Sincere, Deceitful, and Ironic Communicative Acts and the Role of the Theory of Mind in Childhood

Comprehension of irony in autistic children: The role of theory of mind and executive function

Although previous studies have examined irony comprehension in autistic children and potential impact factors, the relationship between theory of mind (ToM), executive function (EF), symptoms of autism, and comprehension of irony in this population remains largely unknown. This study explored irony comprehension in autistic children and examined the roles of ToM and EF in linking autism symptoms to deficits in irony comprehension. Twenty autistic children were compared with 25 typically developing (TD) children in an irony story picture task, ToM task, and EF task. The results showed that autistic children had impaired comprehension of irony compared with TD children, and performance on ironic stories showed a significant moderate discriminatory effect in predicting autistic children. A ToM deficit has also been proposed for autistic children. Comprehension of irony was significantly correlated with second-order ToM (2nd ToM) but was not significantly correlated with any components of EF. Moreover, 2nd ToM can predict the level of irony comprehension and mediate the relationship between symptoms of autism and irony comprehension. Taken together, these findings suggest that irony comprehension may offer a potential cognitive marker for quantifying syndrome manifestations in autistic children, and 2nd ToM may provide insight into the theoretical mechanism underlying the deficit in irony comprehension in this population.

More than one path to pragmatics? Insights from children's grasp of implicit, figurative and ironical meaning

Human communication requires impressive inferential abilities and mind-reading skills. To learn how to speak and become competent communicators children need both. The development of pragmatic abilities presents us with a puzzle. On the one hand, much evidence suggests pragmatics play a grounding role in early communication and language acquisition. On the other, preschoolers find linguistic pragmatic inferences such as implicatures, metaphor and irony difficult to grasp. Apperly and Butterfill (2009) maintain that there are two separate systems for belief reasoning: a simpler one and a more sophisticated one that develops later. Along this line of reasoning we might also expect there to be two separate kinds of pragmatic abilities: an early set using (among other things) the simpler Theory of Mind system, and a more sophisticated one appearing later in childhood and using full-blown Theory of Mind. I will argue there is no need to divide pragmatic abilities in such a way to bridge the gap between the pragmatic inferential skills found in toddlers and the difficulties observed in preschoolers. Evidence from the past two decades indicates that phenomena such as implicatures and metaphor (but not irony) can be understood earlier than previously established. Additionally, children's apparent struggle with specific pragmatic inferences might be better explained by factors independent from pragmatic competence, but which interact with it.

Can Narrative Skills Improve in Autism Spectrum Disorder? A Preliminary Study with Verbally Fluent Adolescents Receiving the Cognitive Pragmatic Treatment

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental condition affecting social and communicative skills, including narrative ability, namely the description of real-life or fictive accounts of temporally and causally related events. With this study, we aimed to determine whether a communicative-pragmatic training, i.e., the version for adolescents of the Cognitive-Pragmatic Treatment, is effective in improving the narrative skills of 16 verbally fluent adolescents with ASD. We used a multilevel approach to assess pre- and post-training narrative production skills. Discourse analysis focused on micro- (i.e., mean length of utterance, complete sentences, omissions of morphosyntactic information) and macrolinguistic measures (i.e., cohesion, coherence errors, lexical informativeness). Results revealed a significant improvement in mean length of utterance and complete sentences and a decrease in cohesion errors. No significant change was found in the other narrative measures investigated. Our findings suggest that a pragmatically oriented training may be useful in improving grammatical efficiency in narrative production.

The relationship between metaphor skills and Theory of Mind in middle childhood: Task and developmental effects

Theoretical pragmatics in the post-Gricean tradition argued that metaphor requires understanding of how another person sees the world. Yet, it is unclear what role mindreading plays in developing metaphor skills. Here we examined the relationship between metaphor and Theory of Mind (ToM) in middle childhood by using two different tasks. In addition to the Physical and Mental Metaphors task (PMM), based on the verbal explanation of physical and mental metaphors, we revived the Referential Metaphors task for children (Noveck, Bianco, & Castry, 2001), where metaphorical and literal referents are presented in a narrative context. The sample included 169 8-, 9-, and 10-year-old children, assessed also for ToM (via the Strange Stories) and other linguistic and cognitive skills as control variables. In the PMM, ToM supported the understanding of mental (but not physical) metaphors in 9-year-olds only, whereas in the Referential Metaphors task ToM supported accuracy of understanding metaphors (but not literal items) in younger children as well. At age 10, ToM effects were negligible in both tasks. These findings suggest that ToM has a task-specific role in metaphor, linked to the characteristics of the items in the task at stake, being for instance greater for metaphors with mental (compared to physical) content and for non-literal (compared to literal) referents. The findings also suggest that the relationship between ToM and metaphor skills is developmental sensitive, as children start to capitalize on ToM earlier in development when the metaphor context is richer, and these effects fade with age. Theoretically, these data argue in favor of the relevance-theoretic account of metaphor, spelling out different ways in which ToM might support metaphor resolution across tasks, for instance by providing better access to the psychological lexicon (i.e., terms referring to mental states) and better context processing, serving as a springboard to achieve sophisticated pragmatic skills in middle childhood.

Children's processing of written irony: An eye-tracking study

Ironic language is challenging for many people to understand, and particularly for children. Comprehending irony is considered a major milestone in children's development, as it requires inferring the intentions of the person who is being ironic. However, the theories of irony comprehension generally do not address developmental changes, and there are limited data on children's processing of verbal irony. In the present pre-registered study, we examined, for the first time, how children process and comprehend written irony in comparison to adults. Seventy participants took part in the study (35 10-year-old children and 35 adults). In the experiment, participants read ironic and literal sentences embedded in story contexts while their eye movements were recorded. They also responded to a text memory question and an inference question after each story, and children's levels of reading skills were measured. Results showed that for both children and adults comprehending written irony was more difficult than for literal texts (the "irony effect") and was more challenging for children than for adults. Moreover, although children showed longer overall reading times than adults, processing of ironic stories was largely similar between children and adults. One group difference was that for children, more accurate irony comprehension was qualified by faster reading times whereas for adults more accurate irony comprehension involved slower reading times. Interestingly, both age groups were able to adapt to task context and improve their irony processing across trials. These results provide new insights about the costs of irony and development of the ability to overcome them.

The fuzzy boundaries of the social (pragmatic) communication disorder (SPCD): Why the picture is still so confusing?

Introduction

Since the introduction of Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder (SPCD) in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5) in 2013, a debate has arisen in the scientific community about its usefulness in differential diagnosis for other clinical categories such as Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Specific Language Impairment (SLI). Indeed, SPCD criteria share a common deficit in communication and pragmatic skills with these diagnostic entities. Available assessment tools seem scarce and not sensitive enough to clarify diagnostic criteria and clinical boundaries. This study aims to review the existing literature on diagnostic screening for SPCD to highlight confounding variables in the domains examined, overlap with other diagnostic entities, and lack of specificity of available assessment tools in identifying the core deficits of the disorder.

Methods

The search strategy was defined by combining the following keywords: "social pragmatic communication disorder," "DSM-5," "differential diagnosis," and "child." The search was performed in three databases: Medline (PubMed), Scopus, and Web of Science. All studies published between 2013 and April 2023, written in English, and with a major focus on SPCD were included in the review.

Results

After the screening for the eligibility, 18 studies were included in the review. Most of these studies aimed to investigate the differential diagnosis between SPCD and other diagnostic categories (e.g., specific language impairment and autism spectrum disorder). Of these researches, only 6 were ad hoc experimental studies, while the others were based on previously collected databases.

Conclusions

SPCD seems to have its own peculiarities and characteristics, indicating its clinical relevance, as emphasized by the DSM-5. However, the lack of specific instruments and a number of confounding variables make it difficult to identify and differentiate SPCD from other diagnostic entities. Further research is needed to overcome the lack of specific clinical instruments and lack of empirical studies.

The theory of mind and human-robot trust repair

Nothing is perfect and robots can make as many mistakes as any human, which can lead to a decrease in trust in them. However, it is possible, for robots to repair a human's trust in them after they have made mistakes through various trust repair strategies such as apologies, denials, and promises. Presently, the efficacy of these trust repairs in the human-robot interaction literature has been mixed. One reason for this might be that humans have different perceptions of a robot's mind. For example, some repairs may be more effective when humans believe that robots are capable of experiencing emotion. Likewise, other repairs might be more effective when humans believe robots possess intentionality. A key element that determines these beliefs is mind perception. Therefore understanding how mind perception impacts trust repair may be vital to understanding trust repair in human-robot interaction. To investigate this, we conducted a study involving 400 participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk to determine whether mind perception influenced the effectiveness of three distinct repair strategies. The study employed an online platform where the robot and participant worked in a warehouse to pick and load 10 boxes. The robot made three mistakes over the course of the task and employed either a promise, denial, or apology after each mistake. Participants then rated their trust in the robot before and after it made the mistake. Results of this study indicated that overall, individual differences in mind perception are vital considerations when seeking to implement effective apologies and denials between humans and robots.

An Experimental Study on Sarcasm Comprehension in School Children: The Possible Role of Contextual, Linguistics and Meta-Representative Factors

Understanding sarcasm is a complex ability, which includes several processes. Previous studies demonstrated the possible roles of linguistic and meta-representative factors in understanding sarcasm in school children, while the influence of specific contextual variables still needs to be investigated. Here, we present two studies investigating the possible role of contextual, linguistics, and meta-representative factors in understanding sarcasm in school children. In Study 1, we investigated sarcasm comprehension in 8-9-year-old school children in three different contexts, in which both familiarity and authority were manipulated. We found that understanding sarcasm was facilitated when the conversational partner was characterized by a high level of authority and familiarity (the mother) rather than when the conversational partner was an adult with a lower level of both authority and familiarity (the cashier of a food store). In Study 2, we replicated and extended Study 1 by investigating the possible influence of the same contextual factors but in a more sizeable sample and at different ages: first, third, and fifth grades of primary school. We found that understanding sarcasm improved significantly with age. The results of both studies indicated that understanding sarcasm is influenced by contextual factors. Children at any age better understood sarcasm produced by a speaker with a high level of both familiarity and authority. This ability improved with age. These results expand our understanding of how children infer a speaker's intentions in sarcasm. This might be particularly of interest to develop possible interventions for children on the Autism Spectrum, who are known to misunderstand sarcasm at different levels of complexity.

The complexity of theory of mind deficit in schizophrenia: A cross-sectional analysis of baseline data from a longitudinal schizophrenia study

A large number of trials have supported the functional significance of Theory of Mind (ToM) impairment in schizophrenia. However, the nature and the extent of the impairment are still unclear. Reviews on the topic suggest that, in many cases, studies use only one tool to assess the levels of difficulty in the field, limiting the validity of the measurement to one aspect of ToM. On the other hand, the divergence of the used assessment tools makes it hard to compare the result of these studies. Thus, we decided to use additional assessment tools to evaluate the extent of ToM in order to describe several aspects of the phenomenon. A hierarchical cluster analysis of variables was used on a sample of 68 participants with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, to determine the similarity between variances of the assessed ToM subcomponents. Further cross-sectional correlational analysis was then performed to investigate the association between the identified clusters and other used measures (e.g.: neurocognition). The statistical analysis supported a five-cluster model. Identified clusters illustrate the difference between Hypo and HyperToM as well as the degree of ToM task complexity, allowing for a more accurate description of the nature of ToM deficit in schizophrenia.

Non-linguistic comprehension, social inference and empathizing skills in autistic young adults, young adults with autistic traits and control young adults: Group differences and interrelatedness of skills

BACKGROUND

Despite increasing knowledge of social communication skills of autistic peole, the interrelatedness of different skills such as non-linguistic comprehension, social inference and empathizing skills is not much known about. A better understanding of the complex interplay between different domains of social communication helps us to develop assessment protocols for individuals with social communication difficulties.

AIMS

To compare the performances of autistic young adults, young adults with autistic traits identified in childhood and control young adults in social communication tasks measuring non-linguistic comprehension, social inference and empathizing skills. In addition, to examine associations between the different social communication measures.

METHODS & PROCEDURES

Autistic young adults (n = 34), young adults with autistic traits (n = 19) and control young adults (n = 36) completed the extra- and paralinguistic scales of the Assessment Battery for Communication (ABaCo), the Faux Pas Recognition Test, Social-Pragmatic Questions (SoPra) and the Empathy Quotient (EQ).

OUTCOMES & RESULTS

Group differences were found in the performance in the ABaCo, SoPra and EQ scores. Compared with the control young adults, autistic young adults scored lower. The performance of the young adults in the autistic traits group fell in between the other two groups. There were no group differences in the Faux Pas Recognition Test. The variability within the groups was large in all measurements. In the control group, there was a significant correlation between EQ and SoPra scores and between the Faux Pas and SoPra scores. In the autistic group, a significant correlation was found between Faux Pas and SoPra scores. Also, other patterns were observed but these were not statistically significant.

CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS

The young adults with autistic traits fell in between the control and autistic young adults, highlighting the presence of the continuum in the terms of features of social communication. The results support other current research that suggests that theory of mind and other social communication skills may not be universally or widely impaired in all autistic individuals without cognitive deficits. Although all tasks examined social communication skills, only a small number of significant correlations were found between test scores. This highlights that clinical conclusions about a person's social communication should be based on the outcomes of different types of methods measuring different aspects of social communication. It is clear that the interrelatedness of different social communication skills needs further research.

WHAT THIS PAPER ADDS

What is already known on this subject For successful communication, the ability to infer others' emotions, intentions and mental states is crucial. Autistic people have difficulty with many aspects of social communication. However, the associations between different aspects of social communication need to be better understood. What this paper adds to existing knowledge The unique contribution of this study is to compare the performance of autistic people not only with that of a control group but also with people with childhood autistic traits. This provides an understanding of the interrelatedness of different social communication skills in people with varying degrees of autistic traits. This study used four assessment methods focusing on three different social communication elements (non-linguistic comprehension, social inference and empathizing skills). These elements have complex relationships to one another, some being closely overlapping, some more distally related and some reflect more complex multifactorial elements. This study shows that although groups differ from each other in most of the assessments, the performance of different groups overlapped showing that many autistic young adults can perform well in non-linguistic and social inference tasks in structured assessment contexts. What are the potential or actual clinical implications of this work? Our findings suggest that in the assessment of social communication, self-reports and clinical assessments can be used effectively together. They can complement each other, pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of a person, leading to more personalized therapeutic interventions.

The role of mentalizing capacity and ecological language diversity on irony comprehension in bilingual adults

Diverse bilingual experiences have implications for language comprehension, including pragmatic elements such as verbal irony. Irony comprehension is shaped by an interplay of linguistic, cognitive, and social factors, including individual differences in bilingual experience. We examined the relationship between individual differences related to bilingualism, specifically, the capacity to understand others' mental states and ambient exposure to language diversity, on irony comprehension. We tested 54 healthy bilingual adults, living in a linguistically diverse region-Montréal, Canada-on an irony comprehension task. This task involved reading positive and negative short stories that concluded with an ironic or literal statement, which were rated on appropriateness and perceived irony. While both irony forms were rated as less appropriate and more ironic than literal statements, ironic criticisms (following a negative context) were rated as more appropriate and higher in perceived irony than ironic compliments (following a positive context). As expected, these ratings varied as a function of individual differences in mentalizing and neighborhood language diversity. Greater mentalizing patterned with more appropriate ratings to ironic statements in high language diversity neighborhoods and with less appropriate ratings to ironic statements in low language diversity neighborhoods. Perceived irony ratings to ironic compliments increased with mentalizing as neighborhood language diversity increased. These results indicate that pragmatic language comprehension and its social cognitive underpinnings may be environmentally contextualized processes.

Irony detection in patients with borderline personality disorder: an experimental study examining schizotypal traits, response biases and empathy

BACKGROUND

In verbal irony we often convey meanings that oppose the literal words. To look behind these words, we need to integrate perspectives of ourselves, others, and their beliefs about us. Although patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD) experience problems in social cognition and schizotypal symptoms, research on irony comprehension mainly focused on the schizophrenic spectrum. Accounting for possible negative biases in BPD, the current study examined the detection of praising and critical irony in a text messaging interface.

METHODS

The cross-sectional study included 30 patients and 30 matched controls, who completed measures of cognitive and affective empathy (Interpersonal Reactivity Index, IRI), schizotypal (Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire; SPQ), and borderline symptoms (Borderline Symptom List; BSL-23) and the irony detection task. The irony task contained critical and praising remarks embedded in text messages. Asking for literality (ironic vs. literal) and intention ratings (critical to praising) of the stimuli, it allowed to analyze the sensitivity of literality detection as well as implicit and explicit response biases in a signal detection framework.

RESULTS

Borderline symptoms explained lower sensitivity for the detection of literal and ironic statements across groups. Whereas HC showed a negativity bias when implicitly asked about the literalness of the statement, patients with BPD perceived praising utterances as less praising when explicitly asked about their perceived intention. Neither empathy nor schizotypy explained outcomes beyond borderline symptoms.

CONCLUSIONS

This was the first study to show lower detection of verbal irony in patients with BPD. While patients were less biased when asked about the literality of a statement, they perceived praising remarks as less positive on explicit measurements. The results highlight the importance of congruent, transparent communication in promoting epistemic trust in individuals with BPD.

Second-Order False Beliefs and Linguistic Recursion in Autism Spectrum Disorder

This study investigates the role of recursive language and working memory (WM) in second-order false belief skills in Danish-speaking children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; n = 62; 8 females) and typical development (n = 41; 15 females), ages 6-16. Second-order false belief skills correlated with receptive grammar, vocabulary, and age; sentential complement production predicted second-order false beliefs, controlling for age, receptive grammar and WM. Regressions showed that second-order false belief was associated with age across groups, but with sentential complements in the ASD group only. Second-order false belief skills improved in children who received training in either recursive phrases (d = 0.21) or WM (d = 0.74), compared to an active control group. Results suggest that false belief skills are entwined with both linguistic and executive functions.

Neural-level associations of non-verbal pragmatic comprehension in young Finnish autistic adults

This video-based study examines the pragmatic non-verbal comprehension skills and corresponding neural-level findings in young Finnish autistic adults, and controls. Items from the Assessment Battery of Communication (ABaCo) were chosen to evaluate the comprehension of non-verbal communication. Inter-subject correlation (ISC) analysis of the functional magnetic resonance imaging data was used to reveal the synchrony of brain activation across participants during the viewing of pragmatically complex scenes of ABaCo videos. The results showed a significant difference between the ISC maps of the autistic and control groups in tasks involving the comprehension of non-verbal communication, thereby revealing several brain regions where correlation of brain activity was greater within the control group. The results suggest a possible weaker modulation of brain states in response to the pragmatic non-verbal communicative situations in autistic participants. Although there was no difference between the groups in behavioural responses to ABaCo items, there was more variability in the accuracy of the responses in the autistic group. Furthermore, mean answering and reaction times correlated with the severity of autistic traits. The results indicate that even if young autistic adults may have learned to use compensatory resources in their communicative-pragmatic comprehension, pragmatic processing in naturalistic situations still requires additional effort.

Children with hearing impairment and early cochlear implant: A pragmatic assessment

Extensive research has demonstrated the benefits of cochlear implants (CI) in contributing to improve the linguistic skills of children with hearing impairment; however, few studies have focused on the development of pragmatic ability and its relationship with age of implantation. Pragmatics is the ability to use language in different contexts and its development has crucial implications, e.g., social inclusion and professional attainments. In this study, we conducted a comprehensive assessment of pragmatic ability using the Language Pragmatic Abilities (APL Medea), a battery composed by five different tasks: Comprehension of Metaphors, Implicit meaning, Comics, Situations and Colors Game (a perspective taking task). Eighteen children with early CI, belonging to 3 different age groups (6; 11-7; 11, 8; 0-8; 11 and 9; 0-9; 11 years-old), and twenty-four children with typical development (Control Group) participated to the study. We also investigated how the precocity of CI, i.e., age of first implantation, may affect the pragmatic development. Globally, children with CI obtained lower scores in the APL Medea battery than typically hearing children. However, focusing on the Medea tasks separately, children with CIs differed from their hearing peers only in Comics and Colors Game tasks. Finally, age of implantation was a moderate but significant predictor of pragmatic performance.

Multimodal assessment of communicative-pragmatic features in schizophrenia: a machine learning approach

An impairment in pragmatic communication is a core feature of schizophrenia, often associated with difficulties in social interactions. The pragmatic deficits regard various pragmatic phenomena, e.g., direct and indirect communicative acts, deceit, irony, and include not only the use of language but also other expressive means such as non-verbal/extralinguistic modalities, e.g., gestures and body movements, and paralinguistic cues, e.g., prosody and tone of voice. The present paper focuses on the identification of those pragmatic features, i.e., communicative phenomena and expressive modalities, that more reliably discriminate between individuals with schizophrenia and healthy controls. We performed a multimodal assessment of communicative-pragmatic ability, and applied a machine learning approach, specifically a Decision Tree model, with the aim of identifying the pragmatic features that best separate the data into the two groups, i.e., individuals with schizophrenia and healthy controls, and represent their configuration. The results indicated good overall performance of the Decision Tree model, with mean Accuracy of 82%, Sensitivity of 76%, and Precision of 91%. Linguistic irony emerged as the most relevant pragmatic phenomenon in distinguishing between the two groups, followed by violation of the Gricean maxims, and then extralinguistic deceitful and sincere communicative acts. The results are discussed in light of the pragmatic theoretical literature, and their clinical relevance in terms of content and design of both assessment and rehabilitative training.

Understanding communicative intentions in schizophrenia using an error analysis approach

Patients with schizophrenia (SCZ) have a core impairment in the communicative-pragmatic domain, characterized by severe difficulties in correctly inferring the speaker's communicative intentions. While several studies have investigated pragmatic performance of patients with SCZ, little research has analyzed the errors committed in the comprehension of different communicative acts. The present research investigated error patterns in 24 patients with SCZ and 24 healthy controls (HC) during a task assessing the comprehension of different communicative acts, i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic, and their relationship with the clinical features of SCZ. We used signal detection analysis to quantify participants' ability to correctly detect the speakers' communicative intention, i.e., sensitivity, and their tendency to wrongly perceive a communicative intention when not present, i.e., response bias. Further, we investigated the relationship between sensitivity and response bias, and the clinical features of the disorder, namely symptom severity, pharmacotherapy, and personal and social functioning. The results showed that the ability to infer the speaker's communicative intention is impaired in SCZ, as patients exhibited lower sensitivity, compared to HC, for all the pragmatic phenomena evaluated, i.e., sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts. Further, we found that the sensitivity measure for irony was related to disorganized/concrete symptoms. Moreover, patients with SCZ showed a stronger response bias for deceitful communicative acts compared to HC: when committing errors, they tended to misattribute deceitful intentions more often than sincere and ironic ones. This tendency to misattribute deceitful communicative intentions may be related to the attributional bias characterizing the disorder.

Do They Really Mean It? Children's Inference of Speaker Intentions and the Role of Age and Gender

Interpreting other people's intentions during communication represents a remarkable challenge for children. Although many studies have examined children's understanding of, for example, sarcasm, less is known about their interpretation. Using realistic audiovisual scenes, we invited 124 children between 8 and 12 years old to watch video clips of young adults using different speaker intentions. After watching each video clip, children answered questions about the characters and their beliefs, and the perceived friendliness of the speaker. Children's responses reveal age and gender differences in the ability to interpret speaker belief and social intentions, especially for scenarios conveying teasing and prosocial lies. We found that the ability to infer speaker belief of prosocial lies and to interpret social intentions increases with age. Our results suggest that children at the age of 8 years already show adult-like abilities to understand literal statements, whereas the ability to infer specific social intentions, such as teasing and prosocial lies, is still developing between the age of 8 and 12 years. Moreover, girls performed better in classifying prosocial lies and sarcasm as insincere than boys. The outcomes expand our understanding of how children observe speaker intentions and suggest further research into the development of teasing and prosocial lie interpretation.

Lies and Irony Understanding in Deaf and Hearing Adolescents

Lies and irony are paradigmatic examples of nonliteral communication; many deaf children and even adults have difficulty in understanding them. The present study assessed the understanding of lies and irony in 96 adolescents living in Spain in urban settings (58 deaf participants, 38 hearing participants; 10-19 years old). We investigated whether deaf and hearing participants differ in their performance, and the effects of age, theory of mind (ToM), and language on the understanding of these nonliteral meanings in deaf participants. The results show that deaf participants do not find it difficult to detect nonliteral statements, but they experience difficulty in attributing the real motivation to the speaker. ToM and language explained performance in the understanding of nonliteral communication in the deaf group. The results suggest the need to focus on promoting the ability to attribute real motivations to speakers. We propose an assessment sequence that differs from those used in other studies. In the proposed sequence, ToM skills would be combined with other skills that influence the understanding of lies and irony and would be sequenced according to the observed performance in deaf adolescents.

Shake it baby, but only when needed: Preschoolers adapt their exploratory strategies to the information structure of the task

Previous research has suggested that active engagement with the world drives children's remarkable learning capabilities. We investigated whether preschoolers are "ecological learners," that is, whether they are able to select those active learning strategies that are most informative in a given task. Children had to choose which of two exploratory actions (open vs. shake) to perform to find an egg shaker hidden in one of four small boxes, contained in two larger boxes. Prior to this game, children either learnt that the egg was equally likely to be found in any of the four small boxes (Uniform condition), or that it was most likely to be found in one particular small box (Skewed condition). Results of Study 1 show that 3- and 4-year-olds successfully tailored their exploratory actions to the different likelihood-distributions: They were more likely to shake first in the Uniform compared to the Skewed condition. Five-year-olds were equally likely to shake first, irrespective of condition, even when incentivized to shake only when needed (Study 2a). However, when the relevance of the frequency training for the hiding game was highlighted (Study 2b and Study 2c), the 5-year-olds showed the same behavioural pattern as the younger preschoolers in Study 1. We suggest that ecological learning may be a key mechanism underlying children's effectiveness in active learning.

The Understanding of Communicative Intentions in Children with Severe-to-Profound Hearing Loss

The ability to distinguish lies from sincere false statements requires understanding a speaker's communicative intentions and is argued to develop through linguistic interaction. We tested whether this ability was delayed in 26 children with severe-to-profound hearing loss who, based on vocabulary size, were thought to have relatively limited access to linguistic exchanges compared to typically hearing peers (n = 93). Children were presented with toy bears who either lied or made a false statement sincerely. Despite identifying speakers' knowledge/ignorance, deaf or hard of hearing (DHH) children were delayed in identifying lies and sincere false statements when matched for chronological age. When matched for receptive vocabulary, observed discrepancies diminished. Deaf children who experienced early access to conversations with their deaf parents demonstrated no delay. Findings suggest limited access to linguistic exchanges delays the development of a key pragmatic skill.

The Ability of Patients With Schizophrenia to Comprehend and Produce Sincere, Deceitful, and Ironic Communicative Intentions: The Role of Theory of Mind and Executive Functions

Patients with schizophrenia are often described as impaired in several cognitive domains. Specifically, patients with schizophrenia often exhibit problems in solving tasks requiring theory of mind (ToM), i.e., the ability to ascribe mental states to oneself and others, communicative-pragmatic ability, i.e., the ability to use language and non-verbal expressive means to convey meaning in a given context, and executive functions (EF). This study aims to investigate the role of cognitive functions, such as general intelligence, selective attention, processing speed, and especially EF (working memory, cognitive flexibility, inhibition, and planning), and ToM in explaining the performance of individual with schizophrenia in comprehending and producing communicative acts expressed with different communicative intentions (i.e., sincere, deceitful, and ironic), and realized through linguistic and extralinguistic/non-verbal expressive means. Thirty-two patients with schizophrenia and an equal number of healthy controls performed tasks aiming to investigate their capacity to comprehend and produce sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts in addition to a series of cognitive tasks evaluating EF and ToM. The results indicated that individuals with schizophrenia performed worse than the controls in the comprehension and production of all pragmatic phenomena investigated, as well as in all the cognitive functions examined. The patients with schizophrenia also exhibited an increasing trend of difficulty in comprehending and producing sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts expressed through either linguistic or extralinguistic means. Furthermore, a multiple regression analysis of the patients' performance on the pragmatic tasks revealed that overall, the role of attention, general intelligence, and processing speed did not appear to significantly explain the patients' communicative-pragmatic performance. The inclusion of EF into the analysis did not contribute to increase the explained variance of the patients' ability to comprehend and produce the various pragmatic phenomena investigated. Only the addition of ToM could significantly increase the explained variance, but only in the comprehension and production of deceit expressed by language and the production of sincere communicative acts, also limited to linguistic production. We conclude that neither EF nor ToM are able to explain the decreasing trend detected in the patients' pragmatic performance.

Addressing the Challenge of Verbal Irony: Getting Serious about Sarcasm Training

In verbal irony, the speaker’s intended meaning can be counterfactual to the literal meaning of their words. This form of figurative language can help speakers achieve a number of communicative aims, but also presents an interpretive challenge for some listeners. There is debate about the skills that support the acquisition of irony comprehension in typical development, and about why verbal irony presents a challenge for many individuals, including children with a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorders and second-language learners. Researchers have explored teaching verbal irony in a very small number of training studies in disparate fields. We bring together and review this limited research. We argue that a focus on training studies in future research could address a number of theoretical questions about irony comprehension and could help refine interventions for individuals who struggle with this form of social language.

Interpreting physical and mental metaphors: Is Theory of Mind associated with pragmatics in middle childhood?

We investigated the association between individual differences in metaphor understanding and Theory of Mind (ToM) in typically developing children. We distinguished between two types of metaphors and created a Physical and Mental Metaphors task, echoing a similar distinction for ToM. Nine-year-olds scored lower than older age-groups in ToM as well as in the interpretation of mental, but not physical, metaphors. Moreover, nine-year-olds (but not older children) who are better in ToM are also better in interpreting mental, but not physical, metaphors. This suggests that the link between metaphor and ToM is stronger when metaphorical interpretation involves mental aspects, and it is more evident in early rather than later childhood.

Mindreading abilities and borderline personality disorder: A comprehensive assessment using the Theory of Mind Assessment Scale

Numerous studies have examined mindreading in borderline personality disorder (BPD). However, the empirical data obtained to date have not facilitated the development of a clear clinical profile of mindreading impairment in BPD due to a lack of consistency or incongruence across studies. One possible explanation for these inconsistencies and divergences in the current literature may lie in the multidimensional character of the mindreading construct; moreover, the heterogeneity of the experimental measures used to assess individuals with BPD mindreading skills may also need to be taken into account. The aim of the present study is to investigate mindreading skills and impairments in patients with BPD through direct comparison of a wide range of mindreading dimensions using a comprehensive semistructured interview, the Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.) (Bosco et al., 2009). Our results show that the performance of patients with BPD differs from that of healthy controls only in certain specific dimensions of mindreading. The difficulties encountered by the patients with BPD typically emerge when mindreading tasks require them to disentangle their own subjective mindreading from that of another person, in other words, when they were required to assume an allocentric perspective.

Association Between Children's Theory of Mind and Responses to Insincere Praise Following Failure

This study examined children’s interpretations of and responses to insincere praise in a situation involving failure and explored the association between these responses and the maturity of their theory of mind. Seventy-two young Japanese children (mean age = 5.70 years, SD = 0.61) completed a test battery that included tasks designed to assess responses to teacher feedback (i.e., insincere praise, no feedback) in hypothetical failure situations, theory of mind, and verbal ability. The results showed that children who failed experienced higher levels of positive emotion and self-rated performance and showed lower motivation to persevere when they received insincere praise following failure, relative to those observed when they failed and received no feedback. In addition, relative to children with less mature theory of mind, children with mature theory of mind responded more negatively to insincere praise following failure. The evidence indicated that the effects of insincere praise could differ depending on the maturity of children’s theory of mind. It highlights the importance of understanding individual differences in theory of mind in parenting and educational settings.

Do executive function and theory of mind predict pragmatic abilities following traumatic brain injury? An analysis of sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts

Quality of life and social integration are strongly influenced by the ability to communicate and previous research has shown that pragmatic ability can be specifically impaired in individuals with traumatic brain injury (TBI). In addition, TBI usually results in damage to the frontotemporal lobes with a consequent impairment of cognitive functions, i.e., attention, memory, executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM). The role of the underlying cognitive deficits in determining the communicative-pragmatic difficulties of an individual with TBI is not yet completely clear. This study examined the relationship between the ability to understand and produce various kinds of communicative acts, (i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic) and the above-mentioned cognitive and ToM abilities following TBI. Thirty-five individuals with TBI and thirty-five healthy controls were given tasks assessing their ability to comprehend and produce sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts belonging to the linguistic and extralinguistic scales of the Assessment Battery for Communication (ABaCo), together with a series of EF and ToM tasks. The results showed that, when compared to healthy individuals, participants with TBI performed poorly overall in the comprehension and production of all the pragmatic phenomena investigated, (i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts), and they also exhibited impaired performance at the level of all the cognitive functions examined. Individuals with TBI also showed a decreasing trend in performance in dealing with sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts, on both the comprehension and production subscales of the linguistic and extralinguistic scales. Furthermore, a hierarchical regression analysis revealed that - in patients with TBI but not in the controls - EF had a significant effect on the comprehension of linguistic and extralinguistic irony only, while the percentage of explained variance increased with the inclusion of theory of mind. Indeed, ToM had a significant role in determining patients' performance in the extralinguistic production of sincere and deceitful communicative acts, linguistic and extralinguistic comprehension of deceit and the linguistic production of irony. However, with regard to the performance of patients with TBI in the various pragmatic tasks investigated, (i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts), EF was able to explain the pattern of patients' scores in the linguistic and extralinguistic comprehension but not in production ability. Furthermore, ToM seemed not to be able to explain the decreasing trend in the performance of patients in managing the various kinds of communicative acts investigated.

Why Pragmatics and Theory of Mind Do Not (Completely) Overlap

Aim of the paper is to discuss the extent to which pragmatics, i.e., the ability to use language and other expressive means to convey meaning in a specific interactional context, overlaps with Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e., the ability to ascribe mental states to oneself and the others. We present empirical data available in the current literature concerning the relation between these two faculties, with specific reference to the developmental and clinical domains. Part of the literature we take into account appears to show that ToM does correlate with pragmatic ability; however, other studies appear to show that pragmatic ability alone cannot explain the empirical differences of performance across different kinds of pragmatic tasks, and therefore that another, at least partially different faculty is required to account for human communication. We argue that to conceive pragmatics as a sort of subcomponent of ToM, and thus to conflate or reduce the notion of pragmatics into the (wider) notion of ToM, is not theoretically correct and a possible cause of methodological confusion in the relevant empirical research. It thus turns out to be necessary that the two faculties be investigated with separate theories as well as different experimental tasks.

Comprehension of Generalized Conversational Implicatures by Children With and Without Autism Spectrum Disorder

This study evaluates the comprehension of generalized conversational implicatures (GCI) in children with and without autism spectrum disorder (ASD), using a GCI test constructed based on the Levinson model, which distinguishes between three types of implicatures: type Q (or scalar: "what is not referred to does not occur"); type I ("by default, it is not necessary to say what can be assumed"); and type M ("if someone is expressing something in a not very simple or marked way, it is because s/he is describing a situation that is not very typical, frequent, or prototypical"). In addition to the ASD group (n = 22), two comparison groups were utilized: a group matched on chronological age with the ASD group, but with a higher linguistic age (TCD group, n = 22), and a group matched on linguistic age with the ASD group, but with a lower chronological age (TLD group, n = 22). In all cases, linguistic age was assessed with the Peabody test. The performance of the three groups on the GCI test was compared (overall and on each type of implicature), and performance on the three types of implicature was compared within each group. The ASD group obtained worse performance than the other two groups, both overall and for each implicature type, without also obtaining differences in performance on the three implicature types. The TCD group obtained better performance than the TLD group on overall performance, but not on each implicature type, and both groups obtained lower performance on the type M heuristics than on the type I. Based on these results, the children with ASD in our study presented limitations in the comprehension of the three types of GCI, but it was not possible to obtain evidence for an inferential continuum of the three types of GCI. However, in the two typical development groups, this evidence was obtained, leading us to propose an inferential continuum model based on the different levels of dependence on the context of each of the three types of implicatures, with type M implicatures being more contextually dependent.

Altered Neural Activity during Irony Comprehension in Unaffected First-Degree Relatives of Schizophrenia Patients-An fMRI Study

Irony is a type of figurative language in which the literal meaning of the expression is the opposite of what the speaker intends to communicate. Even though schizophrenic patients are known as typically impaired in irony comprehension and in the underlying neural functions, to date no one has explored the neural correlates of figurative language comprehension in first-degree relatives of schizophrenic patients. In the present study, we examined the neural correlates of irony understanding in schizophrenic patients and in unaffected first-degree relatives of patients compared to healthy adults with functional MRI. Our aim was to investigate if possible alterations of the neural circuits supporting irony comprehension in first-degree relatives of patients with schizophrenia would fulfill the familiality criterion of an endophenotype. We examined 12 schizophrenic patients, 12 first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients and 12 healthy controls with functional MRI while they were performing irony and control tasks. Different phases of irony processing were examined, such as context processing and ironic statement comprehension. Patients had significantly more difficulty understanding irony than controls or relatives. Patients also showed markedly different neural activation pattern compared to controls in both stages of irony processing. Although no significant differences were found in the performance of the irony tasks between the control group and the relative group, during the fMRI analysis, the relatives showed stronger brain activity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during the context processing phase of irony tasks than the control group. However, the controls demonstrated higher activations in the left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and in the right inferior frontal gyrus during the ironic statement phase of the irony tasks than the relative group. Our results show that despite good task performance, first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients had alterations in the neural circuits during irony processing. Thus, we suggest that neural alteration of irony comprehension could be a potential endophenotypic marker of schizophrenia.