Asynchrony in visual consciousness and the possible involvement of attention

Revisiting the color-motion asynchrony

Color-motion asynchrony (CMA) refers to an illusion in which we perceive a change in color earlier than a change in motion direction when the two changes occur simultaneously. This phenomenon may indicate that color is processed earlier than motion in the visual system. However, the very existence of CMA is under question owing to contradictory findings and methodological deficits in previous studies. Here, we used both the motion and color correspondence tasks (experiment 1) and the temporal order judgment (TOJ) task (experiment 2) to re-examine CMA. Colored dots moved in one direction and changed their color/direction at some time, whereas the relative timing between color and direction changes varied across trials. In the correspondence task, participants reported which direction/color of dots with a particular color/direction lasted longer, the one before or after the change? In the TOJ task, participants reported whether the change in color or the change in motion direction occurred earlier. Results indicated that participants perceived the change in color earlier than the change in motion direction in either the motion or color correspondence task, with a stronger asynchrony in the former. In the TOJ task, although participants showed no difference in psychophysical measures, they responded faster when the change in color occurred before (versus after) the change in direction. Drift-diffusion modeling (DDM) revealed a lower decision threshold when the change in color occurred before (versus after) the change in direction, indicating less cautiousness was excised in judgment when the color changed earlier. These results confirmed the veracity of CMA in different tasks and point to the viability of analyzing response times in traditional psychophysical studies.

The perceived present: What is it, and what is it there for?

It is proposed that the perceived present is not a moment in time, but an information structure comprising an integrated set of products of perceptual processing. All information in the perceived present carries an informational time marker identifying it as "present". This marker is exclusive to information in the perceived present. There are other kinds of time markers, such as ordinality ("this stimulus occurred before that one") and duration ("this stimulus lasted for 50 ms"). These are different from the "present" time marker and may be attached to information regardless of whether it is in the perceived present or not. It is proposed that the perceived present is a very short-term and very high-capacity holding area for perceptual information. The maximum holding time for any given piece of information is ~100 ms: This is affected by the need to balance the value of informational persistence for further processing against the problem of obsolescence of the information. The main function of the perceived present is to facilitate access by other specialized, automatic processes.

Is conscious perception a series of discrete temporal frames?

This paper reviews proposals that conscious perception consists, in whole or part, of successive discrete temporal frames on the sub-second time scale, each frame containing information registered as simultaneous or static. Although the idea of discrete frames in conscious perception cannot be regarded as falsified, there are many problems. Evidence does not consistently support any proposed duration or range of durations for frames. EEG waveforms provide evidence of periodicity in brain activity, but not necessarily in conscious perception. Temporal properties of perceptual processes are flexible in response to competing processing demands, which is hard to reconcile with the relative inflexibility of regular frames. There are also problems concerning the definition of frames, the need for informational connections between frames, the means by which boundaries between frames are established, and the apparent requirement for a storage buffer for information awaiting entry to the next frame.

A massively asynchronous, parallel brain

Whether the visual brain uses a parallel or a serial, hierarchical, strategy to process visual signals, the end result appears to be that different attributes of the visual scene are perceived asynchronously--with colour leading form (orientation) by 40 ms and direction of motion by about 80 ms. Whatever the neural root of this asynchrony, it creates a problem that has not been properly addressed, namely how visual attributes that are perceived asynchronously over brief time windows after stimulus onset are bound together in the longer term to give us a unified experience of the visual world, in which all attributes are apparently seen in perfect registration. In this review, I suggest that there is no central neural clock in the (visual) brain that synchronizes the activity of different processing systems. More likely, activity in each of the parallel processing-perceptual systems of the visual brain is reset independently, making of the brain a massively asynchronous organ, just like the new generation of more efficient computers promise to be. Given the asynchronous operations of the brain, it is likely that the results of activities in the different processing-perceptual systems are not bound by physiological interactions between cells in the specialized visual areas, but post-perceptually, outside the visual brain.

The whole is faster than its parts: evidence for temporally independent attention to distinct spatial locations

Behavioral and electrophysiological evidence suggests that visual attention operates in parallel at distinct spatial locations and samples the environment in periodic episodes. This combination of spatial and temporal characteristics raises the question of whether attention samples locations in a phase-locked or temporally independent manner. If attentional sampling rates were phase locked, attention would be limited by a global sampling rate. However, if attentional sampling rates were temporally independent, they could operate additively to sample higher rates of information. We tested these predictions by requiring participants to identify targets in 2 or 4 rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) streams, synchronized or asynchronized to manipulate the rate of new information globally (across streams). Identification accuracy exhibited little or no change when the global rate of new information doubled from 7.5 to 15 Hz (Experiment 1) or quadrupled to 30 Hz (Experiment 2). This relatively stable identification accuracy occurred even though participants reliably discriminated 7.5 Hz synchronous displays from displays globally asynchronized at 15 and 30 Hz (Metamer Control Experiment). Identification accuracy in the left visual field also significantly exceeded that in the right visual field. Overall, our results are consistent with temporally independent attention across distinct spatial locations and support previous reports of a right parietal "when" pathway specialized for temporal attention.

The physiology and psychophysics of the color-form relationship: a review

The relationship between color and form has been a long standing issue in visual science. A picture of functional segregation and topographic clustering emerges from anatomical and electrophysiological studies in animals, as well as by brain imaging studies in human. However, one of the many roles of chromatic information is to support form perception, and in some cases it can do so in a way superior to achromatic (luminance) information. This occurs both at an early, contour-detection stage, as well as in late, higher stages involving spatial integration and the perception of global shapes. Pure chromatic contrast can also support several visual illusions related to form-perception. On the other hand, form seems a necessary prerequisite for the computation and assignment of color across space, and there are several respects in which the color of an object can be influenced by its form. Evidently, color and form are mutually dependent. Electrophysiological studies have revealed neurons in the visual brain able to signal contours determined by pure chromatic contrast, the spatial tuning of which is similar to that of neurons carrying luminance information. It seems that, especially at an early stage, form is processed by several, independent systems that interact with each other, each one having different tuning characteristics in color space. At later processing stages, mechanisms able to combine information coming from different sources emerge. A clear interaction between color and form is manifested by the fact that color-form contingencies can be observed in various perceptual phenomena such as adaptation aftereffects and illusions. Such an interaction suggests a possible early binding between these two attributes, something that has been verified by both electrophysiological and fMRI studies.

Differences in perceptual latency estimated from judgments of temporal order, simultaneity and duration are inconsistent

Differences in perceptual latency (ΔL) for two stimuli, such as an auditory and a visual stimulus, can be estimated from temporal order judgments (TOJ) and simultaneity judgments (SJ), but previous research has found evidence that ΔL estimated from these tasks do not coincide. Here, using an auditory and a visual stimulus we confirmed this and further show that ΔL as estimated from duration judgments also does not coincide with ΔL estimated from TOJ or SJ. These inconsistencies suggest that each judgment is subject to different processes that bias ΔL in different ways: TOJ might be affected by sensory interactions, a bias associated with the method of single stimuli and an order difficulty bias; SJ by sensory interactions and an asymmetrical criterion bias; duration judgments by an order duration bias.

Contributions of magno- and parvocellular channels to conscious and non-conscious vision

The dorsal and ventral cortical pathways, driven predominantly by magnocellular (M) and parvocellular (P) inputs, respectively, assume leading roles in models of visual information processing. Although in prior proposals, the dorsal and ventral pathways support non-conscious and conscious vision, respectively, recent modelling and empirical developments indicate that each pathway plays important roles in both non-conscious and conscious vision. In these models, the ventral P-pathway consists of one subpathway processing an object's contour features, e.g. curvature, the other processing its surface attributes, e.g. colour. Masked priming studies have shown that feed-forward activity in the ventral P-pathway on its own supports non-conscious processing of contour and surface features. The dorsal M-pathway activity contributes directly to conscious vision of motion and indirectly to object vision by projecting to prefrontal cortex, which in turn injects top-down neural activity into the ventral P-pathway and there 'ignites' feed-forward-re-entrant loops deemed necessary for conscious vision. Moreover, an object's shape or contour remains invisible without the prior conscious registration of its surface properties, which for that reason are taken to comprise fundamental visual qualia. Besides suggesting avenues for future research, these developments bear on several recent and past philosophical issues.

Perceptual asynchrony for motion

Psychophysical experiments show that two different visual attributes, color and motion, processed in different areas of the visual brain, are perceived at different times relative to each other (Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997a). Here we demonstrate psychophysically that two variants of the same attribute, motion, which have the same temporal structure and are processed in the same visual areas, are also processed asynchronously. When subjects were asked to pair up–down motion of dots in one half of their hemifield with up-right motion in the other, they perceived the two directions of motion asynchronously, with the advantage in favor of up-right motion; when they were asked to pair the motion of white dots moving against a black background with that of red dots moving against an equiluminant green background, they perceived the luminant motion first, thus demonstrating a perceptual advantage of luminant over equiluminant motion. These results were not affected by motion speed or perceived motion “streaks.” We thus interpret these results to reflect the different processing times produced by luminant and equiluminant motion stimuli or by different degrees of motion direction change, thus adding to the evidence that processing time within the visual system is a major determinant of perceptual time.