Offloading memory: Serial position effects

Responsible remembering: The role of metacognition, forgetting, attention, and retrieval in adaptive memory

In our everyday lives, we must remember important information, especially if there are consequences for forgetting. In this review, I discuss recent work on responsible remembering: the strategic and effortful prioritization of important information with consequences for forgetting. Thus far, research regarding responsible remembering has revealed several key factors and mechanisms that work together to enhance memory for important information that will continue to be refined: the identification and selection of what to remember (metacognitive reflectivity), the forgetting of less important information to facilitate memory for items that do need to be remembered (responsible forgetting), the functional prioritization of attention at the expense of competing factors (responsible attention), and the selective recall of important information via efficient retrieval strategies (responsible retrieval). Together, these functions form a cohesive system that aims to selectively prioritize, encode, and recall information that is deemed important based on its anticipated utility or the consequences of forgetting, and considering the importance of information may be a critical memory adaptation as we age. Specifically, if younger and older adults learn to self-assess and prioritize important information that has negative consequences if forgotten, engage in strategic forgetting, efficiently allocate their attentional resources, and utilize effective retrieval operations, memory for said important information can be enhanced.

The saving enhanced memory effect can be observed when only a subset of items are saved

Saving one list of words, such as on a computer or by writing them down, can improve a person's ability to learn and remember a second list of words that are not saved. This phenomenon, known as the saving enhanced memory effect, is typically observed by comparing the recall of nonsaved items when other items are saved versus when they are not saved. In past research, the effect has been shown to occur when participants save an entire list before learning a new list. In the current research, we examined whether the effect can be observed when participants save a subset of items within a single list. The results of two experiments confirmed that partial saving can lead to a saving enhanced memory effect, with the effect observed regardless of whether participants saved items by clicking a button on the computer or writing them out by hand. The effect was observed on an item-specific cued-recall test (Experiment 1) as well as a free recall test that did not control the order of output (Experiment 2). However, the effect size did vary as a function of how participants attempted to recall the items on the final test. Specifically, participants who initiated their output by recalling nonsaved items exhibited a significantly larger saving enhanced memory effect than those who initiated their output by reproducing saved items. Together, these findings expand our understanding of the saving enhanced memory effect and shine new light on the impacts of cognitive offloading on human memory.

Cognitive offloading is value-based decision making: Modelling cognitive effort and the expected value of memory

How do people decide between maintaining information in short-term memory or offloading it to external reminders? How does this affect subsequent memory? This article presents a simple computational model based on two principles: A) items stored in brain-based memory occupy its limited capacity, generating an opportunity cost; B) reminders incur a small physical-action cost, but capacity is effectively unlimited. These costs are balanced against the value of remembering, which determines the optimal strategy. Simulations reproduce many empirical findings, including: 1) preferential offloading of high-value items; 2) increased offloading at higher memory loads; 3) offloading can cause forgetting of offloaded items ('Google effect') but 4) improved memory for other items ('saving-enhanced memory'); 5) reduced saving-enhanced-memory effect when reminders are unreliable; 6) influence of item-value: people may preferentially offload high-value items and store additional low-value items in brain-based memory; 7) greatest sensitivity to the effort of reminder-setting at intermediate rather than highest/lowest levels of task difficulty; 8) increased offloading in individuals with poorer memory ability. Therefore, value-based decision-making provides a simple unifying account of many cognitive offloading phenomena. These results are consistent with an opportunity-cost model of cognitive effort, which can explain why internal memory feels effortful but reminders do not.

The role of offloading intentions on future-oriented thinking

Offloading (e.g., using Google calendar reminders) has been shown to improve prospective memory (PM). One unstudied aspect of PM offloading is whether having reminders reduces our future-oriented thinking about PM intentions in contexts in which the intention cannot be fulfilled. In the current study, participants were given two blocks of an ongoing lexical decision task. Prior to beginning the task, participants formed an intention to make a special response to PM targets only in block 2. Participants in the reminder condition had the PM intention displayed at the top of the screen in block 2, whereas those in the no-reminder condition did not. To assess activation of the intention out of context, PM lures (Experiment 1) or thought probes (Experiments 2 and 3) were presented in block 1. Results showed that reminders improved PM performance in block 2 but did not reduce lure interference or PM-related thoughts in block 1. These findings suggest that offloaded memory representations remain as activated and accessible as non-offloaded representations outside the context in which intentions can be fulfilled.

Outsourcing Memory to External Tools: A Review of 'Intention Offloading'

How do we remember delayed intentions? Three decades of research into prospective memory have provided insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in this form of memory. However, we depend on more than just our brains to remember intentions. We also use external props and tools such as calendars and diaries, strategically placed objects, and technologies such as smartphone alerts. This is known as 'intention offloading'. Despite the progress in our understanding of brain-based prospective memory, we know much less about the role of intention offloading in individuals' ability to fulfil delayed intentions. Here, we review recent research into intention offloading, with a particular focus on how individuals decide between storing intentions in internal memory versus external reminders. We also review studies investigating how intention offloading changes across the lifespan and how it relates to underlying brain mechanisms. We conclude that intention offloading is highly effective, experimentally tractable, and guided by metacognitive processes. Individuals have systematic biases in their offloading strategies that are stable over time. Evidence also suggests that individual differences and developmental changes in offloading strategies are driven at least in part by metacognitive processes. Therefore, metacognitive interventions could play an important role in promoting individuals' adaptive use of cognitive tools.

Associative-memory deficit as a function of age and stimuli serial position

Studies have shown associative-memory decline in aging. While the literature is inconclusive regarding the source of the deficit, some researchers argue that it is caused by impaired encoding and maintenance processes in working-memory (WM). Successful retrieval of a stimulus depends on its sequential presentation in the learning list: stimuli at the beginning or the end of the learning list benefit from higher retrieval probability. These effects are known as “primacy” and “recency” effects, respectively. In the case of the primacy-effect, stimuli at early list positions benefit from extensive rehearsal that results in enhanced consolidation and trace in long-term memory (LTM). In the case of the recency-effect, target stimuli at later serial positions are still maintained in WM and can therefore be effortlessly retrieved. Considering these effects could shed light on the involvement of WM in associative-binding. Both behavioral and neuroimaging researchers have studied associative-decline in aging. However, no work has explicitly tested age differences in memory for items versus associations as a function of stimuli serial position (SSP). In the current study, 22 younger and 22 older adults were recruited to participate in a study aimed to test the separate and joint effects of both SSP and aging on memory-recognition of items and associations. In the task used, retrieval was manipulated for SSP (beginning/middle/end of the list) and item/associations recognition modes. We hypothesized that greater associative-decline will be observed in older adults, specifically for recently presented material. The results showed that both groups presented a significant associative-deficit at the recency positions; this decrease was additive and did not correspond to the expected interaction effect. Further analysis showed that the source of associative-memory decline for stimuli at recency position in older adults resulted from an increase in false-alarm (FA) rates. These results support the involvement of WM-binding impairment in aging.

Study effort and the memory cost of external store availability

Previous work demonstrates that individuals often recall less information if, at study, there is expectation that an external memory store will be available at test. One explanation for this effect is that when individuals can expect access to an external memory store, they forgo intentional, controlled efforts at encoding. The present work offers a novel test of this account by examining study effort, indexed by study time and self-reported strategy use, as a function of instructed external store availability. In two preregistered experiments, participants studied lists of to-be-remembered items for a free recall test and were either instructed that they could use their study list to support them at test or that they could not. Critically, participants controlled their own study time, and no participant had their study list at test, regardless of instruction. Consistent with the effort at encoding account, external store availability influenced both study time and strategy use, and there was evidence that these effects mediated the influence of external store availability on recall performance. Interestingly, much of the memory cost remained when controlling for study effort, thus, suggesting that the cost is potentially multiply determined.

Impact of Intrinsic Cognitive Skills and Metacognitive Beliefs on Tool Use Performance

Cognitive tools (e.g., calculators) provide all users with the same potential. Yet when people use such cognitive tools, interindividual variations are observed. Previous findings have indicated that 2 main factors could explain these variations: intrinsic cognitive skills (i.e., the “non–tool use” cognitive skills associated with the task targeted) and metacognitive beliefs about one's performance with tool use. In this study we sought to reproduce these findings and to investigate in more detail the nature of the relationships (i.e., linear vs. exponential) between tool use performance and intrinsic cognitive skills. In Experiment 1, 200 participants completed 2 cognitive tasks (calculation and geography) in 2 conditions (non–tool use vs. tool use). In Experiment 2, 70 participants performed a geography task in 2 conditions (non–tool use vs. tool use) and estimated their performance in each condition before completing the task. Results indicated that intrinsic cognitive skills and, to a lesser extent, metacognitive beliefs improved tool use performance: The higher the intrinsic cognitive skills and the higher participants estimated their tool use performance, the higher this tool use performance was. The nature of the relationship between tool use performance and intrinsic cognitive skills appeared to be linear rather than exponential. These findings extend previous research showing a strong impact of intrinsic cognitive skills on the performance associated with the use of cognitive tools or external aids.

The effect of external store reliance on actual and predicted value-directed remembering

We often rely on external devices to store to-be-remembered information in our everyday lives (e.g., writing grocery lists, setting reminders), yet there is limited research about how certain information (i.e., valuable information) may be differentially encoded when we rely on our internal memory versus an external store. Across three preregistered experiments, we examined the effect of relying on an external store on the recall of high-value and low-value information. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we presented participants with words associated with point values and examined mean recall performance during two critical trials in which the external store was not available: (1) a trial in which participants were told that they would have access to an external memory store at test (told-external-store) and (2) a trial in which participants were told that they would not have access to their external store at test (told-no-external-store). In Experiment 2, we explored participants' metacognitive predictions of performance on the recall test. Critically, across all of the experiments, we found that the value effect (i.e., better recall for valuable information) was significantly reduced when individuals were told that they could rely on an external store. The same pattern was present in participant's metacognitive judgements. Together, these results suggest that when relying on external stores, individuals forgo (to some extent, at least) selective encoding by value and that individuals might be aware of this change in strategy.

On our susceptibility to external memory store manipulation: examining the influence of perceived reliability and expected access to an external store

Offloading memory to external stores (e.g., a saved file) allows us to evade the limitations of our internal memory. One cost of this strategy is that the external memory store used may be accessible to others and, thus, may be manipulated. Here we examine how reducing the perceived reliability of an external memory store and manipulating one's expectation for future access to such a store can influence participants' susceptibility to its manipulation (i.e., endorsing manipulated information as authentic). Across three pre-registered experiments, participants were able to store to-be-remembered information in an external store. On a critical trial, we surreptitiously manipulated the information in that store. Results demonstrated that an explicit notification of a previous manipulation of that store and the warning that the store will be inaccessible in the future can decrease susceptibility to manipulation of that store. Results are discussed in the context of the metacognitive monitoring and control of memory reports in situations that involve the distribution of memory demands across both internal and external spaces.

The gist of it: offloading memory does not reduce the benefit of list categorisation

When we can offload to-be-remembered information to an external store, our ability to recall that information from internal memory can be diminished. However, previous research has suggested that associative memory processes may remain intact in the face of offloading behaviour. In the present investigation, we examine how the opportunity to offload memory demands affects the learning of categorised word lists. Across six experiments, participants studied and wrote down word lists that were either strongly associated with a semantic theme (categorised) or word lists that consisted of the same set of words but shuffled across the categorised lists (shuffled). When participants expected to have access to their written lists during the recall test (i.e., a condition that would encourage offloading) but were not given access to it, we found the typical recall advantage for categorised lists. This effect was found to be the same size or larger compared to a condition where participants did not expect to have access to their written lists during the recall test (i.e., a condition that would not allow offloading). We propose that gist memory supported by semantic associations is not substantially reduced in offloading.

Revisiting the influence of offloading memory on free recall

Relying on external memory aids is a common memory strategy that has long allowed us to "remember" vast amounts of information more reliably than with our internal memory alone. However, recent work has provided evidence consistent with the idea that offloading memory demands encourages a reduced engagement in intentional or top-down memory strategies/efforts, leading to lower memory performance in general. Evidence for this view comes from results demonstrating a reduced primacy effect but intact recency and isolation effects when individuals could offload memory demands (but had to unexpectedly rely on their internal memory at test). In the present investigation, we attempt a replication of these critical results, given some inconsistencies in the findings between studies. In addition, we extend the examination of offloading's impact on memory via examining individual differences in reliance on the external store (when available) and different strategies for the use of that store. Results of the replication are generally consistent with previous research. An individual differences analysis yielded results consistent with the notion that increased reliance on an external store can compromise internal/biological memory in the absence of that store. Finally, a verbal model of offloading memory demands within a framework of effort and study time allocation is presented. Together, the results both reinforce extant research and extend it in new directions.

Saved information is remembered less well than deleted information, if the saving process is perceived as reliable

Prior research has shown that people are more likely to remember information that is deleted from a computer than information that is saved on a computer, presumably because saving serves as a form of cognitive offloading. Given recent concerns about the robustness and replicability of this "Google Effect," we conducted two experiments seeking to replicate and extend the phenomenon by identifying a potential boundary condition for when it is observed. In Experiment 1, we replicated the Google Effect, but only when participants experienced a practice phase demonstrating the reliability of the saving process. No evidence of a Google Effect was observed when participants experienced a practice phase demonstrating the saving process to be unreliable. In Experiment 2, we replicated the results of Experiment 1 in the reliable condition, while demonstrating the effect to be robust across 10 different topics of trivia statements. Taken together, these results suggest that the Google Effect is a replicable phenomenon, but that the perceived reliability of the saving process is critical for determining whether it is observed.

Metacognitive control, serial position effects, and effective transfer to self-paced study

Serial position effects involve the differential recall of information based on its temporal order at encoding. Previous research indicates that learners may be aware of these effects under certain encoding conditions, but it is unclear whether metacognitive control is sensitive to serial position effects. The current study examined whether there are serial position effects in participants' study time and whether they can learn about serial position effects under fixed encoding conditions and then transfer what they have learned to self-paced study conditions. Specifically, participants were given lists of to-be-remembered words and studied each word for a fixed duration on initial lists, but self-paced their study time on later lists. Results revealed that self-paced study times oppositely mirrored serial position effects (i.e., briefer study times in the beginning and end of each list), and serial position effects were reduced in self-paced study conditions, particularly in participants initially studying under fixed conditions before self-pacing their study time. Specifically, participants may have monitored their output and, based on observations of forgetting middle items, transferred their learning of serial position effects from prior lists. Thus, participants may use forgetting and serial position information to guide encoding, indicating that fundamental properties of the memory system can be incorporated into the processes that guide metacognitive control.

Animate and Inanimate Words Demonstrate Equivalent Retrieval Dynamics Despite the Occurrence of the Animacy Advantage

People demonstrate a memory advantage for animate (living) concepts over inanimate (nonliving) concepts in a variety of memory tasks, including free recall, but we do not know the mechanism(s) that produces this effect. We compared the retrieval dynamics (serial-position effects, probability of first recall, output order, categorical clustering, and recall contiguity) of animate and inanimate words in a typical free recall task to help elucidate this effect. Participants were more likely to recall animate than inanimate words, but we found few, if any, differences in retrieval dynamics by word type. The animacy advantage was obtained across serial position, including occurring in both the primacy and recency regions of the lists. Participants were equally likely to recall an animate or inanimate word first on the tests and did not prioritize recalling words of one type earlier in retrieval or demonstrate strong clustering by animacy at recall. Participants showed some greater contiguity of recall for inanimate words, but this outcome ran counter to the animacy effect. Together, the results suggest that the animacy advantage stems from increased item-specific memory strength for animate over inanimate words and is unlikely to stem from intentional or strategic differences in encoding or retrieval by word type, categorical strategies, or differences in temporal organization. Although the present results do not directly support or refute any current explanations for the animacy advantage, we suggest that measures of retrieval dynamics can help to inspire or constrain future accounts for this effect and can be incorporated into relevant hypothesis testing.

Individual differences in cognitive offloading: a comparison of intention offloading, pattern copy, and short-term memory capacity

The cognitive load of many everyday life tasks exceeds known limitations of short-term memory. One strategy to compensate for information overload is cognitive offloading which refers to the externalization of cognitive processes such as reminder setting instead of memorizing. There appears to be remarkable variance in offloading behavior between participants which poses the question whether there is a common factor influencing offloading behavior across different tasks tackling short-term memory processes. To pursue this question, we studied individual differences in offloading behavior between two well-established offloading paradigms: the intention offloading task which tackles memory for intentions and the pattern copy task which tackles continuous short-term memory load. Our study also included an unrelated task measuring short-term memory capacity. Each participant completed all tasks twice on two consecutive days in order to obtain reliability scores. Despite high reliability scores, individual differences in offloading behavior were uncorrelated between the two offloading tasks. In both tasks, however, individual differences in offloading behavior were correlated with the individual differences in an unrelated short-term memory task. Our results therefore show that offloading behavior cannot simply be explained in terms of a single common factor driving offloading behavior across tasks. We discuss the implications of this finding for future research investigating the interrelations of offloading behavior across different tasks.

Consequences of cognitive offloading: Boosting performance but diminishing memory

Modern technical tools such as tablets allow for the temporal externalisation of working memory processes (i.e., cognitive offloading). Although such externalisations support immediate performance on different tasks, little is known about potential long-term consequences of offloading behaviour. In the current set of experiments, we studied the relationship between cognitive offloading and subsequent memory for the offloaded information as well as the interplay of this relationship with the goal to acquire new memory representations. Our participants solved the Pattern Copy Task, in which we manipulated the costs of cognitive offloading and the awareness of a subsequent memory test. In Experiment 1 (N = 172), we showed that increasing the costs for offloading induces reduced offloading behaviour. This reduction in offloading came along with lower immediate task performance but more accurate memory in an unexpected test. In Experiment 2 (N = 172), we confirmed these findings and observed that offloading behaviour remained detrimental for subsequent memory performance when participants were aware of the upcoming memory test. Interestingly, Experiment 3 (N = 172) showed that cognitive offloading is not detrimental for long-term memory formation under all circumstances. Those participants who were forced to offload maximally but were aware of the memory test could almost completely counteract the negative impact of offloading on memory. Our experiments highlight the importance of the explicit goal to acquire new memory representations when relying on technical tools as offloading did have detrimental effects on memory without such a goal.

Harder Than You Think: How Outside Assistance Leads to Overconfidence

Cognitive ability consists not only of one's internal competence but also of the augmentation offered by the outside world. How much of our cognitive success is due to our own abilities, and how much is due to external support? Can we accurately draw that distinction? Here, we explored when and why people are unaware of their reliance on outside assistance. Across eight experiments (N = 2,440 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk), people showed improved metacognitive calibration when assistance occurred after a delay or required active choice. Furthermore, these findings apply across a wide range of cognitive tasks, including semantic memory (Experiments 1a and 1b), episodic memory (Experiments 2a and 2b), and problem solving (Experiments 3a-3d). These experiments offer important insights into how we understand our own abilities when we rely on outside help.

Offloading information to an external store increases false recall

Offloading to-be-remembered information is a ubiquitous memory strategy, yet in relying on external memory stores, our ability to recall from internal memory is often diminished. In the present investigation, we examine how offloading impacts true and false recall. Across three experiments, participants studied and wrote down word lists that were each strongly associated with an unstudied critical word. Recall in the Offloading condition (i.e., when they were told that they would have access to their written lists during recall) was contrasted with a No-Offloading condition (i.e., when they were told that they would not have access to their written lists during recall). We found that offloading decreased true recall of presented words while increasing false recall for unpresented critical words. Results are discussed in terms of offloading's differential effects on the formation of gist and verbatim traces during encoding.

Assessing the presence of face biases by means of anorthoscopic perception

Anorthoscopy is a presentation mode in which an image is shown sliding behind a slit-shaped aperture, so that it is visible only part by part and never in its entirety. With the aims to assess (1) whether the processing of complex stimuli (faces) correctly occurs in anorthoscopy, and (2) whether the Own-Gender Bias (OGB: the better recognition of stimuli belonging to the same gender of the observer: faster and more accurate) and the Left-Face Bias (LFB: the preference to analyze the left half of the face) occur in such a part by part presentation, we presented female and male faces as whole stimuli (Experiment 1) and in anorthoscopy (Experiments 2 and 3), as well as female/male chimeric faces (Experiment 4), during a gender categorization task. Experiment 1 confirmed that participants correctly categorized the gender of faces, but the OGB was not found. In Experiments 2 and 3 we manipulated the direction (Experiment 2: upward/downward; Experiment 3: leftward/rightward), the speed (slow and fast) of the sliding faces, and the width of the aperture (small and large). Both tasks revealed that facial gender was correctly categorized in anorthoscopy. The OGB was found, but only for males/females in Experiments 2/3, respectively. In Experiment 4 the LFB emerged only in the tachistoscopic session, suggesting that this perceptual bias does not extend to anorthoscopy.

Specifying the mechanisms behind benefits of saving-enhanced memory

By saving information on external memory stores, we can offload temporarily irrelevant memories, we believe to be important in the future. The external saving of encoded items enhances subsequent memory performance for new information (Storm and Stone in Psychol Sci 26(2):182-188, 2015). Across three experiments, we replicated and specified this saving-enhanced memory effect. In Experiment 1, we replicated the benefits of saving and showed that they are robust against changes in instructions. In Experiment 2, we extended the saving-enhanced memory effect to motor material and more important, found evidence for better encoding after saving. In Experiment 3, a cost effect for saved verbal material was present, indicating that externally saving information can reduce the accessibility for this information afterwards. These findings suggest that at least two factors contribute to benefits of saving, better encoding and reduced interference at recall. Hereby, similarities of saving-enhanced memory to effects of the list-method directed forgetting phenomenon and useful implications for our daily information management are provided.