Invisible, but how? The depth of unconscious processing as inferred from different suppression techniques

Using virtual reality to induce multi-trial inattentional blindness despite trial-by-trial measures of awareness

Unconscious processing has been widely examined using diverse and well-controlled methodologies. However, the extent to which these findings are relevant to real-life instances of information processing without awareness is limited. Here, we present a novel inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm in virtual reality (VR). In three experiments, we managed to repeatedly induce IB while participants foveally viewed salient stimuli for prolonged durations. The effectiveness of this paradigm demonstrates the close relationship between top-down attention and subjective experience. Thus, this method provides an ecologically valid setup to examine processing without awareness.

Unconscious integration: Current evidence for integrative processing under subliminal conditions

Integrative processing is traditionally believed to be dependent on consciousness. While earlier studies within the last decade reported many types of integration under subliminal conditions (i.e. without perceptual awareness), these findings are widely challenged recently. This review evaluates the current evidence for 10 types of subliminal integration that are widely studied: arithmetic processing, object-context integration, multi-word processing, same-different processing, multisensory integration and 5 different types of associative learning. Potential methodological issues concerning awareness measures are also taken into account. It is concluded that while there is currently no reliable evidence for subliminal integration, this does not necessarily refute 'unconscious' integration defined through non-subliminal (e.g. implicit) approaches.

No effect of attentional modulation by spatial cueing in a masked numerical priming paradigm using continuous flash suppression (CFS)

One notion emerging from studies on unconscious visual processing is that different "blinding techniques" seem to suppress the conscious perception of stimuli at different levels of the neurocognitive architecture. However, even when only the results from a single suppression method are compared, the picture of the scope and limits of unconscious visual processing remains strikingly heterogeneous, as in the case of continuous flash suppression (CFS). To resolve this issue, it has been suggested that high-level semantic processing under CFS is facilitated whenever interocular suppression is attenuated by the removal of visuospatial attention. In this behavioral study, we aimed to further investigate this "CFS-attenuation-by-inattention" hypothesis in a numerical priming study using spatial cueing. Participants performed a number comparison task on a visible target number ("compare number to five"). Prime-target pairs were either congruent (both numbers smaller, or both larger than five) or incongruent. Based on the "CFS-attenuation-by-inattention" hypothesis, we predicted that reaction times (RTs) for congruent prime-target pairs should be faster than for incongruent ones, but only when the prime was presented at the uncued location. In the invisible condition, we observed no priming effects and thus no evidence in support of the "CFS-attenuation-by-inattention" hypothesis. In the visible condition, we found an inverse effect of prime-target congruency. Our results agree with the notion that the representation of CF-suppressed stimuli is fractionated, and limited to their basic, elemental features, thus precluding semantic processing.

Getting to the heart of it: Multi-method exploration of nonconscious prioritization processes

Understanding the determinants of consciousness is crucial for theories that see it as functionally adaptive, and for explaining how consciousness affects higher-level cognition. The invention of continuous flash suppression (CFS), a long-duration suppression technique, resulted in a proliferation of research into the process of prioritization for consciousness. We developed a new technique, repeated masked suppression (RMS), that facilitates the measurement of long suppression times, but relies on different visual principles. RMS enables a theoretical leap: It allows scientists to examine the central process of prioritization across different suppression methods. In five experiments (n = 282) we collected chronometric RMS and CFS data, finding that the previously reported face inversion effect and the face priority-dimension generalize beyond CFS. Our results validate the use of multi-method designs in the study of prioritization for consciousness. Furthermore, we show how RMS could be used online to reach diverse samples, previously beyond the reach of consciousness science.

Reflections on Eriksen's seminal essay on discrimination, performance and learning without awareness

Early in his career C.W. Eriksen published in Psychological Review what turned out to be a highly impactful critique on methods and findings on the topic of unconscious influences on discrimination and awareness. His incisive commentary on extant methodology employed at that time - especially the heavy dependence on subjective reports - clearly was heard by others moving forward, as evidenced by the subsequent, lively discussions within the literature concerning the very definition of the notion of unconscious processing. Of equal importance, Eriksen's paper provided an impetus for the development of more refined techniques for manipulating perceptual awareness and for measuring the consequences of those manipulations. My purpose in this essay is to ensure that Eriksen's seminal contributions concerning unconscious phenomena remain within the awareness of the many current investigators working on this popular topic.

Invisible Adaptation: The Effect of Awareness on the Strength of the Motion Aftereffect

The ability to process information despite the lack of perceptual awareness is one of the most fascinating aspects of the visual system. Such unconscious processing is often investigated using adaptation, where any presence of the former can be traced by its footprint on aftereffects following the latter. We have investigated the mechanisms of the motion aftereffect (MAE) using random dot displays of varying motion coherence as well as crowding to modulate both the physical as well as the perceptual strength of the adaptation stimulus. Perceptual strength was quantitatively measured as the performance in a forced-choice direction-discrimination task. A motion-nulling technique was used to quantitatively measure the strength of the MAE. We show that the strength of the dynamic MAE is independently influenced by both the physical stimulus strength as well as the subjective perceptual strength, with the effect of the former being more prominent than that of the latter. We further show that the MAE still persists under conditions of subthreshold perception. Our results suggest that perceptual awareness can influence the strength of visual processing, but the latter is not fully dependent on the former and can still take place at its partial or even total absence.

"Real-life" continuous flash suppression (CFS)-CFS with real-world objects using augmented reality goggles

Continuous flash suppression (CFS) is a popular method for suppressing visual stimuli from awareness for relatively long periods. Thus far, this method has only been used for suppressing two-dimensional images presented on screen. We present a novel variant of CFS, termed “real-life” CFS, in which a portion of the actual immediate surroundings of an observer—including three-dimensional, real-life objects—can be rendered unconscious. Our method uses augmented reality goggles to present subjects with CFS masks to the dominant eye, leaving the nondominant eye exposed to the real world. In three experiments we demonstrated that real objects can indeed be suppressed from awareness for several seconds, on average, and that the suppression duration is comparable to that obtained using classic, on-screen CFS. As supplementary information, we further provide an example of experimental code that can be modified for future studies. This technique opens the way to new questions in the study of consciousness and its functions.

Intracranial markers of conscious face perception in humans

Investigations of the neural basis of consciousness have greatly benefited from protocols that involve the presentation of stimuli at perceptual threshold, enabling the assessment of the patterns of brain activity that correlate with conscious perception, independently of any changes in sensory input. However, the comparison between perceived and unperceived trials would be expected to reveal not only the core neural substrate of a particular conscious perception, but also aspects of brain activity that facilitate, hinder or tend to follow conscious perception. We take a step towards the resolution of these confounds by combining an analysis of neural responses observed during the presentation of faces partially masked by Continuous Flash Suppression, and those responses observed during the unmasked presentation of faces and other images in the same subjects. We employed multidimensional classifiers to decode physical properties of stimuli or perceptual states from spectrotemporal representations of electrocorticographic signals (1071 channels in 5 subjects). Neural activity in certain face responsive areas located in both the fusiform gyrus and in the lateral-temporal/inferior-parietal cortex discriminated seen vs. unseen faces in the masked paradigm and upright faces vs. other categories in the unmasked paradigm. However, only the former discriminated upright vs. inverted faces in the unmasked paradigm. Our results suggest a prominent role for the fusiform gyrus in the configural perception of faces, and possibly other objects that are holistically processed. More generally, we advocate comparative analysis of neural recordings obtained during different, but related, experimental protocols as a promising direction towards elucidating the functional specificities of the patterns of neural activation that accompany our conscious experiences.

What We Talk about When We Talk about Unconscious Processing - A Plea for Best Practices

In this perspective article, we first outline the large diversity of methods, measures, statistical analyses, and concepts in the field of the experimental study of unconscious processing. We then suggest that this diversity implies that comparisons between different studies on unconscious processing are fairly limited, especially when stimulus awareness has been assessed in different ways. Furthermore, we argue that flexible choices of methods and measures will inevitably lead to an overestimation of unconscious processes. In the concluding paragraph, we briefly present solutions and strategies for future research. We make a plea for the introduction of "best practices," similar to previous attempts to constitute practicing standards for functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG).

Consciousness is more than meets the eye: a call for a multisensory study of subjective experience

Over the last 30 years, our understanding of the neurocognitive bases of consciousness has improved, mostly through studies employing vision. While studying consciousness in the visual modality presents clear advantages, we believe that a comprehensive scientific account of subjective experience must not neglect other exteroceptive and interoceptive signals as well as the role of multisensory interactions for perceptual and self-consciousness. Here, we briefly review four distinct lines of work which converge in documenting how multisensory signals are processed across several levels and contents of consciousness. Namely, how multisensory interactions occur when consciousness is prevented because of perceptual manipulations (i.e. subliminal stimuli) or because of low vigilance states (i.e. sleep, anesthesia), how interactions between exteroceptive and interoceptive signals give rise to bodily self-consciousness, and how multisensory signals are combined to form metacognitive judgments. By describing the interactions between multisensory signals at the perceptual, cognitive, and metacognitive levels, we illustrate how stepping out the visual comfort zone may help in deriving refined accounts of consciousness, and may allow cancelling out idiosyncrasies of each sense to delineate supramodal mechanisms involved during consciousness.

Numerical Priming Between Touch and Vision Depends on Tactile Discrimination

Although the interaction between vision and touch is of crucial importance for perceptual and bodily self-consciousness, only little is known regarding the link between conscious access and tactile processing. Here, we tested whether the numerical encoding of tactile stimuli depends on conscious discrimination. On each trial, participants received between zero and three taps at low, medium, or high intensity and had to enumerate the number of visual items subsequently presented as a visual target. We measured tactovisual numerical priming, that is, the modulation of reaction times according to the numerical distance between the visual target and tactile prime values. While numerical priming and repetition priming were respectively elicited by high and medium intensity stimuli, no effect was found for low intensity stimuli that were not discriminable. This suggests that numerical priming between touch and vision depends on tactile discrimination. We discuss our results considering recent advances in unconscious visual numerical priming.

Definitely maybe: can unconscious processes perform the same functions as conscious processes?

Hassin recently proposed the “Yes It Can” (YIC) principle to describe the division of labor between conscious and unconscious processes in human cognition. According to this principle, unconscious processes can carry out every fundamental high-level cognitive function that conscious processes can perform. In our commentary, we argue that the author presents an overly idealized review of the literature in support of the YIC principle. Furthermore, we point out that the dissimilar trends observed in social and cognitive psychology, with respect to published evidence of strong unconscious effects, can better be explained by the way how awareness is defined and measured in both research fields. Finally, we show that the experimental paradigm chosen by Hassin to rule out remaining objections against the YIC principle is unsuited to verify the new default notion that all high-level cognitive functions can unfold unconsciously.