Metacognition in dogs: Do dogs know they could be wrong?

Olfaction in the canine cognitive and emotional processes: From behavioral and neural viewpoints to measurement possibilities

Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) have excellent olfactory processing capabilities that are utilized widely in human society e.g., working with customs, police, and army; their scent detection is also used in guarding, hunting, mold-sniffing, searching for missing people or animals, and facilitating the life of the disabled. Sniffing and searching for odors is a natural, species-typical behavior and essential for the dog's welfare. While taking advantage of this canine ability widely, we understand its foundations and implications quite poorly. We can improve animal welfare by better understanding their olfactory world. In this review, we outline the olfactory processing of dogs in the nervous system, summarize the current knowledge of scent detection and differentiation; the effect of odors on the dogs' cognitive and emotional processes and the dog-human bond; and consider the methodological advancements that could be developed further to aid in our understanding of the canine world of odors.

Rats did not show evidence of prospective information-seeking: a pilot study

Information-seeking behavior often features in research on metacognition in non-human animals; some species seek more information when they do not know the location of a food reward. Rats are known to do this in situations of uncertainty, but it is still unclear if they seek information prospectively for solving a later problem. In this study, we investigated rats' information-seeking responses in two areas that presented different cognitive challenges (N = 4). In one area, a memory task was presented in which rats could access a cue for a food reward during the information-seeking phase of a trial, but the cue was removed before the subsequent test phase. In the other area, a discrimination task presented a cue that was available in both the information-seeking and the test phases, so that it was not necessary to seek information prospectively. The memory and discrimination test trials were given in quasi-random order (Experiment 1). Rats explored in the memory task area no more than in the discrimination task area during the information-seeking phase, even after extensive training. When they were exposed exclusively to the memory task over multiple sessions (Experiment 2), they developed a strategy of exploring the available object cues. In Experiment 3, rats were found to stay longer in an area, which had an object than in other, less potentially informative areas; they were sensitive to the presence of information. Although these results did not support the existence of prospective information-seeking in rats, they do not necessarily imply that rats lack related abilities. This consideration is due to the constraints of the small sample size and the limited scope of the testing environment. Accumulating not only positive but also negative evidence would further understanding of the factors influencing metacognitive responses in non-human animals.

Don't look back on failure: spontaneous uncertainty monitoring in chimpanzees

During computer-controlled cognitive tasks, chimpanzees often look up at the food dispenser, which activates at the same time as feedback for the correct choice but not for feedback for the incorrect choice. Do these "looking back" behaviors also indicate signs of spontaneous monitoring of their confidence in their choices? To address this question, we delayed the feedback for 1 s after their choice responses and observed their look-back behaviors during the delay period. Two chimpanzees looked up at the food dispenser significantly less frequently when their choice was incorrect (but the feedback was not given) than when it was correct. These look-back behaviors have not been explicitly trained under experimental contexts. Therefore, these results indicate that chimpanzees spontaneously change the frequency of their look-back behaviors in response to the correctness or incorrectness of their own choices, even without external feedback, suggesting that their look-back behaviors may reflect the level of "confidence" or "uncertainty" of their responses immediately before.

Learning with certainty in childhood

Learners use certainty to guide learning. They maintain existing beliefs when certain, but seek further information when they feel uninformed. Here, we review developmental evidence that this metacognitive strategy does not require reportable processing. Uncertainty prompts nonverbal human infants and nonhuman animals to engage in strategies like seeking help, searching for additional information, or opting out. Certainty directs children's attention and active learning strategies and provides a common metric for comparing and integrating conflicting beliefs across people. We conclude that certainty is a continuous, domain-general signal of belief quality even early in life.

Are there Metacognitivists in the Fox Hole? A Preliminary Test of Information Seeking in an Arctic Fox (Vulpes lagopus)

Over the last two decades, evidence has accrued that at least some nonhuman animals possess metacognitive abilities. However, of the carnivores, only domestic dogs have been tested. Although rarely represented in the psychological literature, foxes are good candidates for metacognition given that they cache their food. Two experiments assessed metacognition in one male arctic fox (Vulpes lagopus) for the first time. An information-seeking paradigm was used, in which the subject had the opportunity to discover which compartment was baited before making a choice by looking through a transparent window in the apparatus. In the first experiment, choice accuracy during seen trials was equal to choice accuracy on unseen trials. Importantly, there was no significant difference between the subject's looking behavior on seen versus unseen trials. In the second experiment, with chance probabilities reduced, the subject's choice accuracy on both seen and unseen trials was below chance. The subject did not exhibit looking behavior in any of the trials. Latencies to choose were not influenced by whether he witnessed baiting. Although we did not obtain evidence of metacognition in our tests of a single subject, we maintain that foxes may be good candidates for further tests using similar methodologies to those introduced here.

Investigating information seeking in ravens (Corvus corax)

Measuring the responses of non-human animals to situations of uncertainty is thought to shed light on an animal’s metacognitive processes; namely, whether they monitor their own knowledge states. For example, when presented with a foraging task, great apes and macaques selectively seek information about the location of a food item when they have not seen where it was hidden, compared to when they have. We presented this same information seeking task to ravens, in which a food item was hidden in one of three containers, and subjects could either watch where the food was hidden, infer its location through visual or auditory clues, or were given no information. We found that unlike several ape species and macaques, but similar to capuchin monkeys, the ravens looked inside at least one tube on every trial, but typically only once, inside the baited tube, when they had either witnessed it being baited or could visually infer the reward’s location. In contrast, subjects looked more often within trials in which they had not witnessed the baiting or were provided with auditory cues about the reward’s location. Several potential explanations for these ceiling levels of looking are discussed, including how it may relate to the uncertainty faced by ravens when retrieving food caches.

Capuchin monkeys (sometimes) go when they know: Confidence movements in Sapajus apella

To test for evidence of metacognition in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella), we analyzed confidence movements using a paradigm adapted from research with chimpanzees. Capuchin monkeys provide an interesting model species for the comparative assessment of metacognition as they show limited evidence of such cognitive-monitoring processes in a variety of metacognition paradigms. Here, monkeys were presented with a computerized delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) memory test in one location but were rewarded for correct responses in a separate location. Movements could be made from one location to the other at any time, but movements between a response and reward feedback may reflect confidence in the accuracy of the response. Critically, DMTS tests included occasional "no sample" trials where monkeys' performance was at chance when the trial started without a sample and a 1-s interval to the response options. We predicted that monkeys would (1) perform less accurately (and less confidently) at longer retention intervals, (2) move to the dispenser early more often on trials completed correctly than incorrectly, and (3) show a relation between faster response latency and early movements. Analyses of response times and "go" or "no go" confidence movements before feedback to the reward location suggested that the monkeys were capable of monitoring confidence in their responses. However, their confidence movements were less precise and less flexible than chimpanzees. Overall, this paradigm can reveal potential metacognitive abilities in nonhuman animals that otherwise demonstrate these abilities inconsistently.

Explicit memory and cognition in monkeys

Taxonomies of human memory, influenced heavily by Endel Tulving, make a fundamental distinction between explicit and implicit memory. Humans are aware of explicit memories, whereas implicit memories control behavior even though we are not aware of them. Efforts to understand the evolution of memory, and to use nonhuman animals to model human memory, will be facilitated by better understanding the extent to which this critical distinction exists in nonhuman animals. Work with metacognition paradigms in the past 20 years has produced a strong case for the existence of explicit memory in nonhuman primates and possibly other nonhuman animals. Clear dissociations of explicit and implicit memory by metacognition have yet to be demonstrated in nonhumans, although dissociations between memory systems by other behavioral techniques, and by brain manipulations, suggest that the explicit-implicit distinction applies to nonhumans. Neurobehavioral studies of metamemory are beginning to identify neural substrates for memory monitoring in the frontal cortex of monkeys. We have strong evidence that at least some memory systems are explicit in rhesus monkeys, but we need to learn more about the distribution of explicit processes across cognitive systems within monkeys, and across species.

Monkey Metacognition Could Generate More Insight

Monkeys demonstrate metacognition by avoiding memory tests when they forget, seeking information when ignorant, and gambling sensibly after making judgments. Some of this metacognition appears to be based on introspection of private mental states. It is likely that nonhuman cognitive systems, like human systems, differ in accessibility to such introspective metacognition, and the extent to which differences in access map to explicit and implicit cognition will be an important topic for future work. It will be exciting to learn more about the distribution of metacognition among species, and the conditions under which metacognition evolves.