Drawing attention to previous studies can reduce confidence in a new research finding, even when confidence should increase

People often learn of new scientific findings from brief news reports, and may discount or ignore prior research, potentially contributing to misunderstanding of findings. In this preregistered study, we investigated how people interpret a brief news report on a new drug for weight loss. Participants read an article that either highlighted the importance of prior research when judging the drug's effectiveness, or made no mention of this issue. For articles describing no prior research, mean confidence in the drug was 62%. For articles that noted prior research was conducted, confidence increased as the proportion of studies with positive findings increased. When prior research was highlighted, confidence decreased by a small amount, even when it should have increased (i.e., even when most of the evidence supported the drug's effectiveness). Thus, people's judgements were more sceptical, but not necessarily more accurate. Judgements were not affected by education level, statistics experience, or personal relevance of the research topic.

Base rate neglect and neural computations for subjective weight in decision under uncertainty

Base rate neglect, an important bias in estimating probability of uncertain events, describes humans' tendency to underweight base rate (prior) relative to individuating information (likelihood). However, the neural mechanisms that give rise to this bias remain elusive. In this study, subjects chose between uncertain prospects where estimating reward probability was essential. We found that when the variability of prior and likelihood information about reward probability were systematically manipulated, prior variability significantly affected the degree to which subjects underweight the base rate of reward probability. Activity in the orbitofrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, and putamen represented the relative subjective weight that reflected such bias. Further, sensitivity to likelihood relative to prior variability in the putamen correlated with individuals' overall tendency to underweight base rate. These findings suggest that in combining prior and likelihood, relative sensitivity to information variability and subjective-weight computations critically contribute to the individual heterogeneity in base rate neglect.

Physician and Nonphysician Estimates of Positive Predictive Value in Diagnostic v. Mass Screening Mammography: An Examination of Bayesian Reasoning

BACKGROUND

The same test with the same result has different positive predictive values (PPVs) for people with different pretest probability of disease. Representative thinking theory suggests people are unlikely to realize this because they ignore or underweight prior beliefs when given new information (e.g., test results) or due to confusing test sensitivity (probability of positive test given disease) with PPV (probability of disease given positive test). This research examines whether physicians and MBAs intuitively know that PPV following positive mammography for an asymptomatic woman is less than PPV for a symptomatic woman and, if so, whether they correctly perceive the difference.

DESIGN

Sixty general practitioners (GPs) and 84 MBA students were given 2 vignettes of women with abnormal (positive) mammography tests: 1 with prior symptoms (diagnostic test), the other an asymptomatic woman participating in mass screening (screening test). Respondents estimated pretest and posttest probabilities. Sensitivity and specificity were neither provided nor elicited.

RESULTS

Eighty-eight percent of GPs and 46% of MBAs considered base rates and estimated PPV in diagnosis greater than PPV in screening. On average, GPs estimated a 27-point difference and MBAs an 18-point difference, compared to actual of 55 or more points. Ten percent of GPs and 46% of MBAs ignored base rates, incorrectly assessing the 2 PPVs as equal.

CONCLUSIONS

Physicians and patients are better at intuitive Bayesian reasoning than is suggested by studies that make test accuracy values readily available to be confused with PPV. However, MBAs and physicians interpret a positive in screening as more similar to a positive in diagnosis than it is, with nearly half of MBAs and some physicians wrongly equating the two. This has implications for overdiagnosis and overtreatment.

Individual Differences in Base Rate Neglect: A Fuzzy Processing Preference Index

Little is known about individual differences in integrating numeric base-rates and qualitative text in making probability judgments. Fuzzy-Trace Theory predicts a preference for fuzzy processing. We conducted six studies to develop the FPPI, a reliable and valid instrument assessing individual differences in this fuzzy processing preference. It consists of 19 probability estimation items plus 4 "M-Scale" items that distinguish simple pattern matching from "base rate respect." Cronbach's Alpha was consistently above 0.90. Validity is suggested by significant correlations between FPPI scores and three other measurers: "Rule Based" Process Dissociation Procedure scores; the number of conjunction fallacies in joint probability estimation; and logic index scores on syllogistic reasoning. Replicating norms collected in a university study with a web-based study produced negligible differences in FPPI scores, indicating robustness. The predicted relationships between individual differences in base rate respect and both conjunction fallacies and syllogistic reasoning were partially replicated in two web-based studies.