Many Labs 5: Registered Replication of Förster, Liberman, and Kuschel’s (2008) Study 1

In a test of their global-/local-processing-style model, Förster, Liberman, and Kuschel (2008) found that people assimilate a primed concept (e.g., “aggressive”) into their social judgments after a global prime (e.g., they rate a person as being more aggressive than do people in a no-prime condition) but contrast their judgment away from the primed concept after a local prime (e.g., they rate the person as being less aggressive than do people in a no prime-condition). This effect was not replicated by Reinhard (2015) in the Reproducibility Project: Psychology. However, the authors of the original study noted that the replication could not provide a test of the moderation effect because priming did not occur. They suggested that the primes might have been insufficiently applicable and the scenarios insufficiently ambiguous to produce priming. In the current replication project, we used both Reinhard’s protocol and a revised protocol that was designed to increase the likelihood of priming, to test the original authors’ suggested explanation for why Reinhard did not observe the moderation effect. Teams from nine universities contributed to this project. We first conducted a pilot study ( N = 530) and successfully selected ambiguous scenarios for each site. We then pilot-tested the aggression prime at five different sites ( N = 363) and found that it did not successfully produce priming. In agreement with the first author of the original report, we replaced the prime with a task that successfully primed aggression (hostility) in a pilot study by McCarthy et al. (2018). In the final replication study ( N = 1,460), we did not find moderation by protocol type, and judgment patterns in both protocols were inconsistent with the effects observed in the original study. We discuss these findings and possible explanations.

Many Labs 5: Testing Pre-Data-Collection Peer Review as an Intervention to Increase Replicability

Replication studies in psychological science sometimes fail to reproduce prior findings. If these studies use methods that are unfaithful to the original study or ineffective in eliciting the phenomenon of interest, then a failure to replicate may be a failure of the protocol rather than a challenge to the original finding. Formal pre-data-collection peer review by experts may address shortcomings and increase replicability rates. We selected 10 replication studies from the Reproducibility Project: Psychology (RP:P; Open Science Collaboration, 2015) for which the original authors had expressed concerns about the replication designs before data collection; only one of these studies had yielded a statistically significant effect ( p < .05). Commenters suggested that lack of adherence to expert review and low-powered tests were the reasons that most of these RP:P studies failed to replicate the original effects. We revised the replication protocols and received formal peer review prior to conducting new replication studies. We administered the RP:P and revised protocols in multiple laboratories (median number of laboratories per original study = 6.5, range = 3–9; median total sample = 1,279.5, range = 276–3,512) for high-powered tests of each original finding with both protocols. Overall, following the preregistered analysis plan, we found that the revised protocols produced effect sizes similar to those of the RP:P protocols (Δ r = .002 or .014, depending on analytic approach). The median effect size for the revised protocols ( r = .05) was similar to that of the RP:P protocols ( r = .04) and the original RP:P replications ( r = .11), and smaller than that of the original studies ( r = .37). Analysis of the cumulative evidence across the original studies and the corresponding three replication attempts provided very precise estimates of the 10 tested effects and indicated that their effect sizes (median r = .07, range = .00–.15) were 78% smaller, on average, than the original effect sizes (median r = .37, range = .19–.50).

Bayesian probability estimates are not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes' rule in elementary situations

This paper has two aims. First, we investigate how often people make choices conforming to Bayes’ rule when natural sampling is applied. Second, we show that using Bayes’ rule is not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule. Simpler methods, even fallacious heuristics, might prescribe correct choices reasonably often under specific circumstances. We considered elementary situations with binary sets of hypotheses and data. We adopted an ecological approach and prepared two-stage computer tasks resembling natural sampling. Probabilistic relations were inferred from a set of pictures, followed by a choice which was made to maximize the chance of a preferred outcome. Use of Bayes’ rule was deduced indirectly from choices. Study 1 used a stratified sample of N = 60 participants equally distributed with regard to gender and type of education (humanities vs. pure sciences). Choices satisfying Bayes’ rule were dominant. To investigate ways of making choices more directly, we replicated Study 1, adding a task with a verbal report. In Study 2 (N = 76) choices conforming to Bayes’ rule dominated again. However, the verbal reports revealed use of a new, non-inverse rule, which always renders correct choices, but is easier than Bayes’ rule to apply. It does not require inversion of conditions [transforming P(H) and P(D|H) into P(H|D)] when computing chances. Study 3 examined the efficiency of three fallacious heuristics (pre-Bayesian, representativeness, and evidence-only) in producing choices concordant with Bayes’ rule. Computer-simulated scenarios revealed that the heuristics produced correct choices reasonably often under specific base rates and likelihood ratios. Summing up we conclude that natural sampling results in most choices conforming to Bayes’ rule. However, people tend to replace Bayes’ rule with simpler methods, and even use of fallacious heuristics may be satisfactorily efficient.

Late steps of egg cell differentiation are accelerated by pollination in Zea mays L

Egg cells were analysed cytologically during the female receptivity period in maize (Zea mays L., line A 188). Three classes of egg cell were distinguished: type A--small, non-vacuolated cells with a central nucleus; type B--larger cells with small vacuoles surrounding the perinuclear cytoplasm located in the middle of the cell; type C--big cells with a large apical vacuole and the mid-basal perinuclear cytoplasm. The less-dense cytoplasm of the vacuolated egg cells usually contained numerous cup- or bell-shaped mitochondria. The three egg types appear to correspond to three late stages of egg cell differentiation. The frequencies of each of the three egg types were monitored in developing maize ears before and after pollination. In young ears, with the silks just extending out of the husks, small A-type cells were found in about 86% of ovules. Their frequency decreased to about 58% at the optimum silk length, remained unchanged in non-pollinated ears, and fell to 16% at the end of the female receptivity period. However, after pollination and before fertilisation the frequency of these cells decreased to about 33%, and the larger vacuolated egg cells (types B and C) prevailed. At various stages of the receptivity period, pollination accelerated changes in the egg population, increasing the number of ovules bearing larger, vacuolated egg cells. Experiments with silk removal demonstrated that putative pollination signals act immediately after pollen deposition and are not species-specific.