Moral judgment of objectionable online content: Reporting decisions and punishment preferences on social media

Harmful and inappropriate online content is prevalent, necessitating the need to understand how individuals judge and wish to mitigate the spread of negative content on social media. In an online study with a diverse sample of social media users (n = 294), we sought to elucidate factors that influence individuals' evaluation of objectionable online content. Participants were presented with images varying in moral valence, each accompanied by an indicator of intention from an ostensible content poster. Half of the participants were assigned the role of user content moderator, while the remaining participants were instructed to respond as they normally would online. The study aimed to establish whether moral imagery, the intention of a content poster, and the perceived responsibility of social media users, affect judgments of objectionability, operationalized through both decisions to flag content and preferences to seek punishment of other users. Our findings reveal that moral imagery strongly influences users' assessments of what is appropriate online content, with participants almost exclusively choosing to report and punish morally negative images. Poster intention also plays a significant role in user's decisions, with greater objection shown to morally negative content when it has been shared by another user for the purpose of showing support for it. Bestowing a content moderation role affected reporting behaviour but not punishment preferences. We also explore individual user characteristics, finding a negative association between trust in social media platforms and reporting decisions. Conversely, a positive relationship was identified between trait empathy and reporting rates. Collectively, our insights highlight the complexity of social media users' moderation decisions and preferences. The results advance understanding of moral judgments and punishment preferences online, and offer insights for platforms and regulatory bodies aiming to better understand social media users' role in content moderation.

An experimental study of information transparency and social preferences on donation behaviors: the self-signaling model

Certain segments of the population reply on charitable or other non-governmental organizations as their main source of support, with these organizations largely funded by those in society who can afford to give. The present study investigated to what extent information transparency influences donation decisions, and whether specific preferences for charities influences information seeking behavior. We recruited 114 participants via Prolific and employed a binary online Dictator Game to address these two study objectives. The results showed that participants' actual donation behavior was not influenced by their charity preference or the level of information transparency. However, they were more prone to seek out additional information when deciding about the most preferred category of charity. These results raise important questions as to whether the perceived anonymity of online choices may differ from choices carried out in person.

Moral strategies and psychopathic traits

Psychopathy is a personality construct encompassing impaired interpersonal-affective functioning, combined with the inclination to lead an erratic lifestyle and to engage in antisocial acts. Individuals with elevated psychopathic traits often make decisions that have a negative impact on others. Some findings suggest that a lack of empathy and guilt is a key explanatory factor, while other results point toward a decreased sense of fairness in individuals with elevated psychopathic traits. The goal of the present study was to directly compare these hypotheses. Eighty-six healthy individuals completed the Self-Report Psychopathy scale and performed the Hidden Multiplier Trust Game, a socioeconomic decision-making task designed to untangle the roles of guilt and fairness during decision-making. Computational modeling of choice data identified five types of moral decision strategies: inequity aversion, guilt aversion, moral opportunism, greed, and generosity. The model-free results demonstrated that psychopathic traits were associated with lower levels of reciprocity. The model-based results suggested that a reduced sense of fairness, associated with affective traits, was driving this behavior. Our findings stress the importance of treating guilt and fairness as independent concepts, and highlight the importance of improving conceptual precision in untangling the individual impact of fairness and guilt, as this could help explain the mixed results in moral decision-making literature. Elucidating the psychological motivations underlying the relationship between psychopathic traits and poor social decision-making opens new avenues for research on the underlying cognitive mechanisms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Expect the Worst! Expectations and Social Interactive Decision Making

Psychological studies have demonstrated that expectations can have substantial effects on choice behavior, although the role of expectations on social decision making in particular has been relatively unexplored. To broaden our knowledge, we examined the role of expectations on decision making when interacting with new game partners and then also in a subsequent interaction with the same partners. To perform this, 38 participants played an Ultimatum Game (UG) in the role of responders and were primed to expect to play with two different groups of proposers, either those that were relatively fair (a tendency to propose an equal split—the high expectation condition) or unfair (with a history of offering unequal splits—the low expectation condition). After playing these 40 UG rounds, they then played 40 Dictator Games (DG) as allocator with the same set of partners. The results showed that expectations affect UG decisions, with a greater proportion of unfair offers rejected from the high as compared to the low expectation group, suggesting that players utilize specific expectations of social interaction as a behavioral reference point. Importantly, this was evident within subjects. Interestingly, we also demonstrated that these expectation effects carried over to the subsequent DG. Participants allocated more money to the recipients of the high expectation group as well to those who made equal offers and, in particular, when the latter were expected to behave unfairly, suggesting that people tend to forgive negative violations and appreciate and reward positive violations. Therefore, both the expectations of others’ behavior and their violations play an important role in subsequent allocation decisions. Together, these two studies extend our knowledge of the role of expectations in social decision making.

Out of control: An altered parieto-occipital-cerebellar network for impulsivity in bipolar disorder

Bipolar disorder is an affective disorder characterized by rapid fluctuations in mood ranging from episodes of depression to mania, as well as by increased impulsivity. Previous studies investigated the neural substrates of bipolar disorder mainly using univariate methods, with a particular focus on the neural circuitry underlying emotion regulation difficulties. In the present study, capitalizing on an innovative whole-brain multivariate method to structural analysis known as Source-based Morphometry, we investigated the neural substrates of bipolar disorder and their relation with impulsivity, assessed with both self-report measures and performance-based tasks. Structural images from 46 patients with diagnosis of bipolar disorder and 60 healthy controls were analysed. Compared to healthy controls, patients showed decreased gray matter concentration in a parietal-occipital-cerebellar network. Notably, the lower the gray matter concentration in this circuit, the higher the self-reported impulsivity. In conclusion, we provided new evidence of an altered brain network in bipolar disorder patients related to their abnormal impulsivity. Taken together, these findings extend our understanding of the neural and symptomatic characterization of bipolar disorder.

Two distinct and separable processes underlie individual differences in algorithm adherence: Differences in predictions and differences in trust thresholds

Algorithms play an increasingly ubiquitous and vitally important role in modern society. However, recent findings suggest substantial individual variability in the degree to which people make use of such algorithmic systems, with some users preferring the advice of algorithms whereas others selectively avoid algorithmic systems. The mechanisms that give rise to these individual differences are currently poorly understood. Previous studies have suggested two possible effects that may underlie this variability: users may differ in their predictions of the efficacy of algorithmic systems, and/or in the relative thresholds they hold to place trust in these systems. Based on a novel judgment task with a large number of within-subject repetitions, here we report evidence that both mechanisms exert an effect on experimental participant’s degree of algorithm adherence, but, importantly, that these two mechanisms are independent from each-other. Furthermore, participants are more likely to place their trust in an algorithmically managed fund if their first exposure to the task was with an algorithmic manager. These findings open the door for future research into the mechanisms driving individual differences in algorithm adherence, and allow for novel interventions to increase adherence to algorithms.

Stable distribution of reciprocity motives in a population

Evolutionary models show that human cooperation can arise through direct reciprocity relationships. However, it remains unclear which psychological mechanisms proximally motivate individuals to reciprocate. Recent evidence suggests that the psychological motives for choosing to reciprocate trust differ between individuals, which raises the question whether these differences have a stable distribution in a population or are rather an artifact of the experimental task. Here, we combine data from three independent trust game studies to find that the relative prevalence of different reciprocity motives is highly stable across participant samples. Furthermore, the distribution of motives is relatively unaffected by changes to the salient features of the experimental paradigm. Finally, the motive classification assigned by our computational modeling analysis corresponds to the participants' own subjective experience of their psychological decision process, and no existing models of social preference can account for the observed individual differences in reciprocity motives. These findings support the view that reciprocal decision-making is not just regulated by individual differences in 'pro-social' versus 'pro-self' tendencies, but also by trait-like differences across several alternative pro-social motives, whose distribution in a population is stable.

The social cost of gathering information for trust decisions

Trust decisions are inherently uncertain, as people usually have incomplete information about the trustworthiness of the other person prior to their decision to trust or not trust. Therefore, it is typically beneficial to gather information about a trustee's past behaviour before deciding whether or not to trust them. However, elaborate inquiries about a trustee's behaviour may change the trustee's willingness to reciprocate, causing either a decrease due to the trustee's negative impressions of the investor or an increase because the investor appears to be highly betrayal-averse to the trustee. In turn, such a change could cause the investor to gather less or more information, respectively. Here, we examine how information acquisition is modulated by social context, monetary cost, and the trustee's trustworthiness. We gave participants the opportunity to sequentially sample information about a trustee's reciprocation history before they decided whether or not to invest. Participants sampled less when there was a monetary cost and when the gathered information was more conclusive. On some trials, we induced a social context by telling the participant that the trustee would learn how much the participant sampled ("overt sampling"). Crucially, when sampling was free, participants sampled less when sampling was overt than when it was covert, suggesting that they avoided leaving negative impressions. We find that the data were well accounted for by a Bayesian heuristic model, in which the agent continues sampling until uncertainty about trustworthiness-as measured by the width of the posterior belief-drops below a level that they find tolerable. This study opens the door to broader applications of the tools and models of information sampling to social decision-making.

Neural Mechanisms of Choice Diversification

When asked to select several options at once, people tend to choose a greater diversity of items than when they are asked to make these selections one at a time. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we provide novel insight into the neural mechanisms underlying diversification in portfolio choices. We found that, as participants made multiple selections from a menu of different options, the current state of their choice portfolio (i.e., the previously selected options) dynamically modulates activity in the neural valuation system in response to the options under evaluation. More specifically, we found that activity in the ventral striatum (VS) decreases when the option has already been selected ("satiation"), while activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex increases when other options have previously been selected ("novelty-seeking"). Our findings reveal two processes that drive diversification in portfolio choices, and suggest that the context of previous selections strongly impacts how the brain evaluates current choice options.

Decoding dynamic affective responses to naturalistic videos with shared neural patterns

This study explored the feasibility of using shared neural patterns from brief affective episodes (viewing affective pictures) to decode extended, dynamic affective sequences in a naturalistic experience (watching movie-trailers). Twenty-eight participants viewed pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) and, in a separate session, watched various movie-trailers. We first located voxels at bilateral occipital cortex (LOC) responsive to affective picture categories by GLM analysis, then performed between-subject hyperalignment on the LOC voxels based on their responses during movie-trailer watching. After hyperalignment, we trained between-subject machine learning classifiers on the affective pictures, and used the classifiers to decode affective states of an out-of-sample participant both during picture viewing and during movie-trailer watching. Within participants, neural classifiers identified valence and arousal categories of pictures, and tracked self-reported valence and arousal during video watching. In aggregate, neural classifiers produced valence and arousal time series that tracked the dynamic ratings of the movie-trailers obtained from a separate sample. Our findings provide further support for the possibility of using pre-trained neural representations to decode dynamic affective responses during a naturalistic experience.

Subjective Beliefs About Trust and Reciprocity Activate an Expected Reward Signal in the Ventral Striatum

There is overwhelming evidence that the evaluation of both reward decisions and their associated outcomes are closely linked with bilateral activation of the ventral striatum, with these insights stemming from tasks such as the monetary incentive delay task for lotteries and multiround Trust Games for social settings. The essential element in these tasks is an externally provided cue associated with specific gains/trustworthy partners and losses/non-trustworthy partners. However, in reality people typically use their own beliefs to guide their decision-making and assess the likelihood of positive or and negative outcomes. As when participants assess the relationship between cues and rewards, individuals should anticipate rewards in correspondence to their beliefs, i.e., the higher the belief of obtaining a reward in the future, the higher the anticipation of reward. In this study, we use decision-makers’ own, naturally occurring, beliefs about both social and non-social contexts to examine the subsequent outcome of their choices. We hypothesize that mechanisms of belief-mediated reward processing are mediated by neural activation in the ventral striatum. An essential feature of our design is the elicitation of individuals’ beliefs prior to the decision-making task itself. Furthermore, our incentivized, non-deceptive, decision-making task distinguishes between social – implemented by a Trust Game – and non-social sources, as well as risk and ambiguity as underlying types of uncertainty. Our main result shows that individual beliefs regarding reciprocity likelihoods in both the Trust Game and the lottery influence the amount invested. Subsequently, only the investment amount in the Trust Game parametrically modulates anticipatory reward and outcome evaluation in the ventral striatum. This study demonstrates a first approach at using participants’ subjective sets of beliefs to examine reward processing. We discuss its potential promise, outline some limitations, and propose follow-up studies to extend the current approach.

A scarcity mindset alters neural processing underlying consumer decision making

Not having enough of what one needs has long been shown to have detrimental consequences for decision making. Recent work suggests that the experience of insufficient resources can create a "scarcity" mindset; increasing attention toward the scarce resource itself, but at the cost of attention for unrelated aspects. To investigate the effects of a scarcity mindset on consumer choice behavior, as well as its underlying neural mechanisms, we used an experimental manipulation to induce both a scarcity and an abundance mindset within participants and examined the effects of both mindsets on participants' willingness to pay for familiar food items while being scanned using fMRI. Results demonstrated that a scarcity mindset affects neural mechanisms related to consumer decision making. When in a scarcity mindset compared with an abundance mindset, participants had increased activity in the orbitofrontal cortex, a region often implicated in valuation processes. Moreover, again compared with abundance, a scarcity mindset decreased activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, an area well known for its role in goal-directed choice. This effect was predominant in the group of participants who experienced scarcity following abundance, suggesting that the effects of scarcity are largest when they are compared with previous situations when resources were plentiful. More broadly, these data suggest a potential neural locus for a scarcity mindset and demonstrate how these changes in brain activity might underlie goal-directed decision making.

Catecholaminergic modulation of trust decisions

RATIONALE

Trust is a key component of social interactions. In order to assess the trustworthiness of others, people rely on both information learned from previous encounters, as well as on implicit biases associated with specific facial features.

OBJECTIVE

Here, we investigated the role of catecholamine (dopamine and noradrenaline) transmission on trust decisions as a function of both experienced behavior and facial features.

METHODS

To increase catecholamine levels, methylphenidate (MPH, i.e., Ritalin®, 20 mg) was administered to participants (N = 24) prior to their playing a well-studied economic task, namely the Trust Game (Berg et al. 1995). We measured the amount of money invested with a variety of game partners. Across game partners, we manipulated two aspects of trust: the facial trust level (high facial trust, low facial trust, and non-social) and the likelihood of reciprocation (high, low).

RESULTS

Results demonstrated no main effect of MPH on investments, but rather a selective lowering of investments under MPH as compared with placebo with the game partners who were low on facial trustworthiness and were low reciprocators.

CONCLUSION

These results provide evidence that MPH administration impacts social trust decision-making, but does so in a context-specific manner.

Expectations in the Ultimatum Game: Distinct Effects of Mean and Variance of Expected Offers

Being treated fairly by others is an important need in everyday life. Experimentally, fairness can be studied using the Ultimatum Game, where the decision to reject a low, but non-zero offer is seen as a way to punish the other player for an unacceptable offer. The canonical explanation of such behavior is inequity aversion: people prefer equal outcomes over personal gains. However, there is abundant evidence that people's decision to reject a low offer can be changed by contextual factors and their emotional state, which cannot be explained by the inequity aversion model. Here, we expand a recent alternative explanation: rejections are driven by deviations from expectations: the larger the difference between the actual offer and the expected offer, the more likely one is to reject the offer. Specifically, we provided participants with explicit information on what kind of offers to expect using histograms depicting distribution of offers given in a previous experiment by the same proposers. Crucially, we showed four different distributions, manipulating both the mean and the variance of these expected sets of offers. We found that 50% of our participants clearly and systematically changed their behavior as a function of their expectations (11% followed the standard-economic model of pure self-interest and 39% where not distinguishable from the inequity-aversion model). Using a logistic mixed-model analysis, we found that the mean and variance differently affect the decision to reject an offer. Specifically, the mean expected offer affected the threshold of what offers are acceptable, while the expected variance of offers changed how strict participants were about this threshold. Together, these results suggest that social expectations have a more complex nature as current theories propose.

Why we stay with our social partners: Neural mechanisms of stay/leave decision-making

How do we decide to keep interacting (e.g., stay) with a social partner or to switch (e.g., leave) to another? This paper investigated the neural mechanisms of stay/leave decision-making. We hypothesized that these decisions fit within a framework of value-based decision-making, and explored four potential mechanisms underlying a hypothesized bias to stay. Twenty-six participants underwent functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) while completing social and nonsocial versions of a stay/leave decision-making task. On each trial, participants chose between four alternative options, after which they received a monetary reward. Crucially, in the social condition, reward magnitude was ostensibly determined by the generosity of social partners, whereas in the nonsocial condition, reward amounts were ostensibly determined in a pre-programmed manner. Results demonstrated that participants were more likely to stay with options of relatively high expected value, with these values updated through Reinforcement Learning mechanisms and represented neurally within ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Moreover, we demonstrated that greater brain activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, caudate nucleus, and septo-hypothalamic regions for social versus nonsocial decisions to stay may underlie a bias towards staying with social partners in particular. These findings complement existing social psychological theories by investigating the neural mechanisms of actual stay/leave decisions.

Third-Party Cooperation: How Reducing Material Involvement Enhances Contributions to the Public Good

Decisions to cooperate are often delegated to a third party. We examined whether cooperation differs when decisions are made for a third party compared with ourselves and specified which motives are important for third-party cooperation. Participants played multiple rounds of a public goods game (PGG). In Study 1, we varied personal involvement from high to low; participants played for themselves (Self), for themselves and a third party (Shared), and solely for a third party (Third Party). Participants contributed most when personal involvement was lowest (i.e., Third Party) and least when personal involvement was high (i.e., Self). Study 2 explored if social motives underlie third-party cooperation by comparing cooperation with social (human) and non-social (computer) group members. Reducing personal involvement in the PGG (i.e., Third Party) increased cooperation in social contexts compared with non-social contexts, indicating enhanced collective interest. Increased cooperation for a third party may result from taking the other's perspective, thereby increasing social norm preferences.

Decision Neuroscience

Investigations of decision making have historically been undertaken by different disciplines, each using different techniques and assumptions, and few unifying efforts have been made. Economists have focused on precise mathematical models of normative decision making, psychologists have examined how decisions are actually made based on cognitive constraints, and neuroscientists have concentrated on the detailed operation of neural systems in simple choices. In recent years, however, researchers in these separate fields have joined forces in an attempt to better specify the foundations of decision making. This interdisciplinary effort has begun to use decision theory to guide the search for the neural bases of reward value and predictability. Concurrently, these formal models are beginning to incorporate processes such as social reward and emotion. The combination of these diverse theoretical approaches and methodologies is already yielding significant progress in the construction of more comprehensive decision-making models.

The neuroscience of social conformity: implications for fundamental and applied research

The development of closer ties between researchers and practitioners in the domain of behavior and behavioral change offers useful opportunities for better informing public policy campaigns via a deeper understanding of the psychological processes that operate in real-world decision-making. Here, we focus on the domain of social conformity, and suggest that the recent emergence of laboratory work using neuroscientific techniques to probe the brain basis of social influence can prove a useful source of data to better inform models of conformity. In particular, we argue that this work can have an important role to play in better understanding the specific mechanisms at work in social conformity, in both validating and extending current psychological theories of this process, and in assessing how behavioral change can take place as a result of exposure to the judgments of others. We conclude by outlining some promising future directions in this domain, and indicating how this research could potentially be usefully applied to policy issues.

The Effect of Positive and Negative Feedback on Risk-Taking across Different Contexts

Preferences for risky choices have often been shown to be unstable and context-dependent. Though people generally avoid gambles with mixed outcomes, a phenomenon often attributed to loss aversion, contextual factors can impact this dramatically. For example, people typically prefer risky options after a financial loss, while generally choosing safer options after a monetary gain. However, it is unclear what exactly contributes to these preference shifts as a function of prior outcomes, as these gain/loss outcomes are usually confounded with participant performance, and therefore it is unclear whether these effects are driven purely by the monetary gains or losses, or rather by success or failure at the actual task. Here, we experimentally separated the effects of monetary gains/losses from performance success/failure prior to a standard risky choice. Participants performed a task in which they experienced contextual effects: 1) monetary gain or loss based directly on performance, 2) monetary gain or loss that was randomly awarded and was, crucially, independent from performance, and 3) success or failure feedback based on performance, but without any monetary incentive. Immediately following these positive/negative contexts, participants were presented with a gain-loss gamble that they had to decide to either play or pass. We found that risk preferences for identical sets of gambles were biased by positive and negative contexts containing monetary gains and losses, but not by contexts containing performance feedback. This data suggests that the observed framing effects are driven by aversion for monetary losses and not simply by the positive or negative valence of the context, or by potential moods resulting from positive or negative contexts. These results highlight the specific context dependence of risk preferences.

How Social and Nonsocial Context Affects Stay/Leave Decision-Making: The Influence of Actual and Expected Rewards

This study investigated whether deciding to either stay with or leave a social relationship partner, based on a sequence of collaborative social interactions, is impacted by (1) observed and (2) anticipated gains and losses associated with the collaboration; and, importantly, (3) whether these effects differ between social and nonsocial contexts. In the social context, participants played an iterated collaborative economic game in which they were dependent on the successes and failures of a game partner in order to increase their monetary payoff, and in which they were free to stop collaborating with this partner whenever they chose. In Study 1, we manipulated the actual success rate of partners, and demonstrated that participants decided to stay longer with 'better' partners. In Study 2, we induced prior expectations about specific partners, while keeping the objective performance of all partners equal, and found that participants decided to stay longer with partners whom they expected to be 'better' than others, irrespective of actual performance. Importantly, both Study 1 and 2 included a nonsocial control condition that was probabilistically identical to the social conditions. All findings were replicated in nonsocial context, but results demonstrated that the effect of prior beliefs on stay/leave decision-making was much less pronounced in a social than a nonsocial context.

To play or not to play: a personal dilemma in pathological gambling

Research has shown that healthy people would rather avoid losses than gamble for even higher gains. On the other hand, research on pathological gamblers (PGs) demonstrates that PGs are more impaired than non-pathological gamblers in choice under risk and uncertainty. Here, we investigate loss aversion by using a rigorous and well-established paradigm from the field of economics, in conjunction with personality traits, by using self-report measures for PGs under clinical treatment. Twenty pathological gamblers, at the earlier and later stages of clinical treatment, were matched to 20 non-gamblers (NG). They played a "flip coin task" by deciding across 256 trials whether to accept or reject a 50-50 bet with a variable amount of gains and losses. They completed questionnaires aimed at assessing impulsivity. Compared to NG, pathological gamblers, specifically those in the later stages of therapy, were more loss averse and accepted a lower number of gambles with a positive expected value, whereas their impulsivity traits were significantly higher. This study shows for the first time that changes in loss aversion, but not in personality traits, are associated with the time course of pathology. These findings can be usefully employed in the fields of both gambling addiction and decision-making.

Time devours things: how impulsivity and time affect temporal decisions in pathological gamblers

Impulsivity is associated with several psychiatric disorders in which the loss of control of a specific behavior determines the syndrome itself. One particularly interesting population characterized by reported high impulsivity and problematic decision-making are those diagnosed with pathological gambling. However the association between impulsivity and decision making in pathological gambling has been only partially confirmed until now. We tested 23 normal controls and 23 diagnosed pathological gamblers in an intertemporal choice task, as well as other personality trait measurements. Results showed that gamblers scored higher on impulsivity questionnaires, and selected a higher percentage of impatient choices (higher percentage of smaller, sooner rewards), when compared to normal controls. Moreover, gamblers were faster in terms of reaction times at selecting the smaller, sooner options and discounted rewards more rapidly over time. Importantly, regression analyses clarified that self-reported measures of impulsivity played a significant role in biasing decisions towards small but more rapidly available rewards. In the present study we found evidence for impulsivity in personality traits and decisions in pathological gamblers relative to controls. We conclude by speculating on the need to incorporate impulsivity and decision biases in the conceptualization of pathological gambling for a better understanding and treatment of this pathology.

Norms and expectations in social decision-making

Recent research has shown that stimulating right lateral prefrontal cortex (rLPFC) via transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) changes social norm compliance in economic decisions, with different types of compliance affected in different ways. More broadly considering the norms involved in decision-making, and in particular expectations held by players, can help clarify the mechanisms underlying these results.

Testosterone Inhibits Trust but Promotes Reciprocity

The steroid hormone testosterone has been associated with behavior intended to obtain or maintain high social status. Although such behavior is typically characterized as aggressive and competitive, it is clear that high social status is achieved and maintained not only through antisocial behavior but also through prosocial behavior. In the present experiment, we investigated the impact of testosterone administration on trust and reciprocity using a double-blind randomized control design. We found that a single dose of 0.5 mg of testosterone decreased trust but increased generosity when repaying trust. These findings suggest that testosterone may mediate different types of status-seeking behavior. It may increase competitive, potentially aggressive, and antisocial behavior when social challenges and threats (i.e., abuse of trust and betrayal) need to be considered; however, it may promote prosocial behavior in the absence of these threats, when high status and good reputation may be best served by prosocial behavior.

Reappraising social emotions: the role of inferior frontal gyrus, temporo-parietal junction and insula in interpersonal emotion regulation

Previous studies have reported the effect of emotion regulation (ER) strategies on both individual and social decision-making, however, the effect of regulation on socially driven emotions independent of decisions is still unclear. In the present study, we investigated the neural effects of using reappraisal to both up- and down-regulate socially driven emotions. Participants played the Dictator Game (DG) in the role of recipient while undergoing fMRI, and concurrently applied the strategies of either up-regulation (reappraising the proposer's intentions as more negative), down-regulation (reappraising the proposer's intentions as less negative), as well as a baseline "look" condition. Results showed that regions responding to the implementation of reappraisal (effect of strategy, that is, "regulating regions") were the inferior and middle frontal gyrus, temporo parietal junction and insula bilaterally. Importantly, the middle frontal gyrus activation correlated with the frequency of regulatory strategies in daily life, with the insula activation correlating with the perceived ability to reappraise the emotions elicited by the social situation. Regions regulated by reappraisal (effect of regulation, that is, "regulated regions") were the striatum, the posterior cingulate and the insula, showing increased activation for the up-regulation and reduced activation for down-regulation, both compared to the baseline condition. When analyzing the separate effects of partners' behavior, selfish behavior produced an activation of the insula, not observed when subjects were treated altruistically. Here we show for the first time that interpersonal ER strategies can strongly affect neural responses when experiencing socially driven emotions. Clinical implications of these findings are also discussed to understand how the way we interpret others' intentions may affect the way we emotionally react.

Peer influence: neural mechanisms underlying in-group conformity

People often conform to the behavior of others with whom they identify. However, it is unclear what fundamental mechanisms underlie this type of conformity. Here, we investigate the processes mediating in-group conformity by using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Participants completed a perceptual decision-making task while undergoing fMRI, during which they were exposed to the judgments of both in-group and out-group members. Our data suggest that conformity to the in-group is mediated by both positive affect as well as the cognitive capacity of perspective taking. Examining the processes that drive in-group conformity by utilizing a basic decision-making paradigm combined with neuroimaging methods provides important insights into the potential mechanisms of conformity. These results may provide an integral step in developing more effective campaigns using group conformity as a tool for behavioral change.

Living emotions, avoiding emotions: behavioral investigation of the regulation of socially driven emotions

Emotion regulation is important for psychological well-being. Although it is known that alternative regulation strategies may have different emotional consequences, the effectiveness of such strategies for socially driven emotions remains unclear. In this study we investigated the efficacy of different forms of reappraisal on responses to the selfish and altruistic behavior of others in the Dictator Game. In Experiment 1, subjects mentalized the intentions of the other player in one condition, and took distance from the situation in the other. Emotion ratings were recorded after each offer. Compared with a baseline condition, mentalizing led subjects to experience their emotions more positively when receiving both selfish and altruistic proposals, whereas distancing decreased the valence when receiving altruistic offers, but did not affect the perception of selfish behavior. In Experiment 2, subjects played with both computer and human partners while reappraising the meaning of the player’s intentions (with a human partner) or the meaning of the situation (with a computer partner). Results showed that both contexts were effectively modulated by reappraisal, however a stronger effect was observed when the donor was a human partner, as compared to a computer partner. Taken together, these results demonstrate that socially driven emotions can be successfully modulated by reappraisal strategies that focus on the reinterpretation of others’ intentions.

The Cooperative Brain

Cooperation is essential for the functioning of human societies. To better understand how cooperation both succeeds and fails, recent research in cognitive neuroscience has begun to explore novel paradigms to examine how cooperative mechanisms may be encoded in the brain. By combining functional neuroimaging techniques with simple but realistic tasks adapted from experimental economics, this approach allows for the discrimination and modeling of processes that are important in cooperative behavior. Here, we review evidence demonstrating that many of the processes underlying cooperation overlap with rather fundamental brain mechanisms, such as, for example, those involved in reward, punishment and learning. In addition, we review how social expectations induced by an interactive context and the experience of social emotions may influence cooperation and its associated underlying neural circuitry, and we describe factors that appear important for generating cooperation, such as the provision of incentives. These findings illustrate how cognitive neuroscience can contribute to the development of more accurate, brain-based, models of cooperative decision making.

Waves of regret: a meg study of emotion and decision-making

Recent fMRI studies have investigated brain activity involved in the feeling of regret and disappointment by manipulating the feedback participants saw after making a decision to play certain gambles: full-feedback (regret: participant sees the outcomes from both the chosen and unchosen gamble) vs. partial-feedback (disappointment: participant only sees the outcome from chosen gamble). However, regret and disappointment are also characterized by differential agency attribution: personal agency for regret, external agency for disappointment. In this study, we investigate the neural correlates of these two characterizations of regret and disappointment using magnetoencephalography (MEG). To do this, we experimentally induced each emotion by manipulating feedback (chosen gamble vs. unchosen gamble), agency (human vs. computer choice) and outcomes (win vs. loss) in a fully randomized design. At the behavioral level the emotional experience of regret and disappointment were indeed affected by both feedback and agency manipulations. These emotions also differentially affect subsequent choices, with regret leading to riskier behavior. At the neural level both feedback and agency affected the brain responses associated with regret and disappointment, demonstrating differential localization in the brain for each. Notably, feedback regret showed greater brain activity in the right anterior and posterior regions, with agency regret producing greater activity in the left anterior region. These findings extend the evidence for neural activity in processing both regret and disappointment by highlighting for the first time the respective importance of feedback and agency, as well as outlining the temporal dynamics of these emotions.

The Herding Hormone

People often conform to others with whom they associate. Surprisingly, however, little is known about the possible hormonal mechanisms that may underlie in-group conformity. Here, we examined whether conformity toward one’s in-group is altered by oxytocin, a neuropeptide often implicated in social behavior. After administration of either oxytocin or a placebo, participants were asked to provide attractiveness ratings of unfamiliar visual stimuli. While viewing each stimulus, participants were shown ratings of that stimulus provided by both in-group and out-group members. Results demonstrated that on trials in which the ratings of the in-group and out-group were incongruent, the ratings of participants given oxytocin conformed to the ratings of their in-group but not of their out-group. Participants given a placebo did not show this in-group bias. These findings indicate that administration of oxytocin can influence subjective preferences, and they support the view that oxytocin’s effects on social behavior are context dependent.

Anxious ultimatums: how anxiety disorders affect socioeconomic behaviour

Although the role of emotion in socioeconomic decision making is increasingly recognised, the impact of specific emotional disorders, such as anxiety disorders, on these decisions has been surprisingly neglected. Twenty anxious patients and twenty matched controls completed a commonly used socioeconomic task (the Ultimatum Game), in which they had to accept or reject monetary offers from other players. Anxious patients accepted significantly more unfair offers than controls. We discuss the implications of these findings in light of recent models of anxiety, in particular the importance of interpersonal factors and assertiveness in an integrated model of decision making. Finally, we were able to show that pharmacological serotonin used to treat anxious symptomatology tended to normalise decision making, further confirming and extending the role of serotonin in co-operation, prosocial behaviour, and social decision making. These results show, for the first time, a different pattern of socioeconomic behaviour in anxiety disordered patients, in addition to the known memory, attentional and emotional biases that are part of this pathological condition.

Reduced risk-taking behavior as a trait feature of anxiety

Affect can have a significant influence on decision-making processes and subsequent choice. One particularly relevant type of negative affect is anxiety, which serves to enhance responses to threatening stimuli or situations. In its exaggerated form, it can lead to psychiatric disorders, with detrimental consequences for quality of life, including the ability to make choices. This study investigated, for the first time, how pathological anxiety affects risk-taking behavior. In this study, 20 anxious participants meeting Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, criteria for either generalized anxiety disorder (n = 10) and for panic attack disorder (n = 10), as well as 20 matched nonanxious controls, performed a gambling task. To investigate the tendency toward either a risk-seeking or a risk-averse behavior, we employed a task that did not allow for learning from outcomes. Anxious participants made significantly fewer risky choices than matched nonanxious participants. Specifically, they become risk-avoidant after gains. Moreover, anxious participants not only were less happy after gains but were also less sad after losses, and they also evinced less desire to change their choices after losses than did nonanxious participants. Importantly, whereas the desire to switch choice was followed by actual choice switch for all participants, happiness directly predicted subsequent risky choices, particularly in the nonanxious participants. Further analyses revealed that the anxious participants' risk-avoidance behavior was independent of different types of anxiety disorder (panic attack disorder and generalized anxiety disorder) as well as of the effects of psychotropic drugs treatment. This study demonstrates a specific role for anxiety in individual decision making. In particular, hypersensitivity to potential threats and pessimistic evaluation of future events reduced risk-taking behavior.

Decoding the role of the insula in human cognition: functional parcellation and large-scale reverse inference

Recent work has indicated that the insula may be involved in goal-directed cognition, switching between networks, and the conscious awareness of affect and somatosensation. However, these findings have been limited by the insula's remarkably high base rate of activation and considerable functional heterogeneity. The present study used a relatively unbiased data-driven approach combining resting-state connectivity-based parcellation of the insula with large-scale meta-analysis to understand how the insula is anatomically organized based on functional connectivity patterns as well as the consistency and specificity of the associated cognitive functions. Our findings support a tripartite subdivision of the insula and reveal that the patterns of functional connectivity in the resting-state analysis appear to be relatively conserved across tasks in the meta-analytic coactivation analysis. The function of the networks was meta-analytically "decoded" using the Neurosynth framework and revealed that while the dorsoanterior insula is more consistently involved in human cognition than ventroanterior and posterior networks, each parcellated network is specifically associated with a distinct function. Collectively, this work suggests that the insula is instrumental in integrating disparate functional systems involved in processing affect, sensory-motor processing, and general cognition and is well suited to provide an interface between feelings, cognition, and action.

Social economic decision-making across the lifespan: An fMRI investigation

Recent research in neuroeconomics suggests that social economic decision-making may be best understood as a dual-systems process, integrating the influence of deliberative and affective subsystems. However, most of this research has focused on young adults and it remains unclear whether our current models extend to healthy aging. To address this question, we investigated the behavioral and neural basis of simple economic decisions in 18 young and 20 older healthy adults. Participants made decisions which involved accepting or rejecting monetary offers from human and non-human (computer) partners in an Ultimatum Game, while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The partners' proposals involved splitting an amount of money between the two players, and ranged from $1 to $5 (from a $10 pot). Relative to young adults, older participants expected more equitable offers and rejected moderately unfair offers ($3) to a larger extent. Imaging results revealed that, relative to young participants, older adults had higher activations in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) when receiving unfair offers ($1-$3). Age group moderated the relationship between left DLPFC activation and acceptance rates of unfair offers. In contrast, older adults showed lower activation of bilateral anterior insula in response to unfair offers. No age group difference was observed when participants received fair ($5) offers. These findings suggest that healthy aging may be associated with a stronger reliance on computational areas subserving goal maintenance and rule shifting (DLPFC) during interactive economic decision-making. Consistent with a well-documented "positivity effect", older age may also decrease recruitment of areas involved in emotion processing and integration (anterior insula) in the face of social norm violation.

Reappraising the ultimatum: an fMRI study of emotion regulation and decision making

Emotion regulation strategies provide a means by which to modulate our social behavior. In this study, we investigated the effect of using reappraisal to both up- and downregulate social decision making. After being instructed on how to use reappraisal, participants played the Ultimatum Game while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging and applied the strategies of upregulation (reappraising the proposer's intentions as more negative), down-regulation (reappraising the proposer's intentions as less negative), as well as a baseline "look" condition. As hypothesized, when reappraising, decision acceptance rates were altered, with a greater number of unfair offers accepted while down-regulating and a greater number of unfair offers rejected while upregulating, both relative to the baseline condition. At the neural level, during reappraisal, significant activations were observed in the inferior and middle frontal gyrus (MFG), in addition to the medial prefrontal cortex and cingulate gyrus for unfair offers only. Regulated decisions involved left inferior frontal gyrus for upregulation and MFG for down-regulation strategies, respectively. Importantly, the effects of emotion modulation were evident in posterior insula, with less activation for down-regulation and more activation for upregulation in these areas. Notably, we show for the first time that top-down strategies such as reappraisal strongly affect our socioeconomic decisions.

The neural mechanisms of affect infusion in social economic decision-making: a mediating role of the anterior insula

Though emotions have been shown to have sometimes dramatic effects on decision-making, the neural mechanisms mediating these biases are relatively unexplored. Here, we investigated how incidental affect (i.e. emotional states unrelated to the decision at hand) may influence decisions, and how these biases are implemented in the brain. Nineteen adult participants made decisions which involved accepting or rejecting monetary offers from others in an Ultimatum Game while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Prior to each set of decisions, participants watched a short video clip aimed at inducing either a sad or neutral emotional state. Results demonstrated that, as expected, sad participants rejected more unfair offers than those in the neutral condition. Neuroimaging analyses revealed that receiving unfair offers while in a sad mood elicited activity in brain areas related to aversive emotional states and somatosensory integration (anterior insula) and to cognitive conflict (anterior cingulate cortex). Sad participants also showed a diminished sensitivity in neural regions associated with reward processing (ventral striatum). Importantly, insular activation uniquely mediated the relationship between sadness and decision bias. This study is the first to reveal how subtle mood states can be integrated at the neural level to influence decision-making.

Great expectations: neural computations underlying the use of social norms in decision-making

Social expectations play a critical role in everyday decision-making. However, their precise neuro-computational role in the decision process remains unknown. Here we adopt a decision neuroscience framework by combining methods and theories from psychology, economics and neuroscience to outline a novel, expectation-based, computational model of social preferences. Results demonstrate that this model outperforms the standard inequity-aversion model in explaining decision behavior in a social interactive bargaining task. This is supported by fMRI findings showing that the tracking of social expectation violations is processed by anterior cingulate cortex, extending previous computational conceptualizations of this region to the social domain. This study demonstrates the usefulness of this interdisciplinary approach in better characterizing the psychological processes that underlie social interactive decision-making.

Triangulating the neural, psychological, and economic bases of guilt aversion

VIDEO ABSTRACT

Why do people often choose to cooperate when they can better serve their interests by acting selfishly? One potential mechanism is that the anticipation of guilt can motivate cooperative behavior. We utilize a formal model of this process in conjunction with fMRI to identify brain regions that mediate cooperative behavior while participants decided whether or not to honor a partner's trust. We observed increased activation in the insula, supplementary motor area, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), and temporal parietal junction when participants were behaving consistent with our model, and found increased activity in the ventromedial PFC, dorsomedial PFC, and nucleus accumbens when they chose to abuse trust and maximize their financial reward. This study demonstrates that a neural system previously implicated in expectation processing plays a critical role in assessing moral sentiments that in turn can sustain human cooperation in the face of temptation.

The influence of emotion regulation on social interactive decision-making

Although adequate emotion regulation is considered to be essential in every day life, it is especially important in social interactions. However, the question as to what extent two different regulation strategies are effective in changing decision-making in a consequential socially interactive context remains unanswered. We investigated the effect of expressive suppression and emotional reappraisal on strategic decision-making in a social interactive task, that is, the Ultimatum Game. As hypothesized, participants in the emotional reappraisal condition accepted unfair offers more often than participants in the suppression and no-regulation condition. Additionally, the effect of emotional reappraisal influenced the amount of money participants proposed during a second interaction with partners that had treated them unfairly in a previous interaction. These results support and extend previous findings that emotional reappraisal as compared to expressive suppression, is a powerful regulation strategy that influences and changes how we interact with others even in the face of inequity.

The neuroscience of social decision-making

Given that we live in highly complex social environments, many of our most important decisions are made in the context of social interactions. Simple but sophisticated tasks from a branch of experimental economics known as game theory have been used to study social decision-making in the laboratory setting, and a variety of neuroscience methods have been used to probe the underlying neural systems. This approach is informing our knowledge of the neural mechanisms that support decisions about trust, reciprocity, altruism, fairness, revenge, social punishment, social norm conformity, social learning, and competition. Neural systems involved in reward and reinforcement, pain and punishment, mentalizing, delaying gratification, and emotion regulation are commonly recruited for social decisions. This review also highlights the role of the prefrontal cortex in prudent social decision-making, at least when social environments are relatively stable. In addition, recent progress has been made in understanding the neural bases of individual variation in social decision-making.

The impact of depression on social economic decision making

Although the role of emotion in social economic decision making has been increasingly recognized, the impact of mood disorders, such as depression, on such decisions has been surprisingly neglected. To address this gap, 15 depressed and 23 nondepressed individuals completed a well-known economic task, in which they had to accept or reject monetary offers from other players. Although depressed individuals reported a more negative emotional reaction to unfair offers, they accepted significantly more of these offers than did controls. A positive relationship was observed in the depressed group, but not in controls, between acceptance rates of unfair offers and resting cardiac vagal control, a physiological index of emotion regulation capacity. The discrepancy between depressed individuals' increased emotional reactions to unfair offers and their decisions to accept more of these offers contrasts with recent findings that negative mood in nondepressed individuals can lead to lower acceptance rates. This suggests distinct biasing processes in depression, which may be related to higher reliance on regulating negative emotion.

Toward an integrated neuroscience of morality: the contribution of neuroeconomics to moral cognition

Interest in the neural processes underlying decision making has led to a flurry of recent research in the fields of both moral psychology and neuroeconomics. In this paper, we first review some important findings from both disciplines, and then argue that the two fields can mutually benefit each other. A more explicit recognition of the role of values and norms will likely lead to more accurate models of decision making for neuroeconomists, whereas the tasks, insights into neural mechanisms, and mathematical modeling common in neuroeconomic research offer moral psychologists the opportunity to expand their field and move beyond methodological limitations that may have hindered the field's progress to this point. We conclude by highlighting an exciting group of recent studies that illustrate the potential of research that embraces the integrated moral/neuroeconomic approach that we suggest here.

Unforgettable ultimatums? Expectation violations promote enhanced social memory following economic bargaining

Recent work in the field of neuroeconomics has examined how people make decisions in interactive settings. However, less is currently known about how these social decisions influence subsequent memory for these interactions. We investigated this question by using functional magnetic resonance imaging to scan participants as they viewed photographs of people they had either recently played an Ultimatum Game with in the role of Responder, or that they had never seen before. Based on previous work that has investigated “cheater detection”, we were interested in whether participants demonstrated a relative enhanced memory for partners that made either fair or unfair proposals. We found no evidence, either behaviorally or neurally, supporting enhanced memory based on the amount of money offered by the Proposer. However, we did find that participants’ initial expectations about the offers they would experience in the game influenced their memory. Participants demonstrated relatively enhanced subjective memory for partners that made proposals that were contradictory to their initial expectations. In addition, we observed two distinct brain systems that were associated with partners that either offered more or less than the participants’ expectations. Viewing pictures of partners that exceeded initial expectations was associated with the bilateral anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex/premotor area, striatum, and bilateral posterior hippocampi, while viewing partners that offered less than initial expectations was associated with bilateral temporal-parietal junction, right STS, bilateral posterior insula, and precuneus. These results suggest that memory for social interaction may not be guided by a specific cheater detection system, but rather a more general expectation violation system.

Instructional control of reinforcement learning: a behavioral and neurocomputational investigation

Humans learn how to behave directly through environmental experience and indirectly through rules and instructions. Behavior analytic research has shown that instructions can control behavior, even when such behavior leads to sub-optimal outcomes (Hayes, S. (Ed.). 1989. Rule-governed behavior: cognition, contingencies, and instructional control. Plenum Press.). Here we examine the control of behavior through instructions in a reinforcement learning task known to depend on striatal dopaminergic function. Participants selected between probabilistically reinforced stimuli, and were (incorrectly) told that a specific stimulus had the highest (or lowest) reinforcement probability. Despite experience to the contrary, instructions drove choice behavior. We present neural network simulations that capture the interactions between instruction-driven and reinforcement-driven behavior via two potential neural circuits: one in which the striatum is inaccurately trained by instruction representations coming from prefrontal cortex/hippocampus (PFC/HC), and another in which the striatum learns the environmentally based reinforcement contingencies, but is "overridden" at decision output. Both models capture the core behavioral phenomena but, because they differ fundamentally on what is learned, make distinct predictions for subsequent behavioral and neuroimaging experiments. Finally, we attempt to distinguish between the proposed computational mechanisms governing instructed behavior by fitting a series of abstract "Q-learning" and Bayesian models to subject data. The best-fitting model supports one of the neural models, suggesting the existence of a "confirmation bias" in which the PFC/HC system trains the reinforcement system by amplifying outcomes that are consistent with instructions while diminishing inconsistent outcomes.

Multiple Systems in Decision Making

Various psychological models posit the existence of two systems that contribute to decision making. The first system is bottom-up, automatic, intuitive, emotional, and implicit, while the second system is top-down, controlled, deliberative, and explicit. It has become increasingly evident that this dichotomy is both too simplistic and too vague. Here we consider insights gained from a different approach, one that considers the multiple computational demands of the decision-making system in the context of neural mechanisms specialized to accomplish some of that system's more basic functions. The use of explicit computational models has led to (a) identification of core trade-offs imposed by a single-system solution to cognitive problems that are solved by having multiple neural systems, and (b) novel predictions that can be tested empirically and that serve to further refine the models.