Easily perceived, easily remembered? Perceptual interference produces a double dissociation between metamemory and memory performance

Responsible remembering: The role of metacognition, forgetting, attention, and retrieval in adaptive memory

In our everyday lives, we must remember important information, especially if there are consequences for forgetting. In this review, I discuss recent work on responsible remembering: the strategic and effortful prioritization of important information with consequences for forgetting. Thus far, research regarding responsible remembering has revealed several key factors and mechanisms that work together to enhance memory for important information that will continue to be refined: the identification and selection of what to remember (metacognitive reflectivity), the forgetting of less important information to facilitate memory for items that do need to be remembered (responsible forgetting), the functional prioritization of attention at the expense of competing factors (responsible attention), and the selective recall of important information via efficient retrieval strategies (responsible retrieval). Together, these functions form a cohesive system that aims to selectively prioritize, encode, and recall information that is deemed important based on its anticipated utility or the consequences of forgetting, and considering the importance of information may be a critical memory adaptation as we age. Specifically, if younger and older adults learn to self-assess and prioritize important information that has negative consequences if forgotten, engage in strategic forgetting, efficiently allocate their attentional resources, and utilize effective retrieval operations, memory for said important information can be enhanced.

The perceived importance of words in large font guides learning and selective memory

People are often presented with large amounts of information to remember, and in many cases, the font size of information may be indicative of its importance (such as headlines or warnings). In the present study, we examined how learners perceive the importance of information in different font sizes and how beliefs about font size influence selective memory. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with to-be-remembered words that were either unrelated or related to a goal (e.g., items for a camping trip) in either small or large font. Participants rated words in large font as more important to remember than words in small font when the words in a list were unrelated but not when the words were schematically related to a goal. In Experiments 2 and 3, we were interested in how learners' belief that font size is indicative of importance translates to their ability to selectively encode and recall valuable information. Specifically, we presented participants with words in various font sizes, and larger fonts either corresponded to greater point values or smaller point values (values counted towards participants' scores if recalled). When larger fonts corresponded with greater point values, participants were better able to selectively remember high-value words relative to low-value words. Thus, when to-be-remembered information varies in value, font size may be less diagnostic of an item's importance (the item's importance drives memory), and when the value of information is consistent with a learner's belief, learners can better engage in selective memory.

I remember it now, so I'll remember it later: Working memory strength guides predictions for long-term memory performance

Judgments of learning (JOLs) are assumed to be made inferentially, based on cues. This cue-utilization approach substituted the theory that memory strength guides JOLs. The rejection of this theory ignores the existence of two memory systems: working memory (WM), which holds representations immediately accessible, and long-term memory (LTM), which is a permanent store. By manipulating and measuring WM strength, we tested a revised version of the memory-strength theory in which JOLs are guided by WM representations. In Experiment 1, participants memorized sequences of two or four colored objects, then they provided JOLs for an LTM test of these objects, and performed a WM test on the objects' colors. After learning 200 objects, the LTM test followed. Sequence-length affected WM, but not LTM performance. JOLs, however, were higher for sequences of two than for four objects and correlated higher with WM than LTM performance. We replicated these results with a simultaneous presentation of the objects (Experiment 2), in the absence of a WM test (Experiment 3), and in a word-pair task (Experiment 4). Overall, our findings are consistent with the revised memory-strength theory. WM strength should therefore be considered when examining the factors guiding JOLs.

Probing the effect of perceptual (dis)fluency on metacognitive judgments

Despite research showing that perceptually fluent stimuli (i.e., stimuli that are easier to process) are given higher judgment of learning (JOL) ratings than perceptually disfluent stimuli, it remains unknown whether the influence of perceptual fluency on JOLs is driven by the fluent or disfluent items. Moreover, it is unclear whether this difference hinges on relative differences in fluency. The current study addressed these unanswered questions by employing (Fiacconi et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 46:926-944, 2020), Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 46[5], 926-944) letter set priming procedure. In this procedure, participants are first exposed to words containing only a subset of letters. Following this exposure, JOLs to new words composed of the same letters (i.e., fluent), and new words composed of nonexposed letters (i.e., disfluent) are compared with isolate the contribution of perceptual fluency. Because this procedure does not rely on parametric variations in perceptual features, we can directly assess the potential benefit and/or cost of fluent and disfluent items, respectively, by including neutral baseline conditions. Moreover, implementing both a mixed- and pure-list design allowed us to assess the comparative nature of perceptual fluency on JOLs. Counter to previous assumptions, our results are the first to demonstrate that perceptual disfluency decreases JOLs. Moreover, we found that the influence of perceptual disfluency on JOLs hinges on the relative differences in fluency between items even in the absence of a belief about the mnemonic impact of the fluency manipulation. These findings have important implications as they provide evidence that the difficulty, rather than ease, of information form the basis of individuals metacognitive judgments.

Judgments of learning reflect the encoding of contexts, not items: evidence from a test of recognition exclusion

Two sources of evidence seem to be shared by judgments of past recognition and judgments of future performance: item memory or familiarity (i.e., memory for the item independent of the context in which it was experienced) and context memory or recollection (i.e., memory for the context specific to a particular prior encounter). However, there are few studies investigating the link between these two putative memory processes and judgments of learning (JOLs). We tested memory and metamemory using a continuous exclusion procedure - a modified recognition memory task where study events for two classes of items are interleaved with test trials in which the subject must endorse items from one class and reject items from the other. This procedure allowed us to estimate the influences of memory for context and memory for item on JOLs and licenses conclusions about the relative role of item and context information in supporting JOLs. An analysis of forgetting revealed that JOLs reflect both the initial degree of learning and the rate of forgetting, but only of memory for context and not of memory for items. These findings suggest that JOLs are predictive of memory for context-bound episodes, rather than for the semantic content of those episodes.

Do pictures influence memory and metamemory in Chinese vocabulary learning? Evidence from Russian and Colombian learners

Despite the increasing interest in learning non-alphabetical languages such as Chinese, research about its learning process for alphabet users is scarce. Research conducted on Latin alphabet users on learning languages written in Latin alphabet, or on Chinese language learning in Chinese native speakers, users is undoubtedly useful but it does not inform about the peculiarities of leaning Chinese language by other alphabet users. Additionally, several authors have highlighted the need to inform and extend the current second language acquisition theories on the particular challenges of learning a language that uses another script. In this research we aim to contribute filling this research gap and studied the learning process of Chinese vocabulary by users of scripts different from Chinese. In particular, we examined the role of pictures and translations as learning aids for Chinese language vocabulary learning in participants familiarized with either one or two alphabetical scripts (different from the Chinese logographic script). One hundred thirteen participants studied word-aid pairs in different conditions: Hanzi (Chinese in Chinese characters)-picture; Pinyin (Chinese in Latin alphabet)-picture; Hanzi-translation; Pinyin-translation. Participants evaluated the future recallability of the words and their meanings (i.e., judgements of learning) and completed two recognition tests. Words in Pinyin and words-translation pairs were judged to be easier to remember than Hanzi and word-pictures pairs. Participants remembered the meaning of words written in Hanzi better than in Pinyin, and word-translations pairs better than pictures, but they were more confident about word-picture pairs. These results suggest that pictures boost confidence in learning Chinese, but do not affect performance. These findings suggest that while pictures may boost confidence in learning Chinese, they may not necessarily lead to better performance. Our study provides valuable insights into the interaction of learning aids and writing system in (meta)memory during vocabulary acquisition.

Evidence of a metacognitive illusion in judgments about the effects of music on cognitive performance

Two experiments serve to examine how people make metacognitive judgments about the effects of task-irrelevant sounds on cognitive performance. According to the direct-access account, people have direct access to the processes causing auditory distraction. According to the processing-fluency account, people rely on the feeling of processing fluency to make heuristic metacognitive judgments about the distracting effects of sounds. To manipulate the processing fluency of simple piano melodies and segments of Mozart's sonata K. 448, the audio files of the music were either left in their original forward direction or reversed. The results favor the processing-fluency account over the direct-access account: Even though, objectively, forward and backward music had the same distracting effect on serial recall, stimulus-specific prospective metacognitive judgments showed that participants incorrectly predicted only backward music but not forward music to be distracting. The difference between forward and backward music was reduced but not eliminated in global retrospective metacognitive judgments that participants provided after having experienced the distracting effect of the music first-hand. The results thus provide evidence of a metacognitive illusion in people's judgments about the effects of music on cognitive performance.

Cognitive perspectives on maintaining physicians' medical expertise: III. Strengths and weaknesses of self-assessment

Is self-assessment enough to keep physicians' cognitive skills-such as diagnosis, treatment, basic biological knowledge, and communicative skills-current? We review the cognitive strengths and weaknesses of self-assessment in the context of maintaining medical expertise. Cognitive science supports the importance of accurately self-assessing one's own skills and abilities, and we review several ways such accuracy can be quantified. However, our review also indicates a broad challenge in self-assessment is that individuals do not have direct access to the strength or quality of their knowledge and instead must infer this from heuristic strategies. These heuristics are reasonably accurate in many circumstances, but they also suffer from systematic biases. For example, information that feels easy to process in the moment can lead individuals to overconfidence in their ability to remember it in the future. Another notable phenomenon is the Dunning-Kruger effect: the poorest performers in a domain are also the least accurate in self-assessment. Further, explicit instruction is not always sufficient to remove these biases. We discuss what these findings imply about when physicians' self-assessment can be useful and when it may be valuable to supplement with outside sources.

Online dating through lies: the effects of lie fabrication for personal semantic information on predicted and actual memory performance

Research shows that people lie on online dating sites often but might fail to remember this information subsequently. This study investigated participants' predicted and actual memory performance for personal semantic information after telling the truth versus a lie in two experiments in a setup similar to online dating sites. In Experiment 1, participants responded to open-ended questions either truthfully or fabricated lies in a within-subjects design, followed by predictions for remembering their responses. Subsequently, they recalled their responses through free-recall. Using the same design, Experiment 2 also manipulated the type of retrieval task by using a free- or cued-recall test. The results showed that participants consistently had higher memory predictions for truthful than deceptive responses. However, the actual memory performance did not always produce similar results to their predictions. The results suggest that the difficulties during lie fabrication, measured through response latencies, partially mediated the relationship between lying and memory predictions. The study has important applied implications for lying about personal semantic information in online dating contexts.

Cooking through perceptual disfluencies: The effects of auditory and visual distortions on predicted and actual memory performance

The current study investigated the joint contribution of visual and auditory disfluencies, or distortions, to actual and predicted memory performance with naturalistic, multi-modal materials through three experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants watched food recipe clips containing visual and auditory information that were either fully intact or else distorted in one or both of the two modalities. They were asked to remember these for a later memory test and made memory predictions after each clip. Participants produced lower memory predictions for distorted auditory and visual information than intact ones. However, these perceptual distortions revealed no actual memory differences across encoding conditions, expanding the metacognitive illusion of perceptual disfluency for static, single-word materials to naturalistic, dynamic, multi-modal materials. Experiment 3 provided naïve participants with a hypothetical scenario about the experimental paradigm used in Experiment 1, revealing lower memory predictions for distorted than intact information in both modalities. Theoretically, these results imply that both in-the-moment experiences and a priori beliefs may contribute to the perceptual disfluency illusion. From an applied perspective, the study suggests that when audio-visual distortions occur, individuals might use this information to predict their memory performance, even when it does not factor into actual memory performance.

Recognition of Studied Words in Perceptual Disfluent Sans Forgetica Font

The new Sans Forgetica (SF) typeface creates perceptual disfluency by breaking up parts of letters vertically, horizontally, or diagonally, thereby fragmentizing them. While patterns of fragmentization are consistent for each unique letter, they are not uniform across letters. With Gestalt principles such as good continuation and perceptual completion being more difficult to implement in these settings, viewers may need to depend on context clues to identify words. This may be a desirable difficulty and improve memory for those words. Here, we investigate whether SF improves recognition of studied words. In Experiment 1, participants studied words in Arial and SF and completed old-new recognition tests where words retained their study fonts. In Experiment 2, we investigated the potential for context reinstatement—testing studied words in their studied fonts or the other font. Hit rate and discrimination sensitivities (d’) were analyzed for both experiments. Participants had significantly better recognition (hit rate) in SF than in Arial (Exp 1) and significantly higher discrimination sensitivities (d’) when words were tested in SF than in Arial (Exp 2). However, further examination of these results (e.g., marginally more response bias with SF than with Arial in Exp 1) lead us to hold reservations for the benefit of SF on word memory and conjecture that SF, at best, plays a limited role in improving recognition of studied words.

Association and dissociation between judgments of learning and memory: A Meta-analysis of the font size effect

The font size effect is a metamemory illusion in which larger-font items produce higher judgments of learning (JOLs) but not better memory, relative to smaller-font items. We conducted meta-analyses to determine what is currently known about how font size affects JOLs and memory accuracy. In addition, we implemented both univariate and multivariate meta-regressions to isolate the moderators of JOL effects and memory effects. The results revealed a small-to-moderate effect of font size on JOLs. There was also a small but significant effect of font size on memory. This suggests that JOLs and memory accuracy both increase with font size, rather than being completely dissociated. Moreover, JOL-memory dissociation only occurred when font size ranged between very small and intermediate. Our working explanation is that the memory effects of font size are tied to (dis)fluency, but its JOL effects are not. Some boundary conditions were identified for font size effects on both JOLs and memory. Specifically, larger font sizes only reliably increased both JOLs and memory accuracy (a) when font sizes ranged from intermediate to very large, (b) when study materials were unrelated word lists, (c) when JOLs were solicited immediately after encoding, and (d) when study time was relatively brief.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11409-021-09287-3.

The effect of perceptual processing fluency and value on metacognition and remembering

Previous research has indicated that perceptual processing fluency significantly affects metacognitive predictions of performance but not learning outcomes. In the present study, we examined the differential impact of perceptual processing fluency and an item's value on metacognition and recall. We presented participants with words visually and audibly, with each word paired with a point value counting towards participants' scores if recalled. The words were either highly perceptually fluent (large font, loud volume) or less perceptually fluent (small font, low volume). Results revealed that both metacognitive monitoring (JOLs) and recall were sensitive to perceptual processing fluency as well as value, but the magnitude of the effect of value was significantly greater than that of font size. Specifically, high-value words were better remembered than low-value words, regardless of fluency, and participants' judgments mapped onto their selectivity for valuable information. Thus, the current study revealed the differential effects of intrinsic and extrinsic cues on metacognitive monitoring and later remembering such that the cues that can influence monitoring in certain encoding conditions become less impactful when pitted against other intrinsic cues in different encoding conditions.

Is there more to metamemory? An argument for two specialized monitoring abilities

Metamemory is the process of monitoring and controlling one's beliefs, knowledge, and mental processes of memory. One fundamental question is whether the monitoring component of this theory should be considered as only one ability or an umbrella of more specialized abilities. In the current study, we aimed to understand the structure of metamemory monitoring by testing unitary versus specialized measurement models of metamemory. Monitoring accuracy and mean ratings from four common monitoring judgments across different stimulus presentation pairs were calculated to create latent factors for each judgment using structural equation modeling. Our results suggest that although each of the monitoring judgments was correlated with one another, monitoring may be composed of two distinct abilities: one occurring during initial presentation and one occurring at retrieval. These results can help explain prior behavioral and brain dissociations between predictions at encoding and retrieval in terms of experimental and material manipulations. We caution against the conceptualization and use of metamemory monitoring as a unitary construct.

The effect of signaling in dependence on the extraneous cognitive load in learning environments

Text-based learning media are often used in primary, secondary and university education. Therefore, text designers can support the learner by highlighting the most relevant information by using visual cues. Despite this signaling effect's broad empirical basis, the extent to which the effectiveness of educational signals is dependent on moderator variables, like the design and layout of the text has not been investigated to date. In the current experiment, 138 university students learned about the formation of tsunamis from an instructional text. The text was manipulated in terms of signaling (color cues vs. no color cues) and induced learning-irrelevant extraneous cognitive load (fluent text font vs. disfluent text font). The results revealed that learners who had received the signaled text outperformed those who received the non-signaled text in terms of transfer performance. These results are explained by cognitive load, which was reduced in the signaling condition. The text font had no influence on the learning outcomes. Extraneous load induction further led to higher metacognitive accuracy and invested effort, while cognitive load and frustration were also increased. Interaction effects only occurred in terms of testing time, ease of learning and navigation. Results indicate that signaling is beneficial for transfer performance, independent of the font design of text.

How cognitive conflict affects judgments of learning: Evaluating the contributions of processing fluency and metamemory beliefs

Previous research has documented that cognitive conflict affects basic cognitive processes such as memory, reasoning, and attention allocation. However, little research has explored whether its effect can be extended to higher cognitive processes such as metacognitive monitoring. The current study took a novel variant of a Stroop task that employed words presented in a color opposite to the color of the object itself (e.g., heart, presented in green) or same as the color of the object (e.g., forest, presented in green) as targets, an important form of metacognitive monitoring-judgments of learning (JOLs) was used as the measurement index to investigate the influence of cognitive conflict on metacognitive monitoring and to delineate the potential mechanisms underlying the cognitive conflict effect on JOLs. In Experiment 1, results showed that participants gave higher JOLs to consistent than to conflict words, even though cognitive conflict had little influence on memory recall. Experiment 2, employing a self-paced study task, found that conflict words were processed less rapidly than consistent ones, and the difference in processing fluency significantly mediated the cognitive conflict effect on JOLs. Experiment 3 employed an observer-learner task; the mediation analysis showed a complete mediation role of metamemory beliefs (observation JOLs) in the relationship between word type and JOLs. In Experiment 4, research results suggested that participants' beliefs about processing fluency played an important role in the cognitive conflict effect. To conclude, cognitive conflict is a reliable factor affecting higher cognitive processes (metamemory monitoring). Both processing fluency and metamemory beliefs tend to contribute to the cognitive conflict effect.

Metamemory that matters: judgments of importance can engage responsible remembering

Adaptive memory refers to the memory advantage for information processed in a survival and/or reproduction context while metacognition involves the awareness of what we can later remember. The notion of "responsible remembering" captures how memory functions to prioritise important information that will need to be remembered and how metacognitive processes may be more precise in situations involving consequences for forgetting. In 5 experiments, we examined whether judgments of learning and judgments of importance affect recall selectivity for information with negative consequences if forgotten. We presented participants with lists of children, each with 2 foods they like, 2 foods they dislike, and 2 foods they are allergic to. When making no metacognitive judgments or making JOLs for each food preference, participants best recalled foods the children liked, likely resulting from serial remembering (recalling information according to where it was presented). However, when judging the importance of remembering items, participants were strategic in their memory for the food preferences such that they best recalled information they rated as important to remember (allergies). These results suggest that when forced to consider the importance of remembering, participants engage in responsible remembering by deeming information with consequences for forgetting as most important and subsequently best remembering this information.

Investigating the replicability and boundary conditions of the mnemonic advantage for disgust

Research has demonstrated that people remember emotional information better than neutral information. However, such research has almost exclusively defined emotion in terms of valence and arousal. Discrete emotions may affect memory above and beyond such dimensions, with recent research indicating that disgusting information is better remembered than frightening information. We initially sought to determine whether participants are sensitive to the effects of discrete emotions when predicting their future memory performance. Participants in Experiment 1 were more confident in their memory for emotional (both frightening and disgusting) images relative to neutral images, but confidence did not differ between frightening and disgusting images. However, because we did not replicate the mnemonic advantage of disgust, subsequent experiments were concerned with testing the replicability of this effect. Because metamemorial judgments sometimes eliminate memory effects, participants in Experiment 2 did not make such judgments. Even so, the effect did not replicate. The disgust advantage was ultimately replicated in Experiment 3, where participants completed a secondary task at encoding. The disgust advantage is replicable but appears less robust than previously recognised. A single-paper meta-analysis indicated that the effect is more likely under divided attention, perhaps because the mechanisms which mediate disgust-memory are relatively automatic.

Perceptual Fluency Affects Judgments of Learning Non-analytically and Analytically Through Beliefs About How Perceptual Fluency Affects Memory

Perceptual fluency is generally thought to affect judgments of learning (JOLs) non-analytically. However, some studies suggested that perceptual fluency may also affect JOLs analytically based on beliefs about the relationship between perceptual fluency and memory performance. The present study aimed to investigate how perceptual fluency affects JOLs. In Experiment 1, participants performed a continuous identification task and a JOLs task to determine whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs. In Experiment 2, we manipulated participants’ beliefs about how perceptual fluency affects memory to explore whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs through belief-based analysis. In Experiment 3, we explored whether participants who believed neither perceptual fluency nor font size affected memory performance still offered higher JOLs to large words than to small words, to explore whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs non-analytically. In Experiment 4, participants performed a continuous identification-JOLs task, and then they performed an observation task to measure their beliefs about fluency and memory. The results of the four experiments suggested that perceptual fluency affects JOLs both non-analytically and analytically based on beliefs about the relationship between perceptual fluency and memory performance.

Memory and metamemory for social interactions: Evidence for a metamemory expectancy illusion

People do not always have accurate metacognitive awareness of the conditions that lead to good source memory. In Experiment 1, participants studied words referring to bathroom and kitchen items that were either paired with an expected or unexpected room as the source. Participants provided judgments of item and source learning after each item–source pair. In line with previous studies, participants incorrectly predicted their memory to be better for expected than for unexpected sources. Here, we show that this metamemory expectancy illusion generalizes to socially relevant stimuli. In Experiment 2, participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking partners who either cooperated or cheated. After each round of the game, participants provided metamemory judgments about how well they were going to remember the partner’s face and behavior. On average, participants predicted their source memory to be better for behaviors that were expected based on the facial appearances of the partners. This stands in contrast to the established finding that veridical source memory is better for unexpected than expected information. Asking participants to provide metamemory judgments at encoding selectively enhanced source memory for the expected information. These results are consistent with how schematic expectations affect source memory and metamemory for nonsocial information, suggesting that both are governed by general rather than by domain-specific principles. Differences between experiments may be linked to the fact that people may have special beliefs about memory for social stimuli, such as the belief that cheaters are particularly memorable (Experiment 3).

Blessedly forgetful and blissfully unaware: a positivity bias in memory for (re)constructions of imagined past and future events

People frequently consider the alternatives of the events that can happen in the future and of the events that already happened in the past in everyday life. The current study investigates the effects of engaging in imagination of hypothetical future (Experiment 1) and past (Experiment 2) events on memory and metamemory. We demonstrate, across two experiments, that imagination of positive future and positive past events yielded greater memory performance than negative events, as well as receiving higher vividness and plausibility ratings. In addition, simulation of a negative event occurring positively in the future or having occurred positively in the past produced higher memory performance, compared to simulation of a positive event occurring / having occurred negatively. However, participants' predictions for their subsequent memory performance did not reflect their increased tendency to remember positive or could-be / could-have-been positive events neither for future nor past reconstructions. These findings are interpreted in the framework of positivity bias which suggests that people have a tendency towards positivity when simulating future events; and we extend this positivity bias to reconstructions of the hypothetical past events as well.

The neurocognitive basis of metamemory: Using the N400 to study the contribution of fluency to judgments of learning

Metamemory is crucial for monitoring, evaluating, and optimizing memory performance. The basis of metamemory, however, is a matter of considerable debate. In the present study, we examined the contribution of processing fluency-the ease of processing information during learning-to metamemory judgments. We recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants studied related and unrelated word pairs across two study-test cycles in a judgment of learning (JOL) task. In the first study-test cycle, related pairs were associated with better cued recall, higher JOLs, and a reduced N400 amplitude than unrelated pairs. Crucially, between- and within subject correlational analyses indicated that reduced N400 amplitudes, indexing more fluent processing, were associated with higher JOLs. Furthermore, single-trial N400 mediated a small but significant portion of the relatedness effect on JOLs. In the second study-test cycle, relatedness still increased recall and JOLs. However, related and unrelated pairs did not differ in N400 amplitude. Rather, unrelated pairs elicited a parietal positivity in a later time window that partially mediated the relatedness effect on JOLs. Together, these results suggest that processing fluency, indexed by the N400, contributes to the relatedness effect on JOLs when novel word pairs are learned, but not when previously studied pairs are relearned. Our results also imply that aspects of fluency not captured by the N400 and/or explicit beliefs about memory contribute to JOLs. This study demonstrates the utility of ERPs in gaining new insights into the neurocognitive mechanisms of metamemory.

You may be more original than you think: Predictable biases in self-assessment of originality

How accurate are individuals in judging the originality of their own ideas? Most metacognitive research has focused on well-defined tasks, such as learning, memory, and problem solving, providing limited insight into ill-defined tasks. The present study introduces a novel metacognitive self-judgment of originality, defined as assessments of the uniqueness of an idea in a given context. In three experiments, we examined the reliability, potential biases, and factors affecting originality judgments. Using an ideation task, designed to assess the ability to generate multiple divergent ideas, we show that people accurately acknowledge the serial order effect-judging later ideas as more original than earlier ideas. However, they systematically underestimate their ideas' originality. We employed a manipulation for affecting actual originality level, which did not affect originality judgments, and another one designed to affect originality judgments, which did not affect actual originality performance. This double dissociation between judgments and performance calls for future research to expose additional factors underlying originality judgments.

The Acquisition of Modal Concepts

Sometimes we accept propositions, sometimes we reject them, and sometimes we take propositions to be worth considering but not yet established, as merely possible. The result is a complex representation with logical structure. Is the ability to mark propositions as merely possible part of our innate representational toolbox or does it await development, perhaps relying on language acquisition? Several lines of inquiry show that preverbal infants manage possibilities in complex ways, while others find that preschoolers manage possibilities poorly. Here, we discuss how this apparent conflict can be resolved by distinguishing modal representations of possibility, which mark possibility symbolically, from minimal representations of possibility, which do not encode any modal status and need not have a logical structure.

Judgments of Learning in Context: Backgrounds Can Both Reduce and Produce Metamemory Illusions

Varying item-specific features such as size (Rhodes & Castel, 2008) or blur (Yue, Castel, & Bjork, 2013) often produces metamemory illusions in which one type of item receives higher judgments of learning (JOLs) without being recalled better. In this study, we explored how similar manipulations to context would influence JOLs. When to-be-recalled words varying in size (or blur) were accompanied by backgrounds also varying in size (or blur), the traditional JOL illusions were reduced (Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5) compared to when there were no backgrounds (Experiments 3a, 3b, and 4). Thus, the item-specific and contextual cues were used interactively. Further, the background manipulations also sometimes themselves led to metamemory illusions regarding JOLs for the to-be-remembered items. In general, there were robust individual differences in how participants used the cues, including how they incorporated the contextual cues into their JOL decisions. In part, this may explain why interactive cue utilization did not always emerge at the group level. In sum, we showed that context may affect JOLs both directly and indirectly by influencing participants' use of item-specific cues. These findings broaden our understanding of how cues may be utilized (e.g., Koriat, 1997) and integrated (e.g., Undorf, Söllner, and Bröder, 2018) in JOLs.

Cue integration in metamemory judgements is strategic

People base judgements about their own memory processes on probabilistic cues such as the characteristics of study materials and study conditions. While research has largely focused on how single cues affect metamemory judgements, a recent study by Undorf, Söllner, and Bröder found that multiple cues affected people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgements of learning, JOLs). The present research tested whether this finding was indeed due to strategic integration of multiple cues in JOLs or, alternatively, resulted from people's reliance on a single unified feeling of ease. In Experiments 1 and 2, we simultaneously varied concreteness and emotionality of word pairs and solicited (a) pre-study JOLs that could be based only on the manipulated cues and (b) immediate JOLs that could be based both on the manipulated cues and on a feeling of ease. The results revealed similar amounts of cue integration in pre-study JOLs and immediate JOLs, regardless of whether cues varied in two easily distinguishable levels (Experiment 1) or on a continuum (Experiment 2). This suggested that people strategically integrated multiple cues in their immediate JOLs. Experiment 3 provided further evidence for this conclusion by showing that false explicit information about cue values affected immediate JOLs over and above actual cue values. Hence, we conclude that cue integration in JOLs involves strategic processes.

Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation over the Prefrontal Cortex Alters Encoding and Judgments of Learning Based on Fluency

Past research has shown that judgments of learning (JOLs), subjective confidence judgments made at study about later memorability, are inferential in nature and based on cues available during encoding. Participants tend to use fluency as a cue and give higher JOLs to more fluently encoded items, despite having better recognition memory for disfluently encoded items, which leads to poor JOL accuracy. Research has implicated the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC) in JOL and encoding processes, but no studies to date have tested how the roles of these regions vary with the information on which JOLs are based. We used high-definition transcranial direct current stimulation to test the causal roles of DLPFC and aPFC in encoding success, JOL ratings, and JOL accuracy. Participants studied and made JOLs about words that varied in fluency (i.e., frequency and orientation). High-definition transcranial direct current stimulation over the DLPFC impaired encoding, as evidenced by an increase in subsequent false alarms. For words that were less fluently encoded, aPFC stimulation improved JOL accuracy, perhaps making participants more aware of encoding failures under conditions of disfluency. Conversely, DLPFC and aPFC stimulation decreased JOL accuracy for high-frequency words, suggesting the roles of these regions in JOLs vary with the cognitive bases of the judgments. These results contribute to our understanding of the causal roles of prefrontal regions in objective and subjective memory processes and how their contributions to metamemory accuracy vary with information on which subjective assessments are based.

Would disfluency by any other name still be disfluent? Examining the disfluency effect with cursive handwriting

When exposed to words presented under perceptually disfluent conditions (e.g., words written in Haettenschweiler font), participants have difficulty initially recognizing the words. Those same words, though, may be better remembered later than words presented in standard type font. This counterintuitive finding is referred to as the disfluency effect. Evidence for this disfluency effect, however, has been mixed, suggesting possible moderating factors. Using a recognition memory task, level of disfluency was examined as a moderating factor across three experiments using a novel cursive manipulation that varied on degree of legibility (easy-to-read cursive vs. hard-to-read cursive). In addition, list type and retention interval between study and test were manipulated. Across all three experiments, cursive words engendered better memory than type-print words. This memory effect persisted across varied list designs (blocked vs. mixed) and a longer (24-hour) retention interval. A small-scale meta-analysis across the three experiments suggested that the cursive disfluency effect is moderated by level of disfluency: easy-to-read cursive words tended to be better remembered than hard-to-read cursive words. Taken together, these results challenge extant accounts of the disfluency effect. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Beliefs about memory decline in aging do not impact judgments of learning (JOLs): A challenge for belief-based explanations of JOLs

The cue-utilization framework (Koriat, 1997) and the analytic processing theory (Dunlosky, Mueller, & Tauber, 2015) identify people's beliefs about their memory as central to how judgments of learning (JOLs) are made. This assumption is supported by ample evidence. However, researchers have almost exclusively explored the impact of participants' beliefs about the materials or the learning task, and none have evaluated the impact of beliefs about a person on JOLs. Thus, to inform JOL theory, we evaluated the degree to which JOLs are related to the belief that "memory declines with aging in adulthood." In seven experiments, college-aged participants studied words, made JOLs, and took a memory test. Participants made JOLs predicting memory performance for an average younger adult (i.e., 18-21 years old) or for an average older adult (i.e., 65+ years old). Most important, beliefs about aging in adulthood were not always sufficient to produce cue effects on JOLs, which contrasts with expectations from the aforementioned theories. An important challenge for future research will be to discover factors that moderate belief effects. To guide such explorations, we discuss possible explanations for why beliefs about aging would have demonstrated little to no relationship with people's JOLs.

Not all perceptual difficulties lower memory predictions: Testing the perceptual fluency hypothesis with rotated and inverted object images

Studies typically show that perceptual difficulties at the time of encoding lower memory predictions. One potential exception to this is the inverted-word manipulation, in which participants produce equivalent memory predictions for upright and inverted words, despite higher free-recall performance for the inverted words (Sungkhasettee, Friedman, & Castel in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 18, 973-978, 2011). In the present set of experiments, we aimed to investigate the contributions of online perceptual difficulties versus a priori beliefs through two disfluency manipulations conceptually similar to the inverted-word manipulation: inversion and canonicity. The inversion manipulation involved presentation of upright and inverted object images, whereas the canonicity manipulation involved presentation of objects to participants from frequent (canonical) or infrequent (noncanonical) viewing perspectives. Memory predictions were made either on an item-by-item basis or aggregately. In all studies, the perceptual identification latencies for inverted and noncanonical items were slower than those for upright and canonical items, respectively. In experiments conducted with item-by-item memory predictions, predictions were not significantly different from each other across encoding conditions. In contrast, in experiments using aggregate memory predictions, fluent items produced higher memory predictions than did disfluent items. These results show that in certain cases, participants may not consider online objective perceptual difficulties. Moreover, item-by-item and aggregate memory predictions produce different patterns, evidence of a dissociation between the two types of predictions. The results are discussed in light of theories that rely on objective perceptual fluency differences across encoding conditions versus theories that rely on participants' a priori beliefs about fluency.

Selective attention effects on recognition: the roles of list context and perceptual difficulty

Two recent studies reported superior recognition memory for items that were incongruent targets than for items that were congruent targets in a prior incidental study phase (Krebs et al. in Cereb Cortex (New York, NY) 25(3):833-843, 2015; Rosner et al. in Psychol Res 79(3):411-424, 2015). The present study examined this effect further by addressing two issues. First, we examined whether this effect is sensitive to the list context in which congruent and incongruent items are presented. In Experiment 1, this issue was addressed by manipulating the relative proportions of congruent and incongruent trials in the study phase. In Experiments 2A and 2B, the same issue was examined by contrasting randomly intermixed and blocked manipulations of congruency. The results of these experiments, as well as a trial-to-trial sequence analysis, demonstrate that the recognition advantage for incongruent over congruent items is robust and remarkably insensitive to list context. Second, we examined recognition of incongruent and congruent items relative to a single word baseline condition. Incongruent (Experiment 3A) and congruent (Experiment 3B) items were both better recognized than single word items, though this effect was substantially stronger for incongruent items. These results suggest that perceptual processing difficulty, rather than interference caused by different target and distractor identities on its own, contributes to the enhanced recognition of incongruent items. Together, the results demonstrate that processes that are sensitive to perceptual processing difficulty of items but largely insensitive to list context produce heightened recognition sensitivity for incongruent targets.

Intensifying the intensity illusion in judgments of learning: Modality and cue combinations

We showed that judgments of learning (JOLs) were not affected by presentation modality in a list-learning task, although the typical font-size and loudness illusions emerged in that large-font visual presentations and loud auditory presentations elicited higher JOLs than their less intense counterparts. Further, when items were presented in both modalities simultaneously, large-font/quiet and small-font/loud items received similar JOLs (and were recalled similarly). Most importantly, when the intensity manipulation was compounded across modalities, the magnitude of the illusion increased beyond that observed in a single modality, showing the influence of combining cues. Whereas recall was still the same, large-font/loud items received higher JOLs than either small-font/loud items or large-font/quiet items, and not-intense items received very low JOLs. These differences emerged only when all conditions were presented within a single list and not in a between-subjects design, underscoring the importance of comparative judgments.

Cognitive load eliminates the effect of perceptual information on judgments of learning with sentences

Items presented in large font are rated with higher judgments of learning (JOLs) than those presented in small font. According to current explanations of this phenomenon in terms of processing fluency or implicit beliefs, this effect should be present no matter the type of material under study. However, we hypothesized that the linguistic cues present in sentences may prevent using font size as a cue for JOLs. Experiment 1, with short sentences, showed the standard font-size effect on JOLs, and Experiment 2, with pairs of longer sentences, showed a reduced effect. These results suggest that linguistic factors do not prevent font size from being used for JOLs. However, Experiment 3, with both short and long sentences, showed an effect of font size only for the former and not the latter condition, suggesting that the greater amount of to-be-remembered information eliminated the font-size effect. In Experiment 4, we tested a mechanism to explain this result and manipulated cognitive load using the dot-memory task. The short sentences from Experiments 1 and 3 were used, and the results replicated the font-size effect only in the low-cognitive load condition. Our results are consistent with the idea that perceptual information is used to make JOLs only with materials such as words, word pairs, or short sentences, and that the increased cognitive load required to process longer sentences prevents using font size as a cue for JOLs.

How font size affects judgments of learning: Simultaneous mediating effect of item-specific beliefs about fluency and moderating effect of beliefs about font size and memory

Numerous studies have provided experience-based or theory-based frameworks for the basis of judgment of learning (JOL). However, few studies have directly measured processing experience and beliefs related to the same cue in one experiment and examined their joint contribution to JOLs. The present study focused on font-size effects and aimed to examine the simultaneous contribution of processing fluency and beliefs to the effect of font size on JOLs. We directly measured processing fluency via self-paced study time. We also directly measured participants' beliefs via two approaches: pre-study global differentiated predictions (GPREDs) as an indicator of preexisting beliefs about font size and memory and ease of learning judgments (EORs) as online generated item-specific beliefs about fluency. In Experiment 1, EORs partially mediated the font-size effect, whereas self-paced study time did not. In Experiments 2a and 2b, EORs mediated the font-size effect; at the same time, beliefs about font size and memory moderated the font-size effect. In summary, the present study demonstrates a major role of beliefs underlying the font-size effect.

Can very small font size enhance memory?

Presenting information in a perceptually degraded format sometimes enhances learning outcomes. However, earlier studies in which words were presented in large or small fonts in a paradigm that also involved item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs) consistently yielded no mnemonic benefit of small fonts. Can small font size enhance memory under hitherto unexamined conditions? A series of 11 experiments was conducted to examine systematically the effect of font size on memory for words and whether it depends on the strength of the font size manipulation, whether JOLs are solicited, the format of the test, and study time. The resulting data were meta-analyzed. Results yielded a u-shape relationship between font size and memory. Compared to intermediate fonts, there was a memory advantage for words presented in large fonts but also for words presented in very small fonts. However, the requirement to provide a JOL moderated the benefit of the very small font, which was eliminated when JOLs were solicited. Test format and study time did not moderate the effect of font size on memory. JOLs were insensitive to the u-shape relationship and consistently increased with font size. These findings provide support for the notion that perceptually degraded materials can enhance learning outcomes, but also highlight the importance of systematic investigation of moderators. The results shed new light on the inconsistent effects of manipulations of perceptual degradation on learning outcomes observed in earlier studies.

On belief and fluency in the construction of judgments of learning: Assessing and altering the direct effects of belief

A current debate in metamemory research considers the roles of fluency (Rhodes & Castel, 2008) and belief cues (Mueller, Dunlosky, & Tauber, 2015) in the construction of judgments of learning (JOLs). Under the fluency hypothesis, the processing fluency drives the construction of JOLs. The belief-based hypothesis instead asserts a strong influence of belief. The current study directly influences participants' beliefs to observe the effects on metacognitive judgments of learning. Experiment 1A attempted to variably strengthen participants' beliefs about the font-size effect: participants were informed of research implying a superiority of large-fonts in memory and between study cycles were given differing levels of feedback on the relationship between font-size and their performance. A reliable replication of the font-size effect was found, though there were no appreciable differences due to feedback. Experiment 1B introduced a counter-belief that small-fonts are superior in terms of memory recall, and participants showed minimal effects of font-size on JOLs and none on memory. Finally, in Experiment 2 participants underwent a baseline condition with no belief manipulation and then an experimental condition that manipulated beliefs as in Experiments 1A and 1B. The results provide clear confirmatory evidence for the effects of belief on JOLs, though these data neither support a pure fluency hypothesis nor a pure belief-based hypothesis. We discuss an additive effect of perceptual fluency and belief on JOLs, and present possible mechanisms that may interact to influence and bias JOLs.

Metacognition for strategy selection during arithmetic problem-solving in young and older adults

We examined participants' strategy choices and metacognitive judgments during arithmetic problem-solving. Metacognitive judgments were collected either prospectively or retrospectively. We tested whether metacognitive judgments are related to strategy choices on the current problems and on the immediately following problems, and age-related differences in relations between metacognition and strategy choices. Data showed that both young and older adults were able to make accurate retrospective, but not prospective, judgments. Moreover, the accuracy of retrospective judgments was comparable in young and older adults when participants had to select and execute the better strategy. Metacognitive accuracy was even higher in older adults when participants had to only select the better strategy. Finally, low-confidence judgments on current items were more frequently followed by better strategy selection on immediately succeeding items than high-confidence judgments in both young and older adults. Implications of these findings to further our understanding of age-related differences and similarities in adults' metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive regulation for strategy selection in the context of arithmetic problem solving are discussed.

Simultaneous utilization of multiple cues in judgments of learning

There is much evidence that metacognitive judgments, such as people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning, JOLs), are inferences based on cues and heuristics. However, relatively little is known about whether and when people integrate multiple cues in one metacognitive judgment or focus on a single cue without integrating further information. The current set of experiments systematically addressed whether and to what degree people integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. Experiment 1 varied two cues: number of study presentations (1 vs. 2) and font size (18 point vs. 48 point). Results revealed that people integrated both cues in their JOLs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the two word characteristics concreteness (abstract vs. concrete) and emotionality (neutral vs. emotional) were integrated in JOLs. Experiment 3 showed that people integrated all four cues in their JOLs when manipulated simultaneously. Finally, Experiment 4 confirmed integration of three cues that varied on a continuum rather than in two easily distinguishable levels. These results demonstrate that people have a remarkable capacity to integrate multiple cues in metacognitive judgments. In addition, our findings render an explanation of cue effects on JOLs in terms of demand characteristics implausible.

A metacognitive illusion in monkeys

Like humans, monkeys can make accurate judgements about their own memory by reporting their confidence during cognitive tasks. Some have suggested that animals use associative learning to make accurate confidence judgements, while others have suggested animals directly access and estimate the strength of their memories. Here we test a third, non-exclusive possibility: perhaps monkeys, like humans, base metacognitive inferences on heuristic cues. Humans are known to use cues like perceptual fluency (e.g. how easy something is to see) when making metacognitive judgements. We tested monkeys using a match-to-sample task in which the perceptual fluency of the stimuli was manipulated. The monkeys made confidence wagers on their accuracy before or after each trial. We found that monkeys' wagers were affected by perceptual fluency even when their accuracy was not. This is novel evidence that animals are susceptible to metacognitive illusions similar to those experienced by humans.

The effect of animacy on metamemory

Previous research has shown that the animacy quality of materials affects basic cognitive processes such as memory (i.e., animate stimuli are remembered better than are inanimate stimuli). This is referred to as the animacy effect. Little research has examined, however, whether this effect can be extended to higher cognitive processes such as metamemory. In the present studies, we investigated the influence of animacy on judgments of learning (JOLs) and the underlying basis of the animacy effect, namely, processing fluency and beliefs about the animacy effect. In Experiment 1, participants studied animate and inanimate words and made immediate JOLs. Results revealed that participants gave higher estimates for animate than they did for inanimate words. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we evaluated the contribution of processing fluency to the animacy effect either by measuring self-paced study time or by disrupting fluency by presenting half of the words in an easy or difficult font style. Results from both experiments indicated that processing fluency contributes minimally to the animacy effect. In questionnaire-based Experiment 3, participants estimated hypothetical participants would better remember the animate words than the inanimate words, suggesting the potential role of beliefs on the animacy effect on JOLs. To conclude, these findings suggest that animacy is a reliable cue when people monitor their learning in higher cognitive processes. The beliefs, not processing fluency, contribute substantially to the animacy effect on JOLs.

The future is now: the impact of present fluency in judgments about the future

Recent research has emphasised the role of episodic memory in both remembering past events and in envisaging future events. On the other hand, it has been repeatedly shown that judgments about past events are affected by the fluency with which retrieval cues are processed. In this paper we investigate whether perceptual fluency also plays a role in judgments about future events. For this purpose we conducted four experiments. The first experiment replicated recent findings showing that stimuli that are processed fluently tend to be wrongly recognised as having been encountered in the past outside the laboratory walls [Brown, A. S., & Marsh, E. J. (2009). Creating illusions of past encounter through brief exposure. Psychological Science, 20, 534-538. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02337.x ]. Two follow-up experiments using Brown and Marsh's [(2009). Creating illusions of past encounter through brief exposure. Psychological Science, 20, 534-538. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02337 ] task tested the influence of perceptual fluency on future judgments. The fourth and last experiment was designed to rule out a potential confounding factor in the two previous experiments. Across experiments, we found that people rely on fluency when making judgments about events that are yet to come. These results suggest that fluency is an equally valid cue for past and future judgments.

The relatedness effect on judgments of learning: A closer look at the contribution of processing fluency

The cue-utilization view to judgments of learning (JOLs) assumes that both ease of processing during study and people's beliefs about memory may contribute to people's predictions on the likelihood of remembering recently studied information. However, a recent study (Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(2), 378-384, 2013; Experiment 3) found that processing fluency does not contribute to the effect of pair relatedness on JOLs, that is, to higher JOLs for related paired associates as compared to unrelated paired associates. We investigated whether this finding primarily depends on specific aspects of the paired associates employed or on the measure of processing fluency used in the previous study. In our first two experiments, participants therefore studied lists with (a) uniformly high associative strengths versus (b) a wide range of associative strengths. Results showed that processing disfluency--operationalized as number of trials to acquisition in Experiment 1 and as self-paced study time in Experiment 2--partially mediated the effect of relatedness on JOLs for both types of lists. Finally, in Experiment 3, the contribution of processing fluency to the relatedness effect increased with study-test experience. Unlike Mueller et al., we thus found that processing fluency contributes to the relatedness effect on JOLs. These findings are consistent with the assumption that ease of processing is an important basis for JOLs.