The word frequency effect in recognition memory versus repetition priming

Predictive pre-activation of orthographic and lexical-semantic representations facilitates visual word recognition

To a crucial extent, the efficiency of reading results from the fact that visual word recognition is faster in predictive contexts. Predictive coding models suggest that this facilitation results from pre-activation of predictable stimulus features across multiple representational levels before stimulus onset. Still, it is not sufficiently understood which aspects of the rich set of linguistic representations that are activated during reading-visual, orthographic, phonological, and/or lexical-semantic-contribute to context-dependent facilitation. To investigate in detail which linguistic representations are pre-activated in a predictive context and how they affect subsequent stimulus processing, we combined a well-controlled repetition priming paradigm, including words and pseudowords (i.e., pronounceable nonwords), with behavioral and magnetoencephalography measurements. For statistical analysis, we used linear mixed modeling, which we found had a higher statistical power compared to conventional multivariate pattern decoding analysis. Behavioral data from 49 participants indicate that word predictability (i.e., context present vs. absent) facilitated orthographic and lexical-semantic, but not visual or phonological processes. Magnetoencephalography data from 38 participants show sustained activation of orthographic and lexical-semantic representations in the interval before processing the predicted stimulus, suggesting selective pre-activation at multiple levels of linguistic representation as proposed by predictive coding. However, we found more robust lexical-semantic representations when processing predictable in contrast to unpredictable letter strings, and pre-activation effects mainly resembled brain responses elicited when processing the expected letter string. This finding suggests that pre-activation did not result in "explaining away" predictable stimulus features, but rather in a "sharpening" of brain responses involved in word processing.

Recognition memory shielded from semantic but not perceptual interference in normal aging

Normal aging impairs long-term declarative memory, and evidence suggests that this impairment may be driven partly by structural or functional changes in the medial temporal lobe (MTL). Theories of MTL memory function therefore make predictions for age-related memory loss. One theory - the Representational-Hierarchical account - makes two specific predictions. First, recognition memory performance in older participants should be impaired by feature-level interference, in which studied items contain many shared, and thus repeatedly appearing, perceptual features. Second, if the interference in a recognition memory task - i.e., the information that repeats across items - resides at a higher level of complexity than simple perceptual features, such as semantic gist, older adults should be less impacted by such interference than young adults. We tested these predictions using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm, by creating feature-level (i.e., perceptual) interference with phonemically/orthographically related word categories, and higher-level associative interference with semantically related word categories. We manipulated category size in order to compare the effect of less versus more interference (i.e., small versus large category size), which served to (1) avoid potential item confounds arising from systematic differences between words belonging to perceptually- versus semantically-related categories, and (2) ensure that any effect of interference was due to information encoded at study, rather than pre-experimentally. Further, we used signal detection theory (SDT) to interpret our data, rather than examining false alarm (FA) rates in isolation. The d' measure derived from SDT avoids contamination of the memory measure by response bias, and lies on an interval scale, allowing memory performance in different conditions to be compared without violating assumptions of the statistical tests. Older participants were relatively more impaired by perceptual interference and less impaired by semantic interference than young adults. This pattern is at odds with many current theories of age-related memory loss, but is in line with the Representational-Hierarchical account.

On Reporting Recollective Experiences and “Direct Access to Memory Systems”

Strack and F$oUrster (1995) showed that, unlike remember responses, know responses in recognition memory were influenced by manipulating response bias. We describe an experiment that replicated theirs but additionally allowed subjects to report guesses. Only guess responses were influenced by this manipulation. Response bias had no effects on either know or remember responses. This outcome suggests that manipulating response bias influences know responses only when guessing is encouraged but not reported as such. Moreover, though know responses reflected memory for the study events, guess responses did not.

The Interdependence of Long- and Short-Term Components in Unmasked Repetition Priming: An Indication of Shared Resources

It has been suggested that unmasked repetition priming is composed of distinct long-and short-term priming components. The current study sought to clarify the relationship between these components by examining the relationship between them. A total of 60 people (45 females, 15 males) participated in a computer-based lexical decision task designed to measure levels of short-term priming across different levels of long-term priming. The results revealed an interdependent relationship between the two components, whereby an increase in long-term priming prompted a decrease in short-term priming. Both long-term and short-term priming were accurately captured by a single power function over seven minutes post repetition, suggesting the two components may draw on the same resources. This interdependence between long- and short-term priming may serve to improve fluency in reading.

The consequences of language proficiency and difficulty of lexical access for translation performance and priming

Repetition priming was used to assess how proficiency and the ease or difficulty of lexical access influence bilingual translation. Two experiments, conducted at different universities with different Spanish-English bilingual populations and materials, showed repetition priming in word translation for same-direction and different-direction repetitions. Experiment 1, conducted in an English-dominant environment, revealed an effect of translation direction but not of direction match, whereas Experiment 2, conducted in a more balanced bilingual environment, showed an effect of direction match but not of translation direction. A combined analysis on the items common to both studies revealed that bilingual proficiency was negatively associated with response time (RT), priming, and the degree of translation asymmetry in RTs and priming. An item analysis showed that item difficulty was positively associated with RTs, priming, and the benefit of same-direction over different-direction repetition. Thus, although both participant accuracy and item accuracy are indices of learning, they have distinct effects on translation RTs and on the learning that is captured by the repetition-priming paradigm.

Recognition memory across the lifespan: the impact of word frequency and study-test interval on estimates of familiarity and recollection

The goal of this study was to investigate recognition memory performance across the lifespan and to determine how estimates of recollection and familiarity contribute to performance. In each of three experiments, participants from five groups from 14 up to 85 years of age (children, young adults, middle-aged adults, young-old adults, and old-old adults) were presented with high- and low-frequency words in a study phase and were tested immediately afterwards and/or after a one day retention interval. The results showed that word frequency and retention interval affected recognition memory performance as well as estimates of recollection and familiarity. Across the lifespan, the trajectory of recognition memory followed an inverse u-shape function that was neither affected by word frequency nor by retention interval. The trajectory of estimates of recollection also followed an inverse u-shape function, and was especially pronounced for low-frequency words. In contrast, estimates of familiarity did not differ across the lifespan. The results indicate that age differences in recognition memory are mainly due to differences in processes related to recollection while the contribution of familiarity-based processes seems to be age-invariant.

Understanding gender bias in face recognition: effects of divided attention at encoding

Prior research has demonstrated a female own-gender bias in face recognition, with females better at recognizing female faces than male faces. We explored the basis for this effect by examining the effect of divided attention during encoding on females' and males' recognition of female and male faces. For female participants, divided attention impaired recognition performance for female faces to a greater extent than male faces in a face recognition paradigm (Study 1; N=113) and an eyewitness identification paradigm (Study 2; N=502). Analysis of remember-know judgments (Study 2) indicated that divided attention at encoding selectively reduced female participants' recollection of female faces at test. For male participants, divided attention selectively reduced recognition performance (and recollection) for male stimuli in Study 2, but had similar effects on recognition of male and female faces in Study 1. Overall, the results suggest that attention at encoding contributes to the female own-gender bias by facilitating the later recollection of female faces.

Haven't we met before? The effect of facial familiarity on repetition priming

Within the word recognition literature, word-frequency and hence familiarity has been shown to affect the degree of repetition priming. The current paper reports two experiments which examine whether familiarity also affects the degree of repetition priming for faces. The results of Experiment 1 confirmed that familiarity did moderate the degree of priming in a face recognition task. Low familiarity faces were primed to a significantly greater degree than high familiarity faces in terms of accuracy, speed, and efficiency of processing. Experiment 2 replicated these results but additionally, demonstrated that familiarity moderates priming for name recognition as well as face recognition. These results can be accommodated within both a structural account of repetition priming (Burton, Bruce & Johnston, 1990) and an Episodic Memory account of repetition priming (see Roediger, 1990), and are discussed in terms of a common mechanism for priming, learning and the representation of familiarity.

Change blindness and visual memory: Visual representations get rich and act poor

Change blindness is often taken as evidence that visual representations are impoverished, while successful recognition of specific objects is taken as evidence that they are richly detailed. In the current experiments, participants performed cover tasks that required each object in a display to be attended. Change detection trials were unexpectedly introduced and surprise recognition tests were given for nonchanging displays. For both change detection and recognition, participants had to distinguish objects from the same basic-level category, making it likely that specific visual information had to be used for successful performance. Although recognition was above chance, incidental change detection usually remained at floor. These results help reconcile demonstrations of poor change detection with demonstrations of good memory because they suggest that the capability to store visual information in memory is not reflected by the visual system's tendency to utilize these representations for purposes of detecting unexpected changes.

Semantic and repetition priming effects for Deese/Roediger—McDermott (DRM) critical items and associates produced by DRM and unrelated study lists

Two lexical decision experiments investigated priming for a critical item (CI, sleep) and its related yoked associate (YA, blanket) when one had been studied in a related Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) list (Experiments 1 & 2) or a list of totally unrelated words (Experiment 2) and the other had been nonstudied. Semantic priming from the related DRM list occurred for nonstudied CIs (but not YAs) regardless of whether the CI received within-test priming from its studied related YA during the lexical decision task, though the effect in the absence of within-test priming averaged across experiments was only significant by a one-tailed test. Also averaged across experiments, repetition priming occurred for both studied CIs and YAs when they had been studied in related DRM lists whether or not there was also within-test priming from a nonstudied related yoked pairmate, though individual effects within the two experiments were sometimes not significant. Repetition priming boosted semantic priming from related DRM lists less for CIs than for YAs, similar to the finding that memory discriminability is poorer for CIs than for YAs in episodic recognition. This smaller repetition priming boost for CIs than for YAs occurred to the same degree when the CIs or YAs were studied in an unrelated list. When nonstudied CIs and YAs were totally unrelated to all previously studied items and separated by 3-7 items in the lexical decision task, aYA produced a small 16 msec priming effect for its CI, averaged across both experiments. The implications of these results for the activation account of the DRM false-memory effect and for single-prime versus multiple-prime long-term semantic priming effects are discussed. The online addendum may be downloaded from www.psychonomic.org/archive.

Factors affecting conscious awareness in the recollective experience of adults with Asperger’s syndrome

have shown a small but significant impairment of autonoetic awareness or remembering involved in the episodic memory experiences of adults with Asperger's syndrome. This was compensated by an increase in experiences of noetic awareness or knowing. The question remains as to whether the residual autonoetic awareness in Asperger individuals is qualitatively the same as that of typical comparison participants. Three experiments are presented in which manipulations that have shown differential effects on different kinds of conscious awareness in memory in typical populations are employed with a sample of adults with Asperger's syndrome. The results suggest that the experiences of remembering reported by such individuals, although reduced in quantity, are qualitatively similar to those seen in the typical population. The results are discussed in the context of current theories of awareness in episodic memory.

Relating familiarity-based recognition and the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon: detecting a word's recency in the absence of access to the word

After viewing a list of single-word answers to general knowledge questions, participants received a test list containing general knowledge questions, some of whose answers were studied, and some of whose were not. Regardless of whether participants could provide the answer to a test question, they rated the likelihood that the answer had been studied. Across three experiments,participants consistently gave higher ratings to unanswerable questions whose answers were studied than to those whose answers were not studied. This discrimination ability persisted in the absence of reported tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states and when no information about the answer could be articulated. Studying a question's answer did not increase the likelihood of a later TOT state for that question, yet participants gave higher recognition ratings when in a TOT state than when not in a TOT state. A possible theoretical mechanism for the present pattern is discussed, as are relevant theories of familiarity-based recognition and of the TOT phenomenon.

The low-frequency encoding disadvantage: Word frequency affects processing demands

Low-frequency words produce more hits and fewer false alarms than high-frequency words in a recognition task. The low-frequency hit rate advantage has sometimes been attributed to processes that operate during the recognition test (e.g., L. M. Reder et al., 2000). When tasks other than recognition, such as recall, cued recall, or associative recognition, are used, the effects seem to contradict a low-frequency advantage in memory. Four experiments are presented to support the claim that in addition to the advantage of low-frequency words at retrieval, there is a low-frequency disadvantage during encoding. That is, low-frequency words require more processing resources to be encoded episodically than high-frequency words. Under encoding conditions in which processing resources are limited, low-frequency words show a larger decrement in recognition than high-frequency words. Also, studying items (pictures and words of varying frequencies) along with low-frequency words reduces performance for those stimuli.

Perceptual Effects and Recollective Experience in Face Recognition

Abstract. Four experiments were conducted investigating the effect of size congruency on facial recognition memory, measured by remember, know and guess responses. Different study times were employed, that is extremely short (300 and 700 ms), short (1,000 ms), and long times (5,000 ms). With the short study time (1,000 ms) size congruency occurred in knowing. With the long study time the effect of size congruency occurred in remembering. These results support the distinctiveness/fluency account of remembering and knowing as well as the memory systems account, since the size congruency effect that occurred in knowing under conditions that facilitated perceptual fluency also occurred independently in remembering under conditions that facilitated elaborative encoding. They do not support the idea that remember and know responses reflect differences in trace strength.

Intention to learn influences the word frequency effect in recall but not in recognition memory

Watkins, LeCompte, and Kim (2000) suggested that the recall advantage for rare words in mixed lists is due to a compensatory study strategy that favors the rare words. They found the advantage was reversed when rare and common words were studied under incidental learning conditions. The present study investigated the possibility that the rare-word advantage in recognition memory is also the result of a compensatory study strategy. Experiment 1 replicated the findings of Watkins et al. that the rare-word advantage in recall is eliminated under incidental learning conditions. In contrast, Experiment 2 showed that the rare-word advantage in recognition memory is maintained under both intentional and incidental learning conditions. Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiments 1 and 2 using different stimuli and a different orienting task. Finally, Experiment 4 showed that the rare-word advantage in recognition is maintained with pure lists. These findings show that the rare-word advantage in recognition memory is not the result of a compensatory study strategy. Instead, rare words are encoded more distinctively than common words, irrespective of participants' intention to remember them.

A strict response criterion yields a mirror effect in the novelty paradigm

According to the novelty/encoding hypothesis (NEH; Tulving & Kroll, 1995), efficacy of encoding information into long-term memory depends on the movelty of the information. Recognition accuracy is higher for novel than for previously familiarized material. This novelty effect is not a mirror effect: the superiority of novel over familiar items is not found in the hit rates but only in the false-alarm rates. The main result in the present replication study was that novel hit rates were higher than familiar ones when the most confident responses were examined separately, and thus a mirror effect could be demonstrated for these data, for both the low- and the high-frequency words. Similarly, the word-frequency effect on hits was stronger when a stricter response criterion was applied. It was concluded that the novelty effect and the word-frequency effect are more similar to one another than has hitherto been thought.

Remember-Know: A Matter of Confidence

This article critically examines the view that the signal detection theory (SDT) interpretation of the remember-know (RK) paradigm has been ruled out by the evidence. The author evaluates 5 empirical arguments against a database of 72 studies reporting RK data under 400 different conditions. These arguments concern (a). the functional independence of remember and know rates, (b). the invariance of estimates of sensitivity, (c). the relationship between remember rates and overall hit and false alarm rates, (d). the relationship between RK responses and confidence judgments, and (e). dissociations between remember and overall hit rates. Each of these arguments is shown to be flawed, and despite being open to refutation, the SDT interpretation is consistent with existing data from both the RK and remember-know-guess paradigms and offers a basis for further theoretical development.

Sum-Difference Theory of Remembering and Knowing: A Two-Dimensional Signal-Detection Model

In the remember-know paradigm for studying recognition memory, participants distinguish items whose presentations are episodically remembered from those that are merely familiar. A one-dimensional model postulates that remember responses are just high-confidence old judgments, but a meta-analysis of 373 experiments shows that the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves predicted by this model have the wrong slope. According to the new sum-difference Theory of remembering and knowing (STREAK), old items differ from new ones in both global and specific memory strength: The old-new judgment is based on a weighted sum of these dimensions, and the remember- know judgment is based on a weighted difference. STREAK accounts for the form of several novel kinds of ROC curves and for existing remember-know and item-recognition data.

Effects of cross-modal and intramodal division of attention on perceptual implicit memory

Extant results motivate 3 hypotheses on the role of attention in perceptual implicit memory. The first proposes that only intramodal manipulations of attention reduce perceptual priming. The second attributes reduced priming to the effects of distractor selection operating in a central bottleneck process. The third proposes that manipulations of attention only affect priming via disrupted stimulus identification. In Experiment 1, a standard cross-modal manipulation did not disrupt priming in perceptual identification. However, when study words and distractors were presented synchronously, cross-modal and intramodal distraction reduced priming. Increasing response frequency in the distractor task produced effects of attention regardless of target-distractor synchrony. These effects generalized to a different category of distractors arguing against domain-specific interference. The results support the distractor-selection hypothesis.

Why do non-color words interfere with color naming?

In the non-color-word Stroop task, university students' response latencies were longer for low-frequency than for higher frequency target words. Visual identity primes facilitated color naming in groups reading the prime silently or processing it semantically (Experiment 1) but did not when participants generated a rhyme of the prime (Experiment 3). With auditory identity primes, generating an associate or a rhyme of the prime produced interference (Experiments 2 and 3). Color-naming latencies were longer for nonwords than for words (Experiment 4). There was a small long-term repetition benefit in color naming for low-frequency words that had been presented in the lexical decision task (Experiment 5). Facilitation of word recognition speeds color naming except when phonological activation of the base word increases response competition.

Mediators of age-related differences in recollective experience in recognition memory

This study examined states of awareness with the Remember/Know paradigm during verbal recognition memory in young and old adults. Following the presentation of a word list, subjects undertook a recognition test and indicated whether they could consciously recollect its prior occurrence (R) or recognize it on some other basis, without conscious recollection (K). In this individual-difference approach we also incorporated various processing-speed and working-memory measures to study the link between aging, states of awareness and processing resources. The results revealed that, compared to younger adults, older adults exhibited a decline in the amount of R responses during the recognition test whereas the amount of K responses did not change. Structural equation modeling indicated that a slower processing speed associated with a limited working-memory capacity is a key to explaining age-related variance in conscious recollection. The findings offer further support for the distinction between remembering and knowing and for the processing-resources hypothesis of aging.

Episodic memory and remembering in adults with Asperger syndrome

A group of adults with Asperger syndrome and an IQ-matched control group were compared in remember versus know recognition memory. Word frequency was also manipulated. Both groups showed superior recognition for low-frequency compared with high-frequency words, and in both groups this word frequency effect occurred in remembering, not in knowing. Nor did overall recognition differ between the two groups. However, recognition in the Asperger group was associated with less remembering, and more knowing, than in the control group. Since remembering reflects autonoetic consciousness, which is the hallmark of an episodic memory system, these results show that episodic memory is moderately impaired in individuals with Asperger syndrome even when overall recognition performance is not.

Shades of the mirror effect: recognition of faces with and without sunglasses

A mirror effect was found for a stimulus manipulation introduced at test. When subjects studied a set of normal faces and then were tested with new and old faces that were normal or wearing sunglasses, the hit rate was higher and the false alarm rate was lower for normal faces. Hit rate differences were reflected in remember and sure recognition responses, whereas differences in false alarm rates were largely seen in know and unsure judgments. In contrast, when subjects studied faces wearing sunglasses, the hit rate was greater for test faces with sunglasses than for normal faces, but there was no difference in false alarm rates. These findings are problematic for single-factor theories of the mirror effect, but can be accommodated within a two-factor account.

Panic disorder from a monistic perspective: integrating neurobiological and psychological approaches

In the literature, psychological and biological theories of panic disorder are often regarded as mutually exclusive. The present article presents an integrative theory that explains how and why cognitive misinterpretations and "false threat alarms" leading to irrational fear and anxiety can arise from a neurobiological dysfunction in the amygdala and ascending transmitter systems. According to this view, physiological symptoms (such as palpitations and respiration manoeuvres) and psychological symptoms of anxiety (perception of threat and anticipation of catastrophe) are elicited simultaneously by a subcortical threat detection mechanism. This perspective might help to integrate conflicting earlier approaches. It is discussed with respect to theoretical, empirical, and clinical implications.

Why do strangers feel familiar, but friends don't? A discrepancy-attribution account of feelings of familiarity

Recent articles on familiarity (e.g. Whittlesea, B.W.A, 1993. Journal of Experimental Psychology 19, 1235) have argued that the feeling of familiarity is produced by unconscious attribution of fluent processing to a source in the past. In this article, we refine that notion: We argue that is not fluency per se, but rather fluent processing occurring under unexpected circumstances that produces the feeling. We demonstrate cases in which moderately fluent processing produces more familiarity than does highly fluent processing, at least when the former is surprising.

Experiences of remembering, knowing, and guessing

This article presents and discusses transcripts of some 270 explanations subjects provided subsequently for recognition memory decisions that had been associated with remember, know, or guess responses at the time the recognition decisions were made. Only transcripts for remember responses included reports of recollective experiences, which seemed mostly to reflect either effortful elaborative encoding or involuntary reminding at study, especially in relation to the self. Transcripts for know responses included claims of just knowing, and of feelings of familiarity. These transcripts indicated that subjects were often quite confident of the accuracy of their decisions, compared with those for guess responses. Transcripts for decisions associated with guess responses also expressed feelings of familiarity but additionally revealed various strategies and inferences that did not directly reflect memory for studied items. The article concludes with a historical and theoretical overview of some interpretations of the states of awareness measured by these responses.

Masked target priming effects on feeling-of-knowing and feeling-of-familiarity judgments

The present study tested whether the same processes underlie recognition memory based on feeling-of-familiarity on the one hand and feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments made to unrecalled items on the other. Five experiments compared the effects of masked priming of targets in the memory tests. Masked priming increased recognition judgments based on feeling of familiarity (KNOW responses) but not those accompanied by conscious recollection (REMEMBER responses). The same masked priming procedure enhanced cued recall accuracy and FOK judgments made to recalled items but not for recall failures. These results are interpreted as indicating that the metamemory monitor subserving FOK does not have privileged access to unconscious information, and that FOK is based on partial products of retrieval.