Is knowledge reliance in source guessing a cognitive trait? Examining stability across time and domain

The "good is up" metaphoric effects on recognition: True for source guessing but false for item memory

The "good is up" metaphor, which links valence and verticality was found to influence affective judgement and to direct attention, but its effects on memory remain unclear with contradictory research findings. To provide a more accurate assessment of memory components involved in recognition, such as item memory and source-guessing biases, a standard source monitoring paradigm was applied in this research. A series of three experiments provided a conceptual replication and extension of Experiment 2 by Crawford et al., (2014) and yielded a consistent result pattern suggesting that the "good is up" metaphor biases participants' guessing of source location. That is, when source memory failed, participants were more inclined to guess the "up" location versus "down" location for positive items (and vice versa for negative items). It did, however, not affect source memory or item memory for valenced stimuli learned from metaphor-congruent versus incongruent locations (i.e., no metaphor-(in)congruent effects in memory). We suggest that the "good is up" metaphor may affect cognitive processes in a more subtle way than originally suggested.

Remedying the Metamemory Expectancy Illusion in Source Monitoring: Are there Effects on Restudy Choices and Source Memory?

Metamemory monitoring, study behavior, and memory are presumably causally connected. When people misjudge their memory, their study behavior should be biased accordingly. Remedying metamemory illusions should debias study behavior and improve memory. One metamemory illusion concerns source memory, a critical aspect of episodic memory. People predict better source memory for items that originated from an expected source (e.g., toothbrush in a bathroom) rather than an unexpected source (e.g., shampoo in a kitchen), whereas actual source memory shows the opposite: an inconsistency effect. This expectancy illusion biases restudy choices: Participants restudy more unexpected than expected source-item pairs. The authors tested the causal relationships between metamemory and source memory with a delay and a source-retrieval attempt between study and metamemory judgment to remedy the expectancy illusion and debias restudy choices. Debiased restudy choices should enhance source memory for expected items, thereby reducing the inconsistency effect. Two groups studied expected and unexpected source-item pairs. They made metamemory judgments and restudy choices immediately at study or after delay, restudied the selected pairs, and completed a source-monitoring test. After immediate judgments, participants predicted better source memory for expected pairs and selected more unexpected pairs for restudy. After delayed judgments, participants predicted a null effect of expectancy on source memory and selected equal numbers of expected and unexpected pairs. Thus, the expectancy illusion was partially remedied and restudy choices were debiased. Nevertheless, source memory was only weakly affected. The results challenge the presumed causal relationships between metamemory monitoring, study behavior, and source memory.

The metamemory expectancy illusion in source monitoring affects metamemory control and memory

In source monitoring, schematic expectations affect both memory and metamemory. In metamemory judgments, people predict better source memory for items that originated from an expected source (e.g., oven in the kitchen) than for items that originated from an unexpected source (e.g., hairdryer in the kitchen; expectancy effect; Schaper et al., 2019a). By contrast, actual source memory is either unaffected by expectations or better for unexpected sources (inconsistency effect; Kuhlmann & Bayen, 2016). Thus, the metamemory expectancy effect is illusory. This research is the first to test the hypotheses that such metamemory monitoring of source memory affects metamemory control (i.e., measures taken to achieve a desired level of memory; Nelson & Narens, 1990) and memory. Due to their expectancy illusion, people should choose to restudy unexpected source-item pairs more often. Three participant groups (n = 36 each) studied expected and unexpected source-item pairs. One group rendered metamemory judgments and chose pairs for restudy. A second group made restudy choices only. These two groups then restudied the chosen pairs. A third group did not make restudy choices and restudied a random half of the pairs. All participants completed a source-monitoring test. As predicted, participants chose unexpected pairs more often for restudy based on their illusory conviction that they would remember unexpected sources more poorly. These restudy choices concurred with an inconsistency effect on source memory not shown in the group without restudy choices. Thus, the metamemory illusion related to control and memory in source monitoring.