Threat by Association, Islamic Puritanism and Conspiracy Beliefs Explain A Religious Majority Group’s Collective Protest Against Religious Minority Groups

This article addresses the question of why members of a majority group, despite their more powerful status, may protest against low-power minority groups. The present study addressed this question in the context of immanent intergroup relations between Muslims, as the majority group, and non-Muslims, as the minority group, in Indonesia. It is argued that at the core of such collective protests is a threat by association, a perception of the majority group members that the minority groups are in league with the West which threatens the existence of Muslims worldwide. Based on data collected using a survey questionnaire from Indonesian Muslims ( N = 418) this study tested a hypothesised model using threat by association posed by the minority groups, Islamic puritanism and beliefs relating to western conspiracy to predict collective protests and intolerant intentions against non-Muslim minorities in Indonesia by using MPlus version 7.0. The hypothesised model found empirical support. The relationship between threat by association and Islamic puritanism with collective protests was mediated by Western conspiracy beliefs. It was also found that support for collective protests got translated into majority group members’ religious intolerant intentions against the people belonging to the non-Muslim minority groups. The article discusses the theoretical implications and research limitations of these empirical findings.

Political psychology of Southeast Asia

This special thematic section spotlights the current state of political psychology in Southeast Asia. Drawing from various research methodologies, five papers published in this special thematic section provide psychological insights into different political topics in the past and present-day Southeast Asia, including 1) Islam and politics; 2) terrorist labelling; 3) violence against minorities; 4) moralised policies; and 5) vote-buying. Overall, this special thematic section contributes to the understanding of the political psychology of non-WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) populations, particularly in Southeast Asia. The need for more publications with non-WEIRD samples in the field of political psychology is discussed, as are some strategies to actualise this goal.

Victimisation-by-ingroup Consciousness: Its Antecedents and Impact on Radicalism

This study proposed victimisation-by-ingroup consciousness as a novel concept, which denotes that intragroup violence or wrongdoings by some group members victimise other members of the same group and may elicit sense of physical, material, cultural and psychological sufferings among the victim members. Applying this concept to the context of religious radicalism, this study revealed that among a sample of Indonesian Muslims ( N = 810), the perceptions of physical, material and cultural sufferings positively predicted psychological suffering. This sense of psychological suffering turned out to motivate participants to perceive intragroup violence as illegitimate. This perceived illegitimacy of intragroup violence ultimately facilitated participants to report less emotional, attitudinal and intentional radical tendencies to support terrorists. Finally, we found as expected that Islamic blind patriotism negatively predicted, but constructive Islamic patriotism positively predicted participants’ victimisation-by-ingroup consciousness. These empirical findings broadly suggest that accepting the deficiency of the ingroup may be beneficial for tackling Muslims’ radical tendencies, but this prospect depends on modes of Muslims’ emotional attachment to their own group. We close by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of those empirical findings, as well as limitations and practical implications of this study.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s defensive denial of the Rohingya massacre: A rhetorical analysis of denial and positive-image construction

In December 2019, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accused the Myanmar government of genocide against Rohingya Muslims. Represented by Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar authorities denied such accusations. To understand how a political leader can deny ingroup wrongdoings, we unpacked Suu Kyi’s ICJ speech and analyzed her defensive rhetorical style through critical narrative analysis. We aimed to identify and describe the denial strategies Suu Kyi used as well as how she maintained a positive ingroup image to support her position. Our findings showed that Suu Kyi engaged in interpretative denial of genocide by arguing that genocide cannot occur when there is armed conflict, that there were victims and perpetrators on both sides, and that misconducts by law enforcement had been addressed. To maintain the ingroup’s positive image, she portrayed Myanmar as moral by emphasizing the government’s knowledge of ethical standards and laws, as well as their support for peace and justice. By examining political discourse used by a national leader internationally renowned for supporting human rights, our findings shed light on the dynamic, constructive nature of denial. Theoretical and applied contributions to understanding denial of ingroup wrongdoing are discussed.

The socio-psychological predictors of support for post-truth collective action

Politics in the current era are replete with unreliable media stories which lack evidence, sometimes disparagingly dubbed "fake news". A survey on a sample of Muslims in Indonesia (N = 518) in this work found that participants' endorsement of collective action in of support issues with little to no empirical evidence (i.e., post-truth collective action) increased as a function of their belief in fake news and prejudice against the outgroup (i.e., non-Muslims). Belief in fake news stemmed from participants' generic and specific conspiratorial thinking, whereas prejudice was positively predicted by relative Muslim prototypicality, denoting how much Muslims in Indonesia view that their group is more representative than non-Muslims of the superordinate Indonesian identity that encompasses both groups. Additionally, our findings revealed that generic conspiratorial thinking and relative Muslim prototypicality were positively predicted by collective narcissism, which in turn spurred participants' support for collective action by augmenting belief in fake news.

The psychological antecedents of resistance to humanitarian aid

Victims of natural or humanitarian disasters sometimes resist aid offered to them, resulting in slower recovery among victims, and feelings of rejection among aid offerers. We present two studies conducted in Indonesia that investigated motives for spurning offers of humanitarian aid. Both studies showed that beliefs in developed countries’ conspiracies lead participants to see humanitarian aid as guided by strategic rather than prosocial motives. Perceived strategic motives in turn enhanced aid resistance, whereas perceived prosocial motives decreased resistance. Conspiratorial beliefs and aid resistance were positively predicted by national collective narcissism (Study 1) and intergroup conflict (Study 2). Together, these findings show that humanitarian aid resistance arises from the recipients’ beliefs in malignant intentions of the providers.

Promoting reconciliation in separatist conflict: The effect of morality framing

In separatist conflict, the majority group and the separatist group alternate in their roles as victim and perpetrator. We examined how framing prior ingroup wrongdoings in terms of violations of moral ideals or violations of moral obligations affects the majority’s willingness to reconcile with the separatist group. We conducted a field experiment ( N = 208) in the Republic of Indonesia, where separatist conflict is rife. As expected, among members of the majority who were high in national identification, a moral ideals violation frame produced stronger positive intergroup orientations (e.g., perspective-taking, intergroup trust) and collective emotions of guilt and shame, whereas a moral obligations violation frame produced stronger positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions among low identifiers. In turn, positive intergroup orientations and collective emotions promoted reconciliatory attitudes (e.g., willingness to apologise, support for intergroup cooperation). These findings suggest that policymakers can gain a better insight into the effect of framing ingroup wrongdoings as violations of either moral ideals or moral obligations when taking national identification into account.

Explaining Muslims’ Aggressive Tendencies Towards the West: The Role of Negative Stereotypes, Anger, Perceived Conflict and Islamic Fundamentalism

The current research was to investigate what psychological factors predict Muslims’ negative stereotypes of the West, and the underlying mechanism by which the negative stereotypes can translate into Muslims’ aggressive tendencies towards the West. A correlational survey among a sample of Indonesian Muslims ( N = 360) demonstrated that the more participants negatively stereotyped the West, the more they thought that Muslims should aggress the latter group. We also found as expected that Muslims’ negative stereotypes of the West were positively predicted by the perceived conflict between Islam and the West, and this perceived intergroup conflict in turn mediated the role of Islamic fundamentalism in predicting the negative stereotypes. These findings in sum highlight the role of contextual and individual factors in predicting Muslims’ negative stereotypes of the West, as well as the impact of these stereotypes on Muslims’ aggressive tendencies towards the West. Theoretical implications and research limitations of these empirical findings are discussed.

Remember your crimes: How an appeal to ingroup wrongdoings fosters reconciliation in separatist conflict

The aim of this study was to compare the effectiveness of appeals to ingroup wrongdoings, as opposed to ingroup rightdoings, on reconciliation between groups in a real-world conflict. We conducted an experiment in Indonesia, where separatist conflict in the province West Papua is currently unresolved. Participants were a sample of Javanese residents (N = 502), representing the majority group in Indonesia. Compared to ingroup rightdoings, being reminded of ingroup wrongdoings significantly increased participants' sense of perpetratorhood. These feelings of being a perpetrator in turn fostered participants' reconciliatory attitudes towards the separatist group. These findings reveal that an appeal to ingroup wrongdoings can be effective in promoting intergroup reconciliation. In addition to theoretical implications, we discuss practical implications in terms of highlighting the importance of acknowledging ingroup wrongdoings as part of an intervention programme.

Predicting Support for Reconciliation in Separatist Conflict

The current research examined two fundamental motives that could lie at the root of separatist groups’ desire to be independent from the nonseparatist majority: the need to maintain the own subgroup identity and the need to preserve power vis-à-vis the majority. These motives were examined in two studies through surveys among samples of indigenous people in West Papua ( N = 201 and N = 248), where separatist movements are actively striving for secession from the Republic of Indonesia. As expected, identity threat increased perceptions of injustice in both studies, whereas power threat increased the need for subgroup empowerment. Perceived injustice and need for subgroup empowerment, in turn, decreased support for reconciliation with the majority. The current research is the first to examine how identity and power motives combine in predicting separatist intentions. The studies reveal important insights that can contribute to the reconciliation of separatist conflict.

A Majority Group’s Perspective-taking Towards a Minority Group

This research investigates the impact of perspective-taking on a majority group’s support for government action to help a minority group. Data among a sample of Indonesian Muslims ( N = 380), representing a religious majority group in Indonesia, showed that perspective-taking was a strong positive predictor of Muslims’ support for government action to help Christian minority. Relative Muslim prototypicality vis-à-vis Christians depressed perspective-taking. Contrariwise, inclusive victimhood reflecting a perception that Muslims are equally afflicted relative to Christians in intergroup conflicts, involving both groups, promoted perspective-taking. Relative Muslim prototypicality was augmented by the extent to which this majority group glorified Islam and was motivated to protect Islamic power. However, inclusive victimhood instead attenuated relative Muslim prototypicality. These findings suggest the importance of enhancing inclusive victimhood, given its impact in promoting perspective-taking which is beneficial to the majority’s support for minority helping.

How morality threat promotes reconciliation in separatist conflict: A majority group perspective

We examined how the perception that separatist groups threaten the majority’s moral identity impacts the latter group’s support for reconciliation in separatist conflict. Two studies were conducted in Indonesia, where separatist conflict is rife. Javanese students (representing the nonseparatist majority) responded surveys regarding separatist conflicts in Aceh (Study 1, N = 679) or West Papua (Study 2, N = 500). As expected, perceived threat to the majority’s moral identity increased this particular group’s reconciliatory attitudes (Study 1), emotions, and behaviours (Study 2), through increased compensatory needs for social acceptance and restoration of moral image. These findings underline the importance of moral identity dynamics in separatist conflict. Moreover, they reveal that the majority, despite its dominant position, can experience morality threat from separatist groups which can foster positive attitudes towards the reconciliation process.

The Role of Identity Subversion in Structuring the Effects of Intergroup Threats and Negative Emotions on Belief in Anti-West Conspiracy Theories in Indonesia

Indonesian Muslims believe in conspiracies, suggesting that the West is behind terrorist attacks in Indonesia. This belief persists despite overwhelming evidence that Islamist radicals were the true perpetrators. The current research examines the role intergroup threats and negative emotions have in moulding this type of conspiratorial belief, and how this role is dependent upon the level of Muslims’ perceived identity subversion, that is, a sense that the Western ways of life have fundamentally changed Islamic identity. Data from 246 Indonesian Muslim students revealed that negative emotions of dejection-agitation towards Western ways of life significantly mediated the effects of both symbolic and realistic threats on belief in anti-West conspiracy theories. The effects of intergroup threats and dejection-agitation on belief in conspiracy theories, as predicted, were contingent on Muslim participants’ perceived identity subversion. Higher symbolic threat, realistic threat and dejection-agitation, indeed, positively predicted the belief, but only when the degree of identity subversion was high. Identity subversion moderated the roles of dejection-agitation in mediating the effect of symbolic and realistic threats in predicting belief in conspiracy theories. More specifically, the empirical evidence of these mediating roles of dejection-agitation was only among Muslim participants with high identity subversion. Finally, theoretical implications and study limitations of the current findings were discussed.

You Are the Real Terrorist and We Are Just Your Puppet: Using Individual and Group Factors to Explain Indonesian Muslims' Attributions of Causes of Terrorism

The current study investigates the role of individual and intergroup factors in predicting Muslims' tendency to attribute domestic terrorism in Indonesia to an external cause (i.e., The West) or an internal cause (i.e., radical Islamist groups). The results (N = 308) showed that intergroup factors of symbolic threat and realistic threat directly increased the external attribution and conversely decreased the internal attribution. Within the context of the current research, symbolic threat refers to Muslims' perception that the norms and values of the West undermine Islamic identity. Realistic threat denotes Muslims' perception that the economy and technology of the West undermine Islamic power. The individual factor of Islamic fundamentalism, which has to do with Muslims' belief in the literal interpretation of and strict guidelines to Islamic doctrines, indirectly predicted both external attribution and internal attribution of terrorism as hypothesized, via the extent to which Muslims perceived the West as posing a symbolic threat, but not a realistic threat to Islamic existence. Uncertainty avoidance, a cultural dimension that describes the extent to which people view clear instructions as a pivotal source of concern to deal with societal problems, also significantly increased perceived symbolic threat and realistic threat, and this cultural dimension mediated the effect of Islamic fundamentalism on each of the intergroup threats. Finally, we found that the level of Islamic fundamentalism was dependent upon cognitive response, but not emotional response to mortality salience. The cognitive response to mortality salience denotes what Muslims are thinking about in coping with their own death whereas the emotional response denotes what Muslims are feeling about such issue. In particular, we found the cognitive response, but not the emotional response to mortality salience significantly gave rise to Muslims' Islamic fundamentalism. These findings shed light on the importance of combining individual factors and group factors in explicating the dynamics of Muslims' tendency to make attributions of causes of domestic terrorism. We discuss theoretical implications and study limitations, as well as practical actions policy makers could conduct to deal with Muslims' Islamic fundamentalism and reduce the extent to which this particular group perceives the West as threatening their existence.

Demonising the Victim

The current study aims to understand victim blaming of Ahmadiyya group by majority Sunni Islam in Indonesia. We included ingroup essentialisation, outgroup essentialisation, identity undermining and belief in conspiracy theory as predictors of victim blaming. Results of a survey among 147 Muslims majority Sunni Islam shows that the relationship between identity undermining and victim blaming is stronger for individuals holding ingroup de-essentialisation compared to those with ingroup essentialisation. Moreover, belief in conspiracy theory was found to mediate the effect of the interaction variable of identity undermining and ingroup essentialisation on victim blaming. In addition, outgroup essentialisation was found correlated with belief in conspiracy theory but did not play a significant role to moderate the effect of identity undermining on belief in conspiracy theory and victim blaming. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

The effect of intergroup threat and social identity salience on the belief in conspiracy theories over terrorism in indonesia: collective angst as a mediator

The present study tested how intergroup threat (high versus low) and social identity as a Muslim (salient versus non-salient) affected belief in conspiracy theories. Data among Indonesian Muslim students (N = 139) from this study demonstrated that intergroup threat and social identity salience interacted to influence belief in conspiracy theories. High intergroup threat triggered greater belief in conspiracy theories than low intergroup threat, more prominently in the condition in which participants’ Muslim identity was made salient. Collective angst also proved to mediate the effect of intergroup threat on the belief. However, in line with the prediction, evidence of this mediation effect of collective angst was only on the salient social identity condition. Discussions on these research findings build on both theoretical and practical implications.

National Identification and Collective Emotions as Predictors of Pro-Social Attitudes Toward Islamic Minority Groups in Indonesia

The present study examined the role of Indonesian Moslem majority’s national identification, collective emotions of pride and guilt in predicting their support in helping members of Islamic minority and their perceived inclusion towards this group. Data from this study (N= 182) demonstrated that, in line with our prediction, support for minority helping significantly predicted perceived inclusion. We also hypothesized and found that collective pride and collective guilt directly predicted the minority helping. Finally, national identification had significant direct effects on both collective pride and collective guilt. These findings shed light on the importance of collective emotions and national identification in giving rise to pro-social attitudes of Indonesian Moslem majority towards members of Islamic minority. Implications of the research findings were discussed with reference to theories of group-based emotion and intergroup helping, and to practical strategies Indonesian government can apply to recognize Islamic minorities.

When Common Identities Reduce Between-Group Helping

Emphasizing a common group identity is often suggested as a way to promote between-group helping. But recently, researchers have identified a set of strategic motives for helping other groups, including the desire to present the own group as warm and generous. When the motive for helping is strategic, a salient common identity should reduce the willingness to help another group, because the help no longer communicates a quality of the ingroup (only of the common group). The authors tested this hypothesis in two experiments, in which they assessed beliefs about helping (Study 1) and actual helping through behavioral observation (Study 2). The results fully supported the predictions, demonstrating that a common identity is not a universal tool for the promotion of prosocial behavior. The studies also illustrate the strategic nature of between-group helping, in which acts that appear prosocial on the surface are in fact intended to enhance the ingroup’s image.