Miss it and miss out: Counterproductive nonspatial attentional capture by task-irrelevant, value-related stimuli

Impact of relative and absolute values on orienting attention in time

Reward has been known to render the reward-associated stimulus more salient to block effective attentional orienting in space. However, whether and how reward influences goal-directed attention in time remains unclear. Here, we used a modified attentional cueing paradigm to explore the effect of reward on temporal attention, in which the valid targets were given a low monetary reward and invalid targets were given a high monetary reward. The results showed that the temporal cue validity effect was significantly smaller when the competitive reward structure was employed (Experiment 1), and we ruled out the possibility that the results were due to the practice effect (Experiment 2a) or a reward-promoting effect (Experiment 2b). When further strengthening the intensity of the reward from 1:10 to 1:100 (Experiment 3), we found a similar pattern of results to those in Experiment 1. These results suggest that reward information which was based on relative instead of absolute values can weaken, but not reverse, the orienting attention in time.

Effects of outcome revaluation on attentional prioritisation of reward-related stimuli

Stimuli associated with rewards can acquire the ability to capture our attention independently of our goals and intentions. Here, we examined whether attentional prioritisation of reward-related cues is sensitive to changes in the value of the reward itself. To this end, we incorporated an instructed outcome devaluation (Experiment 1a), "super-valuation" (Experiment 1b), or value switch (Experiment 2) into a visual search task, using eye-tracking to examine attentional prioritisation of stimuli signalling high- and low-value rewards. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we found that prioritisation of high- and low-value stimuli was insensitive to devaluation of a previously high-value outcome, and super-valuation of a previously low-value outcome, even when participants were provided with further experience of receiving that outcome. In Experiment 2, following a value-switch manipulation, we found that prioritisation of a high-value stimulus could not be overcome with knowledge of the new values of outcomes alone. Only when provided with further experience of receiving the outcomes did patterns of attentional prioritisation of high- and low-value stimuli switch, in line with the updated values of the outcomes they signalled. To reconcile these findings, we suggest that participants were motivated to engage in effortful updating of attentional control settings when there was a relative difference between reward values at test (Experiment 2) but that previous settings were allowed to persist when both outcomes had the same value at test (Experiments 1a and 1b). These findings provide a novel framework to further understand the role of cognitive control in driving reward-modulated attention and behaviour.

Can the processing of task-irrelevant threatening stimuli be inhibited? - The role of shape and valence in the saliency of threatening objects

Numerous studies have demonstrated that attention is quickly oriented towards threatening stimuli, and that this attentional bias is difficult to inhibit. The root cause(s) of this bias may be attributable to the affective (e.g., valence) or visual features (e.g., shape) of threats. In two experiments (behavioral, eye-tracking), we tested which features play a bigger role in the salience of threats. In both experiments, participants looked for a neutral target (butterfly, lock) among other neutral objects. In half of the trials a threatening (snake, gun) or nonthreatening (but visually similar; worm, hairdryer) task-irrelevant distractor was also present at a near or far distance from the target. Behavioral results indicate that both distractor types interfered with task performance. Rejecting nonthreatening distractors as nontargets was easier when they were presented further from the target but distance had no effect when the distractor was threatening. Eye-tracking results showed that participants fixated less often (and for less time) on threatening compared to nonthreatening distractors. They also viewed targets for less time when a threatening distractor was present (compared to nonthreatening). Results suggest that visual features of threats are easier to suppress than affective features, and the latter may have a stronger role in eliciting attentional biases.

You eye what you eat: BMI, consumption patterns, and dieting status predict temporal attentional bias to food-associated images

People know that overconsumption of high-fat high-sugar (HFHS) foods have negative consequences for physical and cognitive wellbeing but continue to consume these foods in excess, leading to recent proposals to model obesity as an addiction disorder. The current experiment tested, in a large undergraduate sample (N = 306), the hypothesis that obesity and overconsumption is linked with an oversensitivity to rewards that drives attentional biases towards foods and food-associated cues. Using a modified emotion-induced blindness task with food-related distractors, we examined the extent to which attentional biases to images of HFHS foods were accounted for by BMI, HFHS food intake, self-reported hunger, time since last meal, diet status, food preferences, and attentional control. We also examined whether the same individual differences predicted attentional priority to cues that have a learned association with HFHS foods (i.e., images of food logos). Contrary to our predictions, higher BMI predicted less attentional priority for images of food and food logos. At the same time, increased consumption of HFHS foods predicted increased attentional priority for food images, whereas dieting predicted increased attentional priority for food logo images. Our results suggest that different people may preferentially attend to food versus food logo imagery based on their relationships with food. More broadly, our results support the theoretical perspective that attentional biases to food-associated stimuli can be affected by various competing, state-related factors.

Emotion-Induced Blindness Is Impervious to Working Memory Load

Emotionally-salient stimuli receive attentional priority. Here, we tested the extent to which top-down control can modulate this prioritization within the domain of temporal attention. To test this prioritization, we measured emotion-induced blindness, which is the effect whereby the perception of a target is impaired by the presentation of a negative distractor that precedes the target in a rapid serial visual presentation stream, relative to target perception following a neutral distractor. The degree of top-down control was investigated by manipulating participants' concurrent working memory load while performing the task. The working-memory load consisted of participants performing mathematical calculations (no load = no calculation; low load = adding two numbers; and high load = adding and subtracting four numbers). Results indicated that the magnitude of emotion-induced blindness was not affected by the working-memory load. This finding, when combined with those of previous studies, supports the notion that the prioritization of emotionally-salient stimuli in the temporal allocation of attention does not require top-down processing, while it does in the spatial allocation of attention.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s42761-022-00176-9.

Attentional capture by signals of reward persists following outcome devaluation

Attention, the mechanism that prioritizes stimuli in the environment for further processing, plays an important role in behavioral choice. In the present study, we investigated the automatic orienting of attention to cues that signal reward. Such attentional capture occurs despite negative consequences, and we investigated whether this counterproductive and reflexive behavior would persist following outcome devaluation. Thirsty participants completed a visual search task in which the color of a distractor stimulus in the search display signaled whether participants would earn water or potato chips for making a rapid eye movement to a diamond target, but looking at the colored distractor was punished by omission of the signaled reward. Nevertheless, participants looked at the water-signaling distractor more frequently than the chip-signaling distractor. Half the participants then drank water ad libitum before continuing with the visual search task. Although the water was now significantly less desirable for half of the participants, there was no difference between groups in the tendency for the water-signaling distractor to capture attention. These findings suggest that once established, counterproductive attentional bias to signals of reward persists even when those outcomes are no longer valuable. This suggests a "habit-like" attentional mechanism that prioritizes reward stimuli in the environment for further action, regardless of whether those stimuli are aligned with current goals or currently desired.

Spatial task relevance modulates value-driven attentional capture

Attention tends to be attracted to visual features previously associated with reward. To date, nearly all existing studies examined value-associated stimuli at or near potential target locations, making such locations meaningful to inspect. The present experiments examined whether the attentional priority of a value-associated stimulus depends on its location-wise task relevance. In three experiments we used an RSVP task to compare the attentional demands of a value-associated peripheral distractor to that of a distractor associated with the top-down search goal. At a peripheral location that could never contain the target, a value-associated color did not capture attention. In contrast, at the same location, a distractor in a goal-matching color did capture attention. The results show that value-associated stimuli lose their attentional priority at task-irrelevant locations, in contrast to other types of stimuli that capture attention.

Don't look now! Emotion-induced blindness: The interplay between emotion and attention

Scientists have long been interested in understanding the influence of emotionally salient stimuli on attention and perception. One experimental paradigm that has shown great promise in demonstrating the effect of such stimuli is emotion-induced blindness. That is, when emotionally salient stimuli are presented in a rapid stream of stimuli, they produce impairments in the perception of task-relevant stimuli, even though they themselves are task irrelevant. This is known as emotion-induced blindness, and it is a profound and robust form of attentional bias. Here, we review the literature on emotion-induced blindness, such as identifying the types of stimuli that elicit it, and its temporal dynamics. We discuss the role of dimensional versus categorical approaches to emotion in relation to emotion-induced blindness. We also synthesize the work examining whether certain individuals, such as those high in anxiety versus psychopathy, succumb to emotion-induced blindness to different extents, and we discuss whether the deficit can be reduced or even abolished. We review the theoretical models that have been proposed to explain the phenomenon. Finally, we identify exciting questions for future research, and elucidate useful frameworks to guide future investigations.

Reward Rapidly Enhances Visual Perception

Rewards exert a deep influence on our cognition and behavior. Here, we used a paradigm in which reward information was provided at either encoding or retrieval of a brief, masked stimulus to show that reward can also rapidly modulate perceptual encoding of visual information. Experiment 1 (n = 30 adults) showed that participants' response accuracy was enhanced when a to-be-encoded grating signaled high reward relative to low reward, but only when the grating was presented very briefly and participants reported that they were not consciously aware of it. Experiment 2 (n = 29 adults) showed that there was no difference in participants' response accuracy when reward information was instead provided at the stage of retrieval, ruling out an explanation of the reward-modulation effect in terms of differences in motivated retrieval. Taken together, our findings provide behavioral evidence consistent with a rapid reward modulation of visual perception, which may not require consciousness.

The past, present, and future of selection history

The last ten years of attention research have witnessed a revolution, replacing a theoretical dichotomy (top-down vs. bottom-up control) with a trichotomy (biased by current goals, physical salience, and selection history). This third new mechanism of attentional control, selection history, is multifaceted. Some aspects of selection history must be learned over time whereas others reflect much more transient influences. A variety of different learning experiences can shape the attention system, including reward, aversive outcomes, past experience searching for a target, target‒non-target relations, and more. In this review, we provide an overview of the historical forces that led to the proposal of selection history as a distinct mechanism of attentional control. We then propose a formal definition of selection history, with concrete criteria, and identify different components of experience-driven attention that fit within this definition. The bulk of the review is devoted to exploring how these different components relate to one another. We conclude by proposing an integrative account of selection history centered on underlying themes that emerge from our review.

Contributions of gains and losses to attentional capture and disengagement: evidence from the gap paradigm

It is known that movements of visual attention are influenced by features in a scene, such as colors, that are associated with value or with loss. The present study examined the detailed nature of these attentional effects by employing the gap paradigm-a technique that has been used to separately reveal changes in attentional capture and shifting, and changes in attentional disengagement. In four experiments, participants either looked toward or away from stimuli with colors that had been associated either with gains or with losses. We found that participants were faster to look to colors associated with gains and slower to look away from them, revealing effects of gains on both attentional capture and attentional disengagement. On the other hand, participants were both slower to look to features associated with loss, and faster to look away from such features. The pattern of results suggested, however, that the latter finding was not due to more rapid disengagement from loss-associated colors, but instead to more rapid shifting of attention away from such colors. Taken together, the results reveal a complex pattern of effects of gains and losses on the disengagement, capture, and shifting of visual attention, revealing a remarkable flexibility of the attention system.

Disruptions of Sustained Spatial Attention Can Be Resistant to the Distractor's Prior Reward Associations

Attention can be involuntarily biased toward reward-associated distractors (value-driven attentional capture, VDAC). Yet past work has primarily demonstrated this distraction phenomenon during a particular set of circumstances: transient attentional orienting to potentially relevant stimuli occurring in our visual environment. Consequently, it is not well-understood if reward-based attentional capture can occur under other circumstances, such as during sustained visuospatial attention. Using EEG, we investigated whether associating transient distractors with reward value would increase their distractibility and lead to greater decrements in concurrent sustained spatial attention directed elsewhere. Human participants learned to associate three differently colored, laterally presented squares with rewards of varying magnitude (zero, small, and large). These colored squares were then periodically reintroduced as distractors at the same lateral locations during a demanding sustained-attention rapid-serial-visual-presentation (RSVP) task at the midline. Behavioral and neural evidence indicated that participants had successfully learned and maintained the reward associations to the distractors. During the RSVP task, consistent with prior work, we found that the distractors generated dips in the instantaneous amplitude of the steady-state visual evoked potentials (SSVEPs) elicited by the midline RSVP stimuli, indicating that the distractors were indeed transiently disrupting sustained spatial attention. Contrary to our hypotheses, however, the magnitude of this dip did not differ by the magnitude of the distractor’s reward associations. These results indicate that while sustained spatial attention can be impaired by the introduction of distractors at another location, the main distraction process is resistant to the distractors’ reward associations, thus providing evidence of an important boundary condition to value-driven attentional capture.

Learned value and predictiveness affect gaze but not figure assignment

Many factors affect figure-ground segregation, but the contributions of attention and reward history to this process is uncertain. We conducted two experiments to investigate whether reward learning influences figure assignment and whether this relationship was mediated by attention. Participants learned to associate certain shapes with a reward contingency: During a learning phase, they chose between two shapes on each trial, with subsets of shapes associated with high-probability win, low-probability win, high-probability loss, and low-probability loss. In a test phase, participants were given a figure-ground task, in which they indicated which of two regions that shared a contour they perceived as the figure (high-probability win and low-probability win shapes were pitted against each other, as were high-probability loss and low-probability loss shapes). The results revealed that participants had learned the reward contingencies and that, following learning, attention was reliably drawn to the optimal stimulus. Despite this, neither reward history nor the resulting attentional allocation influenced figure-ground organization.

Reward-Related Suppression of Neural Activity in Macaque Visual Area V4

In order for organisms to survive, they need to detect rewarding stimuli, for example, food or a mate, in a complex environment with many competing stimuli. These rewarding stimuli should be detected even if they are nonsalient or irrelevant to the current goal. The value-driven theory of attentional selection proposes that this detection takes place through reward-associated stimuli automatically engaging attentional mechanisms. But how this is achieved in the brain is not very well understood. Here, we investigate the effect of differential reward on the multiunit activity in visual area V4 of monkeys performing a perceptual judgment task. Surprisingly, instead of finding reward-related increases in neural responses to the perceptual target, we observed a large suppression at the onset of the reward indicating cues. Therefore, while previous research showed that reward increases neural activity, here we report a decrease. More suppression was caused by cues associated with higher reward than with lower reward, although neither cue was informative about the perceptually correct choice. This finding of reward-associated neural suppression further highlights normalization as a general cortical mechanism and is consistent with predictions of the value-driven attention theory.

Attentional Orienting by Non-informative Cue Is Shaped via Reinforcement Learning

It has been demonstrated that a reward-associated stimulus feature captures attention involuntarily. The present study tested whether spatial attentional orienting is biased via reinforcement learning. Participants were to identify a target stimulus presented in one of two placeholders, preceded by a non-informative arrow cue at the center of the display. Importantly, reward was available when the target occurred at a location cued by a reward cue, defined as a specific color (experiments 1 and 3) or a color-direction combination (experiment 2). The attentional bias of the reward cue was significantly increased as trials progressed, resulting in a greater cue-validity effect for the reward cue than the no-reward cue. This attentional bias was still evident even when controlling for the possibility that the incentive salience of the reward cue color modulates the cue-validity effect (experiment 2) or when the reward was withdrawn after reinforcement learning (experiment 3). However, it disappeared when the reward was provided regardless of cue validity (experiment 4), implying that the reinforcement contingency between reward and attentional orienting is a critical determinant of reinforcement learning-based spatial attentional modulation. Our findings highlight that a spatial attentional bias is shaped by value via reinforcement learning.

Attentional capture by Pavlovian reward-signalling distractors in visual search persists when rewards are removed

Existing research indicates that learning about the Pavlovian ‘signal value’ of stimuli can induce attentional biases: findings suggest that our attentional system prioritises detection of stimuli that have previously signalled availability of high reward. These findings potentially provide a human analogue of sign-tracking behaviour previously reported in studies of non-human animals. Here we examine a visual search task that has been developed to demonstrate the Pavlovian influence of reward on attention, in which the critical reward-signalling stimuli are never explicit targets of search. This procedure has previously yielded robust effects of reward on attention; however it remains unclear whether this pattern reflects a persistent and automatic bias in attentional capture based on prior experience of stimulus–reward pairings, or whether it results from participants strategically attending to reward-signalling distractors because they provide useful information about reward magnitude. To investigate this issue, in the current study participants initially completed a rewarded visual search task, in which colours of distractor stimuli signalled availability of high or low reward. Participants then completed a test phase in which rewards were no longer available, such that distractor colours no longer provided useful information on reward availability. Performance during the initial rewarded phase was impaired by the presence of a distractor signalling availability of high relative to low reward. Crucially, the magnitude of this reward-related distraction effect did not reduce in the subsequent unrewarded test phase. This suggests that participants’ experience of differences in reward value signalled by distractor stimuli in this task can induce persistent biases in the extent to which these stimuli involuntarily capture attention, even when they are entirely task-irrelevant.

Reward and emotion influence attentional bias in rapid serial visual presentation

Facial emotion constitutes an important source of information, and rapid processing of this information may bring adaptive advantages. Previous evidence suggests that emotional faces are sometimes prioritised for cognitive processing. Three experiments used an emotion-induced blindness task to examine whether this prioritisation occurs in a purely stimulus-driven fashion or whether it emerges only when the faces are task-relevant. Angry or neutral faces appeared as distractors in a rapid serial visual presentation sequence, shortly before a target that participants were required to identify. Either the emotion (Experiment 1) or gender (Experiments 2 and 3) of the distractor face indicated whether a correct/incorrect response to the target would produce reward/punishment, or not. The three experiments found that reward-related faces impaired subsequent target identification, replicating previous results. Target identification accuracy was also impaired following angry faces, compared with neutral faces, demonstrating an emotion-induced attentional bias. Importantly, this impairment was observed even when face emotion was entirely irrelevant to the participants' ongoing task (in Experiments 2 and 3), suggesting that rapid processing of the facial emotion might arise (at least in part) from the operation of relatively automatic cognitive-perceptual processes.

Do Reward-Related Distractors Impair Cognitive Performance? Perhaps Not

Over a hundred prior studies show that reward-related distractors capture attention. It is less clear, however, whether and when reward-related distractors affect performance on tasks that require cognitive control. In this experiment, we examined whether reward-related distractors impair performance during a demanding arithmetic task. Participants (N = 81) solved math problems, while they were exposed to task-irrelevant stimuli that were previously associated with monetary rewards (vs. not). Although we found some evidence for reward learning in the training phase, results from the test phase showed no evidence that reward-related distractors harm cognitive performance. This null effect was invariant across different versions of our task. We examined the results further with Bayesian analyses, which showed positive evidence for the null. Altogether, the present study showed that reward-related distractors did not harm performance on a mental arithmetic task. When considered together with previous studies, the present study suggests that the negative impact of reward-related distractors on cognitive control is not as straightforward as it may seem, and that more research is needed to clarify the circumstances under which reward-related distractors harm cognitive control.

Reward expectation facilitates context learning and attentional guidance in visual search

Modulations of visual attention due to expectation of reward were frequently reported in recent years. Recent studies revealed that reward can modulate the implicit learning of repeated context configurations (e.g., Tseng & Lleras, 2013). We investigated the influence of reward expectations on context learning by associating colors to different reward magnitudes. Participants searched through contexts consisting of spatially distributed L-shaped distractors and a T-shaped target, with half of these objects appearing in a color associated with low, medium, or high reward. Half of these context configurations were repeatedly presented in every experimental block, whereas the other half was generated newly for every trial. Results showed an earlier and more pronounced contextual cueing effect in contexts associated with high reward compared with low reward contexts. This was visible as faster decline of response times to targets in repeated contexts associated with high reward compared with repeated low reward and novel contexts, and was reflected in the eye movement pattern as shorter distance of the first fixation to the target location. These results suggest that expectation of high reward magnitude facilitates subsequent learning of repeated context configurations. High reward also increases the efficiency of attention guidance toward the target location.

Positive emotions have a unique capacity to capture attention

Most of the previous research in the area of cognitive psychology or cognitive neuroscience focused on studying negative emotions and argued that the negative emotional stimuli capture attention involuntarily as compared to neutral stimuli. However, in the last decades, researchers started paying attention in studying positive emotions also as positive emotions have evolutionary significance and are essential for many aspects of our life. The theme of this chapter is to present an overview of research in the area of positive emotions, and make a case that positively-valenced stimulus is prioritized over others. Primarily, when attentional resources are not constrained, many studies have shown that similar to negative stimuli, positive stimuli also capture attention automatically irrespective of whether they are relevant or irrelevant to the primary task. It suggests a fundamental prioritization of these stimuli by the cognitive/motivational system. However, when attentional resources are constrained, only positive or high rewarding stimuli win the competition for attentional resources compared to negative or stimuli associated with high punishment. Positive or high rewarding stimuli also receive priority in temporal selection, when attention is constrained. Theoretical implications of these results have been discussed. Possible cognitive and neural mechanisms have been proposed underlying these effects.

Knowledge about the predictive value of reward conditioned stimuli modulates their interference with cognitive processes

Stimuli conditioned with a substance can generate drug-approach behaviors due to their acquired motivational properties. According to implicit theories of addiction, these stimuli can decrease cognitive control automatically. The present study (n = 49) examined whether reward-associated stimuli can interfere with cognitive processes in the absence of knowledge about stimulus–outcome contingencies. Conditioned stimuli (CS) were paired with high-reward (HR) or low-reward (LR) probabilities of monetary reward using a Pavlovian learning task. Participants were categorized as Aware or Unaware of contingencies using a Bayesian analysis. CS were then used as task-irrelevant distractors in modified flanker and N-back tasks. Results show HR CS can generate increased interference in the flanker task for participants Unaware of contingencies, contributing further evidence for the existence of implicit Pavlovian conditioning. For the N-back task, working memory performance was affected by HR CS, albeit only for Aware participants. These results suggest that CS can interfere implicitly with cognitive processes in a similar way to drug-related stimuli. Such an effect could occur in a stimulus-driven fashion, devoid of top-down goal-directedness. These findings have implications for the conceptualization and study of implicit processes in addiction and highlights the necessity to reconsider the measurement of such phenomena.

Selection history: How reward modulates selectivity of visual attention

Visual attention enables us to selectively prioritize or suppress information in the environment. Prominent models concerned with the control of visual attention differentiate between goal-directed, top-down and stimulus-driven, bottom-up control, with the former determined by current selection goals and the latter determined by physical salience. In the current review, we discuss recent studies that demonstrate that attentional selection does not need to be the result of top-down or bottom-up processing but, instead, is often driven by lingering biases due to the "history" of former attention deployments. This review mainly focuses on reward-based history effects; yet other types of history effects such as (intertrial) priming, statistical learning and affective conditioning are also discussed. We argue that evidence from behavioral, eye-movement and neuroimaging studies supports the idea that selection history modulates the topographical landscape of spatial "priority" maps, such that attention is biased toward locations having the highest activation on this map.

Attentional responses to stimuli associated with a reward can occur in the absence of knowledge of their predictive values

Classical conditioning theories of addiction suggest that stimuli associated with rewards acquire incentive salience, inducing emotional and attentional conditioned responses. It is not clear whether those responses occur without contingency awareness (CA), i.e. are based on explicit or implicit learning processes. Examining implicit aspects of stimulus-reward associations can improve our understanding of addictive behaviours, supporting treatment and prevention strategies. However, the acquisition of conditioned responses without CA has yet to be rigorously demonstrated, as the existing literature shows a lack of methodological agreement regarding the measurement of implicit and explicit processes. The purpose of two experiments presented here was to study the emotional value acquired by CS through implicit emotional and attentional processes, trying to overcome critical methodological issues. Experiment 1 (n = 48) paired two stimuli categories (houses/buildings) with high (HR) or low (LR) probabilities of monetary reward. An Emotional Attentional Blink revealed preferential attention for HR over LR regardless of CA; while pleasantness ratings were unaffected, probably due to the intrinsic nature of CS. Experiment 2 (n = 60) replicated the effect of conditioning on the Emotional Attentional Blink utilising abstract CS (octagons/squares). In addition increased pleasantness for HR over LR was found significant overall, and marginally significant for Aware but not for Unaware participants. Here CA was rigorously determined using a signal-detection analysis and metacognitive-awareness measurements. Bayesian analyses verified the unconscious nature of the learning. These findings demonstrate that attentional conditioned responses can occur without CA and advance our understanding of the mechanisms by which implicit conditioning can occur and becomes observable. Furthermore, these results can highlight how addictive behaviours might develop.