Inattentional blindness in older adults: Effects of attentional set and to-be-ignored distractors

When the WRENCH turns a few heads: Expectation and semantic relatedness in inattentional blindness

Semantic relatedness and expectation were investigated in inattentional blindness-failure to perceive an unexpected object in plain sight when attention is engaged elsewhere. Participants named primary-task pictures and ignored distractor pictures. Four trials preceded a 'critical' trial where an unexpected six-letter-word appeared at fixation, simultaneously with the pictures. In Experiment 1, we found robust effects for both in-lab and on-line-Zoom methodology. More participants reported the unexpected word semantically-related to the primary-task pictures than a semantically-unrelated word. In Experiment 2, expectations were violated, by changing the semantic category of the primary-task pictures. More participants reported the unexpected word semantically-related to the unexpected picture category than a semantically-unrelated word. When attentional resources are consumed by a task, a violation to task expectations is not enough to reorient attention to an unexpected word. Attention reorients to what is meaningful to the task, and what is meaningful is updated in light of unexpected information.

The role of perceptual and cognitive load on inattentional blindness: A systematic review and three meta-analyses

The inattentional blindness phenomenon refers to situations in which a visible but unexpected stimulus remains consciously unnoticed by observers. This phenomenon is classically explained as the consequence of insufficient attention, because attentional resources are already engaged elsewhere or vary between individuals. However, this attentional-resources view is broad and often imprecise regarding the variety of attentional models, the different pools of resources that can be involved in attentional tasks, and the heterogeneity of the experimental paradigms. Our aim was to investigate whether a classic theoretical model of attention, namely the Load Theory, could account for a large range of empirical findings in this field by distinguishing the role of perceptual and cognitive resources in attentional selection and attentional capture by irrelevant stimuli. As this model has been mostly built on implicit measures of distractor interference, it is unclear whether its predictions also hold when explicit and subjective awareness of an unexpected stimulus is concerned. Therefore, we conducted a systematic review and meta-analyses of inattentional blindness studies investigating the role of perceptual and/or cognitive resources. The results reveal that, in line with the perceptual account of the Load Theory, inattentional blindness significantly increases with the perceptual load of the task. However, the cognitive account of this theory is not clearly supported by the empirical findings analysed here. Furthermore, the interaction between perceptual and cognitive load on inattentional blindness remains understudied. Theoretical implications for the Load Theory are discussed, notably regarding the difference between attentional capture and subjective awareness paradigms, and further research directions are provided.

Decline in the integration of top-down and bottom-up attentional control in older adults with mild cognitive impairment

Individuals with mild cognitive impairment (MCI) have deficits in goal-directed top-down and stimulus-driven bottom-up attentional control. However, it remains unclear whether and how the interaction between the two processes is altered in individuals with MCI. We collected electroencephalography (EEG) data from 30 older adults with MCI and 30 demographically matched healthy controls (HCs) when they were performing a perceptual decision-making task, in which we manipulated the cognitive load involved in task-relevant top-down processing and the surprise level involved in task-irrelevant bottom-up processing. We found the significant group difference in the interaction between top-down and bottom-up processes. HCs showed enlarged P3 and strengthened event-related microstate C on high (vs. low) surprise level trials under high cognitive load, while there was no such surprise effect suggesting distraction under low cognitive load. In contrast, participants with MCI showed increased P2 and P3 amplitudes and strengthened microstates C and D on high (vs. low) surprise level trials under low cognitive load yet no surprise effect under high load. These results suggested that participants with MCI were distracted by task-irrelevant information under low cognitive load, while under high load, they might experience a passive inhibition on the task-irrelevant bottom-up processing because of the exhaustion of attentional resources; in addition, this altered interaction observed in the MCI group occurred at the stages of selective attention and uncertainty reduction.

Poverty and limited attention

In this article, we analyze whether the financial strain of poverty systematically alters the allocation of attention. We address two types of attention: attention to unexpectedly occurring events and attention to primary tasks that require focus. We show that the poor are significantly more likely than the rich to notice unexpected events. In addition, we do not find robust evidence that poverty increases the likelihood of noticing the unexpected events at the expense of attention to the primary task.

The effect of emotional valence and age of faces on adults and children's inattentional blindness

Inattentional blindness (IB) refers to the nature of an individual being unaware of an unexpected stimulus when focusing on an attentional task. Investigation into IB provides an innovative approach for the research of attentional bias that is connected with an individual's immediate attentional capture. This study explored the effect of emotional valence and age of faces on the IB rates of children and adults. We employed a between-subject experimental design with a 2 (age of participants: child, adult) × 2 (age of face: child face, adult face) × 2 (emotional valence: positive, negative) method and used the classic IB task of cross judgment. The participants included 79 adults (54.63 ± 8.192 years old) and 78 children (10.62 ± 2.32 years old). The results showed that: (1) The IB rates of the two groups differed significantly. Children performed better than adults in detecting the faces appearing unexpectedly. (2) The effect of emotional valence only emerged on adult participants' IB. Adults were significantly more likely to detect the positive-emotional faces than the negative-emotional ones. (3) The age of a face was not a significant factor to predict participants' IB. Neither children nor adults showed a preference for the faces of a specific age (e.g., their own age). These findings revealed the distinct characteristics of attentional capture of children and adults when confronting unexpected facial stimuli.

Inattentional Blindness During Driving in Younger and Older Adults

Age-related changes to perceptual and cognitive abilities have been implicated in an increased risk of collision in older adults. This may be due, in part, to their reduced ability to attend to potentially relevant aspects of their driving environment. An associated general phenomenon of inattentional blindness involves a failure to notice visually presented objects or events when attention is directed elsewhere. Previous studies of inattentional blindness using computer paradigms report higher incidence of this effect in older compared to younger adults. However, little is known about whether these age-related effects are observed during more complex, realistic, everyday tasks, such as driving. Therefore, the goal of this study was to explore whether younger and older adults differ in their awareness of objects in their driving environment when their attention is directed toward another primary driving task. This study took place in a high-fidelity, full field of view, driving simulator. Thirty-two younger (M age = 25.41) and 32 older (M age = 73.41) adults drove through 19 short scenarios and were asked to first judge whether their vehicle could fit between two rows of vehicles parked on either side of the road and then to perform the associated driving maneuver (i.e., drive through or drive around). On four critical trials, objects were placed on the side of the road that differed in terms of animacy. Specifically, animate objects consisted of 3D humans standing by a bus shelter and inanimate objects consisted of photographs of the same individuals on a bus shelter advertisement. Inattentional blindness was measured via a post-drive, tablet-based recognition task immediately following the critical trials. Results revealed high rates of inattentional blindness across both age groups, with significantly lower levels of awareness for inanimate objects compared to animate objects. Further, whereas younger adults demonstrated reduced inattentional blindness following the first critical trial, older adults did not show this immediate improvement in recognition performance. Overall, this study provides unique insights into the factors associated with age-related changes to attention and how they may affect important driving-related outcomes.

Age-Related Effects of Stimulus Type and Congruency on Inattentional Blindness

Background: Most of the previous inattentional blindness (IB) studies focused on the factors that contributed to the detection of unattended stimuli. The age-related changes on IB have rarely been investigated across all age groups. In the current study, by using the dual-task IB paradigm, we aimed to explore the age-related effects of attended stimuli type and congruency between attended and unattended stimuli on IB. Methods: The current study recruited 111 participants (30 adolescents, 48 young adults, and 33 middle-aged adults) in the baseline recognition experiments and 341 participants (135 adolescents, 135 young adults, and 71 middle-aged adults) in the IB experiment. We applied the superimposed picture and word streams experimental paradigm to explore the age-related effects of attended stimuli type and congruency between attended and unattended stimuli on IB. An ANOVA was performed to analyze the results. Results: Participants across all age groups presented significantly lower recognition scores for both pictures and words in comparison with baseline recognition. Participants presented decreased recognition for unattended pictures or words from adolescents to young adults and middle-aged adults. When the pictures and words are congruent, all the participants showed significantly higher recognition scores for unattended stimuli in comparison with incongruent condition. Adolescents and young adults did not show recognition differences when primary tasks were attending pictures or words. Conclusion: The current findings showed that all participants presented better recognition scores for attended stimuli in comparison with unattended stimuli, and the recognition scores decreased from the adolescents to young and middle-aged adults. The findings partly supported the attention capacity models of IB.

Inattentional blindness on the full-attention trial: Are we throwing out the baby with the bathwater?

When attention is otherwise engaged, observers may experience inattentional blindness, failing to notice objects or events that are presented in plain sight. In an inattentional blindness experiment, an unexpectedstimulus ispresented alongside primary-task stimuli, and its detection is probed. We evaluate a criterion that is commonly used to exclude observers from the data analysis. On the final experimental trial, observers do not perform the primary task, but instead look for anything new. Observers who fail to report the unexpected stimulus on thisfull-attention trialare excluded. On the basis of 4 hypothetical experiments and a review of 128 actual experiments from the literature, we demonstrate some potentially problematic consequences of implementing the full-attention-trial exclusion criterion. Excluded observers may cluster in experimental conditions and the exclusion criterion may lead researchers to understate the pervasiveness of inattentional blindness. It may even render usblindto inattentional blindness on the full-attention trial.

The relationship between sustained inattentional blindness and working memory capacity

Inattentional blindness, whereby observers fail to detect unexpected stimuli, has been robustly demonstrated in a range of situations. Originally research focused primarily on how stimulus characteristics and task demands affect inattentional blindness, but increasingly studies are exploring the influence of observer characteristics on the detection of unexpected stimuli. It has been proposed that individual differences in working memory capacity predict inattentional blindness, on the assumption that higher working memory capacity confers greater attentional capacity for processing unexpected stimuli. Unfortunately, empirical investigations of the association between inattentional blindness and working memory capacity have produced conflicting findings. To help clarify this relationship, we examined the relationship between inattentional blindness and working memory capacity in two samples (Ns = 195, 147) of young adults. We used three common variants of sustained inattentional blindness tasks, systematically manipulating the salience of the unexpected stimulus and primary task practice. Working memory capacity, measured by automated operation span (both Experiments 1 & 2) and N-back (Experiment 1 only) tasks, did not predict detection of the unexpected stimulus in any of the inattentional blindness tasks tested. Together with previous research, this undermines claims that there is a robust relationship between inattentional blindness and working memory capacity. Rather, it appears that any relationship between inattentional blindness and working memory is either too small to have practical significance or is moderated by other factors and consequently varies with attributes such as the sample characteristics within a given study.