Individual differences in imagination inflation

Memory distrust and imagination inflation: A registered report

Imagination inflation happens when a person's subjective confidence that an event has occurred increases after they imagine it occurring. In this project, our primary aim is to test whether memory distrust is related to the imagination inflation effect in people who are aware of the discrepancies between their own memories and what they have imagined. Our secondary purpose is to investigate whether the influence of memory distrust on imagination inflation is moderated by traits that are described as disengagement from reality and to test whether memory distrust mediates the relationship between self-esteem and imagination inflation. In a three-step procedure, participants (N = 300) will assess their confidence that a list of childhood events happened to them; then, they will imagine three of these events and reassess their confidence. Half of the participants will undergo a memory distrust induction procedure. In order to sensitize participants to discrepancies, some of them will be given cues about the source and/or perspective of the imagined events.

Fake news and false memory formation in the psychology debate

Fake news can generate memory distortions and influence people's behavior. Within the framework of the great debates, the tendency to generate false memories from fake news seems to be modulated by the ideological alignment of each individual. This effect has been observed mainly around issues involving large sectors of society, but little is known about its impact on smaller-scale discussions focused on more specific populations. In this work we examine the formation of false memories from fake news in the debate between psychological currents in Argentina. For this, 326 individuals aligned to psychoanalysis (PSA) or Evidence-Based Practices (EBP) observed a series of news (12 true and 8 fabricated). The EBP group remembered or believed more fake news that damaged PSA. They also remembered with greater precision the statements of the news that harmed their own school, than those referring to others. These results could be understood as the product of an imbalance in the commitment between the different parties, since the group that proposes the paradigm shift (EBP) exhibited a congruence effect, while the group whose orientation is hegemonic in this field (PSA) did not show any effect of ideological alignment. The fact that the congruence effect is manifested to some extent in settings as relevant as the education of mental health professionals, highlights the need to move towards more careful practices in the consumption and production of media.

A scientometric and descriptive review on the debate about repressed memories and traumatic forgetting

Recent work suggests that the debate surrounding repressed memory and traumatic forgetting continues today. To further investigate this debate, we performed preregistered scientometric analyses on publications on the debate about repressed memory to provide information about its bibliometric evolution. Furthermore, we reviewed these publications to highlight the different positions taken by scholars on this debate. We reviewed 434 publications extracted from Scopus and Web of Science from 1969 to 2022. Our scientometric analyses permitted us to visualize the development of the publications on repressed memories and identify the terminology used to label this phenomenon. We identified three waves of publications (i.e., 1994-2000; 2003-2009; 2012-2021) showing that there is a recent peak of scholarly attention into this topic. 40% of scholars supported the phenomenon of repressed memory while 29% did not. Moreover, although in the last wave of publications, 35% of articles included critical arguments against the existence of repressed memory, a sizable number of publications (21%) supported ideas in favour of repressed memory. Finally, we observed that the term dissociative amnesia is another expression used to refer to the phenomenon. Our results provide additional evidence that the debate on repressed memories (and dissociative amnesia) is far from being over.

Psychometrics of Three Dissociation Scales: Reliability and Validity Data on the DESR, DES-II, and DESC

The current study assessed the reliability and validity of three measures of dissociation. Three hundred students completed the Dissociative Experiences Scale Revised (DESR), the Dissociative Experiences Scale-II (DES-II), and the Dissociative Experiences Scale Comparison (DESC); an additional 252 community adults evaluated clarity of instructions. Findings revealed that the three dissociation measures showed acceptable test-retest reliability and Cronbach's alphas. The DESR and DES-II strongly intercorrelated, but the DESC correlated only moderately with the two remaining dissociation measures, sharing less than 10% of the variance with the original scale. Additionally, the DESR and DES-II showed stronger convergent validity (correlation with measures of alexithymia and post-traumatic stress disorder) than did the DESC. The DESC was the only measure unrelated to trauma history. Participants reported substantially greater difficulty in understanding and utilizing the metric offered by the DESC. In conclusion, evidence supports the DES-II and DESR as alternate measures, but the DESC requires more investigation.

Dissociation and false memory: the moderating role of trauma and cognitive ability

The term dissociation is often used to refer to a diverse range of psychological symptoms, including perceptual impairments, emotional detachment, and memory fragmentation. In the present study, we examined whether there was a relation between participants' self-reports of dissociative experiences and their memory performance in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm-a laboratory-based procedure that is frequently used to investigate false memory. University students (N = 298) completed the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) and the Traumatic Life Events Questionnaire (TLEQ). Participants were also administered a standardised intelligence test (Shipley-2), and they were tested in the DRM paradigm. Overall, experiencing trauma and dissociation, as well as lower levels of cognitive ability, were associated with higher false memory. These findings are discussed in the context of the activation monitoring theory of DRM false memory.

Induction of false beliefs and false memories in laboratory studies-A systematic review

Psychological interventions often use guided discovery and other techniques for diagnostic exploration and intervention planning. This way, memories may arise in the person, which may be true or false. False memories of earlier events can be harmful and result in real suffering, similar to actual traumatic memories. Based on cognitive psychological and psycho-traumatological findings, there is pronounced dissent in the academic disciplines regarding the conceptualization, relevance and research of false memories. This review contributes to the basic question of how often false beliefs and false memories may be induced within the frame of different interactional techniques. A systematic review has been conducted of 59 articles from (quasi-)experimental studies and two qualitative sources from 30 data bases. Three main methods of memory induction provide the basis for reporting: imagination inflation, false feedback, and memory implantation. Due to the conceptual and methodological diversity of the studies, the results appear to be heterogeneous. Free and guided imagery, as well as suggestive statements, could induce false beliefs or false memories in, on average, 20%-50% of the participants who underwent experimental manipulation concerning false past events. A false belief induction may occur after dream interpretation or hypnosis in more than 50% of participants. Personalized suggestion is more effective in inducing memory than the general plausibility of the suggested events. Further research questions are which therapeutic actions seem appropriate in cases of harmful false memories. This depends not only on whether there are veridical elements in the false memory but also on the quality and meaning of the memory for the person's life and ability to cope with burdens.

Who is susceptible in three false memory tasks?

Decades of research show that people are susceptible to developing false memories. But if they do so in one task, are they likely to do so in a different one? The answer: "No". In the current research, a large number of participants took part in three well-established false memory paradigms (a misinformation task, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott [DRM] list learning paradigm, and an imagination inflation exercise) as well as completed several individual difference measures. Results indicate that many correlations between false memory variables in all three inter-paradigm comparisons are null, though some small, positive, significant correlations emerged. Moreover, very few individual difference variables significantly correlated with false memories, and any significant correlations were rather small. It seems likely, therefore, that there is no false memory "trait". In other words, no one type of person seems especially prone, or especially resilient, to the ubiquity of memory distortion.

Personality and Memory Conformity

Abstract. When an individual’s memory for an event is altered by post-event information (PEI) provided by a co-witness, this is known as memory conformity ( Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000 ). The aim of this study was to investigate whether personality characteristics are associated with memory conformity. Ninety-nine participants viewed a crime film and then completed the Ten-Item Personality Questionnaire (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003 ), a measure of extraversion, openness, agreeableness, neuroticism, and conscientiousness. Participants then discussed the film with a co-witness who contributed 12 items of post-event information (6 correct, 6 incorrect). Finally, participants completed a film recall questionnaire individually. Significant correlations between personality and memory conformity were found, with decreased openness, extraversion, and neuroticism related to increased reporting of post-event misinformation, increased agreeableness related to increased reporting of accurate post-event information, and decreased conscientiousness and neuroticism related to increased fabrications. These findings suggest that some individuals may be more susceptible to accepting misinformation and reporting errors than others.

Imagination and Memory

A growing body of literature shows that imagining contrary-to-truth experiences can change memory. Recent experiments are reviewed to show that when people think about or imagine a false event, entire false memories can be implanted. Imagination inflation can occur even when there is no overt social pressure, and when hypothetical events are imagined only briefly. Overall, studies of imagination inflation show that imagining a counter-factual event can make subjects more confident that it actually occurred. We discuss possible mechanisms for imagination inflation and find that, with evidence supporting the involvement of both source confusion and familiarity in creating inflation, the primary mechanism is still to be determined. We briefly review evidence on individual differences in susceptibility to inflation. Finally, the widespread use of imagination-based techniques in self-help and clinical contexts suggests that there may be practical implications when imagination is used as a therapeutic tool.

Creating Memories for False Autobiographical Events in Childhood: A Systematic Review

Using a framework that distinguishes autobiographical belief, recollective experience, and confidence in memory, we review three major paradigms used to suggest false childhood events to adults: imagination inflation, false feedback and memory implantation. Imagination inflation and false feedback studies increase the belief that a suggested event occurred by a small amount such that events are still thought unlikely to have happened. In memory implantation studies, some recollective experience for the suggested events is induced on average in 47% of participants, but only in 15% are these experiences likely to be rated as full memories. We conclude that susceptibility to false memories of childhood events appears more limited than has been suggested. The data emphasise the complex judgements involved in distinguishing real from imaginary recollections and caution against accepting investigator‐based ratings as necessarily corresponding to participants' self‐reports. Recommendations are made for presenting the results of these studies in courtroom settings. © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Forced-Choice False Recognition Controlling for Response Bias Correlates With Dissociative Amnesia Controlling for Imagery, but Not With Image Vividness Controlling for Dissociation

In the present study of false memory, subjects completed the Prevalence of Visual Imagery Test (PVIT), the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ), and the Curious Experiences Survey (CES); then, after generating visual images, viewing categorically related pictures, and viewing categorically related words, subjects completed forced-choice source recognition tests for whether they had “imaged” the word, the picture, or the image in a given category. Scoring higher on the CES Dissociative Amnesia/Fugue factor—controlling for the VVIQ and the PVIT—was associated both with poorer memory of the imaged source of visual images and with false memory of an imaged source for pictures. In contrast, greater image vividness on the VVIQ—controlling for CES factors—was not statistically associated with memory of an imaged source for images, pictures, or words. Greater image prevalence on the PVIT—controlling for CES factors—was associated with better memory of the imaged source of visual images and with less false memory of an imaged source for words.

What is the cause of confidence inflation in the Life Events Inventory (LEI) paradigm?

Briefly imagining, paraphrasing, or explaining an event causes people to increase their confidence that this event occurred during childhood-the imagination inflation effect. The mechanisms responsible for the effect were investigated with a new paradigm. In Experiment 1, event familiarity (defined as processing fluency) was varied by asking participants to rate each event once, three times, or five times. No inflation was found, indicating that familiarity does not account for the effect. In Experiment 2, richness of memory representation was manipulated by asking participants to generate zero, three, or six details. Confidence increased from the initial to the final rating in the three- and six-detail conditions, indicating that the effect is based on reality-monitoring errors. However, greater inflation in the three-detail condition than in the six-detail condition indicated that there is a boundary condition. These results were also consistent with an alternative hypothesis, the mental workload hypothesis.

Factors that influence the generation of autobiographical memory conjunction errors

The constructive nature of memory is generally adaptive, allowing us to efficiently store, process and learn from life events, and simulate future scenarios to prepare ourselves for what may come. However, the cost of a flexibly constructive memory system is the occasional conjunction error, whereby the components of an event are authentic, but the combination of those components is false. Using a novel recombination paradigm, it was demonstrated that details from one autobiographical memory (AM) may be incorrectly incorporated into another, forming AM conjunction errors that elude typical reality monitoring checks. The factors that contribute to the creation of these conjunction errors were examined across two experiments. Conjunction errors were more likely to occur when the corresponding details were partially rather than fully recombined, likely due to increased plausibility and ease of simulation of partially recombined scenarios. Brief periods of imagination increased conjunction error rates, in line with the imagination inflation effect. Subjective ratings suggest that this inflation is due to similarity of phenomenological experience between conjunction and authentic memories, consistent with a source monitoring perspective. Moreover, objective scoring of memory content indicates that increased perceptual detail may be particularly important for the formation of AM conjunction errors.

Magic and memory: using conjuring to explore the effects of suggestion, social influence, and paranormal belief on eyewitness testimony for an ostensibly paranormal event

This study uses conjuring to investigate the effects of suggestion, social influence, and paranormal belief upon the accuracy of eyewitness testimony for an ostensibly paranormal event. Participants watched a video of an alleged psychic seemingly bending a metal key by the power of psychokinesis. Half the participants heard the fake psychic suggest that the key continued to bend after it had been put down on a table and half did not. Additionally, participants were exposed to either a negative social influence (a stooge co-witness reporting that the key did not continue to bend), no social influence, or a positive social influence (a stooge co-witness reporting that the key did continue to bend). Participants who were exposed to the verbal suggestion were significantly more likely to report that the key continued to bend. Additionally, more participants reported that the key continued to bend in the positive social influence condition compared to the other two social influence conditions. Finally, believers in the paranormal were more likely to report that the key continued to bend than non-believers.

Confidence-accuracy resolution in the misinformation paradigm is influenced by the availability of source cues

After witnessing an event, people often report having seen details that were merely suggested to them. Evidence is mixed regarding how well participants can use confidence judgments to discriminate between their correct and misled memory reports. We tested the prediction that the confidence-accuracy relationship for misled details depends upon the availability of source cues at retrieval. In Experiment 1, participants (N=77) viewed a videotaped staged crime before reading a misleading narrative. After seven minutes or one week, the participants completed a cued recall test for the details of the original event. Prior to completing the test, all participants were warned that the narrative contained misleading details to encourage source monitoring. The results showed that the strength of the confidence-accuracy relationship declined significantly over the delay. We interpret our results in the source monitoring framework. After an extended delay, fewer diagnostic source details were available to participants, increasing reliance on retrieval fluency as a basis for memory and metamemory decisions. We tested this interpretation in a second experiment, in which participants (N=42) completed a source monitoring test instead of a cued recall test. We observed a large effect of retention interval on source monitoring, and no significant effect on item memory. This research emphasizes the importance of securing eyewitness statements as soon as possible after an event, when witnesses are most able to discriminate between information that was personally seen and information obtained from secondary sources.

Occurrence, plausibility, and desirability for 124 Life Events Inventory items

Imagination inflation is where imaginative elaboration of possible childhood experiences inflates (increases) participants' estimation that these events actually occurred, as indicated by pre- to post-manipulation ratings changes. This research primarily uses the Life Events Inventory (LEI), listing possible experiences that could have happened during childhood (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3, 208-214, 1996). Although imagination inflation research has spawned more than 50 investigations, no normative ratings exist on individual items contained in the LEI. To address this, we present descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, confidence interval) for 124 LEI items on occurrence (how likely is it that this experience happened to you), plausibility (how plausible is it that this event could have happened to someone), and desirability (how desirable is this experience). Occurrence and plausibility showed similar patterns of mean item ratings and were highly correlated, whereas desirability was moderately correlated with plausibility and unrelated to occurrence. These data should facilitate a more informed selection of specific LEI items to use in further research and can assist in clarifying the contributions of normative occurrence, plausibility, and desirability to imagination inflation effects.

Are the "memory wars" over? A scientist-practitioner gap in beliefs about repressed memory

The "memory wars" of the 1990s refers to the controversy between some clinicians and memory scientists about the reliability of repressed memories. To investigate whether such disagreement persists, we compared various groups' beliefs about memory and compared their current beliefs with beliefs expressed in past studies. In Study 1, we found high rates of belief in repressed memory among undergraduates. We also found that greater critical-thinking ability was associated with more skepticism about repressed memories. In Study 2, we found less belief in repressed memory among mainstream clinicians today compared with the 1990s. Groups that contained research-oriented psychologists and memory experts expressed more skepticism about the validity of repressed memories relative to other groups. Thus, a substantial gap between the memory beliefs of clinical-psychology researchers and those of practitioners persists today. These results hold implications for the potential resolution of the science-practice gap and for the dissemination of memory research in the training of mental-health professionals.

What I make up when I wake up: anti-experience views and narrative fabrication of dreams

I propose a narrative fabrication thesis of dream reports, according to which dream reports are often not accurate representations of experiences that occur during sleep. I begin with an overview of anti-experience theses of Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett who reject the received view of dreams, that dreams are experiences we have during sleep which are reported upon waking. Although rejection of the first claim of the received view, that dreams are experiences that occur during sleep, is implausible, I evaluate in more detail the second assumption of the received view, that dream reports are generally accurate. I then propose a "narrative fabrication" view of dreams as an alternative to the received view. Dream reports are often confabulated or fabricated because of poor memory, bizarre dream content, and cognitive deficits. It is well documented that narratives can be altered between initial rapid eye movement sleep awakenings and subsequent reports. I argue that we have reason to suspect that initial reports are prone to inaccuracy. Experiments demonstrate that subjects rationalize strange elements in narratives, leaving out supernatural or bizarre components when reporting waking memories of stories. Inaccuracies in dream reports are exacerbated by rapid memory loss and bizarre dream content. Waking memory is a process of reconstruction and blending of elements, but unlike waking memory, we cannot reality-test for dream memories. Dream experiences involve imaginative elements, and dream content cannot be verified with external evidence. Some dreams may involve wake-like higher cognitive functions, such as lucid dreams. Such dreams are more likely to elicit accurate reports than cognitively deficient dreams. However, dream reports are generally less accurate than waking reports. I then propose methods which could verify the narrative fabrication view, and argue that although the theory cannot be tested with current methods, new techniques and technologies may be able to do so in the future.

False memories for aggressive acts

Can people develop false memories for committing aggressive acts? How does this process compare to developing false memories for victimhood? In the current research we used a simple false feedback procedure to implant false memories for committing aggressive acts (causing a black eye or spreading malicious gossip) or for victimhood (receiving a black eye). We then compared these false memories to other subjects' true memories for equivalent events. False aggressive memories were all too easy to implant, particularly in the minds of individuals with a proclivity towards aggression. Once implanted, the false memories were indistinguishable from true memories for the same events, on several dimensions, including emotional content. Implications for aggression-related memory more generally as well as false confessions are discussed.

Recent advances in false memory research

In the last few years, substantial gains have been made in our understanding of human memory errors and the phenomenon of false memory, wherein individuals remember entire events that did not happen at all. Research had established that false memories can be consequential and emotional, that they can last for long periods of time, and that they are not merely the product of demand characteristics or the recovery of extant but hidden memories. These recent advances are discussed as extensions of earlier foundational research.

Constructive memory: past and future

Human memory is not a literal reproduction of the past, but instead relies on constructive processes that are sometimes prone to error and distortion. Understanding of constructive memory has accelerated during recent years as a result of research that has linked together its cognitive and neural bases. This article focuses on three aspects of constructive memory that have been the target of recent research: (i) the idea that certain kinds of memory distortions reflect the operation of adaptive cognitive processes that contribute to the efficient functioning of memory; (ii) the role of a constructive memory system in imagining or simulating possible future events; and (iii) differences between true and false memories that have been revealed by functional neuroimaging techniques. The article delineates the theoretical implications of relevant research, and also considers some clinical and applied implications.

Mirrored-self misidentification in the hypnosis laboratory: recreating the delusion from its component factors

INTRODUCTION

Mirrored-self misidentification is the delusional belief that one's reflection in the mirror is a stranger. According to Langdon and Coltheart's (2000) "two-factor" theory of monothematic delusions, the delusion can arise from deficits in face processing (Factor 1) and belief evaluation (Factor 2). This study gave participants separate hypnotic suggestions for these two factors to create a hypnotic analogue of the delusion.

METHOD

Forty-six high hypnotisable participants received a hypnotic suggestion for either Factor 1 alone or for Factors 1 and 2, either with hypnosis (hypnosis condition) or without (wake condition). Participants were asked to look into a mirror and to describe what they saw. Participants who reported seeing a stranger in the mirror also received a series of challenges.

RESULTS

Overall, 70% of participants in the hypnosis condition passed the delusion; only 22% of participants in the wake condition passed. Importantly, in hypnosis, the Factor 1 alone suggestion was just as effective in creating the delusion as the combined Factor 1 and Factor 2 suggestion.

CONCLUSION

These results suggest that hypnotic suggestion can recreate the mirrored-self misidentification delusion from its component factors. Notably, the hypnotic context, itself known to disrupt belief evaluation, can act as Factor 2.

Fabrication inflation increases as source monitoring ability decreases

The current research looked at the effects of lying about a false childhood event on the liar's memory for the event. Participants attempted to convince researchers that false events had actually happened to them. In Experiment 1, participants showed a Fabrication Inflation Effect in that they were more likely to increase their beliefs in the lied-about events than control events. Individual differences such as scores on the Dissociative Experience Scale, frequency of lying, and self-reported feelings of discomfort while lying were related to rates of fabrication inflation. In Experiment 2, participants also showed fabrication inflation and were more likely to inflate their likelihood ratings when the lie was created during a separate session from the posttest. Results from both studies support the idea that Source Monitoring failures may cause participants to increase their likelihood ratings of lied-about events. These results suggest that intentional lying may lead some participants to increase their beliefs in their own fabrications. Applications to the legal field are discussed.

Near-Death Experience: Out-of-Body and Out-of-Brain?

During the last decades, several clinical cases have been reported where patients described profound subjective experiences when near-death, a phenomenon called “near-death experience” (NDE). Recurring features in the accounts involving bright lights and tunnels have sometimes been interpreted as evidence of a new life after death; however the origin of such experiences is largely unknown, and both biological and psychological interpretations have been suggested. The study of NDEs represents one of the most important topics of cognitive neuroscience. In the present paper the current state of knowledge has been reviewed, with particular regard to the main features of NDE, scientific explanations and the theoretical debate surrounding this phenomenon.

Mood, dissociation and false memories using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott procedure

Who is likely to have a false memory? Does being in a certain transient state, such as a negative mood, mean that a person is more like to have a false memory? These important questions are examined using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure. The amount of false memories was compared with people's score on a dissociation measure and by mood. Unlike past research, which has used different procedures to explore false memories, we found that dissociation was not associated with false memories. We argue that this is because the DRM procedure requires two processes for a false memory (the generation of the critical lure and mistaking its source), while most false memory procedures only require one process (source monitoring error) because the errant information is suggested to the participant. This pattern of results suggests that only errors with the source monitoring process are associated with dissociation. We found that mood was related to false memories, but it was dependent on the specific task demands. If participants were told to recall as many words as they could, then people in a negative mood had more false memories. However, if they were told to recall as many words as they felt like recalling, then there were more false memories for people in a positive mood. This can be explained by the mood-as-input hypothesis. Results are discussed in relation to both theories and applications of memory.

Do people's motives influence their susceptibility to imagination inflation?

People are motivated to remember past autobiographical experiences related to their current goals; we investigated whether people are also motivated to remember false past experiences related to those goals. In Session 1, we measured subjects' implicit and explicit achievement and affiliation motives. Subjects then rated their confidence about, and memory for, childhood events containing achievement and affiliation themes. Two weeks later in Session 2, subjects received a "computer-generated profile" based on their Session 1 ratings. This profile suggested that one false achievement event and one false affiliation event had happened in childhood. After imagining and describing the suggested false events, subjects made confidence and memory ratings a second time. For achievement events, subjects' explicit motives predicted their false beliefs and memories. The results are explained using source monitoring and a motivational model of autobiographical memory.

Memory modification as an outcome variable in anxiety disorder treatment

Learning and memory are interdependent processes. Memories are learned, and cumulative learning requires memory. It is generally accepted that learning contributes to psychopathology and consequently to pertinent memory formation. Neuroscience and psychological research have established that memory is an active reconstructive process that is influenced by thoughts, feelings, and behaviors including post-event information. Recent research on the treatment of anxiety disorders using medications (i.e., d-cyclcloserine) to alter neurological systems associated with memory used in conjunction with behavior therapy suggests that memory is part of a central mechanism in the etiology and maintenance of these conditions. The main thesis of this article is that learning-based interventions create new memories that may modify existing ones. This raises the possibility of using such memory modifications to measure intervention outcome. A connectionist context for understanding this phenomenon and informing intervention is provided, with specific reference to post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. Recommendations for future research examining the role of memory change in treatment outcome are suggested.

The persistence of false beliefs

Do false beliefs last? To explore this question, this study planted false beliefs or memories of a childhood experience with asparagus. We found that these false beliefs had consequences for subjects, when assessed directly after the suggestive manipulation. Moreover, subjects were brought back two weeks later to see if their false beliefs persisted. After two weeks, subjects' confidence in their new memories, and the consequences of those memories were diminished, but not extinguished. These false beliefs were found to be somewhat weaker than other subjects' true beliefs for the same events. Another novel finding was that the manipulation was sufficiently powerful to affect actual food choices.

False claims about false memory research

Pezdek and Lam [Pezdek, K. & Lam, S. (2007). What research paradigms have cognitive psychologists used to study "False memory," and what are the implications of these choices? Consciousness and Cognition] claim that the majority of research into false memories has been misguided. Specifically, they charge that false memory scientists have been (1) misusing the term "false memory," (2) relying on the wrong methodologies to study false memories, and (3) misapplying false memory research to real world situations. We review each of these claims and highlight the problems with them. We conclude that several types of false memory research have advanced our knowledge of autobiographical and recovered memories, and that future research will continue to make significant contributions to how we understand memory and memory errors.

Children's basic memory processes, stress, and maltreatment

Building upon methods and research utilized with normative populations, we examine extant assumptions regarding the effects of child maltreatment on memory. The effects of stress on basic memory processes is examined, and potential neurobiological changes relevant to memory development are examined. The impact of maltreatment-related sequelae (including dissociation and depression) on basic memory processes as well as false memories and suggestibility are also outlined. Although there is a clear need for additional research, the investigations that do exist reveal that maltreated children's basic memory processes are not reliably different from that of other, nonmaltreated children.

Traumatic memories are not necessarily accurate memories

Some therapists, as well as other commentators, have suggested that memories of horrific trauma are buried in the subconscious by some special process, such as repression, and are later reliably recovered. We find that the evidence provided to support this claim is flawed. Where, then, might these memory reports come from? We discuss several research paradigms that have shown that various manipulations can be used to implant false memories--including false memories for traumatic events. These false memories can be quite compelling for those who develop them and can include details that make them seem credible to others. The fact that a memory report describes a traumatic event does not ensure that the memory is authentic.

Using source cues and familiarity cues to resist imagination inflation

To investigate whether people can resist imagination inflation--the imagination-induced increased confidence that fictitious childhood events really happened--we gave them different types of cues. In a three-stage procedure, participants: (1) rated their confidence that a list of childhood events had happened to them, (2) imagined some of these events, and (3) made confidence ratings a second time. Subjects received either no cues about the source of the imagined event, an additional source cue (perspective), an additional familiarity cue (a plausibility questionnaire), or both cues. Only subjects who had both types of cues resisted imagination inflation. These results suggest that additional cues can sometimes safeguard people from becoming more confident that fictitious events were genuine experiences.

The imagination: Cognitive, pre-cognitive, and meta-cognitive aspects

This article is an attempt to situate imagination within consciousness complete with its own pre-cognitive, cognitive, and meta-cognitive domains. In the first sections we briefly review traditional philosophical and psychological conceptions of the imagination. The majority have viewed perception and imagination as separate faculties, performing distinct functions. A return to a phenomenological account of the imagination suggests that divisions between perception and imagination are transcended by precognitive factors of sense of reality and non-reality where perception and imagination play an indivisible role. In fact, both imagination and perception define sense of reality jointly according to what is possible and not possible. Absorption in a possible world depends on the strengths of alternative possibilities, and the relationship between core and marginal consciousness. The model may offer a parsimonious account of different states and levels of imaginal consciousness, and of how "believed-in imaginings" develop and become under some circumstances "lived-in experiences."

Near-death experiences in cardiac arrest survivors

Near-death experiences (NDEs) have become the focus of much interest in the last 30 years or so. Such experiences can occur both when individuals are objectively near to death and also when they simply believe themselves to be. The experience typically involves a number of different components including a feeling of peace and well-being, out-of-body experiences (OBEs), entering a region of darkness, seeing a brilliant light, and entering another realm. NDEs are known to have long-lasting transformational effects upon those who experience them. An overview is presented of the various theoretical approaches that have been adopted in attempts to account for the NDE. Spiritual theories assume that consciousness can become detached from the neural substrate of the brain and that the NDE may provide a glimpse of an afterlife. Psychological theories include the proposal that the NDE is a dissociative defense mechanism that occurs in times of extreme danger or, less plausibly, that the NDE reflects memories of being born. Finally, a wide range of organic theories of the NDE has been put forward including those based upon cerebral hypoxia, anoxia, and hypercarbia; endorphins and other neurotransmitters; and abnormal activity in the temporal lobes. Finally, the results of studies of NDEs in cardiac arrest survivors are reviewed and the implications of these results for our understanding of mind-brain relationships are discussed.

What's in a Name for Memory Errors? Implications and Ethical Issues Arising From the Use of the Term "False Memory" for Errors in Memory for Details

The term "false memories" has been used to refer to suggestibility experiments in which whole events are apparently confabulated and in media accounts of contested memories of childhood abuse. Since 1992 psychologists have increasingly used the term "false memory" when discussing memory errors for details, such as specific words within lists. Use of the term to refer to errors in details is a shift in language away from other terms used historically (e.g., "memory intrusions"). We empirically examine this shift in language and discuss implications of the new use of the term "false memories." Use of the term presents serious ethical challenges to the data-interpretation process by encouraging over-generalization and misapplication of research findings on word memory to social issues.