Sequential sampling models without random between-trial variability: the racing diffusion model of speeded decision making

EZ-CDM: Fast, simple, robust, and accurate estimation of circular diffusion model parameters

The investigation of cognitive processes that form the basis of decision-making in paradigms involving continuous outcomes has gained the interest of modeling researchers who aim to develop a dynamic decision theory that accounts for both speed and accuracy. One of the most important of these continuous models is the circular diffusion model (CDM, Smith. Psychological Review, 123(4), 425. 2016), which posits a noisy accumulation process mathematically described as a stochastic two-dimensional Wiener process inside a disk. Despite the considerable benefits of this model, its mathematical intricacy has limited its utilization among scholars. Here, we propose a straightforward and user-friendly method for estimating the CDM parameters and fitting the model to continuous-scale data using simple formulas that can be readily computed and do not require theoretical knowledge of model fitting or extensive programming. Notwithstanding its simplicity, we demonstrate that the aforementioned method performs with a level of accuracy that is comparable to that of the maximum likelihood estimation method. Furthermore, a robust version of the method is presented, which maintains its simplicity while exhibiting a high degree of resistance to contaminant responses. Additionally, we show that the approach is capable of reliably measuring the key parameters of the CDM, even when these values are subject to across-trial variability. Finally, we demonstrate the practical application of the method on experimental data. Specifically, an illustrative example is presented wherein the method is employed along with estimating the probability of guessing. It is hoped that the straightforward methodology presented here will, on the one hand, help narrow the divide between theoretical constructs and empirical observations on continuous response tasks and, on the other hand, inspire cognitive psychology researchers to shift their laboratory investigations towards continuous response paradigms.

The Tweedledum and Tweedledee of dynamic decisions: Discriminating between diffusion decision and accumulator models

Theories of dynamic decision-making are typically built on evidence accumulation, which is modeled using racing accumulators or diffusion models that track a shifting balance of support over time. However, these two types of models are only two special cases of a more general evidence accumulation process where options correspond to directions in an accumulation space. Using this generalized evidence accumulation approach as a starting point, I identify four ways to discriminate between absolute-evidence and relative-evidence models. First, an experimenter can look at the information that decision-makers considered to identify whether there is a filtering of near-zero evidence samples, which is characteristic of a relative-evidence decision rule (e.g., diffusion decision model). Second, an experimenter can disentangle different components of drift rates by manipulating the discriminability of the two response options relative to the stimulus to delineate the balance of evidence from the total amount of evidence. Third, a modeler can use machine learning to classify a set of data according to its generative model. Finally, machine learning can also be used to directly estimate the geometric relationships between choice options. I illustrate these different approaches by applying them to data from an orientation-discrimination task, showing converging conclusions across all four methods in favor of accumulator-based representations of evidence during choice. These tools can clearly delineate absolute-evidence and relative-evidence models, and should be useful for comparing many other types of decision theories.

The neural network RTNet exhibits the signatures of human perceptual decision-making

Convolutional neural networks show promise as models of biological vision. However, their decision behaviour, including the facts that they are deterministic and use equal numbers of computations for easy and difficult stimuli, differs markedly from human decision-making, thus limiting their applicability as models of human perceptual behaviour. Here we develop a new neural network, RTNet, that generates stochastic decisions and human-like response time (RT) distributions. We further performed comprehensive tests that showed RTNet reproduces all foundational features of human accuracy, RT and confidence and does so better than all current alternatives. To test RTNet's ability to predict human behaviour on novel images, we collected accuracy, RT and confidence data from 60 human participants performing a digit discrimination task. We found that the accuracy, RT and confidence produced by RTNet for individual novel images correlated with the same quantities produced by human participants. Critically, human participants who were more similar to the average human performance were also found to be closer to RTNet's predictions, suggesting that RTNet successfully captured average human behaviour. Overall, RTNet is a promising model of human RTs that exhibits the critical signatures of perceptual decision-making.

A hybrid approach to dynamic cognitive psychometrics : Dynamic cognitive psychometrics

Dynamic cognitive psychometrics measures mental capacities based on the way behavior unfolds over time. It does so using models of psychological processes whose validity is grounded in research from experimental psychology and the neurosciences. However, these models can sometimes have undesirable measurement properties. We propose a "hybrid" modeling approach that achieves good measurement by blending process-based and descriptive components. We demonstrate the utility of this approach in the stop-signal paradigm, in which participants make a series of speeded choices, but occasionally are required to withhold their response when a "stop signal" occurs. The stop-signal paradigm is widely used to measure response inhibition based on a modeling framework that assumes a race between processes triggered by the choice and the stop stimuli. However, the key index of inhibition, the latency of the stop process (i.e., stop-signal reaction time), is not directly observable, and is poorly estimated when the choice and the stop runners are both modeled by psychologically realistic evidence-accumulation processes. We show that using a descriptive account of the stop process, while retaining a realistic account of the choice process, simultaneously enables good measurement of both stop-signal reaction time and the psychological factors that determine choice behavior. We show that this approach, when combined with hierarchical Bayesian estimation, is effective even in a complex choice task that requires participants to perform only a relatively modest number of test trials.

The effects of non-diagnostic information on confidence and decision making

Many decision-making tasks are characterized by a combination of diagnostic and non-diagnostic information, yet models of responding and confidence almost exclusively focus on the contribution of diagnostic information (e.g., evidence associated with stimulus discriminability), largely ignoring the contribution of non-diagnostic information. An exception is Baranski and Petrusic's Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 24(3), 929-945, (1998) doubt-scaling model, which predicts a negative relationship between non-diagnostic information and confidence, and between non-diagnostic information and accuracy. In two perceptual-choice tasks, we tested the effects of manipulating non-diagnostic information on confidence, accuracy and response time (RT). In Experiment 1, participants viewed a dynamic grid consisting of flashing blue, orange and white pixels and indicated whether the stimulus was predominantly blue or orange (using a response scale ranging from low-confidence blue to high-confidence orange), with the white pixels constituting non-diagnostic information. Increasing non-diagnostic information reduced both confidence and accuracy, generally slowed RTs, and led to an increase in the speed of errors. Experiment 2 replicated these results for a decision-only task, providing further support for the doubt-scaling model of confidence.

An extension of the shifted Wald model of human response times: Capturing the time dynamic properties of human cognition : Trial-varying Wald model

Despite the ubiquitous nature of evidence accumulation models in cognitive and experimental psychology, there has been a comparatively limited uptake of such techniques in the applied literature. While quantifying latent cognitive processing properties has significant potential for applied domains such as adaptive work systems, accumulator models often fall short in practical applications. Two primary reasons for these shortcomings are the complexities and time needed for the application of cognitive models, and the failure of current models to capture systematic trial-to-trial variability in parameters. In this manuscript, we develop a novel, trial-varying extension of the shifted Wald model to address these concerns. By leveraging conjugate properties of the Wald distribution, we derive computationally efficient solutions for threshold and drift parameters which can be updated instantaneously with new data. The resulting model allows the quantification of systematic variation in latent cognitive parameters across trials and we demonstrate the utility of such analyses through simulations and an exemplar application to an existing data set. The analytic nature of our solutions opens the door for real-world applications, significantly extending the reach of computational models of behavioral responses.

The neural implausibility of the diffusion decision model doesn't matter for cognitive psychometrics, but the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model is better

In cognitive psychometrics, the parameters of cognitive models are used as measurements of the processes underlying observed behavior. In decision making, the diffusion decision model (DDM) is by far the most commonly used cognitive psychometric tool. One concern when using this model is that more recent theoretical accounts of decision-making place more emphasis on neural plausibility, and thus incorporate many assumptions not found in the DDM. One such model is the Ising Decision Maker (IDM), which builds from the assumption that two pools of neurons with self-excitation and mutual inhibition receive perceptual input from external excitatory fields. In this study, we investigate whether the lack of such mechanisms in the DDM compromises its ability to measure the processes it does purport to measure. We cross-fit the DDM and IDM, and find that the conclusions of DDM would be mostly consistent with those from an analysis using a more neurally plausible model. We also show that the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Model (OUM) model, a variant of the DDM that includes the potential for leakage (or self-excitation), reaches similar conclusions to the DDM regarding the assumptions they share, while also sharing an interpretation with the IDM in terms of self-excitation (but not leakage). Since the OUM is relatively easy to fit to data, while being able to capture more neurally plausible mechanisms, we propose that it be considered an alternative cognitive psychometric tool to the DDM.

No position-specific interference from prior lists in cued recognition: A challenge for position coding (and other) theories of serial memory

Position-specific intrusions of items from prior lists are rare but important phenomena that distinguish broad classes of theory in serial memory. They are uniquely predicted by position coding theories, which assume items on all lists are associated with the same set of codes representing their positions. Activating a position code activates items associated with it in current and prior lists in proportion to their distance from the activated position. Thus, prior list intrusions are most likely to come from the coded position. Alternative "item dependent" theories based on associations between items and contexts built from items have difficulty accounting for the position specificity of prior list intrusions. We tested the position coding account with a position-cued recognition task designed to produce prior list interference. Cuing a position should activate a position code, which should activate items in nearby positions in the current and prior lists. We presented lures from the prior list to test for position-specific activation in response time and error rate; lures from nearby positions should interfere more. We found no evidence for such interference in 10 experiments, falsifying the position coding prediction. We ran two serial recall experiments with the same materials and found position-specific prior list intrusions. These results challenge all theories of serial memory: Position coding theories can explain the prior list intrusions in serial recall and but not the absence of prior list interference in cued recognition. Item dependent theories can explain the absence of prior list interference in cued recognition but cannot explain the occurrence of prior list intrusions in serial recall.

Are there jumps in evidence accumulation, and what, if anything, do they reflect psychologically? An analysis of Lévy Flights models of decision-making

According to existing theories of simple decision-making, decisions are initiated by continuously sampling and accumulating perceptual evidence until a threshold value has been reached. Many models, such as the diffusion decision model, assume a noisy accumulation process, described mathematically as a stochastic Wiener process with Gaussian distributed noise. Recently, an alternative account of decision-making has been proposed in the Lévy Flights (LF) model, in which accumulation noise is characterized by a heavy-tailed power-law distribution, controlled by a parameter, [Formula: see text]. The LF model produces sudden large "jumps" in evidence accumulation that are not produced by the standard Wiener diffusion model, which some have argued provide better fits to data. It remains unclear, however, whether jumps in evidence accumulation have any real psychological meaning. Here, we investigate the conjecture by Voss et al. (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 26(3), 813-832, 2019) that jumps might reflect sudden shifts in the source of evidence people rely on to make decisions. We reason that if jumps are psychologically real, we should observe systematic reductions in jumps as people become more practiced with a task (i.e., as people converge on a stable decision strategy with experience). We fitted five versions of the LF model to behavioral data from a study by Evans and Brown (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(2), 597-606, 2017), using a five-layer deep inference neural network for parameter estimation. The analysis revealed systematic reductions in jumps as a function of practice, such that the LF model more closely approximated the standard Wiener model over time. This trend could not be attributed to other sources of parameter variability, speaking against the possibility of trade-offs with other model parameters. Our analysis suggests that jumps in the LF model might be capturing strategy instability exhibited by relatively inexperienced observers early on in task performance. We conclude that further investigation of a potential psychological interpretation of jumps in evidence accumulation is warranted.

Joint Modelling of Latent Cognitive Mechanisms Shared Across Decision-Making Domains

Decision-making behavior is often understood using the framework of evidence accumulation models (EAMs). Nowadays, EAMs are applied to various domains of decision-making with the underlying assumption that the latent cognitive constructs proposed by EAMs are consistent across these domains. In this study, we investigate both the extent to which the parameters of EAMs are related between four different decision-making domains and across different time points. To that end, we make use of the novel joint modelling approach, that explicitly includes relationships between parameters, such as covariances or underlying factors, in one combined joint model. Consequently, this joint model also accounts for measurement error and uncertainty within the estimation of these relations. We found that EAM parameters were consistent between time points on three of the four decision-making tasks. For our between-task analysis, we constructed a joint model with a factor analysis on the parameters of the different tasks. Our two-factor joint model indicated that information processing ability was related between the different decision-making domains. However, other cognitive constructs such as the degree of response caution and urgency were only comparable on some domains.

Informational feedback accelerates learning in multi-alternative perceptual judgements of orientation

Experience or training can substantially improve perceptual performance through perceptual learning, and the extent and rate of these improvements may be affected by feedback. In this paper, we first developed a neural network model based on the integrated reweighting theory (Dosher et al., 2013) to account for perceptual learning and performance in n-alternative identification tasks and the dependence of learning on different forms of feedback. We then report an experiment comparing the effectiveness of response feedback (RF) versus accuracy feedback (AF) or no feedback (NF) (full versus partial versus no supervision) in learning a challenging eight-alternative visual orientation identification (8AFC) task. Although learning sometimes occurred in the absence of feedback (NF), RF had a clear advantage above AF or NF in this task. Using hybrid supervision learning rules, a new n-alternative identification integrated reweighting theory (I-IRT) explained both the differences in learning curves given different feedback and the dynamic changes in identification confusion data. This study shows that training with more informational feedback (RF) is more effective, though not necessary, in these challenging n-alternative tasks, a result that has implications for developing training paradigms in realistic tasks.

Neuropsychological differential diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease and vascular dementia: a systematic review with meta-regressions

Introduction

Diagnostic classification systems and guidelines posit distinguishing patterns of impairment in Alzheimer's (AD) and vascular dementia (VaD). In our study, we aim to identify which diagnostic instruments distinguish them.

Methods

We searched PubMed and PsychInfo for empirical studies published until December 2020, which investigated differences in cognitive, behavioral, psychiatric, and functional measures in patients older than 64 years and reported information on VaD subtype, age, education, dementia severity, and proportion of women. We systematically reviewed these studies and conducted Bayesian hierarchical meta-regressions to quantify the evidence for differences using the Bayes factor (BF). The risk of bias was assessed using the Newcastle-Ottawa-Scale and funnel plots.

Results

We identified 122 studies with 17,850 AD and 5,247 VaD patients. Methodological limitations of the included studies are low comparability of patient groups and an untransparent patient selection process. In the digit span backward task, AD patients were nine times more probable (BF = 9.38) to outperform VaD patients (β g = 0.33, 95% ETI = 0.12, 0.52). In the phonemic fluency task, AD patients outperformed subcortical VaD (sVaD) patients (β g = 0.51, 95% ETI = 0.22, 0.77, BF = 42.36). VaD patients, in contrast, outperformed AD patients in verbal (β g = -0.61, 95% ETI = -0.97, -0.26, BF = 22.71) and visual (β g = -0.85, 95% ETI = -1.29, -0.32, BF = 13.67) delayed recall. We found the greatest difference in verbal memory, showing that sVaD patients outperform AD patients (β g = -0.64, 95% ETI = -0.88, -0.36, BF = 72.97). Finally, AD patients performed worse than sVaD patients in recognition memory tasks (β g = -0.76, 95% ETI = -1.26, -0.26, BF = 11.50).

Conclusion

Our findings show inferior performance of AD in episodic memory and superior performance in working memory. We found little support for other differences proposed by diagnostic systems and diagnostic guidelines. The utility of cognitive, behavioral, psychiatric, and functional measures in differential diagnosis is limited and should be complemented by other information. Finally, we identify research areas and avenues, which could significantly improve the diagnostic value of cognitive measures.

Modelling decision-making biases

Biases are a fundamental aspect of everyday life decision-making. A variety of modelling approaches have been suggested to capture decision-making biases. Statistical models are a means to describe the data, but the results are usually interpreted according to a verbal theory. This can lead to an ambiguous interpretation of the data. Mathematical cognitive models of decision-making outline the structure of the decision process with formal assumptions, providing advantages in terms of prediction, simulation, and interpretability compared to statistical models. We compare studies that used both signal detection theory and evidence accumulation models as models of decision-making biases, concluding that the latter provides a more comprehensive account of the decision-making phenomena by including response time behavior. We conclude by reviewing recent studies investigating attention and expectation biases with evidence accumulation models. Previous findings, reporting an exclusive influence of attention on the speed of evidence accumulation and prior probability on starting point, are challenged by novel results suggesting an additional effect of attention on non-decision time and prior probability on drift rate.

Drift-diffusion modeling reveals that masked faces are preconceived as unfriendly

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the use of face masks has become a daily routine. Studies have shown that face masks increase the ambiguity of facial expressions which not only affects (the development of) emotion recognition, but also interferes with social interaction and judgement. To disambiguate facial expressions, we rely on perceptual (stimulus-driven) as well as preconceptual (top-down) processes. However, it is unknown which of these two mechanisms accounts for the misinterpretation of masked expressions. To investigate this, we asked participants (N = 136) to decide whether ambiguous (morphed) facial expressions, with or without a mask, were perceived as friendly or unfriendly. To test for the independent effects of perceptual and preconceptual biases we fitted a drift-diffusion model (DDM) to the behavioral data of each participant. Results show that face masks induce a clear loss of information leading to a slight perceptual bias towards friendly choices, but also a clear preconceptual bias towards unfriendly choices for masked faces. These results suggest that, although face masks can increase the perceptual friendliness of faces, people have the prior preconception to interpret masked faces as unfriendly.

Framing Subjective Emotion Reports as Dynamic Affective Decisions

Self-reports remain affective science's only direct measure of subjective affective experiences. Yet, little research has sought to understand the psychological process that transforms subjective experience into self-reports. Here, we propose that by framing these self-reports as dynamic affective decisions, affective scientists may leverage the computational tools of decision-making research, sequential sampling models specifically, to better disentangle affective experience from the noisy decision processes that constitute self-report. We further outline how such an approach could help affective scientists better probe the specific mechanisms that underlie important moderators of affective experience (e.g., contextual differences, individual differences, and emotion regulation) and discuss how adopting this decision-making framework could generate insight into affective processes more broadly and facilitate reciprocal collaborations between affective and decision scientists towards a more comprehensive and integrative psychological science.

Serial attention to serial memory: The psychological refractory period in forward and backward cued recall

Guided by the conjecture that memory retrieval is attention turned inward, we examined serial attention in serial memory, combining the psychological refractory period (PRP) procedure from attention research with cued recall of two items from brief six-item lists. We report six experiments showing robust PRP effects in cued recall from memory (1-4) and cued report from perceptual displays (5-6), which suggest that memory retrieval requires the same attentional bottleneck as "retrieval" from perception. There were strong direction effects in each memory experiment. Response time (RT) was shorter and accuracy was higher when the cues occurred in the forward direction (left-to-right, top-to-bottom, first-to-last), replicating differences between forward and backward serial recall. Cue positions had strong effects on RT and accuracy in the memory experiments (1-4). The pattern suggested that subjects find cued items in memory by stepping through the list from the beginning or the end, with a preference for starting at the beginning. The perceptual experiments (5-6) showed weak effects of position that were more consistent with direct access. In all experiments, the distance between the cues in the list (lag) had weak effects, suggesting that subjects searched for each cue from the beginning or end of the list more often than they moved through the list from the first cue to the second. Direction, distance, and lag effects on RT and inter-response interval changed with SOA in a manner that suggested they affect bottleneck or pre-bottleneck processes that create and execute a plan for successive retrievals. We conclude that sequential retrieval from memory and sequential attention to perception engage the same computations and we show how computational models of memory can be interpreted as models of attention focused on memory.

"Reliable organisms from unreliable components" revisited: the linear drift, linear infinitesimal variance model of decision making

Diffusion models of decision making, in which successive samples of noisy evidence are accumulated to decision criteria, provide a theoretical solution to von Neumann's (1956) problem of how to increase the reliability of neural computation in the presence of noise. I introduce and evaluate a new neurally-inspired dual diffusion model, the linear drift, linear infinitesimal variance (LDLIV) model, which embodies three features often thought to characterize neural mechanisms of decision making. The accumulating evidence is intrinsically positively-valued, saturates at high intensities, and is accumulated for each alternative separately. I present explicit integral-equation predictions for the response time distribution and choice probabilities for the LDLIV model and compare its performance on two benchmark sets of data to three other models: the standard diffusion model and two dual diffusion model composed of racing Wiener processes, one between absorbing and reflecting boundaries and one with absorbing boundaries only. The LDLIV model and the standard diffusion model performed similarly to one another, although the standard diffusion model is more parsimonious, and both performed appreciably better than the other two dual diffusion models. I argue that accumulation of noisy evidence by a diffusion process and drift rate variability are both expressions of how the cognitive system solves von Neumann's problem, by aggregating noisy representations over time and over elements of a neural population. I also argue that models that do not solve von Neumann's problem do not address the main theoretical question that historically motivated research in this area.

Evidence accumulation modelling in the wild: understanding safety-critical decisions

Evidence accumulation models (EAMs) are a class of computational cognitive model used to understand the latent cognitive processes that underlie human decisions and response times (RTs). They have seen widespread application in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. However, historically, the application of these models was limited to simple decision tasks. Recently, researchers have applied these models to gain insight into the cognitive processes that underlie observed behaviour in applied domains, such as air-traffic control (ATC), driving, forensic and medical image discrimination, and maritime surveillance. Here, we discuss how this modelling approach helps researchers understand how the cognitive system adapts to task demands and interventions, such as task automation. We also discuss future directions and argue for wider adoption of cognitive modelling in Human Factors research.

A cognitive process modeling framework for the ABCD study stop-signal task

The Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development (ABCD) Study is a longitudinal neuroimaging study of unprecedented scale that is in the process of following over 11,000 youth from middle childhood though age 20. However, a design feature of the study's stop-signal task violates "context independence", an assumption critical to current non-parametric methods for estimating stop-signal reaction time (SSRT), a key measure of inhibitory ability in the study. This has led some experts to call for the task to be changed and for previously collected data to be used with caution. We present a cognitive process modeling framework, the RDEX-ABCD model, that provides a parsimonious explanation for the impact of this design feature on "go" stimulus processing and successfully accounts for key behavioral trends in the ABCD data. Simulation studies using this model suggest that failing to account for the context independence violations in the ABCD design can lead to erroneous inferences in several realistic scenarios. However, we demonstrate that RDEX-ABCD effectively addresses these violations and can be used to accurately measure SSRT along with an array of additional mechanistic parameters of interest (e.g., attention to the stop signal, cognitive efficiency), advancing investigators' ability to draw valid and nuanced inferences from ABCD data. AVAILABILITY OF DATA AND MATERIALS: Data from the ABCD Study are available through the NIH Data Archive (NDA): nda.nih.gov/abcd. Code for all analyses featured in this study is openly available on the Open Science Framework (OSF): osf.io/2h8a7/.

Tracking human skill learning with a hierarchical Bayesian sequence model

Humans can implicitly learn complex perceptuo-motor skills over the course of large numbers of trials. This likely depends on our becoming better able to take advantage of ever richer and temporally deeper predictive relationships in the environment. Here, we offer a novel characterization of this process, fitting a non-parametric, hierarchical Bayesian sequence model to the reaction times of human participants' responses over ten sessions, each comprising thousands of trials, in a serial reaction time task involving higher-order dependencies. The model, adapted from the domain of language, forgetfully updates trial-by-trial, and seamlessly combines predictive information from shorter and longer windows onto past events, weighing the windows proportionally to their predictive power. As the model implies a posterior over window depths, we were able to determine how, and how many, previous sequence elements influenced individual participants' internal predictions, and how this changed with practice. Already in the first session, the model showed that participants had begun to rely on two previous elements (i.e., trigrams), thereby successfully adapting to the most prominent higher-order structure in the task. The extent to which local statistical fluctuations in trigram frequency influenced participants' responses waned over subsequent sessions, as participants forgot the trigrams less and evidenced skilled performance. By the eighth session, a subset of participants shifted their prior further to consider a context deeper than two previous elements. Finally, participants showed resistance to interference and slow forgetting of the old sequence when it was changed in the final sessions. Model parameters for individual participants covaried appropriately with independent measures of working memory and error characteristics. In sum, the model offers the first principled account of the adaptive complexity and nuanced dynamics of humans' internal sequence representations during long-term implicit skill learning.

Beyond Drift Diffusion Models: Fitting a Broad Class of Decision and Reinforcement Learning Models with HDDM

Computational modeling has become a central aspect of research in the cognitive neurosciences. As the field matures, it is increasingly important to move beyond standard models to quantitatively assess models with richer dynamics that may better reflect underlying cognitive and neural processes. For example, sequential sampling models (SSMs) are a general class of models of decision-making intended to capture processes jointly giving rise to RT distributions and choice data in n-alternative choice paradigms. A number of model variations are of theoretical interest, but empirical data analysis has historically been tied to a small subset for which likelihood functions are analytically tractable. Advances in methods designed for likelihood-free inference have recently made it computationally feasible to consider a much larger spectrum of SSMs. In addition, recent work has motivated the combination of SSMs with reinforcement learning models, which had historically been considered in separate literatures. Here, we provide a significant addition to the widely used HDDM Python toolbox and include a tutorial for how users can easily fit and assess a (user-extensible) wide variety of SSMs and how they can be combined with reinforcement learning models. The extension comes batteries included, including model visualization tools, posterior predictive checks, and ability to link trial-wise neural signals with model parameters via hierarchical Bayesian regression.

Cognitive Control of Working Memory: A Model-Based Approach

Working memory (WM)-based decision making depends on a number of cognitive control processes that control the flow of information into and out of WM and ensure that only relevant information is held active in WM's limited-capacity store. Although necessary for successful decision making, recent work has shown that these control processes impose performance costs on both the speed and accuracy of WM-based decisions. Using the reference-back task as a benchmark measure of WM control, we conducted evidence accumulation modeling to test several competing explanations for six benchmark empirical performance costs. Costs were driven by a combination of processes, running outside of the decision stage (longer non-decision time) and showing the inhibition of the prepotent response (lower drift rates) in trials requiring WM control. Individuals also set more cautious response thresholds when expecting to update WM with new information versus maintain existing information. We discuss the promise of this approach for understanding cognitive control in WM-based decision making.

Think fast! The implications of emphasizing urgency in decision-making

Evidence accumulation models (EAMs) have become the dominant explanation of how the decision-making process operates, proposing that decisions are the result of a process of evidence accumulation. The primary use of EAMs has been as "measurement tools" of the underlying decision-making process, where researchers apply EAMs to empirical data to estimate participants' task ability (i.e., the "drift rate"), response caution (i.e., the "decision threshold"), and the time taken for other processes (i.e., the "non-decision time"), making EAMs a powerful tool for discriminating between competing psychological theories. Recent studies have brought into question the mapping between the latent parameters of EAMs and the theoretical constructs that they are thought to represent, showing that emphasizing urgent responding - which intuitively should selectively influence decision threshold - may also influence drift rate and/or non-decision time. However, these findings have been mixed, leading to differences in opinion between experts in the field. The current study aims to provide a more conclusive answer to the implications of emphasizing urgent responding, providing a re-analysis of 6 data sets from previous studies using two different EAMs - the diffusion model and the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA) - with state-of-the-art methods for model selection based inference. The findings display clear evidence for a difference in conclusions between the two models, with the diffusion model suggesting that decision threshold and non-decision time decrease when urgency is emphasized, and the LBA suggesting that decision threshold and drift rate decrease when urgency is emphasized. Furthermore, although these models disagree regarding whether non-decision time or drift rate decrease under urgency emphasis, both show clear evidence that emphasizing urgency does not selectively influence decision threshold. These findings suggest that researchers should revise their assumptions about certain experimental manipulations, the specification of certain EAMs, or perhaps both.

How do recall requirements affect decision-making in free recall initiation? A linear ballistic accumulator approach

Models of free recall describe free recall initiation as a decision-making process in which items compete to be retrieved. Recently, Osth and Farrell (Psychological Review, 126, 578–609, 2019) applied evidence accumulation models to complete RT distributions and serial positions of participants’ first recalls in free recall, which resulted in some novel conclusions about primacy and recency effects. Specifically, the results of the modeling favored an account in which primacy was due to reinstatement of the start-of-the-list, and recency was found to be exponential in shape. In this work, we examine what happens when participants are given alternative recall instructions. Prior work has demonstrated weaker primacy and greater recency when fewer items are required to report (Ward & Tan, Memory & Cognition, 2019), and a key question is whether this change in instructions qualitatively changes the nature of the recall process, or merely changes the parameters of the recall competition. We conducted an experiment where participants studied six- or 12-item lists and were post-cued as to whether to retrieve a single item, or as many items as possible. Subsequently, we applied LBA models with various assumptions about primacy and recency, implemented using hierarchical Bayesian techniques. While greater recency was observed when only one item was required for output, the model selection did not suggest that there were qualitative differences between the two conditions. Specifically, start-of-list reinstatement and exponential recency functions were favored in both conditions.

A new model of decision processing in instrumental learning tasks

Learning and decision-making are interactive processes, yet cognitive modeling of error-driven learning and decision-making have largely evolved separately. Recently, evidence accumulation models (EAMs) of decision-making and reinforcement learning (RL) models of error-driven learning have been combined into joint RL-EAMs that can in principle address these interactions. However, we show that the most commonly used combination, based on the diffusion decision model (DDM) for binary choice, consistently fails to capture crucial aspects of response times observed during reinforcement learning. We propose a new RL-EAM based on an advantage racing diffusion (ARD) framework for choices among two or more options that not only addresses this problem but captures stimulus difficulty, speed-accuracy trade-off, and stimulus-response-mapping reversal effects. The RL-ARD avoids fundamental limitations imposed by the DDM on addressing effects of absolute values of choices, as well as extensions beyond binary choice, and provides a computationally tractable basis for wider applications.