Forced choices reveal a trade-off between cognitive effort and physical pain

The neuroscience of active learning and direct instruction

Throughout the educational system, students experiencing active learning pedagogy perform better and fail less than those taught through direct instruction. Can this be ascribed to differences in learning from a neuroscientific perspective? This review examines mechanistic, neuroscientific evidence that might explain differences in cognitive engagement contributing to learning outcomes between these instructional approaches. In classrooms, direct instruction comprehensively describes academic content, while active learning provides structured opportunities for learners to explore, apply, and manipulate content. Synaptic plasticity and its modulation by arousal or novelty are central to all learning and both approaches. As a form of social learning, direct instruction relies upon working memory. The reinforcement learning circuit, associated agency, curiosity, and peer-to-peer social interactions combine to enhance motivation, improve retention, and build higher-order-thinking skills in active learning environments. When working memory becomes overwhelmed, additionally engaging the reinforcement learning circuit improves retention, providing an explanation for the benefits of active learning. This analysis provides a mechanistic examination of how emerging neuroscience principles might inform pedagogical choices at all educational levels.

Bumpy ride ahead: Anticipated effort as emotional evidence?

Conscious reportable (un)pleasantness feelings were shown to be successfully described by a process in which evidence favoring pleasant and unpleasant feelings accumulates until one response wins the race. This approach is challenged by (a) insufficient specification of "evidence," and (b) incomplete verification that participants report their truly experienced (un)pleasant feelings and not what they expect to feel. In each trial in this preregistered experiment, the (un)pleasant feeling reports regarding emotion evoking pictures was embedded in a period when participants expected a low-effort task (feature visual search) or a high-effort task (feature-conjunction search). Fitting the Linear Ballistic Accumulator model to the feeling report data shows that anticipated effort was associated with a higher rate of unpleasant evidence accumulation, but only when the emotion evoking pictures were normatively unpleasant and not when they were normatively pleasant. These results suggest that anticipated effort may be one source of "evidence," but only given a certain interpretation of the findings, and that genuinely felt emotions contribute to the emotion reports, assuming that participants intended to react to the pictures, as instructed, and not to the anticipated effort.

Design and methods of the mobile assessment of cognition, environment, and sleep (MACES) feasibility study in newly diagnosed breast cancer patients

Endocrine therapy (ET) for breast cancer treatment is associated with cognitive complaints, but their etiology is poorly understood. To address this, we developed and implemented an ambulatory assessment protocol consisting of wearable activity monitors, brief surveys of affect, context, and perceived impairments, and ultra-brief performance-based measures of cognition. Newly diagnosed, ER/PR+, stage 0-III, female breast cancer patients, were recruited. Ambulatory assessments were conducted on smart phones and wearable activity monitors were used to monitor sleep and physical activity. Participants were asked to complete five 7-day measurement bursts (one before starting ET and one each month for 4 consecutive months while on ET). We observed a consent rate of 36%, 27 women completed the study. Of the women that withdrew, 91% dropped prior to the midpoint of follow up. There were no significant differences in demographics, clinical breast cancer characteristics, sleep or physical activity patterns, or measures of cognition between women who completed versus withdrew. Women who did not complete the study provided fewer valid days of baseline data. In conclusion, while some women may be overwhelmed with their cancer diagnosis, we did not identify any predictive characteristics of women whom did not complete the study. This novel method enables the prospective study of psychological changes associated with cancer treatment, capturing a wide array of information about behavior, experience, and cognition, thus providing a picture of the lived experiences of cancer patients before and during exposure to ET.

Filtering distractors is costly

To find a target in visual search, it is often necessary to filter out task-irrelevant distractors. People find the process of distractor filtering effortful, exerting physical effort to reduce the number of distractors that need to be filtered on a given search trial. Working memory demands are sufficiently costly that people are sometimes willing to accept aversive heat stimulation in exchange for the ability to avoid performing a working memory task. The present study examines whether filtering distractors in visual search is similarly costly. The findings reveal that individuals are sometimes willing to accept an electric shock in exchange for the ability to skip a single trial of visual search, increasingly so as the demands of distractor filtering increase. This was true even when acceptance of shock resulted in no overall time savings, although acceptance of shock was overall infrequent and influenced by a plurality of factors, including boredom and curiosity. These findings have implications for our understanding of the mental burden of distractor filtering and why people seek to avoid cognitive effort more broadly.

Need for cognition moderates the relief of avoiding cognitive effort

When making decisions, humans aim to maximize rewards while minimizing costs. The exertion of mental or physical effort has been proposed to be one those costs, translating into avoidance of behaviors carrying effort demands. This motivational framework also predicts that people should experience positive affect when anticipating demand that is subsequently avoided (i.e., a "relief effect"), but evidence for this prediction is scarce. Here, we follow up on a previous study [1] that provided some initial evidence that people more positively evaluated outcomes if it meant they could avoid performing an additional demanding task. However, the results from this study did not provide conclusive evidence that this effect was driven by effort avoidance. Here, we report two experiments that are able to do this. Participants performed a gambling task, and if they did not receive reward they would have to perform an orthogonal effort task. Prior to the gamble, a cue indicated whether this effort task would be easy or hard. We probed hedonic responses to the reward-related feedback, as well as after the subsequent effort task feedback. Participants reported lower hedonic responses for no-reward outcomes when high vs. low effort was anticipated (and later exerted). They also reported higher hedonic responses for reward outcomes when high vs. low effort was anticipated (and avoided). Importantly, this relief effect was smaller in participants with high need for cognition. These results suggest that avoidance of high effort tasks is rewarding, but that the size off this effect depends on the individual disposition to engage with and expend cognitive effort. They also raise the important question of whether this disposition alters the cost of effort per se, or rather offset this cost during cost-benefit analyses.

No Evidence That Working Memory Modulates the Plasticity of the Nociceptive System, as Measured by Secondary Mechanical Hypersensitivity

The effect of cognition on the plasticity of the nociceptive system remains controversial. In this study, we examined whether working memory can buffer against the development of secondary hypersensitivity. Thirty-five healthy women participated in 3 experimental conditions. In each condition, they underwent electrical stimulation of the skin for 2 minutes (middle-frequency electrical stimulation [MFS]), which induces secondary hypersensitivity. During MFS, participants executed either an individually tailored and rewarded n-back task (working memory condition), a rewarded reaction-time task (non-working memory condition), or no task at all (control condition). Before and after MFS, participants rated the self-reported intensity and unpleasantness of mechanical pinprick stimuli. Fear of MFS was also assessed. Heart rate variability was measured to examine potential differences between the 3 conditions and steady-state evoked potentials to the electrical stimulation were recorded to investigate differences in cortical responses. We report no significant difference in hypersensitivity between the 3 conditions. Moreover, engaging in the cognitive tasks did not affect the heart rate variability or the steady-state evoked potentials. Interestingly, higher fear of MFS predicted greater hypersensitivity. In conclusion, we found no evidence that working memory affects the plasticity of the nociceptive system, yet pain-related fear plays a role. PERSPECTIVE: This study shows that the execution of a cognitive task, irrespective of cognitive load or working memory, does not significantly modulate the development of secondary hypersensitivity, heart rate variability, or steady-state evoked potentials. However, higher pain-related fear seems to contribute to greater hypersensitivity.

Not all discounts are created equal: Regional activity and brain networks in temporal and effort discounting

Reward outcomes associated with costs like time delay and effort investment are generally discounted in decision-making. Standard economic models predict rewards associated with different types of costs are devalued in a similar manner. However, our review of rodent lesion studies indicated partial dissociations between brain regions supporting temporal- and effort-based decision-making. Another debate is whether options involving low and high costs are processed in different brain substrates (dual-system) or in the same regions (single-system). This research addressed these issues using coordinate-based, connectivity-based, and activation network-based meta-analyses to identify overlapping and separable neural systems supporting temporal (39 studies) and effort (20 studies) discounting. Coordinate-based activation likelihood estimation and resting-state connectivity analyses showed immediate-small reward and delayed-large reward choices engaged distinct regions with unique connectivity profiles, but their activation network mapping was found to engage the default mode network. For effort discounting, salience and sensorimotor networks supported low-effort choices, while the frontoparietal network supported high-effort choices. There was little overlap between the temporal and effort networks. Our findings underscore the importance of differentiating different types of costs in decision-making and understanding discounting at both regional and network levels.

Effortfulness of visual working memory: Gauged by physical exertion

Active maintenance of information in working memory (WM) is an essential but effortful cognitive process. Yet, the effortful nature of WM remains poorly understood. Here, we constructed a model to evaluate how perceived effort of WM is directly compared to that of physical exertion. In Experiment 1, participants freely chose to either remember a certain number of colors in a visual WM task or hold a hand dynamometer to a required percentage of maximal voluntary contraction (%MVC) to obtain a fixed task credit upon successful task completion. We found that participants discounted WM-related effort in the same way as they discounted handgrip-related effort based on a computation of expected choice outcomes (hence utility) associated with different task loads. This rationality in an observer's prospective choice in Experiment 1 was generalized to retrospective choice in Experiment 2 where participants reported which task was more effortful immediately after they had performed both tasks in a randomized order without any reward or feedback. Experiment 3 further probed this shared mechanism using a dual-task paradigm. As predicted by our model, we found that physical exertion could disrupt the performance in the concurrent WM task, proportional to the iso-effort relationship between WM and physical exertion when task loads were high for both tasks. Collectively, our findings converge on a shared computational principle connecting task load, perceived effort, and choice utility across physical and cognitive domains. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

More than a feeling: physiological measures of affect index the integration of effort costs and rewards during anticipatory effort evaluation

The notion that humans avoid effortful action is one of the oldest and most persistent in psychology. Influential theories of effort propose that effort valuations are made according to a cost-benefit trade-off: we tend to invest mental effort only when the benefits outweigh the costs. While these models provide a useful conceptual framework, the affective components of effort valuation remain poorly understood. Here, we examined whether primitive components of affective response-positive and negative valence, captured via facial electromyography (fEMG)-can be used to better understand valuations of cognitive effort. Using an effortful arithmetic task, we find that fEMG activity in the corrugator supercilii-thought to index negative valence-1) tracks the anticipation and exertion of cognitive effort and 2) is attenuated in the presence of high rewards. Together, these results suggest that activity in the corrugator reflects the integration of effort costs and rewards during effortful decision-making.

Efficient stabilization of imprecise statistical inference through conditional belief updating

Statistical inference is the optimal process for forming and maintaining accurate beliefs about uncertain environments. However, human inference comes with costs due to its associated biases and limited precision. Indeed, biased or imprecise inference can trigger variable beliefs and unwarranted changes in behaviour. Here, by studying decisions in a sequential categorization task based on noisy visual stimuli, we obtained converging evidence that humans reduce the variability of their beliefs by updating them only when the reliability of incoming sensory information is judged as sufficiently strong. Instead of integrating the evidence provided by all stimuli, participants actively discarded as much as a third of stimuli. This conditional belief updating strategy shows good test-retest reliability, correlates with perceptual confidence and explains human behaviour better than previously described strategies. This seemingly suboptimal strategy not only reduces the costs of imprecise computations but also, counterintuitively, increases the accuracy of resulting decisions.

Taking the path of least resistance now, but not later: Pushing cognitive effort into the future reduces effort discounting

Effort discounting describes the devaluation of rewards that require effort to obtain. The present study investigated whether discounting of cognitive effort depends on how near the effort is in time. The present study also investigated whether effort discounting, and its modulation by temporal distance to the effort, might depend on need for cognition, a personality trait that describes how much one enjoys cognitively demanding tasks. Participants performed a validated effort discounting task that measured the extent to which they subjectively devalued a $20 reward when effort was required to receive it. Immediacy of the effort was manipulated by having participants imagine exerting varying levels of effort either immediately, in a day, or in a month. Results revealed linear increases in discounting of rewards as a function of both how much effort was involved and how imminent the effort was. The extent to which both these variables influenced discounting correlated with need for cognition. Individuals low in need for cognition exhibited more effort discounting overall and a linear increase in effort discounting as the effort grew imminent. Individuals high in need for cognition engaged in less effort discounting, which was not modulated by how imminent the effort was. These results indicate that people exhibit dynamic inconsistency in effort-related decisions, such that the degree to which they discount effort depends on how soon the effort is. Additionally, this tendency is linked with systematic individual differences in need for cognition. Lastly, this study demonstrates that these tendencies can be quantitatively operationalized.

Distraction from pain depends on task demands and motivation

Supplemental Digital Content is Available in the Text.

Distraction is effective at reducing pain when the task is both cognitively demanding and there is sufficient motivation to invest effort into the task.

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Cognitive effort for self, strangers, and charities

Effort is aversive and often avoided, even when earning benefits for oneself. Yet, people sometimes work hard for others. How do people decide who is worth their effort? Prior work shows people avoid physical effort for strangers relative to themselves, but invest more physical effort for charity. Here, we find that people avoid cognitive effort for others relative to themselves, even when the cause is a personally meaningful charity. In two studies, participants repeatedly decided whether to invest cognitive effort to gain financial rewards for themselves and others. In Study 1, participants (N = 51; 150 choices) were less willing to invest cognitive effort for a charity than themselves. In Study 2, participants (N = 47; 225 choices) were more willing to work cognitively for a charity than an intragroup stranger, but again preferred cognitive exertion that benefited themselves. Computational modeling suggests that, unlike prior physical effort findings, cognitive effort discounted the subjective value of rewards linearly. Exploratory machine learning analyses suggest that people who represented others more similarly to themselves were more willing to invest effort on their behalf, opening up new avenues for future research.

Dopaminergic medication increases motivation to exert cognitive control by reducing subjective effort costs in Parkinson's patients

Engaging in demanding mental activities requires the allocation of cognitive control, which can be effortful and aversive. Individuals thus tend to avoid exerting cognitive effort if less demanding behavioral options are available. Recent accounts propose a key role for dopamine in motivating behavior by increasing the sensitivity to rewards associated with effort exertion. Whether dopamine additionally plays a specific role in modulating the sensitivity to the costs of cognitive effort, even in the absence of any incentives, is much less clear. To address this question, we assessed cognitive effort avoidance in patients (n = 38) with Parkinson's disease, a condition characterized by loss of midbrain dopaminergic neurons, both ON and OFF dopaminergic medication and compared them to healthy controls (n = 24). Effort avoidance was assessed using the Demand Selection Task (DST), in which participants could freely choose between performing a high-demand or a low-demand version of a task-switching paradigm. Critically, participants were not offered any incentives to choose the more effortful option, nor for good performance. While healthy controls and patients OFF their dopaminergic medications consistently preferred the low-demand option, effort avoidance in patients ON dopaminergic medications was reduced compared to patients OFF, a difference which seems to lessen over trials. These differences in preference could not be explained by altered task-switching performance. Although patients ON were less accurate at detecting the different effort levels, as measured during instructed forced-choice blocks, their detection ability was not associated with effort avoidance, unlike in the healthy controls and the patients OFF. Our findings provide evidence that dopamine replacement in Parkinson's patients increases the willingness to engage in cognitively demanding behavior, and that this cannot be explained by possible effects of dopamine replacement on performance nor on the ability to detect effort demands. These results suggest that dopamine plays a role in reducing the sensitivity to effort costs that is independent of its role in enhancing the sensitivity to the benefits of effort exertion.

Cost-benefit considerations have limited effect on the decision to exert cognitive effort in real-world computer-programming tasks

Recent research shows that people usually try to avoid exerting cognitive effort yet they are willing to exert effort to gain rewards. This cost-benefit framework provides predictions for behaviour outside the laboratory. Nevertheless, the extent to which such considerations affect real-life decisions is not clear. Here we experimentally examined computer-programmers' decisions to write code in a reusable manner, using functions, which demands an initial investment of cognitive effort or to clone and tweak code, a strategy whose cost increases with repetitions. Only a small portion of our participants demonstrated sensitivity to the benefits and costs of programming strategies. When asked to solve the tasks, participants tended to avoid using functions, demonstrating biased effort estimation. By contrast, when asked how they planned to solve the tasks, participants tended to demonstrate an opposite trend, overestimating effort, in line with an injunctive norm involving the overuse of functions. In the context of real-world problems, the effect of cost-benefit considerations may therefore be limited by task-irrelevant factors. Our interdisciplinary approach may be useful in providing novel theoretical insights and in promoting cognitive-effort investments outside the laboratory.

Cognitive Control as a Multivariate Optimization Problem

A hallmark of adaptation in humans and other animals is our ability to control how we think and behave across different settings. Research has characterized the various forms cognitive control can take-including enhancement of goal-relevant information, suppression of goal-irrelevant information, and overall inhibition of potential responses-and has identified computations and neural circuits that underpin this multitude of control types. Studies have also identified a wide range of situations that elicit adjustments in control allocation (e.g., those eliciting signals indicating an error or increased processing conflict), but the rules governing when a given situation will give rise to a given control adjustment remain poorly understood. Significant progress has recently been made on this front by casting the allocation of control as a decision-making problem. This approach has developed unifying and normative models that prescribe when and how a change in incentives and task demands will result in changes in a given form of control. Despite their successes, these models, and the experiments that have been developed to test them, have yet to face their greatest challenge: deciding how to select among the multiplicity of configurations that control can take at any given time. Here, we will lay out the complexities of the inverse problem inherent to cognitive control allocation, and their close parallels to inverse problems within motor control (e.g., choosing between redundant limb movements). We discuss existing solutions to motor control's inverse problems drawn from optimal control theory, which have proposed that effort costs act to regularize actions and transform motor planning into a well-posed problem. These same principles may help shed light on how our brains optimize over complex control configuration, while providing a new normative perspective on the origins of mental effort.

Cognitive Effort Exertion Enhances Electrophysiological Responses to Rewarding Outcomes

Recent work has highlighted neural mechanisms underlying cognitive effort-related discounting of anticipated rewards. However, findings on whether effort exertion alters the subjective value of obtained rewards are inconsistent. Here, we provide a more nuanced account of how cognitive effort affects subsequent reward processing in a novel task designed to assess effort-induced modulations of the Reward Positivity, an event-related potential indexing reward-related neural activity. We found that neural responses to both gains and losses were significantly elevated in trials requiring more versus less cognitive effort. Moreover, time-frequency analysis revealed that these effects were mirrored in gain-related delta, but not in loss-related theta band activity, suggesting that people ascribed more value to high-effort outcomes. In addition, we also explored whether individual differences in behavioral effort discounting rates and reward sensitivity in the absence of effort may affect the relationship between effort exertion and subsequent reward processing. Together, our findings provide evidence that cognitive effort exertion can increase the subjective value of subsequent outcomes and that this effect may primarily rely on modulations of delta band activity.

Aversive motivation and cognitive control

Aversive motivation plays a prominent role in driving individuals to exert cognitive control. However, the complexity of behavioral responses attributed to aversive incentives creates significant challenges for developing a clear understanding of the neural mechanisms of this motivation-control interaction. We review the animal learning, systems neuroscience, and computational literatures to highlight the importance of experimental paradigms that incorporate both motivational context manipulations and mixed motivational components (e.g., bundling of appetitive and aversive incentives). Specifically, we postulate that to understand aversive incentive effects on cognitive control allocation, a critical contextual factor is whether such incentives are associated with negative reinforcement or punishment. We further illustrate how the inclusion of mixed motivational components in experimental paradigms enables increased precision in the measurement of aversive influences on cognitive control. A sharpened experimental and theoretical focus regarding the manipulation and assessment of distinct motivational dimensions promises to advance understanding of the neural, monoaminergic, and computational mechanisms that underlie the interaction of motivation and cognitive control.

The influence of emotional salience on gaze behavior in low and high trait empathy: an exploratory eye-tracking study

Previous studies have shown that situational factors like emotional salience are associated with higher subjective levels of state empathy. The present eye-tracking study explored whether gaze behavior varies as a function of emotional salience between individuals with low and high self-reported trait empathy. In a between-subjects design, we presented three social scene images in the context of different emotion conditions (Scene 1: neutral versus positive; Scene 2: neutral versus negative; Scene 3: positive versus negative) and assessed the dwell times of individuals with low versus high self-reported empathy (measured with the Toronto Empathy Questionnaire; TEQ). Analyses revealed that whereas low- and high-TEQ participants differed in their gaze behavior after receiving neutral information, they did not differ after receiving positive or negative information. Our preliminary results suggest that gaze behavior may be more indicative of self-reported trait empathy in situations with low emotional salience than in situations with high emotional salience.

Neuroscience of the yogic theory of consciousness

Yoga as a practice and philosophy of life has been followed for more than 4500 years with known evidence of yogic practices in the Indus Valley Civilization. The last few decades have seen a resurgence in the utility of yoga and meditation as a practice with growing scientific evidence behind it. Significant scientific literature has been published, illustrating the benefits of yogic practices including 'asana', 'pranayama' and 'dhyana' on mental and physical well-being. Electrophysiological and recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have found explicit neural signatures for yogic practices. In this article, we present a review of the philosophy of yoga, based on the dualistic 'Sankhya' school, as applied to consciousness summarized by Patanjali in his yoga sutras followed by a discussion on the five 'vritti' (modulations of mind), the practice of 'pratyahara', 'dharana', 'dhyana', different states of 'samadhi', and 'samapatti'. We formulate the yogic theory of consciousness (YTC), a cohesive theory that can model both external modulations and internal states of the mind. We propose that attention, sleep and mind wandering should be understood as unique modulatory states of the mind. YTC allows us to model the external states, internal states of meditation, 'samadhi' and even the disorders of consciousness. Furthermore, we list some testable neuroscientific hypotheses that could be answered using YTC and analyse the benefits, outcomes and possible limitations.

Reduction of Pain and Spinal Nociceptive Transmission by Working Memory is Load Dependant

Working memory (WM) engagement produces pain inhibition. However, it remains unclear whether higher WM load increases this effect. The aim of this study was to investigate the interaction between WM load and pain inhibition by WM and examine the contribution of cerebrospinal mechanism. Thirty-eight healthy volunteers were assigned to one of 2 n-back groups for which WM load was different (2-back or 3-back). The experimental protocol comprised 5 counterbalanced conditions (0-back, n-back, pain, 0-back with pain, and n-back with pain). Pain and the nociceptive flexion reflex (NFR) were evoked by transcutaneous electrical stimulation of the sural nerve. Pain was significantly different between conditions, but not between n-back groups. Both the 0-back and n-back tasks reduced pain compared with pain alone, but the n-back task produced stronger pain inhibition compared with the 0-back task. NFR amplitude was significantly different between conditions but not between n-back groups. NFR was inhibited by the 0-back and n-back tasks, with no difference between the 2 tasks. These findings indicate that pain inhibition by WM is increased by WM load, but only to a certain point. NFR inhibition by WM suggests that inhibition of pain by WM depends, at least in part, on cerebrospinal mechanism. PERSPECTIVE: This behavioral and electrophysiological study shows that engaging in a cognitive task reduces pain by decreasing spinal nociceptive transmission, depending on task difficulty. These findings may yield better nonpharmacological pain therapies based on individual differences in working memory performance and capacity as well as several factors that regulate working memory.

Forced choices reveal a trade-off between cognitive effort and physical pain

Cognitive effort is described as aversive, and people will generally avoid it when possible. This aversion to effort is believed to arise from a cost-benefit analysis of the actions available. The comparison of cognitive effort against other primary aversive experiences, however, remains relatively unexplored. Here, we offered participants choices between performing a cognitively demanding task or experiencing thermal pain. We found that cognitive effort can be traded off for physical pain and that people generally avoid exerting high levels of cognitive effort. We also used computational modelling to examine the aversive subjective value of effort and its effects on response behaviours. Applying this model to decision times revealed asymmetric effects of effort and pain, suggesting that cognitive effort may not share the same basic influences on avoidance behaviour as more primary aversive stimuli such as physical pain.