Vaccination of Poultry Against Influenza

The complexity of influenza A virus (IAV) infections in avian hosts leads to equally complex scenarios for the vaccination of poultry. Vaccination against avian influenza strains can be used to prevent infections from sources with a single strain of IAV. It has been used as a part of outbreak control strategies as well as a way to maintain production for both low and high pathogenicity outbreaks. Unlike other viral pathogens of birds, avian influenza vaccination when used against highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, is tied to international trade and thus is not freely available for use without specific permission.

Rational approach to vaccination against highly pathogenic avian influenza in Nigeria: a scientific perspective and global best practice

Since 2006, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) subtypes H5Nx have adversely affected poultry production in Nigeria. Successive waves of infections in the last two decades have raised concerns about the ability to contain infections by biosecurity alone, and evidence of recurrent outbreaks suggests a need for adoption of additional control measures such as vaccination. Although vaccination can be used to control virus spread and reduce the morbidity and mortality caused by HPAI, no country using vaccination alone as a control measure against HPAI has been able to eliminate or prevent re-infection. To inform policy in Nigeria, we examined the intricacies of HPAI vaccination, government regulations, and scientific data regarding what kind of vaccines can be used based on subtype, whether inactivated or live attenuated should be used, when to deliver vaccine either proactively or reactively, where to apply vaccination either in disease control zones, regionally, or nationally, and how to vaccinate the targeted poultry population for optimum success. A resurgence of HPAI outbreaks in Nigeria since 2018, after the country was declared free of the epidemic following the first outbreak in 2006, has led to enhanced intervention. Controlled vaccination entails monitoring the application of vaccines, the capacity to differentiate vaccinated from infected (DIVA) flocks, and assessing seroconversion or other immune correlates of protection. Concurrent surveillance for circulating avian influenza virus (AIV) and analyzing AIV isolates obtained via surveillance efforts for genetic and/or antigenic mismatch with vaccine strains are also important. Countries with high investment in commercial poultry farms like Nigeria may identify and zone territories where vaccines can be applied. This may include ring vaccination to control HPAI in areas or production systems at risk of infection. Before adoption of vaccination as an additional control measure on commercial poultry farms, two outcomes must be considered. First, vaccination is an admission of endemicity. Secondly, vaccinated flocks may no longer be made accessible to international poultry markets in accordance with WOAH trade regulations. Vaccination must therefore be approached with utmost caution and be guided by science-based evidence throughout the implementation strategy after thorough risk assessment. Influenza vaccine research, development, and controlled application in addition to biosecurity may be a precautionary measure in the evolving HPAI scenario in Nigeria.

Cross-protection of commercial vaccines against Chilean swine influenza A virus using the guinea pig model as a surrogate

Influenza A virus poses a significant threat to public health and the swine industry. Vaccination is the primary measure for controlling the disease, but the effectiveness of vaccines can vary depending on the antigenic match between vaccine strains and circulating strains. In Chile, H1N1pdm09 and other lineages H1N2 and H3N2 have been detected in pigs, which are genetically distinct from the strains included in commercial vaccines. This study aimed to evaluate the cross-protection by commercial vaccines against strains circulating in Chile using the guinea pig model. For this study, four circulating strains [A/swine/Chile/H1A-7/2014(H1N2), A/swine/Chile/H1B-2/2014(H1N2), A/swine/Chile/H1P-12/2015(H1N1), and A/swine/Chile/H3-2/2015(H3N2)] were selected. Guinea pigs were divided into vaccinated and control groups. The vaccinated animals received either a multivalent antigenically heterologous or monovalent homologous vaccine, while the control animals remained unvaccinated. Following vaccination, all animals were intranasally challenged, and nasal wash samples were collected at different time points post-infection. The results showed that the homologous monovalent vaccine-induced hemagglutinin-specific antibodies against the Chilean pandemic H1N1pdm09 strain. However, the commercial heterologous multivalent vaccine failed to induce hemagglutinin-specific antibody titers against the H1N2 and H3N2 challenge strains. Furthermore, the homologous monovalent vaccine significantly reduced the duration of viral shedding and viral titers specifically against the Chilean pandemic H1N1pdm09 strain and heterologous multivalent vaccine only partial. These findings highlight the importance of regularly updating vaccine strains to match the circulating field strains for effective control of swine influenza. Further research is needed to develop vaccines that confer broader protection against diverse strains of swine influenza A virus.

Evaluation of internal farm biosecurity measures combined with sow vaccination to prevent influenza A virus infection in groups of due-to-wean pigs

Background

Influenza A virus (IAV) is an important respiratory pathogen of pigs that affects pig health, well-being and productivity, has zoonotic potential, and has significant economic impact for producers. The ultimate goal is to maintain herds free from IAV. Due to the probability of IAV introduction into the herds, it is also desirable for herds to have some immunity to the virus. In this study, we evaluated a protocol that combined sow vaccination with the implementation of internal biosecurity practices during the pre-weaning period with the goal to wean IAV negative pigs.

Five IAV positive breeding herds were vaccinated twice, 3 weeks apart with a herd-specific autogenous vaccine. For the subsequent 8 weeks, a biosecurity protocol was maintained, consisting of no pig movements after 3 days of age, no use of nurse sows, workers changing disposable gloves between litters, workers not stepping into farrowing crates, and daily disinfection of tools and materials used to handle pigs.

Results

Following these interventions, four of the five treatment farms had significant reductions in IAV detection (p value < 0.05). Three of the farms tested negative at all sampling points post-intervention and one farm had a 21% reduction in IAV positivity.

Conclusions

This study indicates that a protocol that combines sow vaccination and enhanced biosecurity practices may limit IAV transmission among piglets and enable the weaning of groups of pigs free from the virus.

Evaluation of dam parity and internal biosecurity practices in influenza infections in piglets prior to weaning

Influenza is an important respiratory disease of pigs and humans. Controlling influenza in pigs is challenging due to the substantial genetic diversity of influenza A virus (IAV). In this study, we assessed the impact of internal biosecurity practices directed at limiting exposure of piglets to IAV before weaning; evaluated the association of sow parity with IAV prevalence in piglets and the levels of maternally derived antibodies (MDA), and documented the frequency of detection of IAV on farmworkers' hands and the instruments used when handling pigs. The control group included litters in rooms where no specific changes were made to standard farm procedures. The treatment group included litters in rooms where no cross-fostering or nurse sows use was allowed, and where farmworkers were required to change gloves between litters when handling pigs. Both, younger (≤ Parity 3) and older parity sows (>Parity 3) were represented in all rooms included in the study. Overall, litters in the treatment group had lower IAV prevalence (29.9 %) than litters in the control group (44.2 %) (p < 0.001), and at day 8 of age the litters from the control group had 7.5 times higher IAV prevalence than the litters from the treatment group. However, at weaning differences were not found (77.2 % vs. 81 % for treatment vs. control, respectively, p = 0.41). There were no differences in IAV detection between parity groups at any of the sampling points (p = 0.86) and incidence of detection in sows from farrowing to weaning was 29 %. Piglets that tested ELISA negative were 1.3 times more likely to test IAV positive than piglets that were ELISA positive for IAV antibody test, suggesting that effective colostrum intake may reduce the likelihood of infection. IAV was detected on 46 % of the instruments used when handling piglets and on 58 % of farmworkers' hands, indicating the potential risk for mechanical transmission of IAV in pigs. Overall, we showed that the implementation of internal biosecurity practices that limit IAV exposure to newborn piglets helped delay IAV infections but were not sufficient to reduce the prevalence of IAV infection in litters at weaning.

The Risk of Highly Pathogenic Influenza A Virus Transmission to Turkey Hen Flocks Through Artificial Insemination

Artificial insemination is a routine practice for turkeys that can introduce pathogens into breeder flocks in a variety of ways. In this manuscript, a risk analysis on the potential transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) to naïve hens through artificial insemination is presented. A case of HPAI on a stud farm where the potential transmission of the virus to susceptible hens in the 2015 H5N2 HPAI outbreak in Minnesota is described along with documentation of known and potential transmission pathways from the case. The pathways by which artificial insemination might result in the spread of HPAI to susceptible hens were determined by considering which could result in the 1) entry of HPAI virus onto a premises through semen movement; and 2) exposure of susceptible hens to HPAI as a result of this movement. In the reported case, HPAI virus was detected in semen from infected toms, however, transmission of HPAI to naïve hens through semen is unclear since the in utero infectious dose is not known. This means that the early detection of infection might limit but not eliminate the risk of hen exposure. Because of the numerous potential pathways of spread and the close contact with the birds, it is highly likely that if semen from an HPAI-infected tom flock is used, there will be spread of the virus to naïve hens through insemination. If insemination occurs with semen from stud farms in an HPAI control area, receiving hen farms should have restricted movements to prevent outbreak spread in the event that they become infected.

Shedding and transmission of a live attenuated influenza A virus vaccine in pre-weaned pigs under field conditions

Influenza A virus (IAV) is one of the most important respiratory viruses affecting pig health and vaccination is the most common strategy to control influenza infections. In this field study we assessed the onset and duration of shedding of a live attenuated influenza virus (LAIV) vaccine, its ability to transmit to non-vaccinated pigs and whether the LAIV could be aerosolized and detected in the environment. Thirty-three litters (n = 33) of a farm using the LAIV vaccine were selected for the study, a subset of them (n = 12) were left unvaccinated and a subset of piglets (n = 3) in vaccinated litters were also left unvaccinated to serve as sentinels. Selected piglets from the litters were sampled multiple days post vaccination (DPV) by collecting nasal swabs and blood, and were tested using a LAIV vaccine specific RT-PCR assay and hemagglutination inhibition assay against the LAIV strains respectively. Environmental specimens consisting of air and surface wipes were also collected. One hundred percent (21/21) of the vaccinated litters tested LAIV positive 1 DPV and until 6 DPV. In contrast, only five (5/33) of the thirty-three non-vaccinated pigs tested positive during the course of the study. Viable LAIV was confirmed in vaccinated pigs by cell culture and whole genome sequencing. In addition, low levels of LAIV RNA (RT-PCR Ct values ranging between 33 and 38) were detected in all air specimens collected on the day of vaccination and until 6 DPV (3/10). Pigs had maternally derived antibodies reactive against the LAIV strains which may have influenced the degree of shedding observed. Under the conditions of this study, shedding of the LAIV from vaccinated pigs was limited in time, resulted in minimal transmission to non-vaccinated pigs and was detected in low levels in aerosols collected in the vaccinated rooms likely influenced by the presence of maternally derived antibodies against the LAIV strains.

Avian Influenza Prevalence and Viral Shedding Routes in Minnesota Ring-Billed Gulls (Larus delawarensis)

Birds within the orders Charadriiformes (shorebirds, gulls) and Anseriformes (waterfowl) are reservoir hosts for avian influenza (AI) viruses, but their role in the transmission dynamics of AI viruses is unclear. To date, waterfowl have been the predominant focal species for most surveillance and epidemiological studies, yet gulls, in particular, have been shown to harbor reassortant AI viruses of both North American and Eurasian lineages and are underrepresented in North American surveillance efforts. To address this gap in surveillance, 1346 ring-billed gulls (Larus delawarensis) were sampled during spring and fall migrations and at three breeding sites in 2017 across Minnesota. Results indicate noticeable age-cohort dynamics in AI virus prevalence within ring-billed gulls in Minnesota. Immunologically naïve juveniles represented the cohort with the highest prevalence rate (57.8%). Regardless of age, more gulls had AI virus detected in oropharyngeal (OP) than in cloacal (CL) swabs. The high AI virus prevalence within ring-billed gulls, particularly in immunologically naïve birds, warrants further targeted surveillance efforts of ring-billed gulls and other closely related species.

Mortality-Based Triggers and Premovement Testing Protocols for Detection of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Infection in Commercial Upland Game Birds

Outbreaks involving avian influenza viruses are often devastating to the poultry industry economically and otherwise. Disease surveillance is critically important because it facilitates timely detection and generates confidence that infected birds are not moved during business continuity intended to mitigate associated economic losses. The possibility of using an abnormal increase in daily mortality to levels that exceed predetermined thresholds as a trigger to initiate further diagnostic investigations for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus infection in the flock is explored. The range of optimal mortality thresholds varies by bird species, trigger type, and mortality thresholds, and these should be considered when assessing sector-specific triggers. The study uses purposefully collected data and data from the literature to determine optimal mortality triggers for HPAI detection in commercial upland game bird flocks. Three trigger types were assessed for the ability to detect rapidly both HPAI (on the basis of disease-induced and normal mortality data) and false alarm rate (on the basis of normal mortality data); namely, 1) exceeding a set absolute threshold on one day, 2) exceeding a set absolute threshold on two consecutive days, or 3) exceeding a multiple of a seven-day moving average. The likelihood of disease detection using some of these triggers together with premovement real-time reverse transcription PCR (rRT-PCR) testing was examined. Results indicate that the performance of the two consecutive days trigger had the best metrics (i.e., rapid detection with few false alarms) in the trade-off analysis. The collected normal mortality data was zero on 66% of all days recorded, with an overall mean of 0.6 dead birds per day. In the surveillance scenario analyses, combining the default protocol that relied only on active surveillance (i.e., premovement testing of oropharyngeal swab samples from dead birds by rRT-PCR) together with either of the mortality-based triggers improved detection rates on all days postexposure before scheduled movement. For exposures occurring within 8 days of movement, the protocol that combined the default with single-day triggers had slightly more detections than that with two consecutive days triggers. However, all assessed protocol combinations were able to detect all infections that occurred more than 10 days before scheduled movement. These findings can inform risk-based decisions pertaining to continuity of business in the commercial upland game bird industry.

Antigenic characterization of novel H1 influenza A viruses in swine

Novel H1N2 influenza A viruses (IAVs) in swine have been identified in Chile co-circulating with pandemic H1N1 2009-like (A(H1N1)pdm09-like) viruses. The objective of this study was to characterize antigenically the swine H1 IAVs circulating in Chile. Genetic analysis based on the HA1 domain and antigenic analysis by hemagglutination inhibition assay were carried out. Three antigenic clusters were identified, named Chilean H1 A (ChH1A), Chilean H1 B (ChH1B), and A(H1N1)pdm09-like. The antigenic sites of ChH1A and ChH1B strains were 10–60% distant from those of commercial vaccine strains at the amino acid sequence level. Antigenic variants were identified within the clusters ChH1A and A(H1N1)pdm09-like. Substitutions in the main antigenic sites (E153G in Sa, Q193H in Sb, D168N in Ca1, P137S in Ca2, and F71L in Cb) were detected in variants from the ChH1A cluster, whereas only a single substitution in antigenic site Sa (G155E) was detected in variants from A(H1N1)pdm09-like cluster, which confirms the importance to carrying out antigenic analyses in addition to genetic analyses to evaluate control measures such as vaccination. These results highlight the need to update vaccines for swine in Chile and the importance of continued surveillance to determine the onward transmission of antigenic variants in Chilean pig populations.

A Risk-Based Permitting Process for the Managed Movement of Animals and Products of Animal Origin as a Tool for Disease Management

During a foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak, in addition to detecting, controlling, containing, and eradicating the FAD, one of the goals of response in the United States (US), and many other countries, is to allow the managed movement of non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products from within FAD control areas to facilitate continuity of business (COB). Permits issued by government authorities are the mechanism by which such managed movements are allowed in the US, resulting in permitted movements. The overall purpose of issuing permits during an outbreak is to minimize the risk of disease spread while still allowing movement of products or animals; thus, the risk associated with each permitted movement must be considered. Currently, there are federal guidelines for the various permit types and purposes. These guidelines state that permits should be “based on science and risk-based information.” However, federal guidelines with specific procedures to determine risk are not readily available nor do they explicitly enumerate measures to assist regulatory authorities in using risk to guide decisions to grant permitted movement or deny a request to move. Although some pro-active risk assessments (RAs) have been conducted to determine risk of moving certain animals and their products, there will always be animal and product movements for which no pro-active RAs exist. We present here a process description of steps to conduct risk-based permitting with appropriate resource allocation to permitting by industry and regulatory authorities during an FAD outbreak.

Environmental Sampling Survey of H5N2 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza-Infected Layer Chicken Farms in Minnesota and Iowa

Respiratory secretions, feces, feathers, and eggs of avian influenza-infected hens provide ample sources of virus which heavily contaminate barn and farm environments during a disease outbreak. Environmental sampling surveys were conducted in the Midwestern United States on affected farms during the 2015 H5N2 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak to assess the degree of viral contamination. A total of 930 samples were obtained from various sites inside and outside layer barns housing infected birds and tested with real-time reverse transcriptase PCR. The distribution and load of viral RNA in barns in which most birds were dead at the onset of depopulation efforts (high-mortality barns) were compared with those of barns in which birds were euthanatized before excess mortality occurred (normal-mortality barns). A statistically significant difference was seen between cycle threshold (Ct) values for samples taken of fans, feed troughs, barn floors, barn walls, cages, manure-associated locations, barn doors, egg belts, and the exterior of high-mortality vs. normal-mortality barns. In high-mortality barns, sample sites were found to be the most to least contaminated in the following order: cages, manure-associated locations, barn floors, egg belts, feed troughs, barn doors, barn walls, fans, exterior, and egg processing. Significant changes in Ct values over time following HPAI detection in a barn and depopulation of birds on an infected farm were observed for the manure-associated, barn floor, barn wall, and fan sampling sites. These results show that high mortality in a flock as a result of HPAI will increase contamination of the farm environment. The results also suggest optimal sampling locations for detection of virus; however, the persistence of RNA on highmortality farms may delay the determination that adequate sanitization has been performed for restocking to take place.

Analysis of geographic location and pathways for influenza A virus infection of commercial upland game bird and conventional poultry farms in the United States of America

BACKGROUND

Avian influenza (AI) is an infectious viral disease that affects several species and has zoonotic potential. Due to its associated health and economic repercussions, minimizing AI outbreaks is important. However, most control measures are generic and mostly target pathways important for the conventional poultry farms producing chickens, turkeys, and eggs and may not target other pathways that may be specific to the upland game bird sector. The goal of this study is to provide evidence to support the development of novel strategies for sector-specific AI control by comparing and contrasting practices and potential pathways for spread in upland game bird farms with those for conventional poultry farms in the United States. Farm practices and processes, seasonality of activities, geographic location and inter-farm distance were analyzed across the sectors. All the identified differences were framed and discussed in the context of their associated pathways for virus introduction into the farm and subsequent between-farm spread.

RESULTS

Differences stemming from production systems and seasonality, inter-farm distance and farm densities were evident and these could influence both fomite-mediated and local-area spread risks. Upland game bird farms operate under a single, independent owner rather than being contracted with or owned by a company with other farms as is the case with conventional poultry. The seasonal marketing of upland game birds, largely driven by hunting seasons, implies that movements are seasonal and customer-vendor dynamics vary between industry groups. Farm location analysis revealed that, on average, an upland game bird premises was 15.42 km away from the nearest neighboring premises with birds compared to 3.74 km for turkey premises. Compared to turkey premises, the average poultry farm density in a radius of 10 km of an upland game bird premises was less than a half, and turkey premises were 3.8 times (43.5% compared with 11.5%) more likely to fall within a control area during the 2015 Minnesota outbreak.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that the existing differences in the seasonality of production, isolated geographic location and epidemiological seclusion of farms influence AI spread dynamics and therefore disease control measures should be informed by these and other factors to achieve success.

Comparison of individual, group and environmental sampling strategies to conduct influenza surveillance in pigs

BACKGROUND

Influenza A virus (IAV) is an important pathogen in pigs that affects productivity and has important public health implications because of its zoonotic nature. Surveillance is central to the control of influenza, however, detection of IAV infections can be challenging in endemically infected herds with low prevalence of infection.

METHODS

In groups of suckling (18-21 days of age) and growing (35-45 days of age) pigs, we compared various sampling approaches to detect, isolate and sequence IAV using individual (nasal swabs, nasal wipes and oropharyngeal swabs), group (oral fluids, surface wipes and sow udder skin wipes) and environmental (airborne particles deposited on surfaces and air samples) sampling approaches. All samples were tested by IAV rRT-PCR and a subset was used for virus isolation and direct sequencing.

RESULTS

In general, environmental and group samples resulted in higher odd ratios (range = 3.87-16.5, p-value < 0.05) of detecting a positive sample by rRT-PCR compared to individual pooled samples, except for oropharyngeal swabs (OR = 8.07, p-value < 0.05). In contrast, individual samples were most likely to yield a viral isolate by cell culture. Oropharyngeal swabs in suckling pigs (78.4%), and nasal swabs (47.6%) or nasal wipes (45%) in growing pigs, and udder wipes in lactating sows (75%) were the preferred samples to obtain an isolate.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings indicate that group and environmental sampling strategies should be considered in influenza surveillance programs in particular if the goal is just to detect infection. This study provides new information on sampling approaches to conduct effective influenza surveillance in pigs and identifies udder wipes from lactating sows as a novel sample type that offers a convenient, cheap and sensitive manner to monitor IAV in litters prior to weaning.

Breed-to-wean farm factors associated with influenza A virus infection in piglets at weaning

Breed-to-wean pig farms play an important role in spreading influenza A virus (IAV) because suckling piglets maintain, diversify and transmit IAV at weaning to other farms. Understanding the nature and extent of which farm factors drive IAV infection in piglets is a prerequisite to reduce the burden of influenza in swine. We evaluated the association between IAV infection in piglets at weaning and farm factors including farm features, herd management practices and gilt- and piglet-specific management procedures performed at the farm. Voluntarily enrolled breed-to-wean farms (n = 83) agreed to share IAV diagnostic testing and farm data from July 2011 through March 2017 including data obtained via the administration of a survey. There were 23% IAV RT-PCR positive samples of the 12,814 samples submitted for IAV testing within 2989 diagnostic submissions with 30% positive submissions. Among all the factors evaluated (n = 24), and considering the season-adjusted multivariable analysis, only sow IAV vaccination and gilt IAV status at entry significantly reduced (p-value<0.05) IAV infections in piglets at weaning. Results from this study indicate that veterinarians and producers could manage these identified factors to reduce the burden of influenza in piglets prior to wean and perhaps, reduce the spread of IAV to other farms and people.

Detection of influenza A virus in aerosols of vaccinated and non-vaccinated pigs in a warm environment

The 2009 influenza pandemic, the variant H3N2v viruses in agricultural fairs and the zoonotic poultry H5N9 infections in China have highlighted the constant threat that influenza A viruses (IAV) present to people and animals. In this study we evaluated the effect of IAV vaccination on aerosol shedding in pigs housed in warm environmental conditions. Thirty-six, three-week old weaned pigs were obtained from an IAV negative herd and were randomly allocated to one of 4 groups: 1) a homologous vaccine group, 2) a heterologous multivalent vaccine group, 3) a heterologous monovalent group and, 4) a non-vaccinated group. After vaccination pigs were challenged with the triple reassortant A/Sw/IA/00239/04 H1N1 virus. Environmental temperature and relative humidity were recorded throughout the study. Nasal swabs, oral fluids and air samples were collected daily. All samples were tested by RRT-PCR and virus isolation was attempted on positive samples. Average temperature and relative humidity throughout the study were 27°C (80°F) and 53%, respectively. A significantly higher proportion of infected pigs was detected in the non-vaccinated than in the vaccinated group. Lower levels of nasal virus shedding were found in vaccinated groups compared to non-vaccinated group and IAV was not detected in air samples of any of the vaccinated groups. In contrast, positive air samples were detected in the non-vaccinated group at 1, 2 and 3 days post infection although the overall levels were considered low most likely due to the elevated environmental temperature. In conclusion, both the decrease in shedding and the increase in environmental temperature may have contributed to the inability to detect airborne IAV in vaccinated pigs.

Multiple Genome Constellations of Similar and Distinct Influenza A Viruses Co-Circulate in Pigs During Epidemic Events

Swine play a key role in the ecology and transmission of influenza A viruses (IAVs) between species. However, the epidemiology and diversity of swine IAVs is not completely understood. In this cohort study, we sampled on a weekly basis 132 3-week old pigs for 15 weeks. We found two overlapping epidemic events of infection in which most pigs (98.4%) tested PCR positive for IAVs. The prevalence rate of infection ranged between 0 and 86% per week and the incidence density ranged between 0 and 71 cases per 100 pigs-week. Three distinct influenza viral groups (VGs) replicating as a "swarm" of viruses were identified (swine H1-gamma, H1-beta, and H3-cluster-IV IAVs) and co-circulated at different proportions over time suggesting differential allele fitness. Furthermore, using deep genome sequencing 13 distinct viral genome constellations were differentiated. Moreover, 78% of the pigs had recurrent infections with IAVs closely related to each other or IAVs clearly distinct. Our results demonstrated the molecular complexity of swine IAVs during natural infection of pigs in which novel strains of IAVs with zoonotic and pandemic potential can emerge. These are key findings to design better health interventions to reduce the transmission of swine IAVs and minimize the public health risk.

Ring test evaluation of the detection of influenza A virus in swine oral fluids by real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction and virus isolation

The probability of detecting influenza A virus (IAV) in oral fluid (OF) specimens was calculated for each of 13 assays based on real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) and 7 assays based on virus isolation (VI). The OF specimens were inoculated with H1N1 or H3N2 IAV and serially diluted 10-fold (10(-1) to 10(-8)). Eight participating laboratories received 180 randomized OF samples (10 replicates × 8 dilutions × 2 IAV subtypes plus 20 IAV-negative samples) and performed the rRT-PCR and VI procedure(s) of their choice. Analysis of the results with a mixed-effect logistic-regression model identified dilution and assay as variables significant (P < 0.0001) for IAV detection in OF by rRT-PCR or VI. Virus subtype was not significant for IAV detection by either rRT-PCR (P = 0.457) or VI (P = 0.101). For rRT-PCR the cycle threshold (Ct) values increased consistently with dilution but varied widely. Therefore, it was not possible to predict VI success on the basis of Ct values. The success of VI was inversely related to the dilution of the sample; the assay was generally unsuccessful at lower virus concentrations. Successful swine health monitoring and disease surveillance require assays with consistent performance, but significant differences in reproducibility were observed among the assays evaluated.

Genome plasticity of triple-reassortant H1N1 influenza A virus during infection of vaccinated pigs

To gain insight into the evolution of influenza A viruses (IAVs) during infection of vaccinated pigs, we experimentally infected a 3-week-old naive pig with a triple-reassortant H1N1 IAV and placed the seeder pig in direct contact with a group of age-matched vaccinated pigs (n = 10). We indexed the genetic diversity and evolution of the virus at an intra-host level by deep sequencing the entire genome directly from nasal swabs collected at two separate samplings during infection. We obtained 13 IAV metagenomes from 13 samples, which included the virus inoculum and two samples from each of the six pigs that tested positive for IAV during the study. The infection produced a population of heterogeneous alleles (sequence variants) that was dynamic over time. Overall, 794 polymorphisms were identified amongst all samples, which yielded 327 alleles, 214 of which were unique sequences. A total of 43 distinct haemagglutinin proteins were translated, two of which were observed in multiple pigs, whereas the neuraminidase (NA) was conserved and only one dominant NA was found throughout the study. The genetic diversity of IAVs changed dynamically within and between pigs. However, most of the substitutions observed in the internal gene segments were synonymous. Our results demonstrated remarkable IAV diversity, and the complex, rapid and dynamic evolution of IAV during infection of vaccinated pigs that can only be appreciated with repeated sampling of individual animals and deep sequence analysis.

Association between Influenza A Virus Infection and Pigs Subpopulations in Endemically Infected Breeding Herds

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) are distributed worldwide in birds, pigs and humans, and cause important endemic disease affecting hosts in all countries. Although pigs play a key role in the ecology of IAVs, the epidemiology of IAVs within swine herds is poorly understood. In this longitudinal study we describe the prevalence of IAVs infection in three subpopulations of pigs in 5 breeding herds in the Midwestern USA. Each herd was sampled monthly for a year and, at each visit, 30 individual nasal swabs were collected from the three subpopulations, namely, a) replacement females, resident on-farm for less than 4 weeks (new gilts), b) replacement females, resident on-farm for more than 4 weeks (gilts), and c) neonatal pigs less than 21 days of age (piglets). Real time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RRT-PCR) was used to detect IAVs, and the association between IAVs infection and pig subpopulation was measured using a mixed logistic regression model. Nasal swabs (n = 4,190) were collected from 141 groups of pigs. At least, one IAV-positive nasal swab was found in 19.9% (n = 28) of the sampled groups, and 7.7% (n = 324) of all nasal swabs tested positive. After adjusting by annual quarter and sampling event, the odds of testing IAV positive were 7.9 (95% CI 1.4, 43.9) and 4.4 (95% CI 1.1, 17.1) times higher in groups of new gilts and piglets compared to groups of gilts, respectively. Results indicate that new gilts and piglets had higher odds of testing IAV positive than gilts in swine breeding herds and that season influences IAV infection in pigs. Based on these findings, we recommend that IAV control strategies be aimed at preventing infection before gilts are introduced into the farm, and in pigs prior to weaning.

Widespread rotavirus H in commercially raised pigs, United States

We investigated the presence in US pigs of rotavirus H (RVH), identified in pigs in Japan and Brazil. From 204 samples collected during 2006–2009, we identified RVH in 15% of fecal samples from 10 US states, suggesting that RVH has circulated in the United States since 2002, but probably longer.

Influenza A viruses of swine circulating in the United States during 2009-2014 are susceptible to neuraminidase inhibitors but show lineage-dependent resistance to adamantanes

Antiviral drug susceptibility is one of the evaluation criteria of pandemic potential posed by an influenza virus. Influenza A viruses of swine (IAV-S) can play an important role in generating novel variants, yet limited information is available on the drug resistance profiles of IAV-S circulating in the U.S. Phenotypic analysis of the IAV-S isolated in the U.S. (2009-2011) (n=105) revealed normal inhibition by the neuraminidase (NA) inhibitors (NAIs) oseltamivir, zanamivir, and peramivir. Screening NA sequences from IAV-S collected in the U.S. (1930-2014) showed 0.03% (1/3396) sequences with clinically relevant H274Y-NA substitution. Phenotypic analysis of IAV-S isolated in the U.S. (2009-2011) confirmed amantadine resistance caused by the S31N-M2 and revealed an intermediate level of resistance caused by the I27T-M2. The majority (96.7%, 589/609) of IAV-S with the I27T-M2 in the influenza database were isolated from pigs in the U.S. The frequency of amantadine-resistant markers among IAV-S in the U.S. was high (71%), and their distribution was M-lineage dependent. All IAV-S of the Eurasian avian M lineage were amantadine-resistant and possessed either a single S31N-M2 substitution (78%, 585/747) or its combination with the V27A-M2 (22%, 162/747). The I27T-M2 substitution accounted for 43% (429/993) of amantadine resistance in classic swine M lineage. Phylogenetic analysis showed that both S31N-M2 and I27T-M2 emerged stochastically but appeared to be fixed in the U.S. IAV-S population. This study defines a drug-susceptibility profile, identifies the frequency of drug-resistant markers, and establishes a phylogenetic approach for continued antiviral-susceptibility monitoring of IAV-S in the U.S.

Antigenic drift of H1N1 influenza A virus in pigs with and without passive immunity

BACKGROUND

The genetic and antigenic characteristics of influenza A viruses (IAV) within and between species change over time due to antigenic shift and drift. Although pigs are known to play a key role in the epidemiology of IAV between species, little is known about the molecular evolution of IAV hemagglutinin (HA) in pigs.

OBJECTIVES

The aim of this study was to evaluate the HA drift of an H1N1 IAV after infecting weaned pigs with or without maternally derived passive immunity.

METHODS

Three- to four-week-old piglets born either to vaccinated or unvaccinated sows were contact-infected upon exposure with an IAV-infected pig. Nasal swabs were collected daily from each pig and tested for IAV by RRT-PCR. Full-length HA sequences were obtained directly from positive nasal swabs and compared between groups.

RESULTS

Synonymous and non-synonymous mutations were detected in pigs with and without passive immunity. Most of the non-synonymous mutations occurred within the HA1 region of the HA. Changes within HA1 region were only identified in antigenic site B in pigs without passive immunity and in antigenic sites A, B, and D in pigs with passive immunity. However, there was no association between the immune status of the pig and the amino acid substitutions observed.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, we demonstrated that amino acid substitutions within antigenic sites can happen in weaned pigs with or without passive immunity shortly after infection.

VP6 genetic diversity, reassortment, intragenic recombination and classification of rotavirus B in American and Japanese pigs

Rotavirus B (RVB) has been identified as a causative agent of diarrhea in rats, humans, cattle, lambs, and swine. Recently, 20 RVB VP7 genotypes were determined based on an 80% nucleotide percent cut-off value. In this study, we sequenced the RVB VP6 gene segment from 80 RVB positive swine samples from the United States and Japan. Phylogenetic analyses, using the 30 available RVB VP6 sequences from GenBank and our 80 novel RVB VP6 sequences, revealed a large genetic diversity of RVB strains, mainly in pigs. For classification purposes, pairwise identity frequency analyses suggested an 81% nucleotide percent cut-off value, resulting in 13 RVB VP6 (I) genotypes. In addition, an intragenic recombinant RVB VP6 segment was identified from Japan. Furthermore, the data indicates frequent reassortment events occurred between the porcine RVB VP7 and VP6 gene segments.

Active surveillance for influenza A virus among swine, midwestern United States, 2009-2011

Veterinary diagnostic laboratories identify and characterize influenza A viruses primarily through passive surveillance. However, additional surveillance programs are needed. To meet this need, an active surveillance program was conducted at pig farms throughout the midwestern United States. From June 2009 through December 2011, nasal swab samples were collected monthly from among 540 groups of growing pigs and tested for influenza A virus by real-time reverse transcription PCR. Of 16,170 samples, 746 were positive for influenza A virus; of these, 18.0% were subtype H1N1, 16.0% H1N2, 7.6% H3N2, and 14.5% (H1N1)pdm09. An influenza (H3N2) and (H1N1)pdm09 virus were identified simultaneously in 8 groups. This active influenza A virus surveillance program provided quality data and increased the understanding of the current situation of circulating viruses in the midwestern US pig population.

Airborne detection and quantification of swine influenza a virus in air samples collected inside, outside and downwind from swine barns

Airborne transmission of influenza A virus (IAV) in swine is speculated to be an important route of virus dissemination, but data are scarce. This study attempted to detect and quantify airborne IAV by virus isolation and RRT-PCR in air samples collected under field conditions. This was accomplished by collecting air samples from four acutely infected pig farms and locating air samplers inside the barns, at the external exhaust fans and downwind from the farms at distances up to 2.1 km. IAV was detected in air samples collected in 3 out of 4 farms included in the study. Isolation of IAV was possible from air samples collected inside the barn at two of the farms and in one farm from the exhausted air. Between 13% and 100% of samples collected inside the barns tested RRT-PCR positive with an average viral load of 3.20E+05 IAV RNA copies/m³ of air. Percentage of exhaust positive air samples also ranged between 13% and 100% with an average viral load of 1.79E+04 RNA copies/m³ of air. Influenza virus RNA was detected in air samples collected between 1.5 and 2.1 Km away from the farms with viral levels significantly lower at 4.65E+03 RNA copies/m³. H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 subtypes were detected in the air samples and the hemagglutinin gene sequences identified in the swine samples matched those in aerosols providing evidence that the viruses detected in the aerosols originated from the pigs in the farms under study. Overall our results indicate that pigs can be a source of IAV infectious aerosols and that these aerosols can be exhausted from pig barns and be transported downwind. The results from this study provide evidence of the risk of aerosol transmission in pigs under field conditions.