spontaneous decay of memory with increasing retention intervals, (3) displacement from short-term memory by irrelevant information, and (4) inadequate retrieval cues at test. I briefly review each of these families and discuss data suggesting that many apparent instances of spontaneous forgetting and displacement from short-term memory can be viewed as variants of inadequate retrieval cues and associative interference. The potential for recovery of target information from each of these families of forgetting without further relevant training is then reviewed, with a conclusion that most forgetting is due to retrieval failure as opposed to irreversible erasure of memory. The more general point is made that there are logical problems with ever talking about attenuating or erasing a memory as a consequence of conventional forgetting or disrupted consolidation/reconsolidation. Consideration is then given to the frequently overlooked but highly beneficial consequences of most forgetting. Lastly, the major variables that moderate forgetting are summarized, including (a) the similarities of the target information including training context to the explicit retrieval cues and context present at test, (b) the similarities of potentially interfering acquired information to the retrieval cues and context present at test, and (c) the retention interval for the target information relative to that for the potentially interfering information. Appropriate manipulation of these variables can reduce forgetting, and increase forgetting when desired.

Understanding the dynamic and destiny of memories

Memory formation enables the retention of life experiences overtime. Based on previously acquired information, organisms can anticipate future events and adjust their behaviors to maximize survival. However, in an ever-changing environment, a memory needs to be malleable to maintain its relevance. In fact, substantial evidence suggests that a consolidated memory can become labile and susceptible to modifications after being reactivated, a process termed reconsolidation. When an extinction process takes place, a memory can also be temporarily inhibited by a second memory that carries information with opposite meaning. In addition, a memory can fade and lose its significance in a process known as forgetting. Thus, following retrieval, new life experiences can be integrated with the original memory trace to maintain its predictive value. In this review, we explore the determining factors that regulate the fate of a memory after its reactivation. We focus on three post-retrieval memory destinies (reconsolidation, extinction, and forgetting) and discuss recent rodent studies investigating the biological functions and neural mechanisms underlying each of these processes.

Emotional remodeling with oxytocin durably rescues trauma-induced behavioral and neuro-morphological changes in rats: a promising treatment for PTSD

Recent evidence indicates that reactivated memories are malleable and can integrate new information upon their reactivation. We injected rats with oxytocin to investigate whether the delivery of a drug which dampens anxiety and fear before the reactivation of trauma memory decreases the emotional load of the original representation and durably alleviates PTSD-like symptoms. Rats exposed to the single prolonged stress (SPS) model of PTSD were classified 15 and 17 days later as either resilient or vulnerable to trauma on the basis of their anxiety and arousal scores. Following 2 other weeks, they received an intracerebral infusion of oxytocin (0.1 µg/1 µL) or saline 40 min before their trauma memory was reactivated by exposure to SPS reminders. PTSD-like symptoms and reactivity to PTSD-related cues were examined 3-14 days after oxytocin treatment. Results showed that vulnerable rats treated with saline exhibited a robust PTSD syndrome including increased anxiety and decreased arousal, as well as intense fear reactions to SPS sensory and contextual cues. Exposure to a combination of those cues resulted in c-fos hypo-activation and dendritic arbor retraction in prefrontal cortex and amygdala neurons, relative to resilient rats. Remarkably, 83% of vulnerable rats subjected to oxytocin-based emotional remodeling exhibited a resilient phenotype, and SPS-induced morphological alterations in prelimbic cortex and basolateral amygdala were eliminated. Our findings emphasize the translational potential of the present oxytocin-based emotional remodeling protocol which, when administered even long after the trauma, produces deep re-processing of traumatic memories and durable attenuation of the PTSD symptomatology.

Can cocaine-induced neuroinflammation explain maladaptive cocaine-associated memories?

Persistent and intrusive memories define a number of psychiatric disorders, including posttraumatic stress disorder and substance use disorder. In the latter, memory for drug-paired cues plays a critical role in sustaining compulsive drug use as these are potent triggers of relapse. As with many drugs, cocaine-cue associated memory is strengthened across presentations as cues become reliable predictors of drug availability. Recently, the targeting of cocaine-associated memory through disruption of the reconsolidation process has emerged as a potential therapeutic strategy; reconsolidation reflects the active process by which memory is re-stabilized after retrieval. In addition, a separate line of work reveals that neuroinflammatory markers, regulated by cocaine intake, play a role in memory processes. Our review brings these two literatures together by summarizing recent findings on cocaine-associated reconsolidation and cocaine-induced neuroinflammation. We discuss the interactions between reconsolidation processes and neuroinflammation following cocaine use, concluding with a new perspective on treatment to decrease risk of relapse to cocaine use.

Reactivation of the Unconditioned Stimulus Inhibits the Return of Fear Independent of Cortisol

Reconsolidation is the post-retrieval stabilization of memories, a time-limited process during which reactivated (i.e., retrieved) memories can be updated with new information, become stronger or weaker, depending on the specific treatment. We have previously shown that the stress hormone cortisol has an enhancing effect on the reconsolidation of fear memories in men. This effect was specific, i.e., limited to the conditioned stimulus (CS) that was reactivated, and did not generalize to other previously reinforced, but not reactivated CS. Based on these results, we suggested that cortisol plays a critical role in the continuous strengthening of reactivated emotional memories, contributing to their persistence and robustness. In the current study, we aimed to achieve a more generalized reconsolidation enhancement using an alternative reactivation method, i.e., by a low-intensity unconditioned stimulus (UCS) presentation instead of the more common unreinforced CS presentation. In previous studies, UCS reactivation was shown to lead to a more generalized reconsolidation effect. Therefore, we hypothesized that the combination of cortisol treatment and UCS reactivation would lead to an enhanced fear memory reconsolidation, which would generalize from previously reinforced CS to stimuli that resemble it. We tested 75 men in a 3-day fear conditioning paradigm: fear acquisition training on day 1; UCS reactivation/no reactivation and pharmacological treatment (20 mg hydrocortisone/placebo) on day 2; extinction training, reinstatement and test (of original and modified stimuli) on day 3. In contrast to our hypothesis, UCS reactivation prevented the return of fear [observed in skin conductance responses (SCR)] regardless of the pharmacological manipulation: while reinstatement to the original CS was found in the no-reactivation group, both reactivation groups (cortisol and placebo) showed no reinstatement. As the only methodological difference between our previous study and the current one was the reactivation method, we focus on UCS reactivation as the main explanation for these unexpected findings. We suggest that the robust prediction error generated by the UCS reactivation method (as opposed to CS reactivation), combined with the lower UCS intensity, has by itself weakened the emotional value of the UCS, thus preventing the return of fear to the CS that was associated with it. We call for future research to support these findings and to examine the potential of this reactivation method, or variations thereof, as a tool for therapeutic use.