The relatedness effect on judgments of learning: A closer look at the contribution of processing fluency

Semantic relatedness can impair memory for item locations

While memory for semantically related items is improved over unrelated items in many cases, relatedness can also lead to memory costs. Here we examined how the semantic relatedness of words within a display influenced memory for their locations. Participants learned the locations of words inside grid displays; the words in a given display were either from a single category or were from different assorted categories. When a display containing words from a single category was compared to a scrambled display containing words from multiple categories, location memory performance was rendered worse, while word recall performance was significantly improved. Our results suggest that semantically structured spaces can both help and harm memory within the context of a location memory task. We hypothesize that relatedness can improve memory performance by increasing the likelihood that matching candidates will be retrieved, yet might worsen performance that requires distinguishing between similar target representations.

Judgments of learning in bilinguals: Does studying in a L2 hinder learning monitoring?

Nowadays, use of a second language (L2) has taken a central role in daily activities. There are numerous contexts in which people have to process information, acquire new knowledge, or make decisions via a second language. For example, in academia and higher education, English is commonly used as the language of instruction and communication even though English might not be students' native or first language (L1) and they might not be proficient in it. Such students may face different challenges when studying and learning in L2 relative to contexts in which they study and learn in their L1, and this may affect their metamemory strategies. However, little is yet known about whether metamemory processes undergo significant changes when learning is carried out in L2. The aim of the present study was to investigate the possible consequences on learning derived from studying materials in L2 and, more specifically, to explore whether the interplay between monitoring and control (metamemory processes) changes as a function of the language involved. In three experiments, we explored whether font type (Experiment 1), concreteness (Experiment 2), and relatedness (Experiment 3) affected judgments of learning (JOLs) and memory performance in both L1 and L2. JOLs are considered the result of metacognitive strategies involved in the monitoring of learning and have been reported to vary with the difficulty of the material. The results of this study showed that people were able to monitor their learning in both L1 and L2, even though they judged L2 learning as more difficult than L1. Interestingly, self-perceived difficulty did not hinder learning, and people recognized L2 materials as well or better than L1 materials. We suggest that this might be an example of a desirable difficulty for memory.

Evidence of a metacognitive illusion in judgments about the effects of music on cognitive performance

Two experiments serve to examine how people make metacognitive judgments about the effects of task-irrelevant sounds on cognitive performance. According to the direct-access account, people have direct access to the processes causing auditory distraction. According to the processing-fluency account, people rely on the feeling of processing fluency to make heuristic metacognitive judgments about the distracting effects of sounds. To manipulate the processing fluency of simple piano melodies and segments of Mozart's sonata K. 448, the audio files of the music were either left in their original forward direction or reversed. The results favor the processing-fluency account over the direct-access account: Even though, objectively, forward and backward music had the same distracting effect on serial recall, stimulus-specific prospective metacognitive judgments showed that participants incorrectly predicted only backward music but not forward music to be distracting. The difference between forward and backward music was reduced but not eliminated in global retrospective metacognitive judgments that participants provided after having experienced the distracting effect of the music first-hand. The results thus provide evidence of a metacognitive illusion in people's judgments about the effects of music on cognitive performance.

The font size effect depends on inter-item relation

The font size effect refers to the metacognitive illusion that larger fonts lead to higher judgments of learning (JOLs) but not better recall. Prior studies demonstrated robust JOL effects of font size under conditions of intra-item relation (i.e., cue-target relatedness within a word pair), even though intra-item relation is a more diagnostic cue than font size. However, it remains an open question whether the JOL effects of font size persist under conditions of inter-item relation (i.e., relations across items on a single-word list). In the current study, we examined the JOL and recall effects of font size when font size and inter-item relation were factorially manipulated in three JOL-recall experiments. Additionally, to manipulate the salience of inter-item relation, we presented related and unrelated lists in a blocked manner in Experiment 1 but in a mixed manner in Experiments 2 and 3. Our results showed that the JOL effects of font size are moderated or eliminated when inter-item relation is manipulated simultaneously with font size. Moreover, the smaller font led to better recall for related lists but not for unrelated lists across all three experiments. Therefore, our results demonstrate that individual cues may not be integrated with equal weight, and there can be a trade-off between item-specific and relational processing during the JOL process. Additionally, highlighting key information with larger fonts may not be optimal with related items.

Online dating through lies: the effects of lie fabrication for personal semantic information on predicted and actual memory performance

Research shows that people lie on online dating sites often but might fail to remember this information subsequently. This study investigated participants' predicted and actual memory performance for personal semantic information after telling the truth versus a lie in two experiments in a setup similar to online dating sites. In Experiment 1, participants responded to open-ended questions either truthfully or fabricated lies in a within-subjects design, followed by predictions for remembering their responses. Subsequently, they recalled their responses through free-recall. Using the same design, Experiment 2 also manipulated the type of retrieval task by using a free- or cued-recall test. The results showed that participants consistently had higher memory predictions for truthful than deceptive responses. However, the actual memory performance did not always produce similar results to their predictions. The results suggest that the difficulties during lie fabrication, measured through response latencies, partially mediated the relationship between lying and memory predictions. The study has important applied implications for lying about personal semantic information in online dating contexts.

The metacognition of auditory distraction: Judgments about the effects of deviating and changing auditory distractors on cognitive performance

The duplex-mechanism account of auditory distraction has been extended to predict that people should have metacognitive awareness of the disruptive effect of auditory deviants on cognitive performance but little to no such awareness of the disruptive effect of changing-state relative to steady-state auditory distractors. To test this prediction, we assessed different types of metacognitive judgments about the disruptive effects of auditory-deviant, changing-state, and steady-state distractor sequences on serial recall. In a questionnaire, participants read about an irrelevant-speech experiment and were asked to provide metacognitive beliefs about how serial-recall performance would be affected by the different types of distractors. Another sample of participants heard the auditory distractors before predicting how their own serial-recall performance would suffer or benefit from the distractors. After participants had experienced the disruptive effects of the distractor sequences first hand, they were asked to make episodic retrospective judgments about how they thought the distractor sequences had affected their performance. The results consistently show that people are, on average, well aware of the greater disruptive effect of deviant and changing-state relative to steady-state distractors. Irrespective of condition, prospective and retrospective judgments of distraction were poor predictors of the individual susceptibility to distraction. These findings suggest that phenomena of auditory distraction cannot be categorized in two separate classes based on metacognitive awareness.

Dividing attention impairs metacognitive control more than monitoring

Students consistently report multitasking (e.g., checking social media, texting, watching Netflix) when studying on their own (e.g., Junco & Cotton, Computers & Education, 59[2], 505–514, 2012). Multitasking impairs explicit learning (e.g., Carrier, Rosen, Cheever, & Lim, Developmental Review, 35, 64–78, 2015), but the impact of multitasking on metacognitive monitoring and control is less clear. Metacognition may compete with ongoing cognitive processing for mental resources (e.g., Nelson & Narens, The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26, 125–141, 1990) and would be impaired by dividing attention; alternatively, metacognition may require little attention (e.g., Boekaerts & Niemivirta, Handbook of Self-Regulation [pp. 417–450], 2000) and would not be impacted by dividing attention. Across three experiments, we assessed the influence of divided attention on metacognition. Participants made item-by-item judgements of learning (JOLs) after studying word pairs under full or divided attention (Experiment 1) and made restudy choices (Experiments 2 & 3). Dividing attention had little impact on the resolution of learners’ metacognitive monitoring, but significantly impaired calibration of monitoring, the relationship between monitoring and control, and the efficacy of metacognitive control. The data suggest that monitoring may require few cognitive resources, but controlling one’s learning (e.g., planning what to restudy and implementing a plan) may demand significant mental resources.

Judgements of effort as a function of post-trial versus post-task elicitation

Cognitive effort is a central construct in our lives, yet our understanding of the processes underlying our perception of effort is limited. Performance is typically used as one way to assess effort in cognitive tasks (e.g., tasks that take longer are generally thought to be more effortful); however, Dunn and Risko reported a recent case where such “objective” measures of effort were dissociated from judgements of effort (i.e., subjective effort). This dissociation occurred when participants either made their judgements of effort after the task (i.e., reading stimuli composed of rotated words) or without ever performing the task. This leaves open the possibility that if participants made their judgements of effort more proximal to the actual experience of performing the task (e.g., right after a given trial) that these judgements might better correspond to putatively “objective” measures of effort. To address this question, we conducted two experiments replicating Dunn and Risko with additional probes for post-trial judgements of effort (i.e., a judgement of effort made right after each trial). Results provided some support for the notion that judgements of effort more closely follow reading times when made post-trial as opposed to post-task. Implications of the present work for our understanding of judgements of effort are discussed.

How cognitive conflict affects judgments of learning: Evaluating the contributions of processing fluency and metamemory beliefs

Previous research has documented that cognitive conflict affects basic cognitive processes such as memory, reasoning, and attention allocation. However, little research has explored whether its effect can be extended to higher cognitive processes such as metacognitive monitoring. The current study took a novel variant of a Stroop task that employed words presented in a color opposite to the color of the object itself (e.g., heart, presented in green) or same as the color of the object (e.g., forest, presented in green) as targets, an important form of metacognitive monitoring-judgments of learning (JOLs) was used as the measurement index to investigate the influence of cognitive conflict on metacognitive monitoring and to delineate the potential mechanisms underlying the cognitive conflict effect on JOLs. In Experiment 1, results showed that participants gave higher JOLs to consistent than to conflict words, even though cognitive conflict had little influence on memory recall. Experiment 2, employing a self-paced study task, found that conflict words were processed less rapidly than consistent ones, and the difference in processing fluency significantly mediated the cognitive conflict effect on JOLs. Experiment 3 employed an observer-learner task; the mediation analysis showed a complete mediation role of metamemory beliefs (observation JOLs) in the relationship between word type and JOLs. In Experiment 4, research results suggested that participants' beliefs about processing fluency played an important role in the cognitive conflict effect. To conclude, cognitive conflict is a reliable factor affecting higher cognitive processes (metamemory monitoring). Both processing fluency and metamemory beliefs tend to contribute to the cognitive conflict effect.

The metamemory expectancy illusion in source monitoring affects metamemory control and memory

In source monitoring, schematic expectations affect both memory and metamemory. In metamemory judgments, people predict better source memory for items that originated from an expected source (e.g., oven in the kitchen) than for items that originated from an unexpected source (e.g., hairdryer in the kitchen; expectancy effect; Schaper et al., 2019a). By contrast, actual source memory is either unaffected by expectations or better for unexpected sources (inconsistency effect; Kuhlmann & Bayen, 2016). Thus, the metamemory expectancy effect is illusory. This research is the first to test the hypotheses that such metamemory monitoring of source memory affects metamemory control (i.e., measures taken to achieve a desired level of memory; Nelson & Narens, 1990) and memory. Due to their expectancy illusion, people should choose to restudy unexpected source-item pairs more often. Three participant groups (n = 36 each) studied expected and unexpected source-item pairs. One group rendered metamemory judgments and chose pairs for restudy. A second group made restudy choices only. These two groups then restudied the chosen pairs. A third group did not make restudy choices and restudied a random half of the pairs. All participants completed a source-monitoring test. As predicted, participants chose unexpected pairs more often for restudy based on their illusory conviction that they would remember unexpected sources more poorly. These restudy choices concurred with an inconsistency effect on source memory not shown in the group without restudy choices. Thus, the metamemory illusion related to control and memory in source monitoring.

Experience Matters

Abstract. The present study tested if word frequency effects on judgments of learning (JOLs) are exclusively due to beliefs or if the direct experience with the items also plays a role. Across four experiments, participants read prompts about the frequency of the words (high/low), which could be congruent/incongruent with the words’ actual frequency. They made pre-study JOLs (except Experiment 1b), immediate JOLs, and completed a recall test. If experience drives the effect, JOLs should be based on actual word frequency rather than the prompts. Results showed higher pre-study JOLs for prompts of high frequency, but higher immediate JOLs for high-frequency words regardless of the prompt, suggesting an effect of direct experience with the words. In Experiments 2 and 3, we manipulated participants’ beliefs, finding a small effect of beliefs on JOLs. We conclude that, regarding word frequency, direct experience with the items seems more relevant than beliefs when making immediate JOLs.

The Relation Between Students’ Effort and Monitoring Judgments During Learning: A Meta-analysis

Research has shown a bi-directional association between the (perceived) amount of invested effort to learn or retrieve information (e.g., time, mental effort) and metacognitive monitoring judgments. The direction of this association likely depends on how learners allocate their effort. In self-paced learning, effort allocation is usually data driven, where the ease of memorizing is used as a cue, resulting in a negative correlation between effort and monitoring judgments. Effort allocation is goal driven when it is strategically invested (e.g., based on the importance of items or time pressure) and likely results in a positive correlation. The current study used a meta-analytic approach to synthesize the results from several studies on the relationship between effort and monitoring judgments. The results showed that there was a negative association between effort and monitoring judgments (r = − .355). Furthermore, an exploration of possible moderators of this association between effort and monitoring was made. The negative association was no longer significant when goal-driven regulation was manipulated. Furthermore, it was found that the type of monitoring judgment (i.e., a weaker association for prospective judgments) and type of task (stronger association for problem-solving tasks relative to paired associates) moderated the relation between effort and monitoring. These results have important implications for future research on the use of effort as a cue for monitoring in self-regulated learning.

Memory and metamemory for social interactions: Evidence for a metamemory expectancy illusion

People do not always have accurate metacognitive awareness of the conditions that lead to good source memory. In Experiment 1, participants studied words referring to bathroom and kitchen items that were either paired with an expected or unexpected room as the source. Participants provided judgments of item and source learning after each item–source pair. In line with previous studies, participants incorrectly predicted their memory to be better for expected than for unexpected sources. Here, we show that this metamemory expectancy illusion generalizes to socially relevant stimuli. In Experiment 2, participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking partners who either cooperated or cheated. After each round of the game, participants provided metamemory judgments about how well they were going to remember the partner’s face and behavior. On average, participants predicted their source memory to be better for behaviors that were expected based on the facial appearances of the partners. This stands in contrast to the established finding that veridical source memory is better for unexpected than expected information. Asking participants to provide metamemory judgments at encoding selectively enhanced source memory for the expected information. These results are consistent with how schematic expectations affect source memory and metamemory for nonsocial information, suggesting that both are governed by general rather than by domain-specific principles. Differences between experiments may be linked to the fact that people may have special beliefs about memory for social stimuli, such as the belief that cheaters are particularly memorable (Experiment 3).

Using Multilevel Mediation Model to Measure the Contribution of Beliefs to Judgments of Learning

Recent studies on judgments of learning (JOLs) suggest that beliefs play an important role in the formation of JOLs. The current article introduces a multilevel mediation model to quantify the contribution of beliefs to JOL formation when both JOLs and global belief-based predictions are measured from the same group of participants. Our examples of fitting the multilevel mediation model to hypothetical and published datasets revealed that it is feasible to use the multilevel mediation model to examine the mediation effect of beliefs on the relationship between a cue and JOLs, and quantitatively compare the effects of beliefs and processing fluency on JOLs in one model. Then we compared the current multilevel mediation model and the multilevel moderation model implemented in previous studies, and discussed their similarities and differences. Finally, a data simulation was performed to explain the inflation of Type I error for the multilevel mediation model when we regress global belief-based predictions on the cue, and suggestions about appropriate steps for conducting multilevel mediation analysis are proposed.

The neurocognitive basis of metamemory: Using the N400 to study the contribution of fluency to judgments of learning

Metamemory is crucial for monitoring, evaluating, and optimizing memory performance. The basis of metamemory, however, is a matter of considerable debate. In the present study, we examined the contribution of processing fluency-the ease of processing information during learning-to metamemory judgments. We recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants studied related and unrelated word pairs across two study-test cycles in a judgment of learning (JOL) task. In the first study-test cycle, related pairs were associated with better cued recall, higher JOLs, and a reduced N400 amplitude than unrelated pairs. Crucially, between- and within subject correlational analyses indicated that reduced N400 amplitudes, indexing more fluent processing, were associated with higher JOLs. Furthermore, single-trial N400 mediated a small but significant portion of the relatedness effect on JOLs. In the second study-test cycle, relatedness still increased recall and JOLs. However, related and unrelated pairs did not differ in N400 amplitude. Rather, unrelated pairs elicited a parietal positivity in a later time window that partially mediated the relatedness effect on JOLs. Together, these results suggest that processing fluency, indexed by the N400, contributes to the relatedness effect on JOLs when novel word pairs are learned, but not when previously studied pairs are relearned. Our results also imply that aspects of fluency not captured by the N400 and/or explicit beliefs about memory contribute to JOLs. This study demonstrates the utility of ERPs in gaining new insights into the neurocognitive mechanisms of metamemory.

Easy on the mind, easy on the wrongdoer? No evidence for perceptual fluency effects on moral wrongness ratings

Processing fluency-the subjective ease of information processing-influences a variety of judgments (e.g., judgments of familiarity, liking, and truth). A study by Laham, Alter, and Goodwin (2009) suggests that this is also true for moral judgments. More specifically, the authors found that discrepant perceptual fluency mitigates moral wrongness ratings. In five studies (total N = 694), we tested the replicability of this finding for different kinds of scenarios (moral versus conventional transgressions) and different perceptual fluency manipulations. In Studies 1a and 1b we manipulated fluency by text background, in Studies 2a and 2b by font type, and in Study 3 by word spaces. Critically, none of the studies replicated Laham et al.'s discrepant fluency effect on moral wrongness ratings. In turn, we found that moral wrongness ratings were strongly affected by participants' emotional responses to the scenarios. Taken together, the findings of our five studies cast very strong doubt on perceptual fluency effects on moral judgments.

Word frequency effects on judgments of learning: More than just beliefs

Judgments of learning (JOLs) are usually higher for high-frequency words than for low-frequency words, which has been attributed to beliefs about how word frequency affects memory. The main goal of the present study was to explore if identifying word frequency as a relevant cue is necessary for it to affect JOLs. The idea is that for one to base judgments in beliefs of how a variable affects memory, one must first consider that variable. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants studied a list of high- and low-frequency words, made immediate JOLs, and answered questions aimed at identifying the cues used to make those JOLs. The results showed that identifying word frequency as a cue was not necessary for effects on JOLs to occur, suggesting that some participants could not have used beliefs about how word frequency affects memory when making JOLs. In Experiment 3, we measured processing fluency of high- and low-frequency words through a lexical decision task. Participants identified high-frequency words quicker than low-frequency words, suggesting the former to be more fluently processed. In Experiment 4, we explored if response times in a lexical decision task mediated the effect of word frequency on JOLs. Results showed a significant mediation of 8-13%, depending on the analysis technique. We argue that theory-driven processes do not fully account for word frequency effects on JOLs.

Cue integration in metamemory judgements is strategic

People base judgements about their own memory processes on probabilistic cues such as the characteristics of study materials and study conditions. While research has largely focused on how single cues affect metamemory judgements, a recent study by Undorf, Söllner, and Bröder found that multiple cues affected people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgements of learning, JOLs). The present research tested whether this finding was indeed due to strategic integration of multiple cues in JOLs or, alternatively, resulted from people's reliance on a single unified feeling of ease. In Experiments 1 and 2, we simultaneously varied concreteness and emotionality of word pairs and solicited (a) pre-study JOLs that could be based only on the manipulated cues and (b) immediate JOLs that could be based both on the manipulated cues and on a feeling of ease. The results revealed similar amounts of cue integration in pre-study JOLs and immediate JOLs, regardless of whether cues varied in two easily distinguishable levels (Experiment 1) or on a continuum (Experiment 2). This suggested that people strategically integrated multiple cues in their immediate JOLs. Experiment 3 provided further evidence for this conclusion by showing that false explicit information about cue values affected immediate JOLs over and above actual cue values. Hence, we conclude that cue integration in JOLs involves strategic processes.

Is a picture really worth a thousand words? Evaluating contributions of fluency and analytic processing in metacognitive judgements for pictures in foreign language vocabulary learning

Previous research shows that participants are overconfident in their ability to learn foreign language vocabulary from pictures compared with English translations. The current study explored whether this tendency is due to processing fluency or beliefs about learning. Using self-paced study of Swahili words paired with either picture cues or English translation cues, picture cues garnered higher confidence judgements but not faster study times, and this was true whether judgements of learning were made after a delay (Experiment 1) or immediately (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, when participants learned Swahili words with only one type of cue (pictures or English translations) and then estimated which one would be more effective for learning, the majority of participants believed pictures would be more effective regardless of whether they had experienced those cues during learning. Experiment 4 showed the same results when participants had experienced neither type of cue during a learning phase. These results suggest that metacognitive judgements in foreign language vocabulary learning are driven more by students' beliefs about learning than by processing fluency as reflected in self-paced study times.

A role for metamemory in cognitive offloading

Cognitive offloading refers to our reliance on the external environment in order to reduce cognitive demand. For instance, people write notes on paper or smartphones in order not to forget shopping lists or upcoming appointments. A plausible hypothesis is that such offloading relies on metamemory – our confidence in our future memory performance. However, this hypothesis has not been directly tested, and it remains unclear when and how people use external sources to aid their encoding and retrieval of information. In four experiments, here we asked participants to learn word pairs and decide whether to offload some of the pairs by “saving” them on a computer. In the memory test, they had the opportunity to use this saved information on half of trials. Participants adaptively saved the most difficult items and used this offloaded information to boost their memory performance. Crucially, participants' confidence judgments about their memory predicted their decisions to use the saved information, indicating that cognitive offloading is associated with metacognitive evaluation about memory performance. These findings were accommodated by a Bayesian computational model in which beliefs about the performance boost gained from using offloaded information are negatively coupled to an evaluation of memory ability. Together our findings highlight a close link between metamemory and cognitive offloading.

Beliefs about memory decline in aging do not impact judgments of learning (JOLs): A challenge for belief-based explanations of JOLs

The cue-utilization framework (Koriat, 1997) and the analytic processing theory (Dunlosky, Mueller, & Tauber, 2015) identify people's beliefs about their memory as central to how judgments of learning (JOLs) are made. This assumption is supported by ample evidence. However, researchers have almost exclusively explored the impact of participants' beliefs about the materials or the learning task, and none have evaluated the impact of beliefs about a person on JOLs. Thus, to inform JOL theory, we evaluated the degree to which JOLs are related to the belief that "memory declines with aging in adulthood." In seven experiments, college-aged participants studied words, made JOLs, and took a memory test. Participants made JOLs predicting memory performance for an average younger adult (i.e., 18-21 years old) or for an average older adult (i.e., 65+ years old). Most important, beliefs about aging in adulthood were not always sufficient to produce cue effects on JOLs, which contrasts with expectations from the aforementioned theories. An important challenge for future research will be to discover factors that moderate belief effects. To guide such explorations, we discuss possible explanations for why beliefs about aging would have demonstrated little to no relationship with people's JOLs.

Words in larger font are perceived as more important: explaining the belief that font size affects memory

Words presented in larger font size are considered more memorable and rated with higher judgments of learning (JOLs). One explanation for this phenomenon is that people believe that font size affects memory. However, it is not clear why people hold this belief. One alternative is that font size represents importance, with larger fonts implying more relevant information. More important information is judged as more memorable and is, in fact, better remembered. In Experiments 1 and 2 we presented words in small (18 points) and extra-large font (250 points) and found higher JOLs and higher judgments of importance with extra-large fonts. A mediation analysis showed that importance accounted for 21-23% of the effect of font size on JOLs. In Experiment 3, we tested whether processing fluency was higher with the extra-large font. In a lexical decision task, participants were slower at detecting words and non-words with extra-large than small font, which is the opposite of what the processing fluency hypothesis predicts. This result shows that the font-size effect persists even in conditions in which perceived fluency should be lower. In sum, this research explained the belief that font size affects memory because words in larger fonts are considered more important.

Cognitive load eliminates the effect of perceptual information on judgments of learning with sentences

Items presented in large font are rated with higher judgments of learning (JOLs) than those presented in small font. According to current explanations of this phenomenon in terms of processing fluency or implicit beliefs, this effect should be present no matter the type of material under study. However, we hypothesized that the linguistic cues present in sentences may prevent using font size as a cue for JOLs. Experiment 1, with short sentences, showed the standard font-size effect on JOLs, and Experiment 2, with pairs of longer sentences, showed a reduced effect. These results suggest that linguistic factors do not prevent font size from being used for JOLs. However, Experiment 3, with both short and long sentences, showed an effect of font size only for the former and not the latter condition, suggesting that the greater amount of to-be-remembered information eliminated the font-size effect. In Experiment 4, we tested a mechanism to explain this result and manipulated cognitive load using the dot-memory task. The short sentences from Experiments 1 and 3 were used, and the results replicated the font-size effect only in the low-cognitive load condition. Our results are consistent with the idea that perceptual information is used to make JOLs only with materials such as words, word pairs, or short sentences, and that the increased cognitive load required to process longer sentences prevents using font size as a cue for JOLs.

How font size affects judgments of learning: Simultaneous mediating effect of item-specific beliefs about fluency and moderating effect of beliefs about font size and memory

Numerous studies have provided experience-based or theory-based frameworks for the basis of judgment of learning (JOL). However, few studies have directly measured processing experience and beliefs related to the same cue in one experiment and examined their joint contribution to JOLs. The present study focused on font-size effects and aimed to examine the simultaneous contribution of processing fluency and beliefs to the effect of font size on JOLs. We directly measured processing fluency via self-paced study time. We also directly measured participants' beliefs via two approaches: pre-study global differentiated predictions (GPREDs) as an indicator of preexisting beliefs about font size and memory and ease of learning judgments (EORs) as online generated item-specific beliefs about fluency. In Experiment 1, EORs partially mediated the font-size effect, whereas self-paced study time did not. In Experiments 2a and 2b, EORs mediated the font-size effect; at the same time, beliefs about font size and memory moderated the font-size effect. In summary, the present study demonstrates a major role of beliefs underlying the font-size effect.

Simultaneous utilization of multiple cues in judgments of learning

There is much evidence that metacognitive judgments, such as people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning, JOLs), are inferences based on cues and heuristics. However, relatively little is known about whether and when people integrate multiple cues in one metacognitive judgment or focus on a single cue without integrating further information. The current set of experiments systematically addressed whether and to what degree people integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. Experiment 1 varied two cues: number of study presentations (1 vs. 2) and font size (18 point vs. 48 point). Results revealed that people integrated both cues in their JOLs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the two word characteristics concreteness (abstract vs. concrete) and emotionality (neutral vs. emotional) were integrated in JOLs. Experiment 3 showed that people integrated all four cues in their JOLs when manipulated simultaneously. Finally, Experiment 4 confirmed integration of three cues that varied on a continuum rather than in two easily distinguishable levels. These results demonstrate that people have a remarkable capacity to integrate multiple cues in metacognitive judgments. In addition, our findings render an explanation of cue effects on JOLs in terms of demand characteristics implausible.

The anchoring effect in metamemory monitoring

Judgments about future memory performance (metamemory judgments) are known to be susceptible to illusions and bias. Here we asked whether metamemory judgments are affected, like many other forms of judgment, by numerical anchors. Experiment 1 confirmed previous research showing an effect of informative anchors (e.g., past peer performance) on metamemory monitoring. In four further experiments, we then explored the effects of uninformative anchors. All of the experiments obtained significant anchoring effects on metamemory monitoring; in contrast, the anchors had no effect on recall itself. We also explored the anchoring effect on metamemory control (restudy choices) in Experiment 4. The results suggested that anchors can affect metamemory monitoring, which in turn affects metamemory control. The present research reveals that informative and, more importantly, uninformative numbers that have no influence on recall itself can bias metamemory judgments. On the basis of the current theoretical understanding of the anchoring effect and metamemory monitoring, these results offer insight into the processes that trigger metacognitive biases.

Agency attributions of mental effort during self-regulated learning

Previous results suggest that the monitoring of one's own performance during self-regulated learning is mediated by self-agency attributions and that these attributions can be influenced by poststudy effort-framing instructions. These results pose a challenge to the study of issues of self-agency in metacognition when the objects of self-regulation are mental operations rather than motor actions that have observable outcomes. When participants studied items in Experiment 1 under time pressure, they invested greater study effort in the easier items in the list. However, the effects of effort framing were the same as when learners typically invest more study effort in the more difficult items: Judgments of learning (JOLs) decreased with effort when instructions biased the attribution of effort to nonagentic sources but increased when they biased attribution to agentic sources. However, the effects of effort framing were constrained by parameters of the study task: Interitem differences in difficulty constrained the attribution of effort to agentic regulation (Experiment 2) whereas interitem differences in the incentive for recall constrained the attribution of effort to nonagentic sources (Experiment 3). The results suggest that the regulation and attribution of effort during self-regulated learning occur within a module that is dissociated from the learner's superordinate agenda but is sensitive to parameters of the task. A model specifies the stage at which effort framing affects the effort-JOL relationship by biasing the attribution of effort to agentic or nonagentic sources. The potentialities that exist in metacognition for the investigation of issues of self-agency are discussed.

A metacognitive illusion in monkeys

Like humans, monkeys can make accurate judgements about their own memory by reporting their confidence during cognitive tasks. Some have suggested that animals use associative learning to make accurate confidence judgements, while others have suggested animals directly access and estimate the strength of their memories. Here we test a third, non-exclusive possibility: perhaps monkeys, like humans, base metacognitive inferences on heuristic cues. Humans are known to use cues like perceptual fluency (e.g. how easy something is to see) when making metacognitive judgements. We tested monkeys using a match-to-sample task in which the perceptual fluency of the stimuli was manipulated. The monkeys made confidence wagers on their accuracy before or after each trial. We found that monkeys' wagers were affected by perceptual fluency even when their accuracy was not. This is novel evidence that animals are susceptible to metacognitive illusions similar to those experienced by humans.

The effect of animacy on metamemory

Previous research has shown that the animacy quality of materials affects basic cognitive processes such as memory (i.e., animate stimuli are remembered better than are inanimate stimuli). This is referred to as the animacy effect. Little research has examined, however, whether this effect can be extended to higher cognitive processes such as metamemory. In the present studies, we investigated the influence of animacy on judgments of learning (JOLs) and the underlying basis of the animacy effect, namely, processing fluency and beliefs about the animacy effect. In Experiment 1, participants studied animate and inanimate words and made immediate JOLs. Results revealed that participants gave higher estimates for animate than they did for inanimate words. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we evaluated the contribution of processing fluency to the animacy effect either by measuring self-paced study time or by disrupting fluency by presenting half of the words in an easy or difficult font style. Results from both experiments indicated that processing fluency contributes minimally to the animacy effect. In questionnaire-based Experiment 3, participants estimated hypothetical participants would better remember the animate words than the inanimate words, suggesting the potential role of beliefs on the animacy effect on JOLs. To conclude, these findings suggest that animacy is a reliable cue when people monitor their learning in higher cognitive processes. The beliefs, not processing fluency, contribute substantially to the animacy effect on JOLs.

Performance bias: Why judgments of learning are not affected by learning

Past research has shown a performance bias: People expect their future performance level on a task to match their current performance level, even when there are good reasons to expect future performance to differ from current performance. One explanation of this bias is that judgments are controlled by what learners can observe, and while current performance is usually observable, changes in performance (i.e., learning or forgetting) are not. This explanation makes a prediction that we tested here: If learning becomes observable, it should begin to affect judgments. In three experiments, after practicing a skill, participants estimated how they performed in the past and how they expected to perform in the future. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants knew they had been improving, as shown by their responses, yet they did not predict that they would improve in the future. This finding was particularly striking because (a) they did improve in the future and (b) as Experiment 3 showed, they did hold the conscious belief that past improvement predicted future improvement. In short, when learning and performance are both observable, judgments of learning seem to be guided by performance and not learning.

The future is now: the impact of present fluency in judgments about the future

Recent research has emphasised the role of episodic memory in both remembering past events and in envisaging future events. On the other hand, it has been repeatedly shown that judgments about past events are affected by the fluency with which retrieval cues are processed. In this paper we investigate whether perceptual fluency also plays a role in judgments about future events. For this purpose we conducted four experiments. The first experiment replicated recent findings showing that stimuli that are processed fluently tend to be wrongly recognised as having been encountered in the past outside the laboratory walls [Brown, A. S., & Marsh, E. J. (2009). Creating illusions of past encounter through brief exposure. Psychological Science, 20, 534-538. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02337.x ]. Two follow-up experiments using Brown and Marsh's [(2009). Creating illusions of past encounter through brief exposure. Psychological Science, 20, 534-538. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02337 ] task tested the influence of perceptual fluency on future judgments. The fourth and last experiment was designed to rule out a potential confounding factor in the two previous experiments. Across experiments, we found that people rely on fluency when making judgments about events that are yet to come. These results suggest that fluency is an equally valid cue for past and future judgments.

Intuition and metacognition: The effect of semantic coherence on judgments of learning

The idea that two distinct modes of thought affect human cognition and behavior has received considerable attention in psychology. In the domain of metacognition, it is assumed that metacognitive judgments are based on both nonanalytic, experience-based processes and analytic, theory-based processes. This study examined whether the experience-based process of intuition underlies people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs). In four experiments, people made JOLs and took a test on compound remote associates, that is, groups of 3 words that were either remote associates of a single solution word (coherent triads) or had no common associate (incoherent triads). Previous research has shown that increased fluency of processing coherent triads produces brief positive affects that may underlie judgments. In all experiments, JOLs were higher for coherent than for incoherent triads. The same was true for recognition memory and free recall performance. Moreover, Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that coherent triads were processed more fluently (i.e., read more quickly) than incoherent triads. Finally, Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the effect of semantic coherence on JOLs occurred for participants who were aware and unaware of relations between all three triad words, but was more pronounced for aware participants. In sum, this study demonstrates that intuition impacts JOLs over and above theory-based processes.

Learning style, judgements of learning, and learning of verbal and visual information

The concept of learning style is immensely popular despite the lack of evidence showing that learning style influences performance. This study tested the hypothesis that the popularity of learning style is maintained because it is associated with subjective aspects of learning, such as judgements of learning (JOLs). Preference for verbal and visual information was assessed using the revised Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ). Then, participants studied a list of word pairs and a list of picture pairs, making JOLs (immediate, delayed, and global) while studying each list. Learning was tested by cued recall. The results showed that higher VVQ verbalizer scores were associated with higher immediate JOLs for words, and higher VVQ visualizer scores were associated with higher immediate JOLs for pictures. There was no association between VVQ scores and recall or JOL accuracy. As predicted, learning style was associated with subjective aspects of learning but not objective aspects of learning.

The effect of identical word pairs on people's metamemory judgments: What are the contributions of processing fluency and beliefs about memory?

Judgments of learning (JOLs) are higher for identical pairs (dog–dog) than for related pairs (dog–cat). This identical effect may be mediated (a) by processing fluency (i.e., identical pairs are processed faster than related pairs) or (b) by a belief that identical pairs are better remembered or (c) by both factors. In the present work, we assessed the contribution of both factors. We evaluated whether a measure of processing fluency (i.e., self-paced study) mediated the relationship between pair type and JOLs (Experiment 1) and attempted to disrupt processing fluency using an AlTeRnAtInG presentation format (Experiment 2). We also evaluated whether judgments made in the absence of processing fluency demonstrated the identical effect (Experiment 3), and, finally, we had participants read a vignette about an experiment that included both pair types and estimate which pairs would be best remembered (Experiment 4). Evidence from all experiments converged on the conclusion that people's beliefs about how variables affect memory—and not differential fluency—best explain the identical effect, although we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that fluency plays a small role. The outcomes were consistent with the analytic-processing theory of JOLs—namely, when instructed to make JOLs, people adopt an analytic problem-solving approach that involves identifying variation across pairs that plausibly relate to memory and then use this variation to make JOLs.

The Effect of Word Frequency on Judgments of Learning: Contributions of Beliefs and Processing Fluency

Previous research has shown that word frequency affects judgments of learning (JOLs). Specifically, people give higher JOLs for high-frequency (HF) words than for low-frequency (LF) words. However, the exact mechanism underlying this effect is largely unknown. The present study replicated and extended previous work by exploring the contributions of processing fluency and beliefs to the word frequency effect. In Experiment 1, participants studied HF and LF words and made immediate JOLs. The findings showed that participants gave higher JOLs for HF words than for LF ones, reflecting the word frequency effect. In Experiment 2a (measuring the encoding fluency by using self-paced study time) and Experiment 2b (disrupting perceptual fluency by presenting words in an easy or difficult font style), we evaluated the contribution of processing fluency. The findings of Experiment 2a revealed no significant difference in self-paced study time between HF and LF words. The findings of Experiment 2b showed that the size of word frequency effect did not decrease or disappear even when presenting words in a difficult font style. In Experiment 3a (a questionnaire-based study) and Experiment 3b (making pre-study JOLs), we evaluated the role of beliefs in this word frequency effect. The results of Experiment 3a showed that participants gave higher estimates for HF as compared to LF words. That is, they estimated that hypothetical participants would better remember the HF words. The results of Experiment 3b showed that participants gave higher pre-study JOLs for HF than for LF words. These results across experiments suggested that people’s beliefs, not processing fluency, contribute substantially to the word frequency effect on JOLs. However, considering the validation of the indexes reflecting the processing fluency in the current study, we cannot entirely rule out the possible contribution of processing fluency. The relative contribution of processing fluency and beliefs to word frequency effect and the theoretical implications were discussed.

The role of font size and font style in younger and older adults' predicted and actual recall performance

We examined how font sizes (18pt., 48 pt.) and font styles (regular, italic, bold) influenced younger and older adults' judgments of learning (JOLs) and recall. In Experiment 1 younger adults gave higher JOLs and obtained higher recall than older adults. However, JOLs and recall varied for both age groups as a function of font size and font style manipulations despite a tendency for both groups to predict higher recall for items in large and in regular and italic styles than for small and bold fonts and achieve higher recall for regular than italic or bold items. No age differences were found in relative accuracy, with near-perfect calibration in absolute accuracy for younger and older adults. Experiment 2 presented a description of Experiment 1 and asked participants to predict recall for the various font size/style combinations. Younger and older adults predicted higher recall for large than small font items, regardless of font style, and higher recall for bold than regular or italic styles, regardless of font size. Memory predictions did not align across experiments, suggesting that memory beliefs combine with processing fluency to affect JOLs and recall.