Two kinds of visual perspective taking

Visual perspective taking and action understanding

Understanding what others are doing is a fundamental aspect of social cognition and a skill that is arguably linked to visuospatial perspective taking (VPT), the ability to apprehend the spatial layout of a scene from another's perspective. Yet, with few and notable exceptions, action understanding and VPT are rarely studied together. Participants (43 females, 37 males) made judgements about the spatial layout of objects in a scene from the perspective of an avatar who was positioned at 0°, 90°, 270° or 180° relative to the participant. In a variant of a traditional VPT task, the avatar either interacted with the objects in the scene, by pointing to or reaching for them, or was present but did not engage with the objects. Although the task was identical across all conditions - to say whether a target object is to the right or left of a control object - we show that the avatar's actions modulates performance. Specifically, participants were more accurate when the avatar engaged with the target object, and correspondingly, less accurate and slower when the avatar interacted with the control objects. As these effects were independent of the angular disparity between participant and avatar perspectives, we conclude that action understanding and VPT are likely linked via the rapid deployment of two separate cognitive mechanisms. All participants provided a measure of self-reported empathy and we show that response times decrease with increasing empathy scores for female but not for male participants. However, within the range of 'typical' empathy scores, defined here as the interquartile range where 50 % of the data lie, females were faster than males. These findings lend further insight into the relationship between spatial and social perspective taking.

Dynamic spatial representation of self and others' actions in the macaque frontal cortex

Modulation of neuronal firing rates by the spatial locations of physical objects is a widespread phenomenon in the brain. However, little is known about how neuronal responses to the actions of biological entities are spatially tuned and whether such spatially tuned responses are affected by social contexts. These issues are of key importance for understanding the neural basis of embodied social cognition, such as imitation and perspective-taking. Here, we show that spatial representation of actions can be dynamically changed depending on others' social relevance and agents of action. Monkeys performed a turn-taking choice task with a real monkey partner sitting face-to-face or a filmed partner in prerecorded videos. Three rectangular buttons (left, center, and right) were positioned in front of the subject and partner as their choice targets. We recorded from single neurons in two frontal nodes in the social brain, the ventral premotor cortex (PMv) and the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). When the partner was filmed rather than real, spatial preference for partner-actions was markedly diminished in MPFC, but not PMv, neurons. This social context-dependent modulation in the MPFC was also evident for self-actions. Strikingly, a subset of neurons in both areas switched their spatial preference between self-actions and partner-actions in a diametrically opposite manner. This observation suggests that these cortical areas are associated with coordinate transformation in ways consistent with an actor-centered perspective-taking coding scheme. The PMv may subserve such functions in context-independent manners, whereas the MPFC may do so primarily in social contexts.

Are visual artists better visual perspective takers? An exploratory study with an unexpected outcome

Visual perspective taking (VPT) has been argued to elicit image-like representations of other people's visual experiences. Separately, it has been demonstrated that there are inter-individual differences in the ability to successfully take other people's visual perspectives. In the present study, adults were asked to judge how long two lines appeared visually from the point of view of an agent. The lines were of identical length, but the agent was always closer to one of the lines than the other, meaning that the closer line should be judged as appearing visually longer. It was hypothesised that adults with experience in the visual arts would perform better at this task for one or both of two reasons: (1) they should be more familiar with the knowledge that the closer an object is the larger it appears visually (i.e., the retinal image is larger), and (2) they might be able to "draw" an image-like representation that more accurately reflects the effect of distance on perceived size. Consistent with previous experiments with this paradigm, adults generally failed to judge the closest line as appearing longer; indeed, as many judged this line would appear visually shorter. Crucially, increasing experience in the visual arts failed to improve the accuracy of VPT judgements; even a group of professional illustrators failed to recognise that the line closest to the agent would appear longer than the line furthest from the agent. These results are discussed in the context of the processes and representation types potentially involved in VPT.

Variation in gaze following across the life span: A process-level perspective

Following eye gaze is fundamental for many social-cognitive abilities, for example, when judging what another agent can or cannot know. While the emergence of gaze following has been thoroughly studied on a group level, we know little about (a) the developmental trajectory beyond infancy and (b) the sources of individual differences. In Study 1, we examined gaze following across the lifespan (N = 478 3- to 19-year-olds from Leipzig, Germany; and N = 240 20- to 80-year-old international, remotely tested adults). We found a steep performance improvement during preschool years, in which children became more precise in locating the attentional focus of an agent. Precision levels then stayed comparably stable throughout adulthood with a minor decline toward old age. In Study 2, we formalized the process of gaze following in a computational cognitive model that allowed us to conceptualize individual differences in a psychologically meaningful way (N = 60 3- to 5-year-olds, 50 adults). According to our model, participants estimate pupil angles with varying levels of precision based on observing the pupil location within the agent's eyes. In Study 3, we empirically tested how gaze following relates to vector following in non-social settings and perspective-taking abilities (N = 102 4- to 5-year-olds). We found that gaze following is associated with both of these abilities but less so with other Theory of Mind tasks. This work illustrates how the combination of reliable measurement instruments and formal theoretical models allows us to explore the in(ter)dependence of core social-cognitive processes in greater detail. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Gaze following develops beyond infancy. The highest precision levels in localizing attentional foci are reached in young adulthood with a slight decrease towards old age. We present a computational model that describes gaze following as a process of estimating pupil angles and the corresponding gaze vectors. The model explains individual differences and recovers signature patterns in the data. To estimate the relation between gaze- and vector following, we designed a non-social vector following task. We found substantial correlations between gaze following and vector following, as well as Level 2 perspective-taking. Other Theory of Mind tasks did not correlate.

Adopting the visual perspective of a group member is influenced by implicit group averaging

As social entities, individuals' perception and behaviors are susceptible to the influence of their social groups. Previous research has consistently shown that the group context in which individuals are situated significantly influences their perceptual processing. We aim to investigate whether the group context in which another individual is situated alters our understanding of their visual perception, which holds profound implications for interpersonal interactions. To address this inquiry, we conducted three experiments. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a visual scene depicting multiple avatars seated around a table, all facing an arrow positioned at the center of the table. They were instructed to adopt the visual perspective of a specific avatar within the group to perceive the arrow's orientation, and then reproduce its orientation from their own perspectives. We found that participants exhibited a bias towards the group's average perspective when reproducing the arrow's orientation. Experiment 2 further demonstrated that reinforced group processing could elicit an earlier appearance of this bias. In Experiment 3, we investigated an alternative explanation positing that the aforementioned bias originated from visual ensemble perception rather than group influence by instructing participants to reproduce the target avatar's position relative to the arrow's orientation. If the bias indeed originated from ensemble perception, it should also manifest in this task. However, the absence of any reproduction bias refuted this possibility. Through these experiments, we demonstrate that our understanding of an individual's perceptual experiences is influenced by the social context in which they are situated, which manifests as a convergence phenomenon.

Three key questions to move towards a theoretical framework of visuospatial perspective taking

What would a theory of visuospatial perspective taking (VSPT) look like? Here, ten researchers in the field, many with different theoretical viewpoints and empirical approaches, present their consensus on the three big questions we need to answer in order to bring this theory (or these theories) closer.

Spontaneous visual perspective-taking with constant attention cue: A modified dot-perspective task paradigm

It has been argued that humans can employ mentalizing implicitly and automatically, even with others' visual experiences. In terms of visual perspective-taking (i.e., inferring another's visual experience), the Dot Perspective Task has been considered to provide evidence for this hypothesis. People were found to respond slower when their visual experience was inconsistent with others' (referred to as the consistency effect). However, the specific underlying cognitive process of the consistency effect has been a topic of intense debate, i.e., whether the consistency effect represents a process of social cognition such as mentalizing. Here, we introduce a modified version of the Dot Perspective Task, in which all the targets appear at the position where the avatar is gazing, while some of the targets are invisible to the avatar due to a barrier that may block the avatar's line of sight. Therefore, the effect of perspective-taking and attention-cueing can be better disassociated in the modified paradigm. The results of Experiment 1 illustrated a significant consistency effect, which was further confirmed in Experiment 2. More importantly, the consistency effect was absent in Experiment 3, where the avatar sat with his back to the participants. These findings imply that the consistency effect reflects the automatic computation of others' visual information, and rule out the attention-cueing account of the consistency effect.

Embodied Cross-Modal Interactions Based on an Altercentric Reference Frame

Accurate comprehension of others' thoughts and intentions is crucial for smooth social interactions, wherein understanding their perceptual experiences serves as a fundamental basis for this high-level social cognition. However, previous research has predominantly focused on the visual modality when investigating perceptual processing from others' perspectives, leaving the exploration of multisensory inputs during this process largely unexplored. By incorporating auditory stimuli into visual perspective-taking (VPT) tasks, we have designed a novel experimental paradigm in which the spatial correspondence between visual and auditory stimuli was limited to the altercentric rather than the egocentric reference frame. Overall, we found that when individuals engaged in explicit or implicit VPT to process visual stimuli from an avatar's viewpoint, the concomitantly presented auditory stimuli were also processed within this avatar-centered reference frame, revealing altercentric cross-modal interactions.

Does dynamic balance affect cube mental rotation task in badminton vs. volleyball female players?

BACKGROUND

Changing from a static to a dynamic balance condition could affect the performance of a cognitive task such as mental rotation. Thus, the main goal of this study is to investigate aspects of visual-spatial cognition between two non-contact sports (i.e., badminton and volleyball) in different upright conditions (i.e., standing position, frontal balance, and sagittal balance).

METHODS

Thirty-five volunteer female sports and physical education students, fourteen specialists in badminton and twenty-one specialists in volleyball agreed to participate in this study. Each of the assessments was a 3D cube mental rotation task with and/or without balance exercises (i.e., frontal and/or sagittal balance) on a wobble board. Five stimuli were used in the mental rotation task (i.e., 45°, 135°, 180°, 225° and 315° for objected-based cube condition with egocentric transformation) which included pairs of standard and comparison images.

RESULTS

The findings indicate that there was a notable decrease (p < 0.001; d = 1.745) in response time in both dynamic balance conditions (i.e., frontal and sagittal balance) compared to standing position condition. In addition, results revealed significant interaction between balance conditions (i.e., frontal and/or sagittal balance) and groups (i.e., badminton and volleyball) in the response time at 225° angle and in the error percentage.

CONCLUSIONS

In sum, dynamic balance is also an activity that involves mental manipulation of objects in 3D space, which can enhance badminton and volleyball female players' ability to rotate 3D cube stimuli.

The influence of another's actions and presence on perspective taking

The ability to take each other's visuospatial perspective has been linked to people's capacity to perceive another's action possibilities and to predict their actions. Research has also shown that visuospatial perspective taking is supported by one's own mental own-body transformation. However, how these two processes of action perception and visuospatial perspective taking might interact remains largely unknown. By introducing seven angular disparities between participants and the model in the stimuli pictures across "Action" and "No Action" conditions, we investigated whether the observation of a goal-directed action facilitates perspective taking and whether this facilitation depends on the level of mental own-body transformation required to take perspective. The results showed that action observation facilitated performance independently of the level of mental-own body transformation. The processes behind this facilitation could involve anatomical mapping that is independent of the congruency between the participants' and the model's perspectives. Further, we replicated previous research findings, showing that participants were more accurate and faster when taking the perspective of a person compared to an inanimate object (a chair). The strongest facilitation effects were seen at the highest angular disparities between participants and the model in the stimuli pictures. Together, these findings enhance our knowledge of the mechanisms behind visuospatial perspective taking.

Motor imagery in autism: a systematic review

Introduction

Motor Imagery (MI) is when an individual imagines performing an action without physically executing that action and is thought to involve similar neural processes used for execution of physical movement. As motor coordination difficulties are common in autistic individuals it is possible that these may affect MI ability. The aim of this systematic review was to assess the current knowledge around MI ability in autistic individuals.

Methods

A systematic search was conducted for articles published before September 2023, following PRISMA guidance. Search engines were PsycINFO, PubMed, Web of Science, Scopus, Wiley Online Library and PsyArXiv. Inclusion criteria included: (a) Original peer-reviewed and pre-print publications; (b) Autistic and a non-autistic group (c) Implicit or explicit imagery tasks (d) Behavioral, neurophysiological or self-rating measures, (e) Written in the English language. Exclusion criteria were (a) Articles only about MI or autism (b) Articles where the autism data is not presented separately (c) Articles on action observation, recognition or imitation only (d) Review articles. A narrative synthesis of the evidence was conducted.

Results

Sixteen studies across fourteen articles were included. Tasks were divided into implicit (unconscious) or explicit (conscious) MI. The implicit tasks used either hand (6) or body (4) rotation tasks. Explicit tasks consisted of perspective taking tasks (3), a questionnaire (1) and explicit instructions to imagine performing a movement (2). A MI strategy was apparent for the hand rotation task in autistic children, although may have been more challenging. Evidence was mixed and inconclusive for the remaining task types due to the varied range of different tasks and, measures conducted and design limitations. Further limitations included a sex bias toward males and the hand rotation task only being conducted in children.

Discussion

There is currently an incomplete understanding of MI ability in autistic individuals. The field would benefit from a battery of fully described implicit and explicit MI tasks, conducted across the same groups of autistic children and adults. Improved knowledge around MI in autistic individuals is important for understanding whether MI techniques may benefit motor coordination in some autistic people.

Effect of dynamic balance on human mental rotation task in female badminton vs. volleyball players

Background

The present study aims to compare the mental rotation performance between two non-contact sports (i.e., badminton and volleyball) in different upright conditions (i.e., with and without dynamic balance).

Methods

Thirty-five female sports and physical education students voluntarily participated in the experiment, including fourteen specialists in badminton and twenty-one specialists in volleyball. The experiment involved a mental body rotation task with or without balance exercises on a wobble board.

Results

Badminton players outperformed volleyball players in the mental rotation tasks regardless of balance. More interestingly, the results revealed an overall decrease in reaction times when participants performed balance exercises simultaneously with mental rotation.

Discussion

Our findings suggest that introducing dynamic balance on a wobble board has immediate beneficial effects on the mental rotation performance of female badminton and volleyball players. These findings are discussed in the context of sport specificities and cognitive processing framework.

The Natural Tendency for Wide and Careful Listening: Exploring the Relationship Between Open-Mindedness and Psychological Science

We take open-mindedness to be a component of intellectual humility, as much of the recent empirical literature regarding intellectual humility does but contrary to what some philosophers think. More particularly, we understand intellectual humility as having a self-directed component, which is concerned primarily with the regulation of confidence we have on our own epistemic goods and capacities, and an other-directed component, which is concerned primarily with one's epistemic openness to others so to improve one's epistemic situation. Given that the open-minded person is disposed give new ideas serious consideration, it is crucial that she both listens widely and carefully to other's ideas. In this paper, we examine whether there is evidence to suggest that we have a natural, evolved tendency for this wide and careful listening related to open-mindedness. We conclude that there is indication of a natural tendency for wide listening, especially an in-group tendency. However, careful listening lacks more substantive empirical studies. It seems that human infants are much more inclined to be charitable and attentive to in-group cues or opinions. This is important evidence to deconstruct the idea of a natural tendency of virtuous intellectual humility that opens up the discussion for the role of social learning in cultivating and maintaining a virtuous life.

Perspective Taking Reflects Beliefs About Partner Sophistication: Modern Computer Partners Versus Basic Computer and Human Partners

We investigate partner effects on spatial perspective taking behavior in listeners, comparing behavior with a human versus a computer partner (Experiments 1 and 2), and with computer partners of different perceived capabilities (Experiment 3). Participants responded to spoken instructions from their partner which could be interpreted egocentrically (from their own perspective) or othercentrically (from their partner's perspective). In contrast to earlier work, we found that participants were more egocentric with a computer than a human partner. Participants were also more egocentric with a computer partner that appeared more modern and capable, compared to one that appeared outdated and limited in ability. Our results show that perspective taking behavior is sensitive to information about one's partner; in particular, listeners consider their partner's potential ability to collaborate, adjusting their egocentric tendencies accordingly. Moreover, we highlight what appears to be a shift in listeners' expectations regarding computers' collaborative capabilities, leading to greater willingness to push the burden of perspective taking onto a computer partner.

Inconsistency in perspective-taking during comprehension

In order to successfully comprehend referring expressions, a listener must often consider how the speaker's perspective differs from their own. Such consideration of others' perspective is effortful and not always employed. Previous studies disagree about whether executive function predicts perspective-taking use in language comprehension. Furthermore, it is unclear whether or not there are consistent individual differences of perspective-taking ability in comprehension. This study tested participants in three perspective-taking in comprehension tasks and two measures of executive function to determine whether participants show consistency in their perspective-taking ability and whether this ability is predicted by measures of executive function. We found that (1) some but not all perspective-taking in comprehension tasks correlate with one another, and (2) inhibition control and working memory are not linked with any of the three perspective-taking measures. Based on these findings, we conclude that perspective-taking in comprehension may not be a unitary ability.

The Projective Consciousness Model: Projective Geometry at the Core of Consciousness and the Integration of Perception, Imagination, Motivation, Emotion, Social Cognition and Action

Consciousness has been described as acting as a global workspace that integrates perception, imagination, emotion and action programming for adaptive decision making. The mechanisms of this workspace and their relationships to the phenomenology of consciousness need to be further specified. Much research in this area has focused on the neural correlates of consciousness, but, arguably, computational modeling can better be used toward this aim. According to the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM), consciousness is structured as a viewpoint-organized, internal space, relying on 3D projective geometry and governed by the action of the Projective Group as part of a process of active inference. The geometry induces a group-structured subjective perspective on an encoded world model, enabling adaptive perspective taking in agents. Here, we review and discuss the PCM. We emphasize the role of projective mechanisms in perception and the appraisal of affective and epistemic values as tied to the motivation of action, under an optimization process of Free Energy minimization, or more generally stochastic optimal control. We discuss how these mechanisms enable us to model and simulate group-structured drives in the context of social cognition and to understand the mechanisms underpinning empathy, emotion expression and regulation, and approach-avoidance behaviors. We review previous results, drawing on applications in robotics and virtual humans. We briefly discuss future axes of research relating to applications of the model to simulation- and model-based behavioral science, geometrically structured artificial neural networks, the relevance of the approach for explainable AI and human-machine interactions, and the study of the neural correlates of consciousness.

Individual Differences in Spatial Orientation Modulate Perspective Taking in Listeners

Previous research suggests that individuals exhibit consistent tendencies towards taking their own (an egocentric) or their partner's (an othercentric) spatial perspective. In addition, several factors such as spatial orientation ability, inhibitory control, and social preferences, have been found to mediate these perspective taking tendencies. However, these factors have not been studied together in the context of a single task. The present study explores these individual differences together in spatial perspective taking, using a task of simulated interaction in which listeners can choose to interpret an ambiguous spatial utterance egocentrically or othercentrically. We use a data-driven approach of latent profile analysis to classify participants into subgroups based on their spatial perspective taking tendencies. Our results show that stable subgroups of participants can be identified who differ in their perspective taking tendencies. This behaviour also correlates with a measure of listeners' spatial orientation ability, but not their inhibitory control or social preferences. Our results can be interpreted within a framework that views spatial perspective taking as an embodied cognitive process of a mental reorientation of the self relative to the environment, providing insight on the nature of the mechanisms underlying this operation.

Manipulating avatar age and gender in level-2 visual perspective taking

Visual perspective taking (VPT) represents how the world appears from another person's position. The age, group status and emotional displays of the other person have been shown to affect task performance, but tasks often confound social and spatial outcome measures by embedding perspective taking in explicitly social contexts or theory-of-mind reasoning. Furthermore, while previous research has suggested that visual perspective taking may be impacted by avatar characteristics, it is unknown whether this is driven by general group processing or a specific deficit in mentalizing about outgroups, for example, children. Therefore, using a minimally social task (i.e., the task was not communicative, and acknowledging the "mind" of the avatar was not necessitated), we examined whether avatar age and avatar gender affect performance on simpler (low angular disparity) and more effortful, embodied (high angular disparity) perspective judgments. Ninety-two participants represented the visuospatial perspectives of a boy, girl, man, or woman who were presented at various angular disparities. A target object was placed in front of the avatar and participants responded to the orientation of the object from the avatar's position. The findings suggest that social features of visuospatial perspective taking (VSPT) are processed separately from the fundamental spatial computations. Further, Level-2 VSPT appears to be affected by general group categorization (e.g., age and gender) rather than a deficit in mentalizing about a specific outgroup (e.g., children).

Relationships between the race implicit association test and other measures of implicit and explicit social cognition

Background

The race-based Implicit Association Test (IAT) was proposed to measure individual differences in implicit racial bias subsumed within social cognition. In recent years, researchers have debated the theoretical tenets underpinning the IAT, questioning whether performance on this task: (1) measures implicit attitudes that operate automatically outside of conscious awareness; (2) reflects individual differences in social cognition; and (3) can predict social behavior. One way to better address these research questions is to assess whether the race-IAT correlates with other implicit processes that are subsumed within social cognition.

Aims

The current study assessed whether the race-IAT was related to other commonly used individual difference measures of implicit (and explicit) social cognition. Experiment 1 assessed whether dissociable patterns of performance on the race-IAT were related to measures of implicit imitative tendencies, emotion recognition and perspective taking toward White task actors, as well as explicit measures of trait and state affective empathy and racial bias. Overcoming limitations of task conceptual correspondence, Experiment 2 assessed whether these latter tasks were sensitive in detecting racial biases by using both White and Black task actors and again examined their relationships with the race-IAT.

Method

In two lab-based experiments, 226 and 237 participants completed the race-IAT followed by an extensive battery of social cognition measures.

Results

Across both experiments, pro-White/anti-Black bias on the race-IAT was positively related to a pro-White bias on explicit measures of positive affective empathy. However, relationships between the race-IAT and implicit imitative tendencies, perspective taking, emotion recognition, and explicit trait and negative state affective empathy were statistically equivalent.

Conclusion

The race-IAT was consistently related to explicit measures of positive state affective empathy but not to other individual difference measures of implicit social cognition. These findings are discussed with regards to the theoretical underpinnings of the race-IAT as an individual difference measure of implicit social cognition, as well as alternative explanations relating to the reliability of social cognition measures and the various combinations of general-purpose (social and non-social) executive processes that underpin performance on these tasks.

Predicting Autistic Traits Using Eye Movement during Visual Perspective Taking and Facial Emotion Identification

Autistic traits are broad in severity and difficult to measure quantitatively. Quantitative measurement would be helpful in determining the effectiveness of training and therapy for autistic traits. The development of eye-tracking technology has made it easier to understand autistic traits. Previous works showed that autistic traits can be predicted from eye movements in the facial emotion identification task. It may be possible to measure autistic traits more accurately than the only prediction from facial emotion identification ability. In this study, we used a visual perspective taking task. The results showed that the Social Responsiveness Scale-2 score, which is associated with autistic traits, was predicted at 0.414 in Spearman's correlation coefficient by using eye movements obtained from the two tasks.

Heterogeneity of social cognition between visual perspective-taking and theory of mind in the temporo-parietal junction

Visual perspective taking (VPT), particularly level 2 VPT (VPT2), which allows an individual to understand that the same object can be seen differently by others, is related to the theory of mind (ToM), because both functions require a decoupled representation from oneself. Although previous neuroimaging studies have shown that VPT and ToM activate the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), it is unclear whether common neural substrates are involved in VPT and ToM. To clarify this point, we directly compared the TPJ activation patterns of individual participants performing VPT2 and ToM tasks using functional magnetic resonance imaging and within-subjects design. A whole-brain analysis revealed that VPT2 and ToM activated overlapping areas in the posterior part of the TPJ. In addition, we found that both the peak coordinates and activated regions for ToM were located significantly more anteriorly and dorsally within the bilateral TPJ than those measured during the VPT2 task. We further confirmed that these activity areas were spatially distinct from the nearby extrastriate body area (EBA), visual motion area (MT+), and the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) using independent localizer scans. Our findings revealed that VPT2 and ToM have gradient representations, indicating the functional heterogeneity of social cognition within the TPJ.

Effects of the social context on the neurophysiological correlates of observed error monitoring

Monitoring the motor performance of others, including the correctness of their actions, is crucial for the human behavior. However, while performance (and error) monitoring of the own actions has been studied extensively at the neurophysiological level, the corresponding studies on monitoring of others' errors are scarce, especially for ecological actions. Moreover, the role of the context of the observed action has not been sufficiently explored. To fill this gap, the present study investigated electroencephalographic (EEG) indices of error monitoring during observation of images of interrupted reach-to-grasp actions in social (an object held in another person's hand) and non-social (an object placed on a table) contexts. Analysis in time- and time-frequency domain showed that, at the level of conscious error awareness, there were no effects of the social context (observed error positivity was present for erroneous actions in both contexts). However, the effects of the context were present at the level of hand image processing: observing erroneous actions in the non-social context was related to larger occipito-temporal N1 and theta activity, while in the social context this pattern was reversed, i.e., larger N1 and theta activity were present for the correct actions. These results suggest that, in case of easily predictable ecological actions, action correctness is processed as early as at the level of hand image perception, since the hand posture conveys information about the action (e.g., motor intention). The social context of actions might make the correct actions more salient, possibly through the saliency of the correctly achieved common goal.

Dissociating visual perspective taking and belief reasoning using a novel integrated paradigm: A preregistered online study

There is considerable conceptual overlap between Level-2 Visual Perspective Taking (VPT-2) and Belief Reasoning; both cognitive processes require us to represent another's viewpoint and experience of reality while inhibiting our own egocentric representations. This study investigated if these facets of mentalising are distinct from one another in the general adult population. To do so, we developed a novel "Seeing-Believing Task" with which to compare VPT-2 and true belief (TB) reasoning directly - one in which both judgement types refer to the same state of reality, requiring identical responses, and where self and other perspectives can be dissociated. Across three preregistered online experiments, this task demonstrated consistent differences between these two cognitive processes; specifically, TB judgements were associated with slower response times than VPT-2. This suggests that VPT-2 and TB reasoning are at least partly distinct psychological processes. Further, the greater cognitive effort required for TB reasoning is unlikely to be explained by differences in mnemonic processing. We suggest, therefore, that VPT-2 and TB reasoning differ in the complexity of social processing involved and we discuss theoretical implications based on minimal vs. full-blown Theory of Mind. Future research must attempt to test these conjectures.

It's Not You, It's Me: A Review of Individual Differences in Visuospatial Perspective Taking

Visuospatial perspective taking (VSPT) concerns the ability to understand something about the visual relationship between an agent or observation point on the one hand and a target or scene on the other. Despite its importance to a wide variety of other abilities, from communication to navigation, and decades of research, there is as yet no theory of VSPT. Indeed, the heterogeneity of results from different (and sometimes the same) VSPT tasks point to a complex picture suggestive of multiple VSPT strategies, individual differences in performance, and context-specific factors that together have a bearing on both the efficiency and accuracy of outcomes. In this article, we review the evidence in search of patterns in the data. We found a number of predictors of VSPT performance but also a number of gaps in understanding that suggest useful pathways for future research and, possibly, a theory (or theories) of VSPT. Overall, this review makes the case for understanding VSPT by better understanding the perspective taker rather than the target agents or their perception.

Teleporting into walls? The irrelevance of the physical world in embodied perspective-taking

Embodied theories of Level 2 visual perspective-taking usually assume that we imagine ourselves in other real-world locations to take perspectives. We tested this assertion by giving participants an embodied perspective-taking task in which they were instructed to make manual responses based on imagined perspectives. Importantly, on half of the trials, the location of the alternative perspective was not physically possible (i.e., blocked with a wall). Across two experiments, results showed that participants performed just as well for the physically impossible perspectives as for accessible ones. We interpret these data as evidence that embodied perspective-taking is agnostic to local physical features of our environment.

Age effects on processing spatial relations within different reference frames: The role of executive functions

Mental representations of space can be generated and communicated with respect to different reference frames and perspectives. The present study investigated the effects of age and individual differences in domain-general executive functions on people's ability to process spatial relations as expressed in language within different spatial reference frames (SRFs). Healthy adults aged between 18 and 85 completed a novel task involving self-, third-person-, object-, and environment-centered judgements of spatial relations between two objects, as well as standard tests of working memory, inhibition, and mental flexibility. A psychometric evaluation confirmed the test-retest reliability and the convergent and divergent validity of the new task. Results showed that the lifespan trajectories varied depending on the SRF. Processing from a self-centered perspective or an object-centered frame remained intact throughout the adult-lifespan. By contrast, spatial processing from a third-person-centered perspective or within an environment-centered frame declined in late adulthood. Mediation regression models showed that mental flexibility accounted for a significant part of the age-related variance in spatial processing across all allocentric SRFs. The age effects on environment-centered processing were also partially mediated by age-related changes in visuospatial working memory capacity. These findings suggest that at least partially distinct systems are involved in mentally representing space under different SRFs, which are differentially affected by typical aging. Our results also highlight that people's ability to process spatial relations across different SRFs depends on their capacity to employ domain-general effortful cognitive resources.

Influence of membership in outgroups varying in competence and warmth on observers' Level-2 visual perspective taking

Visual perspective taking (VPT), the ability to adopt another person's viewpoint, entails two distinct processes, Level-1 (L1)-VPT and Level-2 (L2-VPT), referring to the ability to perceive whether and how a target sees an object, respectively. Whereas previous efforts investigated the impact of targets' social characteristics on L1-VPT, the present work is the first to do so regarding L2-VPT. Specifically, we investigate the impact of targets' membership in outgroups varying in perceived competence and warmth, the two fundamental dimensions of social perception. Participants in four experiments engaged in a L2-VPT task. Avatars belonged to a low competence low warmth group (LCLW; e.g. the homeless) or to a high competence low warmth group (HCLW; e.g. bankers) in Experiments 1-3, and to a LCLW or high competence high warmth group (HCHW; e.g. female students) in Experiment 4. Participants answered as quickly as possible whether a cued number matched a number present in a scene from either their own or the avatar's perspective. We consistently found support for the presence of both egocentric and altercentric interference, but this was not modulated by group competence and warmth, suggesting that membership in outgroups varying in competence and warmth does not influence L2-VPT. We discuss the findings' implications in the light of recent views on VPT.

Human but not robotic gaze facilitates action prediction

Do people ascribe intentions to humanoid robots as they would to humans or non-human-like animated objects? In six experiments, we compared people’s ability to extract non-mentalistic (i.e., where an agent is looking) and mentalistic (i.e., what an agent is looking at; what an agent is going to do) information from gaze and directional cues performed by humans, human-like robots, and a non-human-like object. People were faster to infer the mental content of human agents compared to robotic agents. Furthermore, although the absence of differences in control conditions rules out the use of non-mentalizing strategies, the human-like appearance of non-human agents may engage mentalizing processes to solve the task. Overall, results suggest that human-like robotic actions may be processed differently from humans’ and objects’ behavior. These findings inform our understanding of the relevance of an object’s physical features in triggering mentalizing abilities and its relevance for human–robot interaction.

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People differently ascribe mental content to human-like and non-human-like agents

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A human-like shape may automatically engage mentalizing processes

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Human actions are interpreted faster than non-human actions

Spontaneous perspective taking toward robots: The unique impact of humanlike appearance

As robots rapidly enter society, how does human social cognition respond to their novel presence? Focusing on one foundational social-cognitive capacity-visual perspective taking-seven studies reveal that people spontaneously adopt a robot's unique perspective and do so with patterns of variation that mirror perspective taking toward humans. As they do with humans, people take a robot's visual perspective when it displays goal-directed actions. Moreover, perspective taking is absent when the agent lacks human appearance, increases when the agent looks highly humanlike, and persists even when the humanlike agent is perceived as eerie or as obviously lacking a mind. These results suggest that visual perspective taking toward robots is consistent with a "mere appearance hypothesis"-a form of stimulus generalization based on humanlike appearance-rather than following an "uncanny valley" pattern or arising from mind perception. Robots' superficial human resemblance may trigger and modulate social-cognitive responses in human observers originally developed for human interaction.

EXPRESS: Sex Differences in Social and Spatial Perspective Taking: A Replication and Extension of Tarampi et al. (2016)

Tarampi and colleagues (2016) found that females performed better on spatial perspective-taking tasks when social information was present. They interpreted this finding to suggest that adding social information would uniquely improve the performance of females due to their better social perspective taking. In this replication and extension study, we tested an alternative explanation for their results: the tasks with social information also provided spatial information which could explain improved performance. In a study with 278 college students, we used the two versions of the tasks from their study (no social or spatial information and with social and spatial information) and added two versions that isolate only social and only spatial information. Our replication of Tarampi et al.'s analyses found no difference in females' performance on the tasks, however, when both females and males were included, we found some evidence for better performance in the social and spatial condition. Examining both males' and females' performance in all four conditions, we found that males outperformed females. In addition, participants who completed tasks with spatial information performed better. Findings suggest the difference observed in Tarampi et al. may have been due to the inclusion of spatial information, not social information, that improves task performance for both females and males. These results suggest that spatial perspective-taking performance is better when given even subtle spatial cues, but that social information does not appear to improve performance, despite ties with social perspective taking.

Hierarchical Integration of Communicative and Spatial Perspective‐Taking Demands in Sensorimotor Control of Referential Pointing

Recognized as a simple communicative behavior, referential pointing is cognitively complex because it invites a communicator to consider an addressee's knowledge. Although we know referential pointing is affected by addressees’ physical location, it remains unclear whether and how communicators’ inferences about addressees’ mental representation of the interaction space influence sensorimotor control of referential pointing. The communicative perspective‐taking task requires a communicator to point at one out of multiple referents either to instruct an addressee which one should be selected (communicative, COM) or to predict which one the addressee will select (non‐communicative, NCOM), based on either which referents can be seen (Level‐1 perspective‐taking, PT1) or how the referents were perceived (Level‐2 perspective‐taking, PT2) by the addressee. Communicators took longer to initiate the movements in PT2 than PT1 trials, and they held their pointing fingers for longer at the referent in COM than NCOM trials. The novel findings of this study pertain to trajectory control of the pointing movements. Increasing both communicative and perspective‐taking demands led to longer pointing trajectories, with an under‐additive interaction between those two experimental factors. This finding suggests that participants generate communicative behaviors that are as informative as required rather than overly exaggerated displays, by integrating communicative and perspective‐taking information hierarchically during sensorimotor control. This observation has consequences for models of human communication. It implies that the format of communicative and perspective‐taking knowledge needs to be commensurate with the movement dynamics controlled by the sensorimotor system.

The effects of body direction and posture on taking the perspective of a humanoid avatar in a virtual environment

Visual perspective taking is inferring how the world looks to another person. To clarify this process, we investigated whether employing a humanoid avatar as the viewpoint would facilitate an imagined perspective shift in a virtual environment, and which factor of the avatar is effective for the facilitation effect. We used a task that involved reporting how an object looks by a simple direction judgment, either from the avatar’s position or from the position of an empty chair. We found that the humanoid avatar’s presence improved task performance. Furthermore, the avatar’s facilitation effect was observed only when the avatar was facing the visual stimulus to be judged; performance was worse when it faced backwards than when there was only an empty chair facing forwards. This suggests that the avatar does not simply attract spatial attention, but the posture of the avatar is crucial for the facilitation effect. In addition, when the directions of the head and the torso were opposite (i.e., an impossible posture), the avatar’s facilitation effect disappeared. Thus, visual perspective taking might not be facilitated by the avatar when its posture is biomechanically impossible because we cannot embody it. Finally, even when the avatar’s head of the possible posture was covered with a bucket, the facilitation effect was found with the forward-facing avatar rather than the backward-facing avatar. That is, the head/gaze direction cue, or presumably the belief that the visual stimulus to be judged can be seen by the avatar, was not required. These results suggest that explicit perspective taking is facilitated by embodiment towards humanoid avatars.

Inhibitory Control was needed in Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking: A Developing Negative Priming Study

Aim

Previous studies have found that both children and adults have difficulties in dealing with judgments in which self-perspective differs from other-perspective, even in level-1 perspective-taking. However, the underlying cognitive mechanism of this is still unclear. In the present study, we designed a negative priming (NP) paradigm of the dot-perspective task to examine whether inhibitory control was required to overcome egocentric bias in level-1 visual perspective-taking in children and adults. We observed an NP effect in both children (n= 43) and adults (n= 40). However, there was no significant difference between children and adults on the magnitude of the NP effect, indicating that when children could overcome the egocentric bias, they had inhibitory control ability comparable to that of adults in level-1 other-perspective-taking.

Background

Visual perspective-taking is an indispensable ability in social interaction; hence, it has attracted great attention from researchers. However, the mechanism underlying this process remains unclear. The present study aimed to investigate the role of inhibitory control in level-1 visual perspective-taking from a developmental perspective in order to understand the performance differences in perspective-taking tasks between children and adults.

Methods

The NP paradigm was applied to the dot-perspective task. Participants' response times (RTs) and error rates (ERs) were recorded during the experiment. A 2 (trial type: test vs control, within-subject) × 2 (age: children vs adults) mix-design ANOVA was used to analyse the RTs and ERs data separately.

Results

We observed an NP effect for both children (7.31, t (42) = 2.78, p < 0.01, Cohen's d = 0.22) and adults (27.58, t (39) = 2.31, p < 0.05, Cohen's d = 0.21). However, the difference in the magnitude of the NP effect between children and adults was not significant (t (81) = 0.54, p = 0.59).

Conclusion

Inhibitory control was needed to overcome egocentric bias in level-1 visual perspective-taking for both children and adults. Moreover, when children could overcome egocentric bias, they had an inhibitory control ability comparable to that of adults.

Visual perspective-taking in complex natural scenes

Studies of visual perspective-taking have shown that adults can rapidly and accurately compute their own and other peoples’ viewpoints, but they experience difficulties when the two perspectives are inconsistent. We tested whether these egocentric (i.e., interference from one’s own perspective) and altercentric biases (i.e., interference from another person’s perspective) persist in ecologically valid complex environments. Participants (N = 150) completed a dot-probe visual perspective-taking task, in which they verified the number of discs in natural scenes containing real people, first only according to their own perspective and then judging both their own and another person’s perspective. Results showed that the other person’s perspective did not disrupt self perspective-taking judgements when the other perspective was not explicitly prompted. In contrast, egocentric and altercentric biases were found when participants were prompted to switch between self and other perspectives. These findings suggest that altercentric visual perspective-taking can be activated spontaneously in complex real-world contexts, but is subject to both top-down and bottom-up influences, including explicit prompts or salient visual stimuli.

What Can We Learn by Treating Perspective Taking as Problem Solving?

Perspective taking has been studied extensively using a wide variety of experimental tasks. The theoretical constructs that are used to develop these tasks and interpret the results obtained from them, most notably theory of mind (ToM), have conceptual shortcomings from a behavior-analytic perspective. The behavioral approach to conceptualizing and studying this class of behavior is parsimonious and pragmatic, but the body of relevant research is currently small. The prominent relational frame theory (RFT) approach to derived perspective taking asserts that "deictic framing" is a core component of this class of behavior, but this proposal also appears to be conceptually problematic. We suggest that in many cases perspective taking is problem solving; when successful, both classes of behavior involve the emission of context-appropriate precurrent behavior that facilitates the appropriate response (i.e., the "solution"). Conceptualizing perspective taking in this way appears to have many advantages, which we explore herein.

Interactions between interoception and perspective-taking: Current state of research and future directions

Interoception, the sense of the physiological state of the body, and perspective-taking, the ability to take another's point of view, are two fundamental components contributing to our perception and interaction with the external world. However, whether the perception of our inner body influences how we perceive the external world and other people remains poorly understood. Here, we review recent behavioural and neuroimaging evidence investigating the links between dimensions of interoception (i.e., accuracy, sensibility and awareness) and perspective-taking (i.e., affective, cognitive and visual). So far, only a limited subset of these dimensions has been investigated together and the results suggest that interoceptive abilities may only interact with perspective-taking when embodied mental transformations are required. Furthermore, mainly the emotional aspects of perspective-taking are related to interoception, influencing the ability to empathise with others. Future research should systematically investigate the links between all dimensions of interoception and perspective-taking to provide full understanding of the specific role interoception has on how we perceive the world and take another's point of view.

Effects of non-invasive brain stimulation on visual perspective taking: A meta-analytic study

Visual perspective taking (VPT) is a critical ability required by complex social interaction. Non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) has been increasingly used to examine the causal relationship between brain activity and VPT, yet with heterogeneous results. In the current study, we conducted two meta-analyses to examine the effects of NIBS of the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) or dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) on VPT, respectively. We performed a comprehensive literature search to identify qualified studies and computed the standardized effect size (ES) for each combination of VPT level (Level-1: visibility judgment; Level-2: mental rotation) and perspective (self and other). Thirteen studies (rTPJ: 12 studies, 23 ESs; dmPFC: 4 studies, 14 ESs) were included in the meta-analyses. Random-effects models were used to generate the overall effects. Subgroup analyses for distinct VPT conditions were also performed. We found that rTPJ stimulation significantly improved participants' visibility judgment from the allocentric perspective, whereas its effects on other VPT conditions are negligible. Stimulation of dmPFC appeared to influence Level-1 performance from the egocentric perspective, although this finding was only based on a small number of studies. Notably, contrary to some theoretical models, we did not find strong evidence that these regions are involved in Level-2 VPT with a higher requirement of mental rotation. These findings not only advance our understanding of the causal roles of the rTPJ and dmPFC in VPT, but also reveal that the efficacy of NIBS on VPT is relatively small. Additionally, researchers should also be cautious about the potential publication bias and selective reporting.

Stimulation of the Social Brain Improves Perspective Selection in Older Adults: A HD-tDCS Study

There is evidence for dissociable, causal roles for two key social brain regions in young adults. Specifically, the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) is associated with embodied perspective taking, whereas the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) is associated with the integration of social information. However, it is unknown whether these causal brain-behaviour associations are evident in older adults. Fifty-two healthy older adults were stratified to receive either rTPJ or dmPFC anodal high-definition transcranial direct current stimulation in a sham-controlled, double-blinded, repeated-measures design. Self-other processing was assessed across implicit and explicit level one (line-of-sight) and level two (embodied rotation) visual perspective taking (VPT) tasks, and self-other encoding effects on episodic memory. Both rTPJ and dmPFC stimulation reduced the influence of the alternate perspective during level one VPT, indexed by a reduced congruency effect (difference between congruent and incongruent perspectives). There were no stimulation effects on level two perspective taking nor self-other encoding effects on episodic memory. Stimulation to the rTPJ and dmPFC improved perspective selection during level one perspective taking. However, dissociable effects on self-other processing, previously observed in young adults, were not identified in older adults. The results provide causal evidence for age-related changes in social brain function that requires further scrutinization.

The Relation of Mental Rotation and Postural Stability

Main goal of this study was to investigate the influence of mental rotation tasks on postural stability. 84 participants were tested with two object-based mental rotation tasks (cube vs. human figures), an egocentric mental rotation task with one human figure, a math- (cognitive control) and a neutral task, while standing on a force plate in a both-legged narrow stance. Parameters related to the Center of Pressure course over time were used to quantify postural stability. The simultaneous solution of mental rotation tasks has led to postural stabilisation compared to the neutral condition. Egocentric tasks provoked more postural stability than object-based tasks with cube figures. Furthermore, a more stable stance was observed for embodied stimuli than for cube figures. An explorative approach showed the tendency that higher rotation angles of the object-based mental rotation task stimuli lead to more postural sway. These results contribute to a better understanding of the interaction between mental rotation and motor skills and emphasize the role of type of task and embodiment in dual task research.

Mindreading in conversation

How is human social intelligence engaged in the course of ordinary conversation? Standard models of conversation hold that language production and comprehension are guided by constant, rapid inferences about what other agents have in mind. However, the idea that mindreading is a pervasive feature of conversation is challenged by a large body of evidence suggesting that mental state attribution is slow and taxing, at least when it deals with propositional attitudes such as beliefs. Belief attributions involve contents that are decoupled from our own primary representation of reality; handling these contents has come to be seen as the signature of full-blown human mindreading. However, mindreading in cooperative communication does not necessarily demand decoupling. We argue for a theoretical and empirical turn towards "factive" forms of mentalizing here. In factive mentalizing, we monitor what others do or do not know, without generating decoupled representations. We propose a model of the representational, cognitive, and interactive components of factive mentalizing, a model that aims to explain efficient real-time monitoring of epistemic states in conversation. After laying out this account, we articulate a more limited set of conversational functions for nonfactive forms of mentalizing, including contexts of meta-linguistic repair, deception, and argumentation. We conclude with suggestions for further research into the roles played by factive versus nonfactive forms of mentalizing in conversation.

Visual perspective-taking and image-like representations: We don't see it

The ability to represent another agent's visual perspective has recently been attributed to a process called "perceptual simulation", whereby we generate an image-like or "quasi-perceptual" representation of another agent's vision. In an extensive series of experiments we tested this notion. Adult observers were presented with pictures of an agent looking at two horizontal lines, one of which was closer to the agent and hence appeared longer from his/her visual perspective. In each case approximately as many participants judged the closer line to appear shorter as longer (to the agent), i.e., failures to take the agent's perspective. This occurred when clear depth cues were added to emphasise the agent's location relative to the stimuli, when the agent was moved closer to the lines, when the lines were oriented vertically, when judgments could be made while viewing the image, and when participants imagined themselves in the agent's place. It also persisted when we asked participants to imagine what a photo taken from the same location as the agent would show, ruling out a misinterpretation of the instructions. Overall, our data suggest that adults attempt to solve visual perspective-taking problems by drawing upon naïve and often erroneous ideas about how vision works.

Exploring neurophysiological markers of visual perspective taking: Methodological considerations

RATIONALE

For visual perspective taking (VPT) using the avatar task, examinations of neural processes using event related potentials (ERP) indicate a distinction between an early posterior perspective calculation process (P3) and a later frontal process (LFSW) managing perspective conflict. While it is unknown if these neural processes are affected in clinical populations, it is unclear if the avatar task can be applied to this group, due to the long duration and sensitivity to data loss. Thus, we performed a methodological study of the avatar task, testing the feasibility of a shortened experimental paradigm.

OBJECTIVE

To investigate whether previously reported behavioural and ERP effects in the avatar task can also be seen if analysing all trials (matching/non-matching) jointly, and whether they remain robust if only a subset of the data is analysed.

METHOD

Healthy individuals (n = 20) completed the avatar task with ERP measurement. ERP components (P3, LFSW) and behavioural data were investigated by A) comparing use of only matching trials (n = 384) versus all trials (n = 768), and B) examining if reduced duration of assessment, by analysing only a subset of the data, impacts ERP findings.

RESULTS

We observed minimal differences when analysing data from only matching trial types compared to all trial types. Further, ERP amplitudes and latency findings were replicated when analysing only a subset of the data.

CONCLUSIONS

The duration of the avatar task can be reduced to avoid long testing times, thus making it better suited for use in clinical populations.

Functional Connectivity During Visuospatial Processing in Schizophrenia: A Classification Study Using Lasso Regression

BACKGROUND

Robust evidence shows that schizophrenia is associated with significant cognitive impairments, including deficits in visuospatial abilities. While other cognitive domains have sparked several functional neuroimaging studies in schizophrenia, only a few brain activation studies have examined the neural correlates of visuospatial abilities in schizophrenia.

PURPOSE

Here, we propose to perform a functional connectivity study on visuospatial processing in schizophrenia, and to determine the classification accuracy of the observed alterations.

METHODS

Thirty-nine schizophrenia patients and 42 healthy controls were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging while performing a mental rotation task. Task-based functional connectivity was examined using a region-of-interest (ROI) to ROI approach, as implemented in the CONN Toolbox. ROIs were selected from a previous meta-analysis on mental rotation. Logistic regression with Lasso regularization was performed, using train-test cross-validation.

RESULTS

Schizophrenia was associated with a complex pattern of dysconnectivity between the superior, middle and inferior frontal gyrus, the precentral gyrus, the superior parietal lobule (SPL) and the inferior lateral occipital cortex. The classification accuracy was 86.1%. Mental rotation performance was predicted by the dysconnectivity between the right and left superior frontal gyrus (SFG), as well as between the left SFG and left SPL.

CONCLUSION

The results of the current study highlight that visuospatial processing is useful for examining the widespread dysconnectivity between executive, motor and visual brain regions in schizophrenia. We also demonstrate that very good classification accuracy can be achieved using visuospatial-related functional connectivity data.

Take a Seat and Get Into Its Shoes! When Humans Spontaneously Represent Visual Scenes From the Point of View of Inanimate Objects

Human description of the surrounding world may spontaneously rely on others' perspective, which is a crucial component of social cognition. In five studies, participants were asked to describe the spatial relations between objects in visual scenes including, or not, other agents. In Experiment 1, a substantial proportion of participants used an other-centered perspective in the presence of another agent, replicating classical findings. To our own surprise, we also observed that an even greater number of participants used an other-centered perspective when the human agent was replaced by an armchair. In order to explore this phenomenon, Experiments 2 to 5 compared the respective strength of chair-centered and agent-centered perspectives and/or set them into conflict. A significant proportion of participants spontaneously took the seat's perspective even when it may not be sat on (Experiments 3 and 4) and even when the seat was not referred to (Experiments 4 and 5). Altogether, these findings suggest that perspective taking may spontaneously apply to inanimate objects. These results question whether such tendencies originate from social cognitive skills-as classically assumed-or reveal a nonsocial phenomenon. Future works should specifically test the widely assumed social nature of spontaneous perspective-taking.

Shared contributions of the head and torso to spatial reference frames across spatial judgments

Egocentric frames of reference take the body as the point of origin of a spatial coordinate system. Bodies, however, are not points, but extended objects, with distinct parts that can move independently of one another. We recently developed a novel paradigm to probe the use of different body parts in simple spatial judgments, what we called the misalignment paradigm. In this study, we applied the misalignment paradigm in a perspective-taking task to investigate whether the weightings given to different body parts are shared across different spatial judgments involving different spatial axes. Participants saw birds-eye images of a person with their head rotated 45° relative to the torso. On each trial, a ball appeared and participants made judgments either of whether the ball was to the person's left or right, or whether the ball was in front of the person or behind them. By analysing the pattern of responses with respect to both head and torso, we quantified the contribution of each body part to the reference frames underlying each judgment. For both judgment types we found clear contributions of both head and torso, with more weight being given on average to the torso. Individual differences in the use of the two body parts were correlated across judgment types indicating the use of a shared set of weightings used across spatial axes and judgments. Moreover, retesting of participants several months later showed high stability of these weightings, suggesting that they are stable characteristics of people.