In conflict with ourselves? An investigation of heuristic and analytic processes in decision making

Role of knowledge and reasoning processes as predictors of resident physicians' susceptibility to anchoring bias in diagnostic reasoning: a randomised controlled experiment

BACKGROUND

Diagnostic errors have been attributed to reasoning flaws caused by cognitive biases. While experiments have shown bias to cause errors, physicians of similar expertise differed in susceptibility to bias. Resisting bias is often said to depend on engaging analytical reasoning, disregarding the influence of knowledge. We examined the role of knowledge and reasoning mode, indicated by diagnosis time and confidence, as predictors of susceptibility to anchoring bias. Anchoring bias occurs when physicians stick to an incorrect diagnosis triggered by early salient distracting features (SDF) despite subsequent conflicting information.

METHODS

Sixty-eight internal medicine residents from two Dutch university hospitals participated in a two-phase experiment. Phase 1: assessment of knowledge of discriminating features (ie, clinical findings that discriminate between lookalike diseases) for six diseases. Phase 2 (1 week later): diagnosis of six cases of these diseases. Each case had two versions differing exclusively in the presence/absence of SDF. Each participant diagnosed three cases with SDF (SDF+) and three without (SDF-). Participants were randomly allocated to case versions. Based on phase 1 assessment, participants were split into higher knowledge or lower knowledge groups.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASUREMENTS

frequency of diagnoses associated with SDF; time to diagnose; and confidence in diagnosis.

RESULTS

While both knowledge groups performed similarly on SDF- cases, higher knowledge physicians succumbed to anchoring bias less frequently than their lower knowledge counterparts on SDF+ cases (p=0.02). Overall, physicians spent more time (p<0.001) and had lower confidence (p=0.02) on SDF+ than SDF- cases (p<0.001). However, when diagnosing SDF+ cases, the groups did not differ in time (p=0.88) nor in confidence (p=0.96).

CONCLUSIONS

Physicians apparently adopted a more analytical reasoning approach when presented with distracting features, indicated by increased time and lower confidence, trying to combat bias. Yet, extended deliberation alone did not explain the observed performance differences between knowledge groups. Success in mitigating anchoring bias was primarily predicted by knowledge of discriminating features of diagnoses.

Conflict detection and base-rate extremity

People tend to ignore the probabilistic rules cued by the base-rate information and rely on the heuristic intuition cued by the descriptive information to make "stereotypical" responses in base-rate problems. Conflict detection studies have shown that reasoners can detect conflicts between heuristic intuition and probabilistic considerations despite ultimately stereotypical responses. However, these studies primarily used extreme base-rate tasks. A critical open question is the extent to which successful conflict detection relies on an extreme base rate. The present study explores this issue by manipulating the base-rate extremity of problems in which the descriptive information and the base-rate information conflict or not. As a result, when reasoners made stereotypical responses in the conflict version of the moderate base-rate task, they took longer to respond, had lower confidence in their responses, and were slower to evaluate their confidence than in the no-conflict version of the task. All three measures indicate that stereotypical reasoners can stably detect conflict in moderate base-rate tasks, which expands the scope of successful conflict detection. Moreover, our response confidence data found a larger detection effect size in the extreme base-rate condition than in the moderate base-rate condition. This suggests that conflict detection is more efficient as the base-rate extremity increases. Implications for the boundary conditions of conflict detection are discussed.

When Cognitive Reflection Leads to Less Overall but More Systematic Judgment Bias: The Case of the Base Rates Fallacy

Although widely used in the judgment under uncertainty literature, the so-called Lawyer-Engineer problem does not have a Bayesian solution because the base rates typically oppose qualitative stereotypical information, which has an undefined diagnostic value. We propose an experimental paradigm that elicits participants' subjective estimates of the diagnosticity of stereotypical information and allows us to investigate the degree to which participants are able to integrate both sources of information (base rates and stereotypical descriptions) according to the Bayesian rule. This paradigm was used to test the hypothesis that the responses (probability estimates) to the Lawyer-Engineer problem from more rational individuals deviate from normative Bayesian solutions in a way that shows smaller but more systematic bias. The results further suggest that the estimates of less rational participants are noisier (less reliable) but may be more accurate when aggregated across several problems.

Overconfidence in the Cognitive Reflection Test: Comparing Confidence Resolution for Reasoning vs. General Knowledge

This research examines the metacognitive awareness that people have about their reasoning performance in the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). The first two studies compare confidence judgments about the CRT vs. general knowledge (GK) questions. Results show that (1) people are generally able to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers, but this ability is far from perfect, and it is greater for GK questions than for CRT problems. Indeed, and strikingly, (2) incorrect responses to CRT problems are produced with approximately the same level of confidence as correct responses to GK questions. However, (3) even though confidence is high for incorrect responses to CRT problems, it is even higher for correct responses. The results of two additional studies show that these differences in confidence are ultimately related to the conflict that CRT problems pose between intuition and deliberation. These findings have implications for the possibility of implicit error monitoring and dual-process models of overconfidence.

The intuitive decision preference and EEG features based on commonality heuristic

People tend to make intuitive decisions based on certain heuristics. We have observed that there is an intuitive heuristic that tends to prioritize the most common features as the selection result. In order to study the influence of cognitive limitation and context induction on the intuitive thinking of common items, a questionnaire experiment with multidisciplinary features and similarity associations is designed. The experimental results reveal the existence of three classes of subjects. The behavioral features of Class I subjects show that cognitive limitations and task context fail to induce intuitive decision-making based on common items; instead, they rely heavily on rational analysis. The behavioral features of Class II subjects show a mixture of intuitive decision-making and rational analysis, with priority given to rational analysis. The behavioral features of Class III subjects indicate that the induction of the task context reinforces the reliance on intuitive decision-making. The electroencephalogram (EEG) feature responses (mainly in the β and γ bands) of the three classes of subjects reflect their respective decision-making thinking characteristics. The event-related potential (ERP) results demonstrate that Class III subjects induce a late positive P600 component with a significantly higher average wave amplitude than the other two classes, which may be related to the "oh yes" behavior for the common item intuitive decision method.

Conflict Detection in Moderate Base-Rate Tasks: A Multi-Measure Study

Empirical studies have found that although humans often rely on heuristic intuition to make stereotypical judgments during extreme base-rate tasks, they can at least detect conflicts between stereotypical and base-rate responses, which supports the dual-processing view of flawless conflict detection. The current study combines the conflict detection paradigm with moderate base-rate tasks of different scales to test the generalization and boundaries of flawless conflict detection. After controlling for possible confounding by the "storage failure" factor, the conflict detection results indicated that reasoners providing stereotypical heuristic responses to conflict problems were slower to respond, less confident in their stereotypical responses, and slower to indicate their reduced confidence than reasoners who answered no-conflict problems. Moreover, none of these differences were affected by different scales. The results suggest that stereotypical reasoners are not blind heuristic performers and that they at least realize that their heuristic responses are not entirely warranted, which supports the argument for flawless conflict detection and extends the boundaries of flawless conflict detection. We discuss the implications of these findings for views of detection, human rationality, and the boundaries of conflict detection.

Cognitive miserliness in argument literacy? Effects of intuitive and analytic thinking on recognizing fallacies

Fallacies are a particular type of informal argument that are psychologically compelling and often used for rhetorical purposes. Fallacies are unreasonable because the reasons they provide for their claims are irrelevant or insufficient. Ability to recognize the weakness of fallacies is part of what we call argument literacy and imporatant in rational thinking. Here we examine classic fallacies of types found in textbooks. In an experiment, participants evaluated the quality of fallacies and reasonable arguments. We instructed participants to think either intuitively, using their first impressions, or analytically, using rational deliberation. We analyzed responses, response times, and cursor trajectories (captured using mouse tracking). The results indicate that instructions to think analytically made people spend more time on the task but did not make them change their minds more often. When participants made errors, they were drawn towards the correct response, while responding correctly was more straightforward. The results are compatible with “smart intuition” accounts of dual-process theories of reasoning, rather than with corrective default-interventionist accounts. The findings are discussed in relation to whether theories developed to account for formal reasoning can help to explain the processing of everyday arguments.

The Impact of Choice Architecture on Sepsis Fluid Resuscitation Decisions: An Exploratory Survey-Based Study

Background

Discordance with well-known sepsis resuscitation guidelines is often attributed to rational assessments of patients at the point of care. Conversely, we sought to explore the impact of choice architecture (i.e., the environment, manner, and behavioral psychology within which options are presented and decisions are made) on decisions to prescribe guideline-discordant fluid volumes.

Design

We conducted an electronic, survey-based study using a septic shock clinical vignette. Physicians from multiple specialties and training levels at an academic tertiary-care hospital and academic safety-net hospital were randomized to distinct answer sets: control (6 fluid options), time constraint (6 fluid options with a 10-s limit to answer), or choice overload (25 fluid options). The primary outcome was discordance with Surviving Sepsis Campaign fluid resuscitation guidelines. We also measured response times and examined the relationship between each choice architecture intervention group, response time, and guideline discordance.

Results

A total of 189 of 624 (30.3%) physicians completed the survey. Time spent answering the vignette was reduced in time constraint (9.5 s, interquartile range [IQR] 7.3 s to 10.0 s, P < 0.001) and increased in choice overload (56.8 s, IQR 35.9 s to 86.7 s, P < 0.001) groups compared with control (28.3 s, IQR 20.0 s to 44.6 s). In contrast, the relative risk of guideline discordance was higher in time constraint (2.07, 1.33 to 3.23, P = 0.001) and lower in choice overload (0.75, 0.60, to 0.95, P =0.02) groups. After controlling for time spent reading the vignette, the overall odds of choosing guideline-discordant fluid volumes were reduced for every additional second spent answering the vignette (OR 0.98, 0.97, to 0.99, P < 0.001).

Conclusions

Choice architecture may affect fluid resuscitation decisions in sepsis regardless of patient conditions, warranting further investigation in real-world contexts. These effects should be considered when implementing practice guidelines.

Highlights

The bright homunculus in our head: Individual differences in intuitive sensitivity to logical validity

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called "logical intuition." In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiments 1 and 4), likeability (Experiments 1, 2, and 3), and physical brightness (Experiments 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Brightness judgements were made by evaluating the font shade brightness of the argument's conclusion. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, to evaluate the extent to which "logical intuitions" were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable, and more physically bright than invalid statements. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgements (varied across experiments). However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of "logical intuition." We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

Reasoning strategy vs cognitive capacity as predictors of individual differences in reasoning performance

The dual strategy model posits that reasoners rely on two information processing strategies when making inferences: The statistical strategy generates a rapid probabilistic estimate based on associative access to a wide array of information, and the counterexample strategy uses a more focused representation allowing for a search for potential counterexamples. In this paper, we focused on individual differences in strategy use as a predictor of performance on four reasoning tasks: Belief bias, base rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, and denominator neglect. Predictions from the strategy use model were contrasted with predictions from Dual Process Theories, which suggest that individual differences in performance reflect variations in cognitive ability. In each of four studies, a large number (N ≈ 200) completed one of the above reasoning tasks, a strategy use diagnostic questionnaire, and measures of IQ, cognitive reflection, and numeracy. In three of four studies, individual differences in strategy use predicted differences in reasoning performance when the effects of the other variables were eliminated. Bayesian analysis indicated that none of the individual differences measures predicted a significant portion of variance on the conjunction fallacy task, and that strategy use was a strong predictor on the remaining three tasks. This research suggests that the type of strategy that is adopted paves a road to successful reasoning that is independent of cognitive capacity.

Recognizing biased reasoning: Conflict detection during decision-making and decision-evaluation

Although it is well established that our thinking can often be biased, the precise cognitive mechanisms underlying these biases are still debated. The present study builds on recent research showing that biased reasoners often seem aware that their reasoning is incorrect; they show signs of conflict detection. One important shortcoming in this research is that the conflict detection effect has only been studied with classic problem-solving tasks, requiring people to make a decision themselves. However, in many reasoning situations people are confronted with decisions already made by others. Therefore, the present study (N = 159) investigated whether conflict detection occurs not only during reasoning on problem-solving tasks (i.e., decision-making), but also on vignette tasks, requiring participants to evaluate decisions made by others. We analyzed participants' conflict detection sensitivity on confidence and response time measures. Results showed that conflict detection occurred during both decision-making and decision-evaluation, as indicated by a decreased confidence. The response time index appeared to be a less reliable measure of conflict detection on the novel tasks. These findings are very relevant for studying reasoning in contexts in which recognizing reasoning errors is important; for instance, in education where teachers have to give feedback on students' reasoning.

On Dual- and Single-Process Models of Thinking

Popular dual-process models of thinking have long conceived intuition and deliberation as two qualitatively different processes. Single-process-model proponents claim that the difference is a matter of degree and not of kind. Psychologists have been debating the dual-process/single-process question for at least 30 years. In the present article, I argue that it is time to leave the debate behind. I present a critical evaluation of the key arguments and critiques and show that-contra both dual- and single-model proponents-there is currently no good evidence that allows one to decide the debate. Moreover, I clarify that even if the debate were to be solved, it would be irrelevant for psychologists because it does not advance the understanding of the processing mechanisms underlying human thinking.

Eye-tracking IQ: Cognitive capacity and strategy use on a ratio-bias task

This study tested the relationship between strategy use (assessed by eye-gaze patterns), cognitive ability (CA), and reasoning performance on a ratio-bias task. For the ratio-bias problems, participants (N = 125) chose which of two ratios was larger; each ratio was represented both as a fraction and as a picture. Problems were solved in two blocks: once under a deadline (Time1) and once in free time (Time2). Consistent with the assumption of dual process theories that CA is needed to overturn a pre-potent, initial response (Evans & Stanovich, 2013), CA was positively associated with correct performance at Time2, as well as the increase in performance from Time1 to Time2. However, strategy use predicted performance independently of CA at Time2, and accounted for the relationship between CA and improvement between Time1 and Time2: reasoners who attended to the fractions rather than to the misleading pictures performed better, regardless of CA. CA also predicted performance at Time1. Together, these findings suggest that the robust relationship between CA and reasoning (Stanovich, 1999) may arise because 1) high capacity reasoners are more likely to "intuit" the initial answer and 2) because CA is correlated with good strategy use, which, in turn, predicts performance.

Age, numeracy, and cultural differences in Chinese and American adolescents' performance on the ratio bias task

Ratio bias occurs when low-probability events with large numerators are judged as more probable than identical or higher-probability ratios with small numerators. Chinese and American adolescents made judgments on ratio bias problems with identical winning probabilities and unequal winning probabilities and completed a test of numeracy. In general, older participants performed better than younger participants and Chinese participants performed subtly better than American participants. On both problem types, numeracy mediated the relationships between age and performance. Between-country differences on unequal ratio problems were moderated by numeracy, such that Chinese participants outperformed American adolescents only at the most numerate level. By contrast, numeracy neither mediated nor moderated the country-performance relationship on equal ratio problems; instead, Chinese adolescents outperformed American adolescents at each level of numeracy, although these differences were fairly small. Discussion focuses on transferring formal math skills to everyday judgments, the associations among age, culture, and numeracy from a dual-process perspective, and limitations and alternative interpretations of the findings.

Developmental frontal brain activation differences in overcoming heuristic bias

Since reasoning is often biased by intuitive heuristics, the development of sound reasoning has long been postulated to depend on successful bias monitoring and inhibition. The present fMRI study aimed to identify neural correlates of developmental changes in these processes. A group of adults and young adolescents were presented with ratio-bias problems in which an intuitively cued heuristic response could be incongruent (conflict item) or congruent (no-conflict item) with the correct response. Results showed that successfully avoiding biased responding on conflict items across both age groups was associated with increased activation in Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) and the right Lateral Prefrontal Cortex (LPFC) regions of interest. Critically, the right LPFC activation decreased with age. Biased responding did not result in right LPFC or ACC modulation and failed to show any developmental activation changes. We discuss implications for ongoing debates on the nature of heuristic bias and its development.

“Judging a Book by Its Cover”: The Dominance of Delivery Over Content When Perceiving Charisma

Perceived charisma is an outcome of message content and delivery, where the latter dominates the former. Framing perception of charisma within dual-process theories, we suggest a rapid processing of delivery and a slow processing of content. We aimed to track the differential processing speed of content and delivery that accounts for the delivery dominance. In two laboratory experiments, we manipulated content and delivery. Participants reported perceived charisma after viewing a presentation (Experiment 1) or moment-by-moment during the presentation (Experiment 2). The results confirmed the immediate influence of delivery on perceived charisma that was later either supported or revised by the content. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.

Second-guess: Testing the specificity of error detection in the bat-and-ball problem

In the last decade conflict detection studies in the reasoning and decision-making field have suggested that biased reasoners who give an intuitive response that conflicts with logico-mathematical principles can often detect that their answer is questionable. In the present studies we introduced a second guess paradigm to test the nature and specificity of this error or conflict signal. Participants solved the bat-and-ball problem and were allowed to make a second guess after they had entered their answer. Three studies in which we used a range of second guess elicitation methods show that biased reasoners predominantly give second guesses that are smaller than the intuitively cued heuristic response ("10 cents"). Findings indicate that although biased reasoners do not know the exact correct answer ("5 cents") they do correctly grasp that the right answer must be smaller than the intuitively cued "10 cents" answer. This suggests that reasoners might be savvier about their errors than traditionally assumed. Implications for the conflict detection and dual process literature are discussed.

Deliberate reasoning is not affected by language

BACKGROUND

Millions of people use a second language every day. Does this have an effect on their decision-making? Are decisions in a second language more deliberate? Two mechanisms have been proposed: reduced emotionality or increased deliberation. Most studies so far used problems where both mechanisms could contribute to a foreign language effect. Here, we aimed to identify whether deliberate reasoning increases for problems that are devoid of any emotional connotation when using a second language or having to switch between native and second language.

METHOD

We measured deliberate reasoning with items from the cognitive reflection test, ratio bias, a probability matching task, and base rate neglect items. We recruited over 500 participants from Norway and the Netherlands that had English as their second language. Participants were randomly assigned to either the native, switching or second language condition. We measured: number of correctly answered items-deliberate reasoning score, perceived effort, perceived accuracy or confidence, and language proficiency.

RESULTS

Deliberate reasoning was not increased when using a second language or when having to switch between native and second language. All three groups performed equally well. Significant predictors of deliberate reasoning were age, gender, education, perceived effort, and confidence but not the language context. Participants with low English proficiency spent more time reading compared to more fluent speakers.

CONCLUSION

There is no advantage of second language on deliberate reasoning in the absence of time pressure. Deliberation was not increased by providing items in a second language, but through the willingness to spend cognitive effort and time to read carefully.

Conflict Detection and Logical Complexity

Empirical evidence for the capacity to detect conflict between biased reasoning and normative principles has led to the proposal that reasoners have an intuitive grasp of some basic logical principles. In two studies, we investigate the boundary conditions of these logical intuitions by manipulating the logical complexity of problems where logical validity and conclusion believability conflict or not. Results pointed to evidence for successful conflict detection on the basic Modus Ponens (MP) inference, but also showed evidence for such a phenomenon on the more complex Modus Tollens (MT) inference. This suggests that both the MP and the MT inferences are simple enough for reasoners to have an intuitive grasp of their logical structure. The boundaries of logical intuition might thus reside in problems of greater complexity than these inferences. We also observed that on the invalid Affirmation of the Consequent (AC) and Denial of the Antecedent (DA) inferences, participants showed higher accuracy on the inference that was expected to be more complex (DA), and no evidence for successful conflict detection was found on these forms. Implications for the logical intuition framework are discussed.

The Reflective Mind: Examining Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Base Rate Neglect with fMRI

Performance on heuristics and bias tasks has been shown to be susceptible to bias. In turn, susceptibility to bias varies as a function of individual differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., intelligence) and thinking styles (e.g., propensity for reflection). Using a classic task (i.e., lawyer–engineer problem), we conducted two experiments to examine the differential contributions of cognitive abilities versus thinking styles to performance. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)—a well-established measure of reflective thinking—predicted performance on conflict problems (where base rates and intuition point in opposite directions), whereas STM predicted performance on nonconflict problems. Experiment 2 conducted in the fMRI scanner replicated this behavioral dissociation and enabled us to probe their neural correlates. As predicted, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the ACC—a key region for conflict detection—even in cases when participants responded stereotypically. In participants with higher CRT scores, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and activation in PCC covaried in relation to CRT scores during conflict problems. Also, CRT scores predicted activation in PCC in conflict problems (over and above nonconflict problems). Our results suggest that individual differences in reflective thinking as measured by CRT are related to brain activation in PCC—a region involved in regulating attention between external and internal foci. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of PCC's possible involvement in switching from intuitive to analytic mode of thought.

Dunning-Kruger effects in reasoning: Theoretical implications of the failure to recognize incompetence

The Dunning-Kruger effect refers to the observation that the incompetent are often ill-suited to recognize their incompetence. Here we investigated potential Dunning-Kruger effects in high-level reasoning and, in particular, focused on the relative effectiveness of metacognitive monitoring among particularly biased reasoners. Participants who made the greatest numbers of errors on the cognitive reflection test (CRT) overestimated their performance on this test by a factor of more than 3. Overestimation decreased as CRT performance increased, and those who scored particularly high underestimated their performance. Evidence for this type of systematic miscalibration was also found on a self-report measure of analytic-thinking disposition. Namely, genuinely nonanalytic participants (on the basis of CRT performance) overreported their "need for cognition" (NC), indicating that they were dispositionally analytic when their objective performance indicated otherwise. Furthermore, estimated CRT performance was just as strong a predictor of NC as was actual CRT performance. Our results provide evidence for Dunning-Kruger effects both in estimated performance on the CRT and in self-reported analytic-thinking disposition. These findings indicate that part of the reason why people are biased is that they are either unaware of or indifferent to their own bias.

Unclaimed Prize Information Biases Perceptions of Winning in Scratch Card Gambling

Unclaimed prize information (i.e., the number of prizes still available to be won) is information commonly provided to scratch card gamblers. However, unless the number of tickets remaining to be purchased is also provided, this information is uninformative. Despite its lack of utility in assisting gamblers in choosing the most favourable type of scratch card to play, we hypothesized that unclaimed prize information would bias participants’ judgments within a scratch card gambling context. In Experiment 1 (N = 201), we showed that participants are influenced by this information such that they felt more likely to win, were more excited to play, and preferred to hypothetically purchase more of the scratch card with the greatest number of unclaimed prizes. In Experiment 2 (N = 201), we attempted to ameliorate this bias by providing participants with the number of tickets remaining to be purchased and equating the payback percentages of all three games. The bias, although attenuated, still persisted in these conditions. Finally, in Experiment 3 (N = 200), we manipulated the hypothetical scratch cards such that games with the highest number of unclaimed prizes were the least favourable, and vice versa. As in Experiment 2, participants still favoured cards with greater numbers of unclaimed prizes. Possible mechanisms underlying this bias are discussed. In conclusion, across three experiments, we demonstrate that salient unclaimed prize information is capable of exerting a strong effect over judgments related to scratch card games.

Thinking dynamics and individual differences: Mouse-tracking analysis of the denominator neglect task

Most decision-making models describing individual differences in heuristics and biases tasks build on the assumption that reasoners produce a first incorrect answer in a quick, automatic way which they may or may not override later and that the advantage of high capacity reasoners arises from this late correction mechanism. To investigate this assumption, we developed a mouse-tracking analysis technique to capture individuals’ first answers and subsequent thinking dynamics. Across two denominator neglect task experiments, we observed that individuals initially move the mouse cursor towards the correct answer option in a substantial number of cases suggesting that reasoners may not always produce an incorrect answer first. Furthermore, we observed that, compared to low capacity reasoners, high capacity individuals revise their first answer more frequently if it is incorrect and make fewer changes if it is correct. However, we did not find evidence that high capacity individuals produce correct initial answers more frequently. Consistent with the predictions of previous decision-making models, these results suggest that in the denominator neglect task the capacity-normativity relationship arises after the initial response is formulated. The present work demonstrates how the analysis of mouse trajectories can be utilized to investigate individual differences in decision-making and help us better apprehend the dynamics of thinking behind decision biases.

Individual differences in conflict detection during reasoning

Decades of reasoning and decision-making research have established that human judgment is often biased by intuitive heuristics. Recent “error” or bias detection studies have focused on reasoners’ abilities to detect whether their heuristic answer conflicts with logical or probabilistic principles. A key open question is whether there are individual differences in this bias detection efficiency. Here we present three studies in which co-registration of different error detection measures (confidence, response time and confidence response time) allowed us to assess bias detection sensitivity at the individual participant level in a range of reasoning tasks. The results indicate that although most individuals show robust bias detection, as indexed by increased latencies and decreased confidence, there is a subgroup of reasoners who consistently fail to do so. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for the field.