Updating false beliefs: The role of misplaced vs. well-placed certainty

People can update their misconceptions or false beliefs by learning from corrective sources. However, research has shown that people vary drastically in the extent to which they learn from feedback and update their false beliefs accordingly. That past work drew attention to cognitive and motivational factors such as cognitive rigidity and closed-mindedness as inhibitors of belief updating. Here we examined a novel epistemic structure, misplaced certainty, a subjective sense of certainty while recognizing uncertainty in oneself or most people (e.g., I feel certain although I recognize X is technically uncertain or it is technically uncertain according to most people), as a unique predictor of lower belief updating. In a preregistered study, we hypothesized that those with high chronic misplaced certainty would be less likely to learn from feedback and revise their misconceptions in a feedback-learning task. In our analyses, we controlled for well-placed certainty-certainty while recognizing no doubt in oneself or most others. We also controlled for variables associated with closed-minded cognition. Consistent with our predictions, those with high misplaced certainty were less likely to revise their false beliefs in response to corrective feedback. In contrast, those with high well-placed certainty were more likely to learn from corrective feedback and revise their false beliefs. By shedding light on the nuances of different forms of subjective certainty, the present work aims to pave the way for further research on epistemic factors in the perseverance and correction of false beliefs.

Certain, but incorrect: on the relation between subjective certainty and accuracy in sound localisation

When asked to identify the position of a sound, listeners can report its perceived location as well as their subjective certainty about this spatial judgement. Yet, research to date focused primarily on measures of perceived location (e.g., accuracy and precision of pointing responses), neglecting instead the phenomenological experience of subjective spatial certainty. The present study aimed to investigate: (1) changes in subjective certainty about sound position induced by listening with one ear plugged (simulated monaural listening), compared to typical binaural listening and (2) the relation between subjective certainty about sound position and localisation accuracy. In two experiments (N = 20 each), participants localised single sounds delivered from one of 60 speakers hidden from view in front space. In each trial, they also provided a subjective rating of their spatial certainty about sound position. No feedback on response was provided. Overall, participants were mostly accurate and certain about sound position in binaural listening, whereas their accuracy and subjective certainty decreased in monaural listening. Interestingly, accuracy and certainty dissociated within single trials during monaural listening: in some trials participants were certain but incorrect, in others they were uncertain but correct. Furthermore, unlike accuracy, subjective certainty rapidly increased as a function of time during the monaural listening block. Finally, subjective certainty changed as a function of perceived location of the sound source. These novel findings reveal that listeners quickly update their subjective confidence on sound position, when they experience an altered listening condition, even in the absence of feedback. Furthermore, they document a dissociation between accuracy and subjective certainty when mapping auditory input to space.