Spread of viruses, which measures are the most apt to control COVID-19?

The persistent debate about the modes of transmission of SARS-CoV2 and preventive measures has illustrated the limits of our knowledge regarding the measures to be implemented in the face of viral risk. Past and present (pandemic-related) scientific data underline the complexity of the phenomenon and its variability over time. Several factors contribute to the risk of transmission, starting with incidence in the general population (i.e., colonization pressure) and herd immunity. Other major factors include intensity of symptoms, interactions with the reservoir (proximity and duration of contact), the specific characteristics of the virus(es) involved, and a number of unpredictable elements (humidity, temperature, ventilation…). In this review, we will emphasize the difficulty of "standardizing" the situations that might explain the discrepancies found in the literature. We will show that the airborne route remains the main mode of transmission. Regarding preventive measures of prevention, while vaccination remains the cornerstone of the fight against viral outbreaks, we will remind the reader that wearing a mask is the main barrier measure and that the choice of type of mask depends on the risk situations. Finally, we believe that the recent pandemic should induce us in the future to modify our recommendations by adapting our measures in hospitals, not to the pathogen concerned, which is currently the case, but rather to the type of at-risk situation.

Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales and vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium carriage in patients who have traveled in foreign countries: A single center 5-year prospective study

BACKGROUND

Numerous patients carrying carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales (CPE) and/or vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium (VRE) in France have previously travelled abroad. The risk of spreading CPE/VRE by patients who have stayed abroad without hospitalization is underexplored. This prompted us to screen and isolate all patients who travelled abroad in the previous 12 months upon admission to our hospital. Our aim was to evaluate the efficiency of this CPE/VRE-related risk policy.

METHODS

From 2014 to 2018, patients who had travelled abroad in the previous year before their admission underwent microbiological screening and were pre-emptively isolated. Contact precautions were verified and CPE/VRE cross-transmission events investigated.

RESULTS

Among 1,780 screened patients, 59 (3.3%) were colonized with CPE and/or VRE, of whom 17 (29.3%) were not hospitalized abroad. Nine generated 18 readmissions. No episodes of CPE/VRE cross-transmission were related to patients with a stay abroad without hospitalization, whereas 2 patients hospitalized abroad generated one episode each, despite implementation of contact precautions reaching values from 73.6% to 87.5%.

DISCUSSION

Throughout 17 admissions and 18 readmissions, patients who stayed abroad without hospitalization represented a true risk of spreading CPE/VRE, without generating cross-transmission.

CONCLUSIONS

Our strategy of CPE/VRE-related risk policy is successful.

Risk factors for the environmental spread of different multidrug-resistant organisms: a prospective cohort study

BACKGROUND

Substantial scientific evidence shows that contamination of environmental surfaces in hospitals plays an important role in the transmission of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs). To date, studies have failed to identify the risk factors associated with environmental contamination.

AIM

To evaluate, compare, and identify factors associated with environmental contamination around carriers of different MDROs.

METHODS

This was a prospective cohort study from May 2018 to February 2020. A total of 125 patients were included, having been admitted to Avicenne Hospital and Hotel Dieu de France de Beyrouth Hospital who were faecal carriers of MDROs (extended-spectrum β-lactamase-producing Enterobacterales (ESBL-PE), carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales (CPE), vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE)). For each patient, quantification of MDRO in stool was undertaken, plus a qualitative evaluation of the presence of MDRO in six different environmental sites; and clinical data were collected.

FINDINGS

MDROs comprised ESBL-PE (34%), CPE (45%), and VRE (21%). The most frequent MDRO species was Escherichia coli. Contamination of at least one environmental site was observed for 22 (18%) patients. Only carriage of VanA was associated with a significantly higher risk of dissemination. Having a urinary catheter, carriage of OXA48 and E. coli were protective factors against environmental contamination. There were no significant differences in environmental contamination between E. coli and other Enterobacterales or between ESBL-PE and CPE.

CONCLUSIONS

Hospital environmental contamination rates are substantially higher for patients with VRE, compared to the low environment dissemination rates around ESBL-PE and CPE. Further studies on a larger scale are needed to confirm the validity of our findings.

Incidence, risk factors, and outcome of multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii acquisition during an outbreak in a burns unit

BACKGROUND

Multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (MR-AB) can cause outbreaks in a burns unit.

AIM

To study the incidence, risk factors and outcome of MR-AB colonization during an outbreak.

METHODS

A prospective study was conducted from April to November 2014 in a burns unit in Paris. Weekly surveillance cultures of patients and their environment were performed. MR-AB acquisition, discharge, or death without MR-AB colonization were considered as competing events. To identify risk factors for colonization, baseline characteristics and time-dependent variables were investigated in univariate and multivariate analyses using Cox models. MR-AB strains were genotypically compared using multi-locus sequence typing.

FINDINGS

Eighty-six patients were admitted in the burns unit during the study period. Among 77 patients without MR-AB colonization at admission, 25 (32%) acquired MR-AB with a cumulative incidence of 30% at 28 days (95% CI: 20-40). Median time to MR-AB acquisition was 13 days (range: 5-34). In multivariate analysis, risk factors for MR-AB acquisition were ≥2 skin graft procedures performed [hazard ratio (HR): 2.97; 95% confidence interval (CI): 1.10-8.00; P = 0.032] and antibiotic therapy during hospitalization (HR: 4.42; 95% CI: 1.19-16.4; P = 0.026). A major sequence type of MR-AB (ST2) was found in 94% and 92% of patients and environmental strains, respectively, with all strains harbouring the blaOXA-23 gene. MR-AB colonization increased length of hospitalization (HR: 0.32; 95% CI: 0.17-0.58; P = 0.0002) by a median of 12 days.

CONCLUSION

A high incidence of MR-AB acquisition was seen during this outbreak with most strains from patients and their environment belonging to single sequence type. MR-AB colonization was associated with more skin graft procedures, antibiotic use, and prolonged hospitalization.