Strategic metacognition: Self-paced study time and responsible remembering

Responsible remembering: The role of metacognition, forgetting, attention, and retrieval in adaptive memory

In our everyday lives, we must remember important information, especially if there are consequences for forgetting. In this review, I discuss recent work on responsible remembering: the strategic and effortful prioritization of important information with consequences for forgetting. Thus far, research regarding responsible remembering has revealed several key factors and mechanisms that work together to enhance memory for important information that will continue to be refined: the identification and selection of what to remember (metacognitive reflectivity), the forgetting of less important information to facilitate memory for items that do need to be remembered (responsible forgetting), the functional prioritization of attention at the expense of competing factors (responsible attention), and the selective recall of important information via efficient retrieval strategies (responsible retrieval). Together, these functions form a cohesive system that aims to selectively prioritize, encode, and recall information that is deemed important based on its anticipated utility or the consequences of forgetting, and considering the importance of information may be a critical memory adaptation as we age. Specifically, if younger and older adults learn to self-assess and prioritize important information that has negative consequences if forgotten, engage in strategic forgetting, efficiently allocate their attentional resources, and utilize effective retrieval operations, memory for said important information can be enhanced.

The perceived importance of words in large font guides learning and selective memory

People are often presented with large amounts of information to remember, and in many cases, the font size of information may be indicative of its importance (such as headlines or warnings). In the present study, we examined how learners perceive the importance of information in different font sizes and how beliefs about font size influence selective memory. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with to-be-remembered words that were either unrelated or related to a goal (e.g., items for a camping trip) in either small or large font. Participants rated words in large font as more important to remember than words in small font when the words in a list were unrelated but not when the words were schematically related to a goal. In Experiments 2 and 3, we were interested in how learners' belief that font size is indicative of importance translates to their ability to selectively encode and recall valuable information. Specifically, we presented participants with words in various font sizes, and larger fonts either corresponded to greater point values or smaller point values (values counted towards participants' scores if recalled). When larger fonts corresponded with greater point values, participants were better able to selectively remember high-value words relative to low-value words. Thus, when to-be-remembered information varies in value, font size may be less diagnostic of an item's importance (the item's importance drives memory), and when the value of information is consistent with a learner's belief, learners can better engage in selective memory.

Read carefully, because this is important! How value-driven strategies impact sentence memory

Little is understood about how people strategically process and remember important but complex information, such as sentences. In the current study, we asked whether people can effectively prioritize memory for sentences as a function of their relative importance (operationalized as a reward point value) and whether they do so, in part, by changing their sentence processing strategies when value information is available in advance. We adapted the value-directed remembering paradigm (Castel, Psychol Learn Motiv 48:225-270, 2007) for sentences that varied in constraint and predictability. Each sentence was associated with a high or low value for subsequent free recall (whole sentence) and recognition (sentence-final words) tests. Value information appeared after or before each sentence as a between-subject manipulation. Regardless of condition, we observed that high-value sentences were recalled more often than low-value sentences, showing that people can strategically prioritize their encoding of sentences. However, memory patterns differed depending on when value information was available. Recall for high-value sentences that ended unexpectedly (and therefore violated one's predictions) was reduced in the Before compared to the After condition. Before condition participants also showed a greater tendency to false alarm to lures (words that were the predicted - but not obtained - ending) from strongly constraining sentences. These observations suggest that when people try to prioritize sentence-level information that they know is valuable, the reading strategies they employ may paradoxically lead to worse memory.

Metacognitive Effort Regulation across Cultures

Success in cognitive tasks is associated with effort regulation and motivation. We employed the meta-reasoning approach to investigate metacognitive monitoring accuracy and effort regulation in problem solving across cultures. Adults from China, from Israel, and from Europe and North America (for simplicity: "Western countries") solved nonverbal problems and rated their confidence in their answers. The task involved identifying geometric shapes within silhouettes and, thus, required overcoming interference from holistic processing. The Western group displayed the worst monitoring accuracy, with both the highest overconfidence and poorest resolution (discrimination in confidence between the correct and wrong solutions). The Israeli group resembled the Western group in many respects but exhibited better monitoring accuracy. The Chinese group invested the most time and achieved the best success rates, demonstrating exceptional motivation and determination to succeed. However, their efficiency suffered as they correctly solved the fewest problems per minute of work. Effort regulation analysis based on the Diminishing Criterion Model revealed distinct patterns: the Western participants invested the least amount of time regardless of item difficulty and the Israelis invested more time only when addressing the hardest items. The Chinese group allocated more time throughout but particularly in moderate to difficult items, hinting at their strategic determination to overcome the challenge. Understanding cultural differences in metacognitive processes carries implications for theory (e.g., motivational factors) and practice (e.g., international teams, education). The present findings can serve as a foundation for future research in these and other domains.

The animacy advantage in memory occurs under self-paced study conditions, but participants' metacognitive beliefs can deter it

Introduction

Animacy distinguishes living (animate) things from non-living (inanimate) things. People tend to devote attention and processing to living over nonliving things, resulting in a privileged status for animate concepts in human cognition. For example, people tend to remember more animate than inanimate items, a phenomenon known as the "animacy effect" or "animacy advantage." To date, however, the exact cause(s) of this effect is unknown.

Methods

We examined the animacy advantage in free-recall performance under computer-paced versus self-paced study conditions and using three different sets of animate and inanimate stimuli (Experiments 1 and 2). We also measured participants' metacognitive beliefs (expectations) about the task before it began (Experiment 2).

Results

We consistently obtained an animacy advantage in free-recall, regardless of whether participants studied the materials under computer-paced or self-paced conditions. Those in self-paced conditions spent less time studying items than did those in computer-paced conditions, but overall levels of recall and the occurrence of the animacy advantage were equivalent by study method. Importantly, participants devoted equivalent study time to animate and inanimate items in self-paced conditions, so the animacy advantage in those conditions cannot be attributed to study time differences. In Experiment 2, participants who believed that inanimate items were more memorable instead showed equivalent recall and study time for animate and inanimate items, suggesting that they engaged in equivalent processing of animate and inanimate items. All three sets of materials reliably produced an animacy advantage, but the effect was consistently larger for one set than the other two, indicating some contribution of item-level properties to the effect.

Discussion

Overall, the results suggest that participants do not purposely allocate greater processing to animate over inanimate items, even when study is self-paced. Rather, animate items seem to naturally trigger greater richness of encoding than do inanimate items and are then better remembered, although under some conditions participants might engage in deeper processing of inanimate items which can reduce or eliminate the animacy advantage. We suggest that researchers might conceptualize mechanisms for the effect as either centering on intrinsic, item-level properties of the items or centering on extrinsic, processing-based differences between animate and inanimate items.

Framing effects in value-directed remembering

Changing how an issue is framed can influence both decision-making and metacognition, but framing a memory task in terms of gains and losses could also impact how learners prioritize information according to its value or importance. We investigated how framing task instructions and feedback in terms of gains and losses influences learners’ ability to selectively remember valuable information at the expense of low-value information. Specifically, we presented learners with to-be-remembered words paired with point values and either told participants how many points they scored (the sum of the values of recalled words) or lost (the sum of the values of not-recalled words) on each list, with participants’ goal being to maximize their scores or minimize their losses, respectively. Overall, participants were more selective for high-value words when their goals were framed in terms of point gains compared with when their goals were framed in terms of losses, and learners’ metacognitive predictions of performance (JOLs) generally mapped onto this trend. Thus, framing in terms of losses for forgetting can reduce memory selectivity, perhaps because even small losses are salient, indicating that framing effects are not limited to decision-making but can influence memory and metacognitive processes as well.

Responsible attention: the effect of divided attention on metacognition and responsible remembering

We are frequently exposed to situations where we need to remember important information when our attentional resources are divided; however, it was previously unclear how divided attention impacts responsible remembering: selective memory for important information to avoid consequences for forgetting. In the present study, we examined participants' memory for valuable information, metacognitive accuracy, and goal-directed cognitive control mechanisms when under full and divided attention. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with words paired with point values counting towards their score if recalled but were required to "bet" on whether they would remember it. Results revealed that selective memory for high-value information was impaired under divided attention. In Experiment 2, we presented participants with unassociated word pairs and solicited metacognitive predictions of recall (i.e., JOLs). Results revealed that the relative accuracy of participants' metacognitive judgments was enhanced when studying under divided attention. Experiment 3 examined cognitive control mechanisms to selectively remember goal-relevant information at the expense of information that could potentially be offloaded (i.e., responsible forgetting). Results revealed that participants' ability to strategically prioritize goal-relevant information at the expense of information that could be offloaded was preserved under divided attention. Collectively, responsible attention encompasses how attentional resources impact one's ability to engage in responsible remembering and we demonstrate that responsible remembering can be impaired, enhanced, and preserved in certain contexts.