Minding Rights: Mapping Ethical and Legal Foundations of 'Neurorights'

The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty - often framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.

The body of law: boundaries, extensions, and the human right to physical integrity in the biotechnical age

The body is precondition of human existence and reference point of many legal norms. But the law only rarely asks what the body is more precisely. Answers might appear evident, but commonsensical conceptions of the body have been cast into doubt by feminists, artists, and disability theorists. Drawing on polyphonic arguments, they suggest social or post-human reconceptualizations with potential legal implications. Civil rights activists call for better protection of cyborg bodies; some legal scholars suggest redefining or even dismissing the right to bodily integrity because of its uncertain foundations. Of particular importance is the question of the boundaries of the body because the legal treatment of prostheses and assistive devices depends on whether they are part of it. This paper analyzes these boundaries with a focus on the right to bodily integrity, in light of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the foundational legal distinction between persons and things. It argues that bodies indeed have multiple boundaries, but none of them qualifies for legal purposes. The law must thus draw normative boundaries. Against the temper of times, it should resort to a naturalistic conception because it accommodates interests of stakeholders in the best way.

Forensic Brain-Reading and Mental Privacy in European Human Rights Law: Foundations and Challenges

A central question in the current neurolegal and neuroethical literature is how brain-reading technologies could contribute to criminal justice. Some of these technologies have already been deployed within different criminal justice systems in Europe, including Slovenia, Italy, England and Wales, and the Netherlands, typically to determine guilt, legal responsibility, or recidivism risk. In this regard, the question arises whether brain-reading could permissibly be used against the person's will. To provide adequate legal protection from such non-consensual brain-reading in the European legal context, ethicists have called for the recognition of a novel fundamental legal right to mental privacy. In this paper, we explore whether these ethical calls for recognising a novel legal right to mental privacy are necessary in the European context. We argue that a right to mental privacy could be derived from, or at least developed within in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and that introducing an additional fundamental right to protect against (forensic) brain-reading is not necessary. What is required, however, is a specification of the implications of existing rights for particular neurotechnologies and purposes.

On The Verge of the Hybrid Mind

Recent advances in neurotechnology allow for an increasingly tight integration of the human brain and mind with artificial cognitive systems, blending persons with technologies and creating an assemblage that we call a hybrid mind. In some ways the mind has always been a hybrid, emerging from the interaction of biology, culture (including technological artifacts) and the natural environment. However, with the emergence of neurotechnologies enabling bidirectional flows of information between the brain and AI-enabled devices, integrated into mutually adaptive assemblages, we have arrived at a point where the specific examination of this new instantiation of the hybrid mind is essential. Among the critical questions raised by this development are the effects of these devices on the user’s perception of the self, and on the user’s experience of their own mental contents. Questions arise related to the boundaries of the mind and body and whether the hardware and software that are functionally integrated with the body and mind are to be viewed as parts of the person or separate artifacts subject to different legal treatment. Other questions relate to how to attribute responsibility for actions taken as a result of the operations of a hybrid mind, as well as how to settle questions of the privacy and security of information generated and retained within a hybrid mind.

Is the European Data Protection Regulation sufficient to deal with emerging data concerns relating to neurotechnology?

Research-driven technology development in the fields of the neurosciences presents interesting and potentially complicated issues around data in general and brain data specifically. The data produced from brain recordings are unlike names and addresses in that it may result from the processing of largely involuntarily brain activity, it can be processed and reprocessed for different aims, and it is highly sensitive. Consenting for brain recordings of a specific type, or for a specific purpose, is complicated by these factors. Brain data collection, retention, processing, storage, and destruction are each of high ethical importance. This leads us to ask: Is the present European Data Protection Regulation sufficient to deal with emerging data concerns relating to neurotechnology? This is pressing especially in a context of rapid advancement in the fields of brain computer interfaces (BCIs), where devices that can function via recorded brain signals are expanding from research labs, through medical treatments, and beyond into consumer markets for recreational uses. One notion we develop herein is that there may be no trivial data collection when it comes to brain recording, especially where algorithmic processing is involved. This article provides analysis and discussion of some specific data protection questions related to neurotechnology, especially BCIs. In particular, whether and how brain data used in BCI-driven applications might count as personal data in a way relevant to data protection regulations. It also investigates how the nature of BCI data, as it appears in various applications, may require different interpretations of data protection concepts. Importantly, we consider brain recordings to raise questions about data sensitivity, regardless of the purpose for which they were recorded. This has data protection implications.

Brain-computer interfaces and personhood: interdisciplinary deliberations on neural technology

OBJECTIVE

Scientists, engineers, and healthcare professionals are currently developing a variety of new devices under the category of brain-computer interfaces (BCIs). Current and future applications are both medical/assistive (e.g. for communication) and non-medical (e.g. for gaming). This array of possibilities has been met with both enthusiasm and ethical concern in various media, with no clear resolution of these conflicting sentiments.

APPROACH

To better understand how BCIs may either harm or help the user, and to investigate whether ethical guidance is required, a meeting entitled 'BCIs and Personhood: A Deliberative Workshop' was held in May 2018.

MAIN RESULTS

We argue that the hopes and fears associated with BCIs can be productively understood in terms of personhood, specifically the impact of BCIs on what it means to be a person and to be recognized as such by others.

SIGNIFICANCE

Our findings suggest that the development of neural technologies raises important questions about the concept of personhood and its role in society. Accordingly, we propose recommendations for BCI development and governance.

Hacking the Brain: Dimensions of Cognitive Enhancement

In an increasingly complex information society, demands for cognitive functioning are growing steadily. In recent years, numerous strategies to augment brain function have been proposed. Evidence for their efficacy (or lack thereof) and side effects has prompted discussions about ethical, societal, and medical implications. In the public debate, cognitive enhancement is often seen as a monolithic phenomenon. On a closer look, however, cognitive enhancement turns out to be a multifaceted concept: There is not one cognitive enhancer that augments brain function per se, but a great variety of interventions that can be clustered into biochemical, physical, and behavioral enhancement strategies. These cognitive enhancers differ in their mode of action, the cognitive domain they target, the time scale they work on, their availability and side effects, and how they differentially affect different groups of subjects. Here we disentangle the dimensions of cognitive enhancement, review prominent examples of cognitive enhancers that differ across these dimensions, and thereby provide a framework for both theoretical discussions and empirical research.

An assay for glucose 6-phosphatase based on the formation of glucose

A rapid, convenient method for the assay of glucose 6-phosphatase dependent on the removal of radioactive substrate from radioactive product by Dowex 2 fluoride is described. The enzymatic reaction is stopped by the addition of an ethanolic slurry of the resin. After the tubes are shaken, the radioactivity of glucose in the clarified supernatant layer is measured. The release of glucose is directly proportional to time and enzyme concentration. Detergents do not interfere with the method.

Immunocytochemical localization of endopeptidase-24.11 in the nucleus tractus solitarius of the rat brain

Recently, it has been hypothesized that the N-terminal portion of substance P (SP), SP(1-7), which results from the action of endopeptidase 24.11 (EC3.4.24.11), could be involved in mediating the depressor effects of baroreceptor afferent activation via its action on cells in the nucleus tractus solitarius (NTS). In this study, the binding of a monoclonal antibody to endopeptidase 24.11 was examined immunohistochemically at the level of the caudal medulla of the rat brain. By light microscopy, intense immunoreactivity was seen in the NTS, in fibers bordering the area postrema, and in the area postrema itself. After electron microscopy, endopeptidase 24.11-like immunoreactivity was seen to be associated with the cytoskeleton and plasma membrane in axons, dendrites and glial processes. Antigen was also associated with synaptic vesicles and plasma membranes in presynaptic terminals forming mainly axo-dendritic synapses typical of vagal afferent terminals involved in the baroreceptor reflex. Thus, endopeptidase 24.11 appears to be localized at sites where it could effectively process SP prior to its binding to postsynaptic receptors.

The activation of glucose dehydrogenase by p-chloromercuribenzoate

p-Chloromercuribenzoate alters various reactions of rat liver glucose (hexose phosphate) dehydrogenase differently. The reagent has little effect on the glucose: NAD or the glucose: NADP oxidoreductases, doubles the rates of oxidations of galactose-6-phosphate and glucose-6-phosphate by NADP and greatly stimulates the oxidations of glucose-6-phosphate and galactose-6-phosphate by NAD. The reagent appears to react with a sulfhydryl group of the enzyme since activation is reversed and prevented by mercaptoethanol. The direct reaction of the reagent with the enzyme is indicated by its lower thermal stability in the presence of the p-chloromercuribenzoate. The size of the enzyme appears to be the same when determined by sucrose gradient centrifugation in the presence or absence of p-chloromercuribenzoate. In microsomes, the oxidation of NADH or NADPH hampers measurements of glucose dehydrogenase. Since p-chloromercuribenzoate inhibits microsomal oxidation of reduced nicontinamide nucleotides, it is possible to assay for glucose dehydrogenase accurately in the presence of the mercurial in microsomes and microsomal extracts and thus measure the effectiveness of a detergent in extracting the enzyme from microsomes.

The pentose phosphate pathway in the endoplasmic reticulum

Approximately the same levels of six of the seven enzymes catalyzing reactions of the pentose phosphate pathway are in the cisternae of washed microsomes from rat heart, spleen, lung, and brain. Renal and hepatic microsomes also have detectable levels of these enzymes except ribulose-5-phosphate epimerase and ribose-5-phosphate isomerase. Their location in the cisternae is indicated by their latencies, i.e. requirement for disruption of the membrane for activity. In addition, transketolase, transaldolase, and glucose-6-phosphatase, a known cisternal enzyme, are inactivated by chymotrypsin and subtilisin only in disrupted hepatic microsomes under conditions in which NADPH-cytochrome c reductase, an enzyme on the external surface, is inactivated equally in intact and disrupted microsomes. The failure to detect the epimerase and isomerase in hepatic microsomes is due to inhibition of their assays by ketopentose-5-phosphatase. Xylulose 5-phosphate is hydrolyzed faster than ribulose 5-phosphate. A mild heat treatment destroys hepatic xylulose-5-phosphatase and glucose-6-phosphatase without affecting acid phosphatase. These results plus the established wide distribution of glucose dehydrogenase, the microsomal glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase, and its localization to the lumen of the endoplasmic reticulum suggest that most mammalian cells have two sets of enzymes of the pentose phosphate pathway: one is cytoplasmic and the other is in the endoplasmic reticulum. The activity of the microsomal pentose phosphate pathway is estimated to be about 1.5% that of the cytoplasmic pathway.

The use of glucose dehydrogenase to monitor the integrity of microsomes

Various concentrations of Tergitol NP-10 stimulate mannose-6-phosphatase and glucose dehydrogenase to the same extent in untreated rat liver microsomes. Thus, the latency of glucose dehydrogenase may be used as an alternative to mannose phosphatase as a measure of the integrity of the microsomal membrane. The advantage of using glucose dehydrogenase rather than mannose phosphatase to monitor microsomal integrity is that NADH is more easily measured than Pi.

The topology of phosphogluconate dehydrogenases in rat liver microsomes

Rat liver microsomes are known to contain a 6-phosphogluconate dehydrogenase which differs from the 6-phosphogluconate dehydrogenase in the soluble fraction. Microsomes which were washed once bind the soluble phosphogluconate dehydrogenase more tightly than they do glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase. Microsomes washed three times in 0.15 M Tris-HCl, pH 8.0, contain only the microsomal 6-phosphogluconate dehydrogenase. Two observations show that this dehydrogenase is located in the cisternae. First, this dehydrogenase is inactive in intact, three times washed microsomes. Second, proteolytic inactivation of 6-phosphogluconate dehydrogenase like that of the cisternal enzyme glucose-6-phosphatase requires disruption of the membrane. Under the conditions used, detergent did not affect the proteolytic inactivation of NADPH-cytochrome c reductase, an enzyme located on the external surface. The excellent correspondence between the activations of hexose phosphate dehydrogenase and 6-phosphogluconate dehydrogenase in microsomes at various stages of disruption of the microsomal membrane produced by detergent supports the earlier contention that these two dehydrogenases are reducing NADP in the same region of the microsomes. A similar experiment which shows an exact correspondence between the activations of 6-phosphogluconate dehydrogenase and mannose-6-phosphatase with increasing concentrations of detergent indicates that the activation of the dehydrogenase can be explained solely by the penetration of the substrates to the active dehydrogenase within the microsomes and strongly suggests that the dehydrogenase is catalytically active in the cisternae.

The levels of nicotinamide nucleotides in liver microsomes and their possible significance to the function of hexose phosphate dehydrogenase

The concentrations of NAD and NADP have been determined in detergent extracts of washed rat liver microsomes. Precautions were taken during the preparation of the microsomes to remove nicotinamide nucleotides from their external surface both by hydrolysis by nucleotide pyrophosphatase (EC 3.6.1.9) and by washing them three times in 0.15 M-Tris/HCl, pH 8.0, to remove soluble proteins which bind these nucleotides. The mannose phosphatase was essentially completely latent, indicating that the microsomes were intact. Assuming these nucleotides are in the cisternae of the microsomes, the concentrations in the cisternae are 240 +/- 25 microM-NAD and 55 +/- 12 microM-NADP. These levels of nucleotides are compatible with both the glucose:NAD+ and the glucose 6-phosphate:NADP+ oxidoreductase activities of hexose phosphate dehydrogenase (EC 1.1.1.47). Since the organ and subcellular distributions of this dehydrogenase and glucose-6-phosphatase are similar, and Pi stimulates the glucose:NAD+ oxidoreductase activity, it is proposed that the combined action of these two enzymes leads to the reduction of both coenzymes in the lumen of the endoplasmic reticulum. A modification of the colorimetric method of Nisselbaum & Green [(1969) Anal. Biochem. 27, 212-217] for the determination of NADP+ is described. Colour formation is linear with the concentration of NADP+ and is sensitive to less than 0.3 nmol of NADP+.