Between Ecological Psychology and Enactivism: Is There Resonance?

Affordances and curvature preference: The case of real objects and spaces

Chuquichambi and colleagues recently questioned the prevailing belief that a universal human visual preference exists for curved shapes and lines. Their comprehensive meta-analysis demonstrated that while curvature preference is widespread, it is not universally constant or invariant. By revisiting their dataset, we made an intriguing discovery: a negative relationship between curvature preference and an object's "affordances." Taking an embodiment perspective into account, we propose an explanation for this phenomenon, suggesting that the diminished curvature preference in objects with abundant affordances can be understood through the lens of embodied cognition.

Cognitive modeling, ecological psychology, and musical improvisation

Understanding novelty and improvisation in music requires gathering insight from a variety of disciplines. One fruitful path for synthesizing these insights is via modeling. As such, my aim in this paper is to start building a bridge between traditional cognitive models and contemporary embodied and ecological approaches to cognitive science. To achieve this task, I offer a perspective on a model that would combine elements of ecological psychology (especially affordances) and the Learning Intelligent Decision Agent (LIDA) cognitive architecture. Jeff Pressing's cognitive model of musical improvisation will also be a central link between these elements. While some overlap between these three areas already exists, there are several points of tension between them, notably concerning the nature of perception and the function of artificial general intelligence modeling. I thus aim to alleviate the most worrisome concerns here, introduce several future research questions, and conclude with several points on how my account is part of a general theory, rather than merely a redescription of existent work.

Affordances of musical instruments: Conceptual consideration

While the concept of affordances has been applied in music research, it has not been satisfyingly developed regarding musical instruments. The resulting vagueness restricts the potential of the concept to guide exploration, discussion, and development of new approaches towards musical learning. Also, the concept of affordances comes with strong ontological claims and thus prompts the researcher to be careful when merging it with other theoretical domains or applying it in empirical studies. Consequently, the present article aims at contributing to a conceptualization of affordances of musical instruments by highlighting and discussing components that are necessary to consider in such a project. The first part consists of an overview of key elements of ecological psychology and more recent theoretical contributions, which are of relevance to the aim of the article: Material Engagement Theory, Skilled Intentionality Framework, and Sensorimotor Contingency Theory. A brief review of examples on how the concept of affordances has been applied in music research is presented. The main section of the article discusses four components, vital to further theoretical developments on affordances of musical instruments: the musical niche, spatial networks, sensorimotor relationship, and the amodal nature of affordances. Central to the argument is an understanding of affordances as relational, limited in scope and bound up with the physical interaction between musician and instrument. Accordingly, it is proposed that analytical focus in studies of musical instruments should be the sensorimotor relationship, spatiotemporally unfolding through a musical event. The article is concluded with comments upon educational implications of the presented perspective and suggestions on further research on the topic.

Context-sensitive computational mechanistic explanation in cognitive neuroscience

Mainstream cognitive neuroscience aims to build mechanistic explanations of behavior by mapping abilities described at the organismal level via the subpersonal level of computation onto specific brain networks. We provide an integrative review of these commitments and their mismatch with empirical research findings. Context-dependent neural tuning, neural reuse, degeneracy, plasticity, functional recovery, and the neural correlates of enculturated skills each show that there is a lack of stable mappings between organismal, computational, and neural levels of analysis. We furthermore highlight recent research suggesting that task context at the organismal level determines the dynamic parcellation of functional components at the neural level. Such instability prevents the establishment of specific computational descriptions of neural function, which remains a central goal of many brain mappers - including those who are sympathetic to the notion of many-to-many mappings between organismal and neural levels. This between-level instability presents a deep epistemological challenge and requires a reorientation of methodological and theoretical commitments within cognitive neuroscience. We demonstrate the need for change to brain mapping efforts in the face of instability if cognitive neuroscience is to maintain its central goal of constructing computational mechanistic explanations of behavior; we show that such explanations must be contextual at all levels.

Notes for life: a Henrian research methodology in psychology

Abstract This study aims to consider a Henrian methodology in Psychology. It is a theoretical, cross-sectional study that, drawing on the phenomenological tradition in Psychology, seeks to structure a research itinerary in two dimensions or layers of appearance. 1st – the intentional classical phenomenology display, and 2nd – the essence of the Henrian phenomenology manifestation. This route follows phases ranging from the design of the research and the constitution of the phenomenological view, reaching the synthesis scenario in which researchers can draw their conclusions about the content of the experience investigated. The insertion of the essence dimension manifestation enriches the traditional phenomenological method, opening up to Psychology the possibility of exploring the pathos avec. It provides Psychology with a methodological route to understand the dynamics of human experience beyond the health-disease model. It is necessary to continue the research in view of the development of the measurement instruments.

The Circularity of the Embodied Mind

From an embodied and enactive point of view, the mind-body problem has been reformulated as the relation between the lived or subject body on the one hand and the physiological or object body on the other ("body-body problem"). The aim of the paper is to explore the concept of circularity as a means of explaining the relation between the phenomenology of lived experience and the dynamics of organism-environment interactions. This concept of circularity also seems suitable for connecting enactive accounts with ecological psychology. It will be developed in a threefold way: (1) As the circular structure of embodiment, which manifests itself (a) in the homeostatic cycles between the brain and body and (b) in the sensorimotor cycles between the brain, body, and environment. This includes the interdependence of an organism's dispositions of sense-making and the affordances of the environment. (2) As the circular causality, which characterizes the relation between parts and whole within the living organism as well as within the organism-environment system. (3) As the circularity of process and structure in development and learning. Here, it will be argued that subjective experience constitutes a process of sense-making that implies (neuro-)physiological processes so as to form modified neuronal structures, which in turn enable altered future interactions. On this basis, embodied experience may ultimately be conceived as the integration of brain-body and body-environment interactions, which has a top-down, formative, or ordering effect on physiological processes. This will serve as an approach to a solution of the body-body problem.

Meshed Architecture of Performance as a Model of Situated Cognition

In this paper, we engage in a reciprocal analysis of situated cognition and the notion of "meshed architecture" as found in performance studies (Christensen et al., 2016). We start with an account of various conceptions of situated cognition using the distinction between functional integration, which characterizes how an agent dynamically organizes to couple with its environment, and task dependency, which specifies various constraints and structures imposed by the environment (see Slors, 2019). We then exploit the concept of a meshed architecture as a model that provides a more focused analysis of situated cognition and performance. Through this analysis, we show how the model of meshed architecture can be enhanced through (1) the involvement of a more complex set of cognitive processes, (2) a form of intrinsic control, (3) the influence of affective factors, and (4) the role of factors external to the performer. The aim of this paper, then, is twofold: first to work out an enhanced conception of the model of meshed architecture by taking into consideration a number of factors that clarify its situated nature, and second, to use this model to provide a richer and more definitive understanding of the meaning of situated cognition. Thus, we argue that this reciprocal analysis gives us a very productive way to think about how various elements come together in skilled action and performance but also a detailed way to characterize situated cognition.