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Laycock A, Schofield G, McCall C. The effects of threat on complex decision-making: evidence from a virtual environment. Sci Rep 2024; 14:22637. [PMID: 39349575 PMCID: PMC11442743 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-024-72812-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/18/2024] [Accepted: 09/10/2024] [Indexed: 10/02/2024] Open
Abstract
Individuals living and working in dangerous settings (e.g., first responders and military personnel) make complex decisions amidst serious threats. However, controlled studies on decision-making under threat are limited given obvious ethical concerns. Here, we embed a complex decision-making task within a threatening, immersive virtual environment. Based on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a paradigm widely used to study complex decision-making, the task requires participants to make a series of choices to escape a collapsing building. In Study 1 we demonstrate that, as with the traditional IGT, participants learn to make advantageous decisions over time and that their behavioural data can be described by reinforcement-learning based computational models. In Study 2 we created threatening and neutral versions of the environment. In the threat condition, participants performed worse, taking longer to improve from baseline and scoring lower through the final trials. Computational modelling further revealed that participants in the threat condition were more responsive to short term rewards and less likely to perseverate on a given choice. These findings suggest that when threat is integral to decision-making, individuals make more erratic choices and focus on short term gains. They furthermore demonstrate the utility of virtual environments for making threat integral to cognitive tasks.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aaron Laycock
- Department of Psychology, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, UK.
| | - Guy Schofield
- Department of Archaeology, University of York, York, YO10 5GB, UK
| | - Cade McCall
- Department of Psychology, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, UK
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Goodwin I, Hester R, Garrido MI. Temporal stability of Bayesian belief updating in perceptual decision-making. Behav Res Methods 2024; 56:6349-6362. [PMID: 38129733 PMCID: PMC11335944 DOI: 10.3758/s13428-023-02306-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 11/24/2023] [Indexed: 12/23/2023]
Abstract
Bayesian inference suggests that perception is inferred from a weighted integration of prior contextual beliefs with current sensory evidence (likelihood) about the world around us. The perceived precision or uncertainty associated with prior and likelihood information is used to guide perceptual decision-making, such that more weight is placed on the source of information with greater precision. This provides a framework for understanding a spectrum of clinical transdiagnostic symptoms associated with aberrant perception, as well as individual differences in the general population. While behavioral paradigms are commonly used to characterize individual differences in perception as a stable characteristic, measurement reliability in these behavioral tasks is rarely assessed. To remedy this gap, we empirically evaluate the reliability of a perceptual decision-making task that quantifies individual differences in Bayesian belief updating in terms of the relative precision weighting afforded to prior and likelihood information (i.e., sensory weight). We analyzed data from participants (n = 37) who performed this task twice. We found that the precision afforded to prior and likelihood information showed high internal consistency and good test-retest reliability (ICC = 0.73, 95% CI [0.53, 0.85]) when averaged across participants, as well as at the individual level using hierarchical modeling. Our results provide support for the assumption that Bayesian belief updating operates as a stable characteristic in perceptual decision-making. We discuss the utility and applicability of reliable perceptual decision-making paradigms as a measure of individual differences in the general population, as well as a diagnostic tool in psychiatric research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Isabella Goodwin
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Parkville Campus, Melbourne, Victoria, 3010, Australia.
| | - Robert Hester
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Parkville Campus, Melbourne, Victoria, 3010, Australia
| | - Marta I Garrido
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Parkville Campus, Melbourne, Victoria, 3010, Australia
- Graeme Clark Institute for Biomedical Engineering, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
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Kouklari EC, Tsermentseli S, Pavlidou A. Hot and cool executive function and theory of mind in children with and without specific learning disorders. APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY. CHILD 2024:1-10. [PMID: 38975692 DOI: 10.1080/21622965.2024.2375659] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 07/09/2024]
Abstract
Executive function (EF) in specific learning disorders (SLD) has been investigated using mainly cool EF tasks, whilst less is known about hot EF and theory of mind (ToM) in this population. The aim of this study was to examine group differences in hot and cool EF and ToM in school-aged children with SLD relative to typically developing peers. It also attempted to investigate whether EF measures are significant predictors of ToM in SLD and typical development. Cross-sectional data were collected from 135 school-aged children with and without SLD (8-10 years old), tested on measures of cool & hot EF and ToM. Significant group differences were observed in EFs inhibition (p= .04), working memory (p= .04) and delay of gratification (p < .001), as well as ToM mental state/emotion recognition (p = .019). Inhibition and planning contributed to 22% of the explained variance of ToM mental state/emotion recognition, but not false belief overall. Results suggest that cool EF may be a crucial predictor of ToM in children with and without SLD. Finally, stepwise logistic regression analysis identified specific hot EF and ToM measures contributing to group differentiation, specifically delay of gratification (odds ratio=.995, 95% CI [.993-.998]) and mental state/emotion recognition (odds ratio= .89, 95% CI [.796-.995]). This study contributes to our understanding of cognitive deficits and socio-cognitive impairment in children with SLD, which hold promise for informing interventions aimed at addressing these cognitive challenges.
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Affiliation(s)
- Evangelia-Chrysanthi Kouklari
- Department of Child Psychiatry, "Aghia Sophia" Children's Hospital, School of Medicine, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece
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Schurr R, Reznik D, Hillman H, Bhui R, Gershman SJ. Dynamic computational phenotyping of human cognition. Nat Hum Behav 2024; 8:917-931. [PMID: 38332340 PMCID: PMC11132988 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-024-01814-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/30/2023] [Accepted: 12/21/2023] [Indexed: 02/10/2024]
Abstract
Computational phenotyping has emerged as a powerful tool for characterizing individual variability across a variety of cognitive domains. An individual's computational phenotype is defined as a set of mechanistically interpretable parameters obtained from fitting computational models to behavioural data. However, the interpretation of these parameters hinges critically on their psychometric properties, which are rarely studied. To identify the sources governing the temporal variability of the computational phenotype, we carried out a 12-week longitudinal study using a battery of seven tasks that measure aspects of human learning, memory, perception and decision making. To examine the influence of state effects, each week, participants provided reports tracking their mood, habits and daily activities. We developed a dynamic computational phenotyping framework, which allowed us to tease apart the time-varying effects of practice and internal states such as affective valence and arousal. Our results show that many phenotype dimensions covary with practice and affective factors, indicating that what appears to be unreliability may reflect previously unmeasured structure. These results support a fundamentally dynamic understanding of cognitive variability within an individual.
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Affiliation(s)
- Roey Schurr
- Department of Psychology, Center for Brain Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA.
| | - Daniel Reznik
- Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany.
| | - Hanna Hillman
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
| | - Rahul Bhui
- Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
- Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
| | - Samuel J Gershman
- Department of Psychology, Center for Brain Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
- Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
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Colas JT, O’Doherty JP, Grafton ST. Active reinforcement learning versus action bias and hysteresis: control with a mixture of experts and nonexperts. PLoS Comput Biol 2024; 20:e1011950. [PMID: 38552190 PMCID: PMC10980507 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011950] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/13/2023] [Accepted: 02/26/2024] [Indexed: 04/01/2024] Open
Abstract
Active reinforcement learning enables dynamic prediction and control, where one should not only maximize rewards but also minimize costs such as of inference, decisions, actions, and time. For an embodied agent such as a human, decisions are also shaped by physical aspects of actions. Beyond the effects of reward outcomes on learning processes, to what extent can modeling of behavior in a reinforcement-learning task be complicated by other sources of variance in sequential action choices? What of the effects of action bias (for actions per se) and action hysteresis determined by the history of actions chosen previously? The present study addressed these questions with incremental assembly of models for the sequential choice data from a task with hierarchical structure for additional complexity in learning. With systematic comparison and falsification of computational models, human choices were tested for signatures of parallel modules representing not only an enhanced form of generalized reinforcement learning but also action bias and hysteresis. We found evidence for substantial differences in bias and hysteresis across participants-even comparable in magnitude to the individual differences in learning. Individuals who did not learn well revealed the greatest biases, but those who did learn accurately were also significantly biased. The direction of hysteresis varied among individuals as repetition or, more commonly, alternation biases persisting from multiple previous actions. Considering that these actions were button presses with trivial motor demands, the idiosyncratic forces biasing sequences of action choices were robust enough to suggest ubiquity across individuals and across tasks requiring various actions. In light of how bias and hysteresis function as a heuristic for efficient control that adapts to uncertainty or low motivation by minimizing the cost of effort, these phenomena broaden the consilient theory of a mixture of experts to encompass a mixture of expert and nonexpert controllers of behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jaron T. Colas
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, California, United States of America
- Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, United States of America
- Computation and Neural Systems Program, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, United States of America
| | - John P. O’Doherty
- Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, United States of America
- Computation and Neural Systems Program, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, United States of America
| | - Scott T. Grafton
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, California, United States of America
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Karvelis P, Paulus MP, Diaconescu AO. Individual differences in computational psychiatry: a review of current challenges. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2023; 148:105137. [PMID: 36940888 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105137] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 14.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/19/2023] [Revised: 03/04/2023] [Accepted: 03/14/2023] [Indexed: 03/23/2023]
Abstract
Bringing precision to the understanding and treatment of mental disorders requires instruments for studying clinically relevant individual differences. One promising approach is the development of computational assays: integrating computational models with cognitive tasks to infer latent patient-specific disease processes in brain computations. While recent years have seen many methodological advancements in computational modelling and many cross-sectional patient studies, much less attention has been paid to basic psychometric properties (reliability and construct validity) of the computational measures provided by the assays. In this review, we assess the extent of this issue by examining emerging empirical evidence. We find that many computational measures suffer from poor psychometric properties, which poses a risk of invalidating previous findings and undermining ongoing research efforts using computational assays to study individual (and even group) differences. We provide recommendations for how to address these problems and, crucially, embed them within a broader perspective on key developments that are needed for translating computational assays to clinical practice.
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Affiliation(s)
- Povilas Karvelis
- Krembil Centre for Neuroinformatics, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), Toronto, ON, Canada.
| | - Martin P Paulus
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, USA; Oxley College of Health Sciences, The University of Tulsa, Tulsa, OK, USA
| | - Andreea O Diaconescu
- Krembil Centre for Neuroinformatics, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), Toronto, ON, Canada; Department of Psychiatry, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada; Institute of Medical Sciences, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada; Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
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