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Sheikhbahaee Z, Safron A, Hesp C, Dumas G. From physics to sentience: Deciphering the semantics of the free-energy principle and evaluating its claims: Comment on "Path integrals, particular kinds, and strange things" by Karl Friston et al. Phys Life Rev 2023; 47:276-278. [PMID: 37992466 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2023.11.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/06/2023] [Accepted: 11/13/2023] [Indexed: 11/24/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Zahra Sheikhbahaee
- CHU Sainte-Justine Research Center, Department of Psychiatry, University of Montreal, Canada
| | - Adam Safron
- Center for Psychedelic & Consciousness Research, John Hopkins University, United States of America
| | - Casper Hesp
- Department for Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Guillaume Dumas
- CHU Sainte-Justine Research Center, Department of Psychiatry, University of Montreal, Canada; Mila - Quebec AI Institute, Canada.
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Kastel N, Hesp C, Ridderinkhof KR, Friston KJ. Corrigendum: Small steps for mankind: Modeling the emergence of cumulative culture from joint active inference communication. Front Neurorobot 2023; 17:1151062. [PMID: 36845068 PMCID: PMC9945271 DOI: 10.3389/fnbot.2023.1151062] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/25/2023] [Accepted: 01/26/2023] [Indexed: 02/10/2023] Open
Abstract
[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fnbot.2022.944986.].
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Affiliation(s)
- Natalie Kastel
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Precision Psychiatry and Social Physiology Laboratory, Department of Psychiatry, CHU Sainte-Justine Research Center, Université de Montreal, Montreal, QC, Canada,*Correspondence: Natalie Kastel ✉
| | - Casper Hesp
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom,Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - K. Richard Ridderinkhof
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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Kastel N, Hesp C, Ridderinkhof KR, Friston KJ. Small steps for mankind: Modeling the emergence of cumulative culture from joint active inference communication. Front Neurorobot 2023; 16:944986. [PMID: 36699948 PMCID: PMC9868743 DOI: 10.3389/fnbot.2022.944986] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/16/2022] [Accepted: 11/30/2022] [Indexed: 01/11/2023] Open
Abstract
Although the increase in the use of dynamical modeling in the literature on cultural evolution makes current models more mathematically sophisticated, these models have yet to be tested or validated. This paper provides a testable deep active inference formulation of social behavior and accompanying simulations of cumulative culture in two steps: First, we cast cultural transmission as a bi-directional process of communication that induces a generalized synchrony (operationalized as a particular convergence) between the belief states of interlocutors. Second, we cast social or cultural exchange as a process of active inference by equipping agents with the choice of who to engage in communication with. This induces trade-offs between confirmation of current beliefs and exploration of the social environment. We find that cumulative culture emerges from belief updating (i.e., active inference and learning) in the form of a joint minimization of uncertainty. The emergent cultural equilibria are characterized by a segregation into groups, whose belief systems are actively sustained by selective, uncertainty minimizing, dyadic exchanges. The nature of these equilibria depends sensitively on the precision afforded by various probabilistic mappings in each individual's generative model of their encultured niche.
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Affiliation(s)
- Natalie Kastel
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Precision Psychiatry and Social Physiology Laboratory, Department of Psychiatry, CHU Sainte-Justine Research Center, Université de Montréal, Montreal, QC, Canada,*Correspondence: Natalie Kastel
| | - Casper Hesp
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom,Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - K. Richard Ridderinkhof
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands,Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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Ciaunica A, Seth A, Limanowski J, Hesp C, Friston KJ. I overthink—Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder. Conscious Cogn 2022; 101:103320. [PMID: 35490544 PMCID: PMC9130736 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103320] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2021] [Revised: 03/27/2022] [Accepted: 03/29/2022] [Indexed: 12/17/2022]
Abstract
This paper examines potential mechanisms behind atypical sense of self and agency in Depersonalisation Disorder (DPD). Using Active Inference, we argue that aberrant somatosensory attenuation and precision weighting underlies DPD. Failures of somatosensory attenuation may disrupt the sense of agency and control over one’s perceptions and actions. In DPD, individuals may believe ‘another agent’ is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions. Unlike psychosis however, in DPD the individual maintains the full insight that the ‘other agent’ is ‘me’ (the self).
This paper considers the phenomenology of depersonalisation disorder, in relation to predictive processing and its associated pathophysiology. To do this, we first establish a few mechanistic tenets of predictive processing that are necessary to talk about phenomenal transparency, mental action, and self as subject. We briefly review the important role of ‘predicting precision’ and how this affords mental action and the loss of phenomenal transparency. We then turn to sensory attenuation and the phenomenal consequences of (pathophysiological) failures to attenuate or modulate sensory precision. We then consider this failure in the context of depersonalisation disorder. The key idea here is that depersonalisation disorder reflects the remarkable capacity to explain perceptual engagement with the world via the hypothesis that “I am an embodied perceiver, but I am not in control of my perception”. We suggest that individuals with depersonalisation may believe that ‘another agent’ is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions, while maintaining full insight that the ‘other agent’ is ‘me’ (the self). Finally, we rehearse the predictions of this formal analysis, with a special focus on the psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that may underwrite the phenomenology of depersonalisation.
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Ramstead MJD, Seth AK, Hesp C, Sandved-Smith L, Mago J, Lifshitz M, Pagnoni G, Smith R, Dumas G, Lutz A, Friston K, Constant A. From Generative Models to Generative Passages: A Computational Approach to (Neuro) Phenomenology. Rev Philos Psychol 2022; 13:829-857. [PMID: 35317021 PMCID: PMC8932094 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00604-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 10/28/2021] [Indexed: 12/16/2022]
Abstract
This paper presents a version of neurophenomenology based on generative modelling techniques developed in computational neuroscience and biology. Our approach can be described as computational phenomenology because it applies methods originally developed in computational modelling to provide a formal model of the descriptions of lived experience in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy (e.g., the work of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, etc.). The first section presents a brief review of the overall project to naturalize phenomenology. The second section presents and evaluates philosophical objections to that project and situates our version of computational phenomenology with respect to these projects. The third section reviews the generative modelling framework. The final section presents our approach in detail. We conclude by discussing how our approach differs from previous attempts to use generative modelling to help understand consciousness. In summary, we describe a version of computational phenomenology which uses generative modelling to construct a computational model of the inferential or interpretive processes that best explain this or that kind of lived experience.
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Affiliation(s)
- Maxwell J. D. Ramstead
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK
- VERSES Research Lab and Spatial Web Foundation, Los Angeles, California USA
| | - Anil K. Seth
- School of Engineering and Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9QJ UK
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Program on Brain, Mind, and Consciousness, Toronto, Ontario, M5G 1M1 Canada
| | - Casper Hesp
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 147, 1012 GC Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Lars Sandved-Smith
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK
- Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, Lyon, France
| | - Jonas Mago
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK
- Integrated Program in Neuroscience, Department of Neuroscience, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
- Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
| | - Michael Lifshitz
- Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
- Lady Davis Institute for Medical Research, Montreal Jewish General Hospital, Montreal, Canada
| | - Giuseppe Pagnoni
- Department of Biomedical, Metabolic and Neural Sciences, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Modena, Italy
- Center for Neuroscience and Neurotechnology, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Modena, Italy
| | - Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, Oklahoma USA
| | - Guillaume Dumas
- CHU Sainte-Justine Research Center, Department of Psychiatry, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada
- Mila – Quebec Artificial Intelligence Institute, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada
| | - Antoine Lutz
- Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, Lyon, France
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK
- VERSES Research Lab and Spatial Web Foundation, Los Angeles, California USA
| | - Axel Constant
- Charles Perkins Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
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Sandved-Smith L, Hesp C, Mattout J, Friston K, Lutz A, Ramstead MJD. Publisher’s note to: towards a computational phenomenology of mental action: modelling meta-awareness and attentional control with deep parametric active inference. Neurosci Conscious 2021. [PMCID: PMC8445367 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab035] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Lars Sandved-Smith
- Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, 95 Bd Pinel, Lyon 69500, France
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
| | - Casper Hesp
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, Amsterdam 1098 XH, Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, Amsterdam 1098 XH, Netherlands
- Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 147, Amsterdam 1012 GC, Netherlands
| | - Jérémie Mattout
- Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, 95 Bd Pinel, Lyon 69500, France
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
| | - Antoine Lutz
- Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, 95 Bd Pinel, Lyon 69500, France
| | - Maxwell J D Ramstead
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
- Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, 1033 Pine Ave W, QC H3A 1A1, Canada
- Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, 1033 Pine Ave W, QC H3A 1A1, Canada
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Sandved-Smith L, Hesp C, Mattout J, Friston K, Lutz A, Ramstead MJD. Towards a computational phenomenology of mental action: modelling meta-awareness and attentional control with deep parametric active inference. Neurosci Conscious 2021; 2021:niab018. [PMID: 34457352 PMCID: PMC8396119 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/26/2020] [Revised: 06/23/2021] [Accepted: 07/14/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
Meta-awareness refers to the capacity to explicitly notice the current content of consciousness and has been identified as a key component for the successful control of cognitive states, such as the deliberate direction of attention. This paper proposes a formal model of meta-awareness and attentional control using hierarchical active inference. To do so, we cast mental action as policy selection over higher-level cognitive states and add a further hierarchical level to model meta-awareness states that modulate the expected confidence (precision) in the mapping between observations and hidden cognitive states. We simulate the example of mind-wandering and its regulation during a task involving sustained selective attention on a perceptual object. This provides a computational case study for an inferential architecture that is apt to enable the emergence of these central components of human phenomenology, namely, the ability to access and control cognitive states. We propose that this approach can be generalized to other cognitive states, and hence, this paper provides the first steps towards the development of a computational phenomenology of mental action and more broadly of our ability to monitor and control our own cognitive states. Future steps of this work will focus on fitting the model with qualitative, behavioural, and neural data.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lars Sandved-Smith
- Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, 95 Bd Pinel, Lyon 69500, France
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
| | - Casper Hesp
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, Amsterdam 1098 XH, Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, Amsterdam 1098 XH, Netherlands
- Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 147, Amsterdam 1012 GC, Netherlands
| | - Jérémie Mattout
- Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, 95 Bd Pinel, Lyon 69500, France
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
| | - Antoine Lutz
- Lyon Neuroscience Research Centre, INSERM U1028, CNRS UMR5292, Lyon 1 University, 95 Bd Pinel, Lyon 69500, France
| | - Maxwell J D Ramstead
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
- Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, 1033 Pine Ave W, QC H3A 1A1, Canada
- Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, 1033 Pine Ave W, QC H3A 1A1, Canada
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Abstract
Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behavior, from which special and important cases-for example, reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design-can be derived. Active inference finesses the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this letter, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about "what would happen if I did that" to "what I would believe about what would happen if I did that." The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology, London WC1N 3AR, U.K.
| | - Lancelot Da Costa
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology, London WC1N 3AR, U.K., and Department of Mathematics, Imperial College London, U.K.
| | - Danijar Hafner
- Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 2E4, Canada, and Google Research, Brain Team, Toronto, ON MSH 153, Canada
| | - Casper Hesp
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology, London WC1N 3AR, U.K., and Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Center, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam 1001 NK, The Netherlands
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology, London WC1N 3AR, U.K.
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Parr T, Marković D, Ramstead MJD, Smith R, Hesp C, Friston K. Editorial: Probabilistic Perspectives on Brain (Dys)function. Front Artif Intell 2021; 4:710179. [PMID: 34164617 PMCID: PMC8215382 DOI: 10.3389/frai.2021.710179] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/15/2021] [Accepted: 05/24/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Dimitrije Marković
- Department of Psychology, Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden, Germany
| | - Maxwell James D Ramstead
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom.,Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada.,Spatial Web Foundation, Los Angeles, CA, United States.,Nested Minds Network, London, United Kingdom
| | - Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, United States
| | - Casper Hesp
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom.,Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Center, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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Constant A, Hesp C, Davey CG, Friston KJ, Badcock PB. Why Depressed Mood is Adaptive: A Numerical Proof of Principle for an Evolutionary Systems Theory of Depression. Comput Psychiatr 2021; 5:60-80. [PMID: 34113717 PMCID: PMC7610949 DOI: 10.5334/cpsy.70] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/16/2022]
Abstract
We provide a proof of principle for an evolutionary systems theory (EST) of depression. This theory suggests that normative depressive symptoms counter socioenvironmental volatility by increasing interpersonal support via social signalling and that this response depends upon the encoding of uncertainty about social contingencies, which can be targeted by neuromodulatory antidepressants. We simulated agents that committed to a series of decisions in a social two-arm bandit task before and after social adversity, which precipitated depressive symptoms. Responses to social adversity were modelled under various combinations of social support and pharmacotherapy. The normative depressive phenotype responded positively to social support and simulated treatments with antidepressants. Attracting social support and administering antidepressants also alleviated anhedonia and social withdrawal, speaking to improvements in interpersonal relationships. These results support the EST of depression by demonstrating that following adversity, normative depressed mood preserved social inclusion with appropriate interpersonal support or pharmacotherapy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Axel Constant
- Charles Perkins Centre, The University of Sydney, AU; Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, CA; Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, UK
| | - Casper Hesp
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, UK; Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Amsterdam, NL; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Center, University of Amsterdam, NL; Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, NL
| | - Christopher G Davey
- Centre for Youth Mental Health, The University of Melbourne, AU; Department of Psychiatry, The University of Melbourne, AU
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, UK
| | - Paul B Badcock
- Centre for Youth Mental Health, The University of Melbourne, AU; Department of Psychiatry, The University of Melbourne, AU; Orygen, AU
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Hesp C, Smith R, Parr T, Allen M, Friston KJ, Ramstead MJD. Deeply Felt Affect: The Emergence of Valence in Deep Active Inference. Neural Comput 2021; 33:398-446. [PMID: 33253028 PMCID: PMC8594962 DOI: 10.1162/neco_a_01341] [Citation(s) in RCA: 66] [Impact Index Per Article: 22.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/03/2020] [Accepted: 08/17/2020] [Indexed: 01/20/2023]
Abstract
The positive-negative axis of emotional valence has long been recognized as fundamental to adaptive behavior, but its origin and underlying function have largely eluded formal theorizing and computational modeling. Using deep active inference, a hierarchical inference scheme that rests on inverting a model of how sensory data are generated, we develop a principled Bayesian model of emotional valence. This formulation asserts that agents infer their valence state based on the expected precision of their action model-an internal estimate of overall model fitness ("subjective fitness"). This index of subjective fitness can be estimated within any environment and exploits the domain generality of second-order beliefs (beliefs about beliefs). We show how maintaining internal valence representations allows the ensuing affective agent to optimize confidence in action selection preemptively. Valence representations can in turn be optimized by leveraging the (Bayes-optimal) updating term for subjective fitness, which we label affective charge (AC). AC tracks changes in fitness estimates and lends a sign to otherwise unsigned divergences between predictions and outcomes. We simulate the resulting affective inference by subjecting an in silico affective agent to a T-maze paradigm requiring context learning, followed by context reversal. This formulation of affective inference offers a principled account of the link between affect, (mental) action, and implicit metacognition. It characterizes how a deep biological system can infer its affective state and reduce uncertainty about such inferences through internal action (i.e., top-down modulation of priors that underwrite confidence). Thus, we demonstrate the potential of active inference to provide a formal and computationally tractable account of affect. Our demonstration of the face validity and potential utility of this formulation represents the first step within a larger research program. Next, this model can be leveraged to test the hypothesized role of valence by fitting the model to behavioral and neuronal responses.
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Affiliation(s)
- Casper Hesp
- Department of Psychology and Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, 1098 XH Amsterdam, Netherlands; Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, 1012 GC Amsterdam, Netherlands; and Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, U.K.
| | - Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK 74136, U.S.A.
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, U.K.
| | - Micah Allen
- Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies, Aarhus University, Aarhus 8000, Denmark; Centre of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Aarhus 8200, Denmark; and Cambridge Psychiatry, Cambridge University, Cambridge CB2 8AH, U.K.
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, U.K.
| | - Maxwell J D Ramstead
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, U.K.; Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry and Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal H3A 0G4, QC, Canada
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Ramstead MJD, Hesp C, Tschantz A, Smith R, Constant A, Friston K. Neural and phenotypic representation under the free-energy principle. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2021; 120:109-122. [PMID: 33271162 PMCID: PMC7955287 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.11.024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/07/2020] [Revised: 11/19/2020] [Accepted: 11/27/2020] [Indexed: 01/19/2023]
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to leverage the free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference, to develop a generic, generalizable model of the representational capacities of living creatures; that is, a theory of phenotypic representation. Given their ubiquity, we are concerned with distributed forms of representation (e.g., population codes), whereby patterns of ensemble activity in living tissue come to represent the causes of sensory input or data. The active inference framework rests on the Markov blanket formalism, which allows us to partition systems of interest, such as biological systems, into internal states, external states, and the blanket (active and sensory) states that render internal and external states conditionally independent of each other. In this framework, the representational capacity of living creatures emerges as a consequence of their Markovian structure and nonequilibrium dynamics, which together entail a dual-aspect information geometry. This entails a modest representational capacity: internal states have an intrinsic information geometry that describes their trajectory over time in state space, as well as an extrinsic information geometry that allows internal states to encode (the parameters of) probabilistic beliefs about (fictive) external states. Building on this, we describe here how, in an automatic and emergent manner, information about stimuli can come to be encoded by groups of neurons bound by a Markov blanket; what is known as the neuronal packet hypothesis. As a concrete demonstration of this type of emergent representation, we present numerical simulations showing that self-organizing ensembles of active inference agents sharing the right kind of probabilistic generative model are able to encode recoverable information about a stimulus array.
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Affiliation(s)
- Maxwell J D Ramstead
- Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, WC1N3BG, UK.
| | - Casper Hesp
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, WC1N3BG, UK; Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 147, 1012 GC Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
| | - Alexander Tschantz
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK; Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.
| | - Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, USA.
| | - Axel Constant
- Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, WC1N3BG, UK; Theory and Method in Biosciences, Level 6, Charles Perkins Centre D17, Johns Hopkins Drive, University of Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia.
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, WC1N3BG, UK.
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Hesp C. Beyond connectionism: A neuronal dance of ephaptic and synaptic interactions: Commentary on "The growth of cognition: Free energy minimization and the embryogenesis of cortical computation" by Wright and Bourke (2020). Phys Life Rev 2020; 36:40-43. [PMID: 32807647 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2020.08.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2020] [Accepted: 08/04/2020] [Indexed: 01/05/2023]
Affiliation(s)
- Casper Hesp
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH Amsterdam, Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition Centre, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH Amsterdam, Netherlands; Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 147, 1012 GC Amsterdam, Netherlands; Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, WC1N 3BG, London, UK.
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Hesp C, Steenbeek HW, van Geert PLC. Socio-Emotional Concern Dynamics in a Model of Real-Time Dyadic Interaction: Parent-Child Play in Autism. Front Psychol 2019; 10:1635. [PMID: 31379670 PMCID: PMC6646602 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01635] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/25/2018] [Accepted: 06/28/2019] [Indexed: 12/16/2022] Open
Abstract
We used a validated agent-based model-Socio-Emotional CONcern DynamicS (SECONDS)-to model real-time playful interaction between a child diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) and its parent. SECONDS provides a real-time (second-by-second) virtual environment that could be used for clinical trials and testing process-oriented explanations of ASD symptomatology. We conducted numerical experiments with SECONDS (1) for internal model validation comparing two parental behavioral strategies for stimulating social development in ASD (play-centered vs. initiative-centered) and (2) for empirical case-based model validation. We compared 2,000 simulated play sessions of two particular dyads with (second-by-second) time-series observations within 29 play sessions of a real parent-child dyad with ASD on six variables related to maintaining and initiating play. Overall, both simulated dyads provided a better fit to the observed dyad than reference null distributions. Given the idiosyncratic behaviors expected in ASD, the observed correspondence is non-trivial. Our results demonstrate the applicability of SECONDS to parent-child dyads in ASD. In the future, SECONDS could help design interventions for parental care in ASD.
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Affiliation(s)
- Casper Hesp
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | | | - Paul L. C. van Geert
- Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
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Liska M, Hesp C, Tchekhovskoy A, Ingram A, van der Klis M, Markoff S. Formation of precessing jets by tilted black hole discs in 3D general relativistic MHD simulations. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2017. [DOI: 10.1093/mnrasl/slx174] [Citation(s) in RCA: 147] [Impact Index Per Article: 21.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [What about the content of this article? (0)] [Affiliation(s)] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/14/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- M Liska
- Anton Pannekoek Institute for Astronomy, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, NL-1098 XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - C Hesp
- Anton Pannekoek Institute for Astronomy, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, NL-1098 XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Gravitation Astroparticle Physics Amsterdam (GRAPPA) Institute, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, NL-1098 XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - A Tchekhovskoy
- Center for Interdisciplinary Exploration and Research in Astrophysics (CIERA), Physics and Astronomy, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60202, USA
- Departments of Astronomy and Physics, Theoretical Astrophysics Center, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-3411, USA
- Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 1 Cyclotron Rd, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA
- Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics, Kohn Hall, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA
| | - A Ingram
- Anton Pannekoek Institute for Astronomy, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, NL-1098 XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - M van der Klis
- Anton Pannekoek Institute for Astronomy, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, NL-1098 XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - S Markoff
- Anton Pannekoek Institute for Astronomy, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, NL-1098 XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Gravitation Astroparticle Physics Amsterdam (GRAPPA) Institute, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, NL-1098 XH Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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