In praise of empathic AI

In this article we investigate the societal implications of empathic artificial intelligence (AI), asking how its seemingly empathic expressions make people feel. We highlight AI's unique ability to simulate empathy without the same biases that afflict humans. While acknowledging serious pitfalls, we propose that AI expressions of empathy could improve human welfare.

Social and moral psychology of COVID-19 across 69 countries

The COVID-19 pandemic has affected all domains of human life, including the economic and social fabric of societies. One of the central strategies for managing public health throughout the pandemic has been through persuasive messaging and collective behaviour change. To help scholars better understand the social and moral psychology behind public health behaviour, we present a dataset comprising of 51,404 individuals from 69 countries. This dataset was collected for the International Collaboration on Social & Moral Psychology of COVID-19 project (ICSMP COVID-19). This social science survey invited participants around the world to complete a series of moral and psychological measures and public health attitudes about COVID-19 during an early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (between April and June 2020). The survey included seven broad categories of questions: COVID-19 beliefs and compliance behaviours; identity and social attitudes; ideology; health and well-being; moral beliefs and motivation; personality traits; and demographic variables. We report both raw and cleaned data, along with all survey materials, data visualisations, and psychometric evaluations of key variables.

Adversity-based identities drive social change

Adversity experiences have been linked to empathy and prosocial behavior. Here, we argue for unique additional advantages of such experiences, namely, the identity memberships that arise and their links to collective action and harmonious intergroup relations. We discuss challenges and future directions for the study of adversity as a source of identity.

National identity predicts public health support during a global pandemic

Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated self-reported factors associated with public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and stricter hygiene) and endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (April-May 2020). Respondents who reported identifying more strongly with their nation consistently reported greater engagement in public health behaviours and support for public health policies. Results were similar for representative and non-representative national samples. Study 2 (N = 42 countries) conceptually replicated the central finding using aggregate indices of national identity (obtained using the World Values Survey) and a measure of actual behaviour change during the pandemic (obtained from Google mobility reports). Higher levels of national identification prior to the pandemic predicted lower mobility during the early stage of the pandemic (r = -0.40). We discuss the potential implications of links between national identity, leadership, and public health for managing COVID-19 and future pandemics.

Empathic choices for animals versus humans: the role of choice context and perceived cost

People appear to empathize with cases of animal suffering yet to disregard such suffering when it conflicts with human needs. In three studies, we used an empathy regulation measure - the empathy selection task - to test whether people choose or avoid sharing in experiences of animals versus humans. In Study 1, when choosing between sharing experiences of animals or humans, participants preferred humans and rated sharing animal (versus human) experiences as more cognitively costly. In Studies 2a-2b, the choice to share experiences or be objective was done without a forced choice between animals and humans. When empathy opportunities for humans and animals were not contrasted against each other, participants avoided experience sharing for humans but not for animals. Manipulations of prosocial cost in these studies did not consistently moderate choice differences. Freeing people from contexts that pit empathy for animals against empathy for humans may diminish motivated disregard of animals' experiences.

Psychological Science in the Wake of COVID-19: Social, Methodological, and Metascientific Considerations

The COVID-19 pandemic has extensively changed the state of psychological science from what research questions psychologists can ask to which methodologies psychologists can use to investigate them. In this article, we offer a perspective on how to optimize new research in the pandemic's wake. Because this pandemic is inherently a social phenomenon-an event that hinges on human-to-human contact-we focus on socially relevant subfields of psychology. We highlight specific psychological phenomena that have likely shifted as a result of the pandemic and discuss theoretical, methodological, and practical considerations of conducting research on these phenomena. After this discussion, we evaluate metascientific issues that have been amplified by the pandemic. We aim to demonstrate how theoretically grounded views on the COVID-19 pandemic can help make psychological science stronger-not weaker-in its wake.

Empathy regulation, prosociality, and moral judgment

In this review, we examine relationships between empathy, prosocial behavior, and moral judgment. We focus on recent evidence for these relationships, with a focus on motivated empathy regulation as an important process that shapes empathic and moral outcomes. In particular, we highlight tradeoffs in contexts that involve competing victims with different needs, such as in large-scale suffering situations and sacrificial moral dilemmas, as well as on effects on punishment and recursive effects of morality on empathy. Our aim is to integrate motivation frameworks in empathy regulation and social cognition with prosocial and moral judgments.

Caring is costly: People avoid the cognitive work of compassion

Compassion-the warm, caregiving emotion that emerges from witnessing the suffering of others-has long been considered an important moral emotion for motivating and sustaining prosocial behavior. Some suggest that compassion draws from empathic feelings to motivate prosocial behavior, whereas others try to disentangle these processes to examine their different functions for human prosociality. Many suggest that empathy, which involves sharing in others' experiences, can be biased and exhausting, whereas warm compassionate concern is more rewarding and sustainable. If compassion is indeed a warm and positive experience, then people should be motivated to seek it out when given the opportunity. Here, we ask whether people spontaneously choose to feel compassion, and whether such choices are associated with perceiving compassion as cognitively costly. Across all studies, we found that people opted to avoid compassion when given the opportunity, reported compassion to be more cognitively taxing than empathy and objective detachment, and opted to feel compassion less often to the degree they viewed compassion as cognitively costly. We also revealed two important boundary conditions: first, people were less likely to avoid compassion for close (vs. distant) others, and this choice difference was associated with viewing compassion for close others as less cognitively costly. Second, in the final study we found that with more contextually enriched and immersive pleas for help, participants preferred to escape feeling compassion, although their preference did not differ from also escaping remaining objectively detached. These results temper strong arguments that compassion is an easier route to prosocial motivation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The goal-dependence of level-1 and level-2 visual perspective calculation

Does tracking another agent's visual perspective depend on having a goal-albeit a remote one-to do so? In 5 experiments using indirect measures of visual perspective taking with a cartoon avatar, we examined whether and how adult perceivers' processing goals shape the incidental tracking of what objects the avatar sees (Level-1 perspective taking) and how the avatar sees those objects (Level-2 perspective taking). Process dissociation analyses, which aim to isolate calculation of the avatar's perspective as the process of focal interest, revealed that both Level-1 and Level-2 perspective calculation were consistently weaker when the avatar's perspective was less relevant for participants' own processing goals. This pattern of goal-dependent perspective tracking was also evident in behavioral analyses of interference from the avatar's differing perspective when reporting one's own perspective (i.e., altercentric interference). These results suggest that, although Level-1 and Level-2 visual perspective calculation may operate unintentionally, both also appear to depend on perceivers' processing goals. More generally, these findings advance understanding of processes underlying visual perspective taking and the conditional automaticity with which those processes operate. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Stereotypes about compassion across the political spectrum

To what extent are ideological differences in compassion real or exaggerated, and who is more likely to engage in stereotyping about such differences? In five studies, including three online studies and two field studies of voters at the Iowa Caucus and U.S. Presidential Election in 2016, we found evidence for political stereotyping about compassion. Although Democratic and Republican participants did not consistently rate themselves as feeling different amounts of compassion on a single-item self-assessment, there was a stereotype that the average Democrat/liberal is more compassionate than the average Republican/conservative. Importantly, this stereotype exaggerated the extent of self-reported differences in compassion across parties in these samples, and Democratic participants engaged in stronger stereotype exaggeration. These results suggest that although there can be ideological variability in compassion, the perceived difference may exaggerate this reality. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Empathy choice in physicians and non-physicians

Empathy in medical care has been one of the focal points in the debate over the bright and dark sides of empathy. Whereas physician empathy is sometimes considered necessary for better physician-patient interactions, and is often desired by patients, it also has been described as a potential risk for exhaustion among physicians who must cope with their professional demands of confronting acute and chronic suffering. The present study compared physicians against demographically matched non-physicians on a novel behavioural assessment of empathy, in which they choose between empathizing or remaining detached from suffering targets over a series of trials. Results revealed no statistical differences between physicians and non-physicians in their empathy avoidance, though physicians were descriptively more likely to choose empathy. Additionally, both groups were likely to perceive empathy as cognitively challenging, and perceived cognitive costs of empathy associated with empathy avoidance. Across groups, there were also no statistically significant differences in self-reported trait empathy measures and empathy-related motivations and beliefs. Overall, these results suggest that physicians and non-physicians were more similar than different in terms of their empathic choices and in their assessments of the costs and benefits of empathy for others.

Empathy is hard work: People choose to avoid empathy because of its cognitive costs

Empathy is considered a virtue, yet it fails in many situations, leading to a basic question: When given a choice, do people avoid empathy? And if so, why? Whereas past work has focused on material and emotional costs of empathy, here, we examined whether people experience empathy as cognitively taxing and costly, leading them to avoid it. We developed the empathy selection task, which uses free choices to assess the desire to empathize. Participants make a series of binary choices, selecting situations that lead them to engage in empathy or an alternative course of action. In each of 11 studies (N = 1,204) and a meta-analysis, we found a robust preference to avoid empathy, which was associated with perceptions of empathy as more effortful and aversive and less efficacious. Experimentally increasing empathy efficacy eliminated empathy avoidance, suggesting that cognitive costs directly cause empathy choice. When given the choice to share others' feelings, people act as if it is not worth the effort. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Intentional and Unintentional Empathy for Pain Among Physicians and Nonphysicians

Empathy can be both beneficial and costly. This trade-off is pertinent for physicians who must care for patients while maintaining emotional distance to avoid burnout. Prior work using self-report and neurophysiological measures has found mixed evidence for differences in empathy between physicians and nonphysicians. We used implicit measurement and multinomial modeling to examine intentional empathy (IE) and unintentional empathy (UE) for pain among physicians and demographically matched nonphysicians. Relative to nonphysicians, physicians displayed greater ability to judge the painfulness of target experiences (i.e., IE). Contrary to some prior work, however, physicians and nonphysicians displayed comparable spontaneous resonance with distracter experiences (i.e., UE). These findings suggest that physicians may be more likely than nonphysicians to empathize with others’ pain when empathy aligns with their overt goals.

How to think about emotion and morality: circles, not arrows

Emotion and morality are powerful conscious experiences. There are two ways to think about their psychological basis: arrows and circles. Arrows ground each experience in its own specialized mechanism (mechanism x causes phenomenon x; mechanism y causes phenomenon y). Examples of arrows include when feelings of disgust are attributed to a specialized 'disgust circuit' and when judgments of impurity are attributed to a specialized 'purity foundation.' In contrast, circles - Venn diagrams - describe experiences as emerging from the overlap of more fundamental domain-general processes (different combinations of processes a, b, c cause both phenomena x and y). Circles are used by constructionist theories of emotion and morality, including the Theory of Dyadic Morality, which grounds moral judgment in the combination of norm violations, negative affect, and perceived harm. Despite the intuitive popularity of arrows, we show that scientific evidence is more consistent with circles.

Valence and arousal-based affective evaluations of foods

We investigated the nutrient-specific and individual-specific validity of dual-process models of valenced and arousal-based affective evaluations of foods across the disordered eating spectrum. 283 undergraduate women provided implicit and explicit valence and arousal-based evaluations of 120 food photos with known nutritional information on structurally similar indirect and direct affect misattribution procedures (AMP; Payne et al., 2005, 2008), and completed questionnaires assessing body mass index (BMI), hunger, restriction, and binge eating. Nomothetically, added fat and added sugar enhance evaluations of foods. Idiographically, hunger and binge eating enhance activation, whereas BMI and restriction enhance pleasantness. Added fat is salient for women who are heavier, hungrier, or who restrict; added sugar is influential for less hungry women. Restriction relates only to valence, whereas binge eating relates only to arousal. Findings are similar across implicit and explicit affective evaluations, albeit stronger for explicit, providing modest support for dual-process models of affective evaluation of foods.

Dissociating processes underlying level-1 visual perspective taking in adults

Although reasoning about other people's mental states has typically been thought to require effortful deliberation, evidence from indirect measures suggests that people may implicitly track others' perspectives, spontaneously calculating what they see and know. We used a process-dissociation approach to investigate the unique contributions of automatic and controlled processes to level-1 visual perspective taking in adults. In Experiment 1, imposing time pressure reduced the ability to exert control over one's responses, but it left automatic processing of a target's perspective unchanged. In Experiment 2, automatic processing of a target's perspective was greater when the target was a human avatar versus a non-social entity, whereas controlled processing was relatively unaffected by the specific target. Our findings highlight the utility of a process-dissociation approach for increasing theoretical precision and generating new questions about the nature of perspective taking.

The Emotional Cost of Humanity

Although mind perception is a basic part of social interaction, people often dehumanize others by denying them mental states. Many theories suggest that dehumanization happens in order to facilitate aggression or account for past immorality. We suggest a novel motivation for dehumanization: to avoid affective costs. We show that dehumanization of stigmatized targets (e.g., drug addicts) relative to nonstigmatized targets is strongest for those who are motivated to avoid emotional exhaustion. In Experiment 1, participants anticipated more exhaustion from helping, and attributed less mind to, a stigmatized target and anticipated exhaustion partially mediated the influence of stigma on mind attribution. Experiment 2 manipulated anticipated exhaustion prior to an empathy plea and revealed that the influence of stigma on mind attribution was only present when people anticipated high levels of emotional exhaustion.

Intention invention and the affect misattribution procedure: reply to Bar-Anan and Nosek (2012)

A recent study of the affect misattribution procedure (AMP) found that participants who retrospectively reported that they intentionally rated the primes showed larger effect sizes and higher reliability. The study concluded that the AMP's validity depends on intentionally rating the primes. We evaluated this conclusion in three experiments. First, larger effect sizes and higher reliability were associated with (incoherent) retrospective reports of both (a) intentionally rating the primes and (b) being unintentionally influenced by the primes. A second experiment manipulated intentions to rate the primes versus targets and found that this manipulation produced systematically different effects. Experiment 3 found that giving participants an option to "pass" when they felt they were influenced by primes did not reduce priming. Experimental manipulations, rather than retrospective self-reports, suggested that participants make post hoc confabulations to explain their responses. There was no evidence that validity in the AMP depends on intentionally rating primes.

Sequential priming measures of implicit social cognition: a meta-analysis of associations with behavior and explicit attitudes

In a comprehensive meta-analysis of 167 studies, the authors found that sequential priming tasks were significantly associated with behavioral measures (r = .28) and with explicit attitude measures (r = .20). Priming tasks continued to predict behavior after controlling for the effects of explicit attitudes. These results generalized across a variety of study domains and methodological variations. Within-study moderator analyses revealed that priming tasks have good specificity, only predicting behavior and explicit measures under theoretically expected conditions. Together, these results indicate that sequential priming-one of the earliest methods of investigating implicit social cognition--continues to be a valid tool for the psychological scientist.

The Cost of Callousness

It has often been argued that compassion is fundamental to morality. Yet people often suppress compassion for self-interested reasons. We provide evidence that suppressing compassion is not cost free, as it creates dissonance between a person’s moral identity and his or her moral principles. We instructed separate groups of participants to regulate their compassion, regulate their feelings of distress, or freely experience emotions toward compassion-inducing images. Participants then reported how central morality was to their identities and how much they believed that moral rules should always be followed. Participants who regulated compassion—but not those who regulated distress or experienced emotions—showed a dissonance-based trade-off. If they reported higher levels of moral identity, they had a greater belief that moral rules could be broken. If they maintained their belief that moral rules should always be followed, they sacrificed their moral identity. Regulating compassion thus has a cost of its own: It forces trade-offs within a person’s moral self-concept.

A Process Model of Affect Misattribution

People often misattribute the causes of their thoughts and feelings. The authors propose a multinomial process model of affect misattributions, which separates three component processes. The first is an affective response to the true cause of affect. The second is an affective response to the apparent cause. The third process is when the apparent source is confused for the real source. The model is validated using the affect misattribution procedure (AMP), which uses misattributions as a means to implicitly measure attitudes. The model illuminates not only the AMP but also other phenomena in which researchers wish to model the processes underlying misattributions using subjective judgments.

Intramedullary nailing of the femoral shaft: a prospective, randomized study

We conducted a prospective, randomized study on 84 consecutive patients with 88 acute, traumatic femoral shaft fractures using 32 Grosse-Kempf nails, 29 Russell-Taylor nails, and 27 Synthes nails. Although total operative times and proximal and distal locking times were similar for the three groups, the procedure was faster with the Grosse-Kempf nail. Three proximal fractures could not be locked with the Synthes nail. At first follow-up, we found no significant difference in terms of pain, limp, range of motion, or time to union; however, we removed fewer Synthes nails to resolve patient complaints of pain. Three delayed unions were attributed to fracture distraction. We conclude that all three nails are suitable for the treatment of almost all femoral shaft fractures. A careful analysis of intraoperative technique and instrumentation indicates that all three nails can be used safely and easily once experience is gained. Clinical outcome is similar regardless of the nail chosen.

Transvaginal sonography of the endometrium in postmenopausal women

The purposes of this study were to compare transvaginal sonographic scanning of the uterus and endometrium with histology obtained by endometrial biopsy or curettage and to determine whether the sonographic technique might be useful in the evaluation of postmenopausal women. Eighty postmenopausal women were studied. Of these, 65 were asymptomatic (38 on no hormone therapy and 27 on hormone replacement). Fifteen women underwent evaluation because of postmenopausal bleeding. In both groups, endometrial thickness of 4 mm or less as depicted by sonography correlated well with endometrial characteristics of decreased estrogen stimulation. However, in women with measured endometrial thickness between 5-8 mm, proliferative endometrium could not be distinguished from hyperplastic endometrium or, in one case, low-grade carcinoma. Large polyps and invasive carcinoma with myometrial extension were easily recognized.

Intravitreal injections by a Dermojet syringe

Dermojet is a spring-loaded device that injects a high velocity microspray capable of perforating the globe. An accidental intraocular injection of triamcinolone acetonide from a Dermojet syringe by a dermatologist is reported. The lack of untoward effects led to experimental intravitreal injections. The Dermojet syringe was used for intravitreal injections in 7 rabbit eyes with normal saline as the vehicle in 6 and India ink in one. There were no irreversible effects attribute to the injection noted clinically or histopathologically. While modification and further animal experimentation with this device are in order, it should not be use on human eyes at this time.