Reasonableness as a Relational Principle: An Integrated Framework for Pediatric Decision-Making

We modified and applied the surrogate decision-making framework of Buchanan and Brock for pediatrics, and present an integrated framework of pediatric health care decision-making, specifying authority and intervention principles, 2 guidance principles, and an additional category of relational principles, governing stakeholder interactions.

Public health, induced abortion, and spontaneous abortion

Bruce P. Blackshaw and Daniel Rodger contend that if we assume fetuses are persons, then abortion is a public health crisis that justifies overriding a gestational mother's rights and compelling her to carry the fetus to term, but dawdle addressing greater public health crises like spontaneous abortion and hunger. They draw a distinction between deliberate and indeliberate harm to justify restricting rights in the former, but not the latter; but such distinction fails to justify restricting rights in most public health crises. Furthermore, it fails to justify curtailing abortion rights as unwilling gestational mothers might deliberately induce abortion in self-defense, merely indeliberately harming the fetus.

A sufficiency threshold is not a harm principle: A better alternative to best interests for overriding parental decisions

Douglas Diekema influentially argues that interference with parental decisions is not in fact guided by the child's best interests, but rather by a more permissive standard, which he calls the harm principle. This article first seeks to clarify this alternative position and defend it against certain existing criticisms, before offering a new criticism and alternative. This 'harm principle' has been criticized for (i) lack of adequate moral grounding, and (ii) being as indeterminate as the best interest standard that it seeks to replace. I argue that these are not serious problems. I take Diekema's negative point to be right-our actual standard for intervention is not literally the best interests of the child-but I disagree with his proposed replacement. First, Diekema's proposed harm threshold should be more carefully distinguished from Mill's harm principle. Second, there is no reason to assume that the standard for permissible intervention coincides with the threshold for harm (or serious harm). Thus, I propose that the best alternative to the best interests standard is not a harm principle, but rather a sufficiency threshold between adequate (or 'good enough') and inadequate (or 'substandard') parenting.

Have Indian Surrogates Been Harmed by Commercial Surrogacy Transactions?

Draft legislation has been approved by the Union Cabinet in India seeking to limit surrogacy to altruistic arrangements with intended parents who are either Indian citizens or couples residing outside the country but of Indian origin. This follows longstanding debates as to whether commercial surrogacy should be permitted. The primary argument against such arrangements has been the potential to exploit and cause harm to surrogate women. There is considerable literature on the exploitation debate, but little has been written about whether these transactions cause harm to surrogate women. Our article addresses this gap in the literature and develops a three-step framework using Mill's harm principle through which to assess whether harm has occurred. We apply this framework to a sample of women who provided surrogacy services in India between 2006 and 2015, the period just before the government moved to ban overseas couples from accessing commercial surrogacy.

Conceptual challenges to the harm threshold

Children are presumptively regarded as incompetent to make their own medical decisions, and the responsibility for making such decisions typically falls to parents. Parental authority is not unlimited, however, and ethical guidelines identifying appropriate bounds on this authority are needed. One proposal currently gaining support is the harm threshold (HT), which asserts that the state may only legitimately intervene in parental decision-making when serious and preventable harm to children is likely. This paper considers two questions: in virtue of what underlying principle or property does the HT gain its purported justification?; and does this underlying principle or property ground the HT as its proponents conceive of it? I identify two separate grounds represented in the literature: (a) J.S. Mill's Harm Principle; and (b) the liberty interests of parents. I find that the HT is not sufficiently grounded in either of these, revealing a substantial conceptual difficulty for its advocates.

The Extremely Preterm Infant: Ethical Considerations in Life-and-Death Decision-Making

Care of the preterm infant has improved tremendously over the last 60 years, with attendant improvement in outcomes. For the extremely preterm infant, <28 weeks' gestation, concerns related to survival as well as neurodevelopmental impairment, have influenced decision-making to a much larger extent than seen in older children. Possible reasons for conferring a different status on extremely preterm infants include: (1) the belief that the brain is a privileged organ, (2) the degree of medical uncertainty in terms of outcomes, (3) the fact that the family will deal with the psychological, emotional, physical, and financial consequences of treatment decisions, (4) that the extremely preterm looks more like a fetus than a term newborn, (5) the initial lack of relational identity, (6) the fact that extremely preterm infants are technology-dependent, and (7) the timing of decision-making around delivery. Treating extremely preterm infants differently does not hold up to scrutiny. They are owed the same respect as other pediatric patients, in terms of personhood, and we have the same duties to care for them. However, the degree of medical uncertainty and the fact that parents will deal with the consequences of decision-making, highlights the importance of providing a wide band of discretion in parental decision-making authority. Ethical principles considered in decision-making include best interest (historically the sine qua non of pediatric decision-making), a reasonable person standard, the "good enough" parent, and the harm principle, the latter two being more pragmatic. To operationalize these principles, potential models for decision-making are the Zone of Parental Discretion, the Not Unreasonable Standard, and a Shared Decision-Making model. In the final analysis shared decision-making with a wide zone of parental discretion, which is based on the harm principle, would provide fair and equitable decision-making for the extremely preterm infant. However, in the rare circumstance where parents do not wish to embark upon intensive care, against medical recommendations, it would be most helpful to develop local guidelines both for support of health care practitioners and to provide consistency of care for extremely preterm infants.

The Role of Parental Capacity for Medical Decision-Making in Medical Ethics and the Care of Psychiatrically Ill Youth: Case Report

Introduction: Parents/legal guardians are medical decision-makers for their minor children. Lack of parental capacity to appreciate the implications of the diagnosis and consequences of refusing recommended treatment may impede pediatric patients from receiving adequate medical care. Child and adolescent psychiatrists (CAPs) need to appreciate the ethical considerations relevant to overriding parental medical decision-making when faced with concerns for medical neglect. Methods: Two de-identified cases illustrate the challenges inherent in clinical and ethical decision-making reflected in concerns for parental capacity for medical decision-making. Key ethical principles are reviewed. Case 1: Treatment of an adolescent with an eating disorder ethically complex due to the legal guardian's inability to adhere with treatment recommendations leading to the patient's recurrent abrupt weight loss. Case 2: Questions of parental decisional capacity amid treatment of an adolescent with schizoaffective disorder raised due to parental mistrust of diagnosis, disagreement with treatment recommendations, and lack of appreciation of the medical severity of the situation with repeated discharges against medical advice and medication nonadherence. Discussion: Decisions to question parental capacity for medical decision-making when risk of imminent harm is low but concern for medical neglect exists are controversial. Systematic review of cases concerning for medical neglect benefits from the assessment of parental decisional capacity, review of ethical standards and principles. Conclusion: Recognition of the importance of parental decision-making capacity as relates to parental autonomy and medical neglect and understanding key ethical principles will enhance the CAP's capacity in medical decision-making when stakes are high and absolute recommendations are lacking.

An Ethics of Care Approach to Regulating Surrogacy

Victorian laws limit who may be a surrogate in an arrangement that uses assisted reproductive treatment and so restrict infertile people's ability to create a family. These restrictions arose because of concern about protecting surrogates from harm. The restrictions are inconsistent with other laws and with the principles on which a harm-based approach to regulation relies. The harm-based approach fails to describe surrogacy accurately because it fails to account for the interdependence of those involved. An ethics of care approach allows recognition of this interdependence and provides a more appropriate framework for regulation. An ethics of care approach to surrogacy would allow less prescriptive regulation, which focused on fostering caring relationships. This could be achieved by formally recognising the role of the surrogate in the formation of the family and by dispensing with attempts to replicate "traditional" heteronormative families.

The harm of bioethics: a critique of Singer and Callahan on obesity

Debate concerning the social impact of obesity has been ongoing since at least the 1980s. Bioethicists, however, have been relatively silent. If obesity is addressed it tends to be in the context of resource allocation or clinical procedures such as bariatric surgery. However, prominent bioethicists Peter Singer and Dan Callahan have recently entered the obesity debate to argue that obesity is not simply a clinical or personal issue but an ethical issue with social and political consequences. This article critically examines two problematic aspects of Singer and Callahan's respective approaches. First, there is an uncritical assumption that individuals are autonomous agents responsible for health-related effects associated with food choices. In their view, individuals are obese because they choose certain foods or refrain from physical activity. However, this view alone does not justify intervention. Both Singer and Callahan recognize that individuals are free to make foolish choices so long as they do not harm others. It is at this point that the second problematic aspect arises. To interfere legitimately in the liberty of individuals, they invoke the harm principle. I contend, however, that in making this move both Singer and Callahan rely on superficial readings of public health research to amplify the harm caused by obese individuals and ignore pertinent epidemiological research on the social determinants of obesity. I argue that the mobilization of the harm principle and corresponding focus on individual behaviours without careful consideration of the empirical research is itself a form of harm that needs to be taken seriously.

Ethics and Social Value Judgments in Public Health

The exercise of government powers for the health of its population raises ethical issues, such as public welfare, individual autonomy and freedom, privacy and confidentiality, just distribution of benefits and burdens, transparency, and public accountability. Conflicts among these values often arise and how they should be balanced will vary on a case-by-case basis, weighing costs against benefits. This entry discusses justifications for government action in public health, the tension between individual freedom and public health, issues of distributive justice in public health, and ethical guidelines for public health policymaking.