Global taxonomic, functional, and phylogenetic diversity of bees in apple orchards

An essential prerequisite to safeguard pollinator species is characterisation of the multifaceted diversity of crop pollinators and identification of the drivers of pollinator community changes across biogeographical gradients. The extent to which intensive agriculture is associated with the homogenisation of biological communities at large spatial scales remains poorly understood. In this study, we investigated diversity drivers for 644 bee species/morphospecies in 177 commercial apple orchards across 33 countries and four global biogeographical biomes. Our findings reveal significant taxonomic dissimilarity among biogeographical zones. Interestingly, despite this dissimilarity, species from different zones share similar higher-level phylogenetic groups and similar ecological and behavioural traits (i.e. functional traits), likely due to habitat filtering caused by perennial monoculture systems managed intensively for crop production. Honey bee species dominated orchard communities, while other managed/manageable and wild species were collected in lower numbers. Moreover, the presence of herbaceous, uncultivated open areas and organic management practices were associated with increased wild bee diversity. Overall, our study sheds light on the importance of large-scale analyses contributing to the emerging fields of functional and phylogenetic diversity, which can be related to ecosystem function to promote biodiversity as a key asset in agroecosystems in the face of global change pressures.

Implying implausibility and undermining versus accepting peoples' experiences of suicidal ideation and self-harm in Emergency Department psychosocial assessments

Background

Patients seeking emergency care for self-harm and suicidality report varying experiences from being believed and taken seriously to not being believed and taken seriously. Epistemic injustice provides a conceptual framework to explore how peoples' experiences of self-harm and suicidality are believed or not. We use an empirical method -conversation analysis - to analyze epistemics in clinical communication, focusing on how knowledge is claimed, contested and negotiated. In courtroom, police and political interaction, conversation analysis has identified communication practices implying implausibility in a person's story to contest and recharacterize their accounts.

Aims

To investigate communication practices in Emergency Department (ED) biopsychosocial assessments that may (1) undermine, imply implausibility and recharacterize or (2) accept peoples' experiences of suicidal ideation and self-harm.

Methods

Using conversation analysis, we micro-analyzed verbal and non-verbal communication in five video-recorded biopsychosocial assessments with people presenting to the ED with self-harm or suicidal ideation, and conducted supplementary analysis of participants' medical records and post-visit interviews. We present three cases where experiences were not accepted and undermined/recharacterized and two cases where experiences were accepted and validated.

Results

When peoples' experiences of suicidality and self-harm were not accepted or were undermined, questioners: did not acknowledge or accept the person's account; asked questions that implied inconsistency or implausibility ("Didn't you tell your GP that you were coping okay?"); juxtaposed contrasting information to undermine the person's account ("You said you were coping okay before, and now you're saying you feel suicidal"); asked questions asserting that, e.g., asking for help implied they were not intending to end their life ("So when you called 111 what were you expecting them to do"); and resistinged or directly questioned the person's account. Multiple practices across the assessment built on each other to assert that the person was not suicidal, did not look or act like they were suicidal; that the person's decision to attend the ED was not justified; that an overdose was impulsive and not intended to end life; asking why the person didn't take a more harmful medication to overdose; that self-harming behaviors were not that serious and should be in the person's control. Alternative characterizations were used to justify decisions not to provide further support or referrals to specialist services. At times, these practices were also delivered when speaking over the patient. When peoples' experiences were accepted, practitioners acknowledged, accepted, validated suicidality/self-harm and introduced a shared understanding of experiences that patients found helpful. Non-verbal feedback such as nodding and eye contact was central in acceptance of patients' accounts.

Conclusion

These findings advance our understanding of how peoples' experiences of suicidality or self-harm are undermined or accepted in mental health encounters in the ED. They have important clinical implications: patients report that when their experiences are not accepted or undermined, this makes them more distressed, less hopeful about the future and discourages future help-seeking when in crisis. Conversely, acknowledging, accepting and validating suicidality/self-harm and introducing a new ways of understanding peoples' experiences may make people less suicidal and more hopeful, generates shared understanding and encourages future help-seeking.

Is it pathological to believe conspiracy theories?

According to a naturalist conception of what counts as a disorder, conspiracy beliefs are pathological beliefs if they are the outcome of a cognitive dysfunction. In this article, I take issue with the view that it is pathological to believe a conspiracy theory. After reviewing several approaches to the aetiology of conspiracy beliefs, I find that no approach compels us to view conspiracy beliefs as the outcome of a dysfunction: a speaker's conspiracy beliefs can appear as implausible and unshakeable to an interpreter, but in a naturalist framework it is not pathological for the speaker to adopt and maintain such beliefs.

Communication in youth mental health clinical encounters: Introducing the agential stance

When young people seek support from mental health care practitioners, the encounters may affect the young people's sense of self, and in particular undermine their sense of agency. For this study, an interdisciplinary team of academics and young people collaboratively analysed video-recorded encounters between young people and mental healthcare practitioners in emergency services. They identified five communication techniques that practitioners can use to avoid undermining the young person's sense of agency in the clinical encounter. They conceptualise the use of those techniques as the adoption of an agential stance towards the young person. The agential stance consists of: (a) validating the young person's experiences, (b) legitimising the young person's choice to seek help, (c) refraining from objectifying the young person, (d) affirming the young person's capacity to contribute to positive change, and (e) involving the young person in the decision-making process.

Treating disease progression with osimertinib in EGFR-mutated non-small-cell lung cancer: novel targeted agents and combination strategies

A precision medicine approach has been successfully applied in medical oncology for the treatment of non-small-cell lung cancer (NSCLC) through the identification of targetable driver molecular aberrations; activating mutations of epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR) are the most common. Osimertinib, a third-generation, wild-type sparing, irreversible EGFR tyrosine kinase inhibitor (TKI), originally showed a striking activity after progression to first- and second-generation EGFR-TKIs when T790M resistance mutation was identified. Thereafter, upfront use of osimertinib became the standard of care based on overall survival benefit over first-generation TKIs erlotinib and gefitinib as reported in the FLAURA trial. For patients progressing on osimertinib, identification of resistance mechanisms is crucial to develop novel targeted therapeutic approaches. Moreover, innovative drugs or combination therapies are being developed for cases in which a specific resistance mechanism is not identifiable. In this review, the post-osimertinib treatment options for EGFR-mutated NSCLC are analyzed, with an outlook to ongoing clinical trials. An algorithm to guide clinicians in managing progression on osimertinib is proposed.

Do delusions have and give meaning?

Delusions are often portrayed as paradigmatic instances of incomprehensibility and meaninglessness. Here we investigate the relationship between delusions and meaning from a philosophical perspective, integrating arguments and evidence from cognitive psychology and phenomenological psychopathology. We review some of the empirical and philosophical literature relevant to two claims about delusions and meaning: (1) delusions are meaningful, despite being described as irrational and implausible beliefs; (2) some delusions can also enhance the sense that one's life is meaningful, supporting agency and creativity in some circumstances. Delusions are not incomprehensible representations of reality. Rather, they can help make sense of one's unusual experiences and in some circumstances even support one's endeavours, albeit temporarily and imperfectly. Acknowledging that delusions have meaning and can also give meaning to people's lives has implications for our understanding of psychotic symptoms and for addressing the stigma associated with psychiatric conditions.

Toxicity of the insecticide sulfoxaflor alone and in combination with the fungicide fluxapyroxad in three bee species

The sulfoximine insecticide sulfoxaflor is regarded as a potential substitute for neonicotinoids that were recently banned in the EU due to their side effects on bees. Like neonicotinoids, sulfoxaflor acts as a competitive modulator of nicotinic acetylcholine receptors. In agricultural environments, bees are commonly exposed to combinations of pesticides, and neonicotinoids are known to interact synergistically with fungicides. The objective of our study is to assess the acute oral toxicity of sulfoxaflor alone and in combination with a single dose of fluxapyroxad, a succinate dehydrogenase inhibitor (SDHI) fungicide, in three bee species: Apis mellifera, Bombus terrestris and Osmia bicornis. Because synergism may be dose-dependent, we tested a range of sulfoxaflor doses. Synergistic effects were assessed using three different approaches: Bliss criterion of drugs independence, ratio test comparing LD50s and model deviation ratio. Osmia bicornis was the most sensitive species to sulfoxaflor and both O. bicornis and A. mellifera showed significant synergism between the insecticide and the fungicide. For the most part, these synergistic effects were weak and only occurred at early assessment times and intermediate sulfoxaflor doses. The potential ecological relevance of these effects should be confirmed in field and/or cage studies. Overall, our laboratory results demonstrate that sulfoxaflor is somewhat less toxic than the recently banned neonicotinoids imidacloprid, thiamethoxam and clothianidin, but much more toxic than other neonicotinoids (acetamiprid, thiacloprid) still in use in the EU at the time this study was conducted.

Threats to epistemic agency in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs

A good therapeutic relationship in mental health services is a predictor of positive clinical outcomes for people who seek help for distressing experiences, such as voice hearing and paranoia. One factor that may affect the quality of the therapeutic relationship and raises further ethical issues is the impact of the clinical encounter on users' sense of self, and in particular on their sense of agency. In the paper, we discuss some of the reasons why the sense of epistemic agency may be especially fragile in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs. We argue that it is important to identify and avoid behaviours that can undermine young people's contributions as epistemic agents in the clinical encounter.

Doctors without ‘Disorders’

On one influential view, the problems that should attract medical attention involve a disorder, because the goals of medical practice are to prevent and treat disorders. Based on this view, if there are no mental disorders then the status of psychiatry as a medical field is challenged. In this paper, I observe that it is often difficult to establish whether the problems that attract medical attention involve a disorder, and argue that none of the notions of disorder proposed so far offers a successful demarcation criterion between medical and non-medical problems. As an illustration, I consider why delusions are considered pathological and whether they attract medical attention in virtue of being pathological, where ‘pathological’ stands for ‘being caused by a disorder’. Although there are several promising answers to what makes delusions pathological, available accounts of the pathological nature of delusions fail to distinguish delusions from other irrational beliefs that are not typically thought of as pathological; and cannot explain why delusions typically attract medical attention whereas other irrational beliefs do not.

Instrumental rationality and suicide in schizophrenia: a case for rational suicide?

It is estimated that up to 7500 people develop schizophrenia each year in the UK. Schizophrenia has significant consequences, with 28% of the excess mortality in schizophrenia being attributed to suicide. Previous research suggests that suicide in schizophrenia may be more related to affective factors such as depression and hopelessness, rather than psychotic symptoms themselves. Considering suicide in schizophrenia within this framework enables us to develop a novel philosophical approach, in which suicide may not be related to loss of self-consciousness, thought processing dysfunctions or perception disturbances. The action of suicide may be due neither to persistent hallucinations nor other psychotic symptoms, such as delusional beliefs, but to other underexamined, perhaps rational reasons, such as extreme social isolation, severe depression or emotional withdrawal. This paper does not examine the moral character of suicide. Instead, it argues that we should conceive the action of suicide in schizophrenia as an act that is not necessarily irrational. People with schizophrenia might end their life based on reasons if suicide is the best means to achieve their ends. However, the paper does not support assisted suicide. It aims to provide a better understanding of the reasons why people take their own lives and suggests that understanding can inform effective interventions to reduce high rates of suicide.

Female volatiles as sex attractants in the invasive population of Vespa velutina nigrithorax

Due to its huge invasion potential and specialization in honeybee predation, the invasive hornet Vespa velutina nigrithorax represents a high-concern species under both an ecological and economical perspective. In light of the development of specific odorant attractants to be used in sustainable control strategies, we carried out both behavioural assays and chemical analyses to investigate the possibility that, in the invasive population of V. velutina nigrithorax, reproductive females emit volatile pheromones to attract males, as demonstrated in a Chinese non-invasive population. We focused on the secretions produced by sternal and venom glands; because of the volatility and complexity of their composition, both of them could potentially allow an attraction and a species-specific response, decreasing therefore non-target species by-catches. Results of chemical analyses and behavioural assays showed that venom volatiles, although population-specific, are unlikely candidates as male attractants since they do not differ in composition or in quantity between reproductive females and workers and do not attract males. Conversely, sternal gland secretion differs between female castes for the presence of some ketoacids exclusive of gynes already reported as sex pheromones for the non-invasive subspecies V. velutina auraria. Despite such a difference, males are attracted by the sternal gland secretion of both workers and gynes. These results provide a first step to understand the reproductive biology of V. velutina nigrithorax in its invasive range and to develop effective and sustainable management strategies for the species.

Are clinical delusions adaptive?

Delusions are symptoms of psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and dementia. By and large, delusions are characterized by their behavioral manifestations and defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. In this overview paper, we ask whether delusions can be adaptive notwithstanding their negative features. Can they be a response to a crisis rather than the source of the crisis? Can they be the beginning of a solution rather than the problem? Some of the psychological, psychiatric, and philosophical literature has recently suggested that they can. We consider different types of delusions and different ways in which they can be considered as adaptive: psychologically (e.g., by increasing wellbeing, purpose in life, intrapsychic coherence, or good functioning) and biologically (e.g., by enhancing genetic fitness). Although further research is needed to map the costs and benefits of adopting and maintaining delusional beliefs, a more nuanced picture of the role of delusions in people's lives has started to emerge.

This article is categorized under:

Philosophy > Representation

Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief

Neuroscience > Cognition

Effects of nonprotein amino acids on survival and locomotion of Osmia bicornis

To investigate the effects of two nectar nonprotein amino acids, β-alanine and γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA), on Osmia bicornis survival and locomotion, two groups of caged bees were fed with sugar syrup enriched with β-alanine and GABA, respectively. A further control group was fed with sugar syrup. Five behavioural categories were chosen according to the principle of parsimony and intrinsic unitary consistency from start to end, and recorded by scan sampling: two states (remaining under paper or in tubes) and three events (walking on net, feeding from flower and flying). We also analysed the amino acid content of haemolymph sampled from an additional 45 bees fed the same diets (15 per diet type). Bees fed with β-alanine had a significantly shorter survival time than those fed with the control and GABA diets. The GABA diet induced higher levels of locomotion than β-alanine. The former nonprotein amino acid was only detected in the haemolymph of bees fed GABA. The results suggest that insects consuming nonprotein amino-acid-rich diets absorb and transfer these substances to the haemolymph and that nonprotein amino acids affect survival and locomotion. Ecological consequences are discussed in the framework of plant reproductive biology.

The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions

In some neuropsychological disorders, distorted reports seem to fill gaps in people's memory of their past, where people's self-image, history, and prospects are often enhanced. False beliefs about the past compromise both people's capacity to construct a reliable autobiography and their trustworthiness as communicators. However, such beliefs contribute to people's sense of competence and self-confidence, increasing psychological well-being. Here, we consider both the psychological benefits and epistemic costs and argue that distorting the past is likely to also have epistemic benefits that cannot be obtained otherwise, such as enabling people to exchange information, receive feedback, and retain key beliefs about themselves.

Surgery Followed by Intracavitary plus Systemic Chemotherapy in Malignant Pleural Mesothelioma

Aims and background

Malignant mesothelioma is associated with a median survival of 4 to 12 months. Data from the literature indicate that single modality treatment (surgery or intrapleural and/or systemic chemotherapy) does not significantly affect survival.

Methods

We therefore evaluated a combined approach consisting of surgery (pleurectomy + diaphragmatic or pericardial resection), intrapleural chemotherapy with cisplatin (100 mg/m2) and cytarabine (1,000 mg/m2) for 4 h immediately after pleurectomy, and systemic chemotherapy consisting of epirubicin (60 mg/m2) and mitomycin-C (10 mg/m2) day 1 every 4 weeks for 4 cycles.

Results

Twenty patients were enrolled in the study and were evaluable. Thirteen cases had residual gross disease after pleurectomy and 7 patients only minimal disease. Median time to disease progression was 7.4 months, and median survival was 11.5 months (range, 2-25+). No treatment-related death have been observed. Side effects after intracavitary chemotherapy included renal toxicity, anaemia and pain. Myelosuppression and alopecia were recorded during systemic chemotherapy.

Conclusions

The results of the study indicate that the schedule is feasible, with encouraging results in terms of survival for patients with minimal residual disease after surgery.

Stranger than Fiction: Costs and Benefits of Everyday Confabulation

In this paper I discuss the costs and benefits of confabulation, focusing on the type of confabulation people engage in when they offer explanations for their attitudes and choices. What makes confabulation costly? In the philosophical literature confabulation is thought to undermine claims to self-knowledge. I argue that when people confabulate they do not necessarily fail at mental-state self-attributions, but offer ill-grounded explanations which often lead to the adoption of other ill-grounded beliefs. What, if anything, makes confabulation beneficial? As people are unaware of the information that would make their explanations accurate, they are not typically in a position to acknowledge their ignorance or provide better-grounded explanations for their attitudes and choices. In such cases, confabulating can have some advantages over offering no explanation because it makes a distinctive contribution to people's sense of themselves as competent and largely coherent agents. This role of ill-grounded explanations could not be as easily played by better-grounded explanations should these be available. In the end, I speculate about the implications of this conclusion for attempting to eliminate or reduce confabulation.

What is unrealistic optimism?

Here we consider the nature of unrealistic optimism and other related positive illusions. We are interested in whether cognitive states that are unrealistically optimistic are belief states, whether they are false, and whether they are epistemically irrational. We also ask to what extent unrealistically optimistic cognitive states are fixed. Based on the classic and recent empirical literature on unrealistic optimism, we offer some preliminary answers to these questions, thereby laying the foundations for answering further questions about unrealistic optimism, such as whether it has biological, psychological, or epistemic benefits.

Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia

In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are unavailable to that agent at that time. Elaborated and systematized delusions in schizophrenia are typically false and exemplify failures of rationality and self-knowledge. Empirical studies suggest that they may have psychological benefits by relieving anxiety and enhancing meaningfulness. Moreover, these delusions have been considered as adaptive in virtue of the fact that they enable automated learning to resume after a significant disruption caused by incorrect prediction-error signalling. I argue that such psychological benefits and adaptive features also have positive epistemic consequences. More precisely, delusions can be a means to restoring epistemic functionality in agents who are overwhelmed by hypersalient experiences in the prodromal stage of psychosis. The analysis leads to a more complex view of the epistemic status of delusions than is found in the contemporary philosophical literature and has some implications for clinical practice. 1 Introduction2 Types of Delusions3 What Is Wrong with Elaborated and Systematized Delusions?4 Finding Life Meaningful5 Learning Resumed6 Epistemic Innocence7 Epistemic Benefit8 No Alternatives9 Conclusions and Implications.

Seasonal and annual variations in the pollination efficiency of a pollinator community of Dictamnus albus L

The interplay between insect and plant traits outlines the patterns of pollen transfer and the subsequent plant reproductive fitness. We studied the factors that affect the pollination efficiency of a pollinator community of Dictamnus albus L. by evaluating insect behaviour and morphological characteristics in relation to flowering phenology. In order to extrapolate the pollinator importance of single taxa and of the whole pollinator guild, we calculated an index distinguishing between potential (PPI) and realized (RPI) pollinator importance. Although the pollinator species spectrum appeared rather constant, we found high intra- and inter-annual variability of pollinator frequency and importance within the insect community. Flower visitation rate strictly depended on insect abundance and on the overlap between their flying period and flower blooming. All the pollinators visited flowers from the bottom to the top of the racemes, excluding intra-plant geitonogamous pollination, and most of them showed high pollen fidelity. Only medium large-sized bees could contact the upward bending stiles while feeding on nectar, highlighting a specialisation of the plant towards bigger pollinators. Moreover, we found evidence of functional specialisation, since all pollinators were restricted to a single taxonomic group (order: Hymenoptera; superfamily: Apoidea). Both the PPI and RPI indices indicate Habropoda tarsata as the most important pollinator of D. albus. Following hand cross-pollination experiments we revealed the presence of pollination limitation in 1 of the 3 years of field study. We discuss this result in relation to flowering abundance and to possible mismatches of phenological periods between plants and insects.

Moral Preferences

In this brief response to Etzioni's paper we argue that satisfying one's preferences and seeking to live up to one's moral standards are not incompatible ways of living one's life, and that choosing to act morally need not involve self-sacrifice.

Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions

In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter-evidence? Do the formation and maintenance of delusions require abnormal experience alone, or also reasoning biases or deficits? We hope to show that the focus on delusions has made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of the mind and continues to raise issues that are central to defining the concept of belief and gaining a better understanding of how people process information and learn about the world.

Costs and benefits of realism and optimism

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

What is the relationship between rationality and mental health? By considering the psychological literature on depressive realism and unrealistic optimism, it was hypothesized that, in the context of judgments about the self, accurate cognitions are psychologically maladaptive and inaccurate cognitions are psychologically adaptive. Recent studies recommend being cautious in drawing any general conclusion about the style of thinking and mental health.

RECENT FINDINGS

Recent investigations suggest that people with depressive symptoms are more accurate than controls in tasks involving time perception and estimates of personal circumstances, but not in other tasks. Unrealistic optimism remains a robust phenomenon across a variety of tasks and domains, and researchers are starting to explore its neural bases. However, the challenge is to determine to what extent and in what way unrealistic optimism is beneficial.

SUMMARY

We should revisit the hypothesis that optimistic cognitions are psychologically adaptive, whereas realistic thinking is not. Realistic beliefs and expectations can be conducive to wellbeing and good functioning, and wildly optimistic cognitions have considerable psychological costs.

Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights from the Breivik Case

What factors should be taken into account when attributing criminal responsibility to perpetrators of severe crimes? We discuss the Breivik case, and the considerations which led to holding Breivik accountable for his criminal acts. We put some pressure on the view that experiencing certain psychiatric symptoms or receiving a certain psychiatric diagnosis is sufficient to establish criminal insanity. We also argue that the presence of delusional beliefs, often regarded as a key factor in determining responsibility, is neither necessary nor sufficient for criminal insanity.

Taking the long view: an emerging framework for translational psychiatric science

Understood in their historical context, current debates about psychiatric classification, prompted by the publication of the DSM-5, open up new opportunities for improved translational research in psychiatry. In this paper, we draw lessons for translational research from three time slices of 20th century psychiatry. From the first time slice, 1913 and the publication of Jaspers' General Psychopathology, the lesson is that translational research in psychiatry requires a pluralistic approach encompassing equally the sciences of mind (including the social sciences) and of brain. From the second time slice, 1959 and a conference in New York from which our present symptom-based classifications are derived, the lesson is that, while reliability remains the basis of psychiatry as an observational science, validity too is essential to effective translation. From the third time slice, 1997 and a conference on psychiatric classification in Dallas that brought together patients and carers with researchers and clinicians, the lesson is that we need to build further on collaborative models of research combining expertise-by-training with expertise-by-experience. This is important if we are to meet the specific challenges to translation presented by the complexity of the concept of mental disorder, particularly as reflected in the diversity of desired treatment outcomes. Taken together, these three lessons - a pluralistic approach, reliability and validity, and closer collaboration among relevant stakeholders - provide an emerging framework for more effective translation of research into practice in 21st century psychiatry.

The relative importance of undesirable truths

The right not to know is often defended on the basis of the principle of respect for personal autonomy. If I choose not to acquire personal information that impacts on my future prospects, such a choice should be respected, because I should be able to decide whether to access information about myself and how to use it. But, according to the incoherence objection to the right not to know in the context of genetic testing, the choice not to acquire genetic information undermines the capacity for autonomous decision making. The claim is that it is incoherent to defend a choice that is inimical to autonomy by appealing to autonomy. In this paper, I suggest that the choice not to know in the context of genetic testing does not undermine self-authorship, which is a key aspect of autonomous decision making. In the light of this, the incoherence objection to the right not to know seems less compelling.

Affective Dimensions of the Phenomenon of Double Bookkeeping in Delusions

It has been argued that schizophrenic delusions are “behaviourally inert.” This is evidence for the phenomenon of “double bookkeeping,” according to which people are not consistent in their commitment to the content of their delusions. The traditional explanation for the phenomenon is that people do not genuinely believe the content of their delusions. In the article, we resist the traditional explanation and offer an alternative hypothesis: people with delusions often fail to acquire or to maintain the motivation to act on their delusional beliefs. This may be due to avolition, to emotional disturbances, or to the fact that, given the peculiar content of some delusions, the surrounding environment does not support the agent’s motivation to act.

Self-Deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology

To what extent do self-deception and delusion overlap? In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folk-psychological terms. "Motivated" delusions, just like self-deception, can be described as beliefs driven by personal interests. If self-deception can be understood folk-psychologically because of its motivational component, so can motivated delusions. Non-motivated delusions also fit (to a large extent) the folk-psychological notion of belief, since they can be described as hypotheses one endorses when attempting to make sense of unusual and powerful experiences. We suggest that there is continuity between the epistemic irrationality manifested in self-deception and in delusion.

The right not to know: the case of psychiatric disorders

This paper will consider the right not to know in the context of psychiatric disorders. It will outline the arguments for and against acquiring knowledge about the results of genetic testing for conditions such as breast cancer and Huntington's disease, and examine whether similar considerations apply to disclosing to clients the results of genetic testing for psychiatric disorders such as depression and Alzheimer's disease. The right not to know will also be examined in the context of the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders that are associated with stigma or for which there is no effective treatment.

Does reflection lead to wise choices?

Does conscious reflection lead to good decision-making? Whereas engaging in reflection is traditionally thought to be the best way to make wise choices, recent psychological evidence undermines the role of reflection in lay and expert judgement. The literature suggests that thinking about reasons does not improve the choices people make, and that experts do not engage in reflection, but base their judgements on intuition, often shaped by extensive previous experience. Can we square the traditional accounts of wisdom with the results of these empirical studies? Should we even attempt to? I shall defend the view that philosophy and cognitive sciences genuinely interact in tackling questions such as whether reflection leads to making wise choices.

In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions

Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are in-between perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quite-beliefs, proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and Maura Tumulty. Then, I address the relationship between the doxastic account of delusions and the role, nature, and prospects of folk psychology, which is discussed by Dominic Murphy, Keith Frankish, and Maura Tumulty in their contributions. In the final remarks, I turn to the continuity thesis and suggest that, although there are important differences between clinical delusions and non-pathological beliefs, these differences cannot be characterised satisfactorily in epistemic terms.

The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving

There is an apparent tension in current accounts of the relationship between reason giving and self-knowledge. Philosophers like Richard Moran (2001) claim that deliberation and justification can give rise to first-person authority over the attitudes that subjects form or defend on the basis of what they take to be their best reasons. On the other hand, the psychological evidence on introspection effects and the literature on elusive reasons suggest that engaging in explicit deliberation or justification leads subjects to report attitudes that are not consistent with their previous attitudes or with their future behavior. On the basis of these findings, Tim Wilson (2002) argues that analyzing reasons compromises self-knowledge. I shall defend a realistic account of the effects of reason giving which is compatible with the empirical findings on introspection and also with the claim that deliberation and justification have epistemic benefits.

Reproductive and parental autonomy: an argument for compulsory parental education

In this paper we argue that comprehensive and systematic parental education has the potential to equip young adults with the necessary information for the responsible exercise of their autonomy in choices about reproduction and parenting. Education can allow young adults to acquire largely accurate beliefs about reproduction and parenting and about the implications of their reproductive and parental choices. Far from being a limitation of individual freedom, the acquisition of relevant information about reproduction and parenting and the acquisition of self-knowledge with respect to reproductive and parenting choices can help give shape to individual life plans. We make a case for compulsory parental education on the basis of the need to respect and enhance individual reproductive and parental autonomy within a culture that presents contradictory attitudes towards reproduction and where decisions about whether to become a parent are subject to significant pressure and scrutiny.

Reproductive cloning in humans and therapeutic cloning in primates: is the ethical debate catching up with the recent scientific advances?

After years of failure, in November 2007 primate embryonic stem cells were derived by somatic cellular nuclear transfer, also known as therapeutic cloning. The first embryo transfer for human reproductive cloning purposes was also attempted in 2006, albeit with negative results. These two events force us to think carefully about the possibility of human cloning which is now much closer to becoming a reality. In this paper we tackle this issue from two sides, first summarising what scientists have achieved so far, then discussing some of the ethical arguments in favour and against human cloning which are debated in the context of policy making and public consultation. Therapeutic cloning as a means to improve and save lives has uncontroversial moral value. As to human reproductive cloning, we consider and assess some common objections and failing to see them as conclusive. We do recognise, though, that there will be problems at the level of policy and regulation that might either impair the implementation of human reproductive cloning or make its accessibility restricted in a way that could become difficult to justify on moral grounds. We suggest using the time still available before human reproductive cloning is attempted successfully to create policies and institutions that can offer clear directives on its legitimate applications on the basis of solid arguments, coherent moral principles, and extensive public consultation.

Disputes over moral status: philosophy and science in the future of bioethics

Various debates in bioethics have been focused on whether non-persons, such as marginal humans or non-human animals, deserve respectful treatment. It has been argued that, where we cannot agree on whether these individuals have moral status, we might agree that they have symbolic value and ascribe to them moral value in virtue of their symbolic significance. In the paper I resist the suggestion that symbolic value is relevant to ethical disputes in which the respect for individuals with no intrinsic moral value is in conflict with the interests of individuals with intrinsic moral value. I then turn to moral status and discuss the suitability of personhood as a criterion. There some desiderata for a criterion for moral status: it should be applicable on the basis of our current scientific knowledge; it should have a solid ethical justification; and it should be in line with some of our moral intuitions and social practices. Although it highlights an important connection between the possession of some psychological properties and eligibility for moral status, the criterion of personhood does not meet the desiderata above. I suggest that all intentional systems should be credited with moral status in virtue of having preferences and interests that are relevant to their well-being.

Delimiting the concept of research: an ethical perspective

It is important to be able to offer an account of which activities count as scientific research, given our current interest in promoting research as a means to benefit humankind and in ethically regulating it. We attempt to offer such an account, arguing that we need to consider both the procedural and functional dimensions of an activity before we can establish whether it is a genuine instance of scientific research. By placing research in a broader schema of activities, the similarities and differences between research activities and other activities become visible. It is also easier to show why some activities that do not count as research can sometimes be confused with research and why some other activities can be regarded only partially as research. Although the concept of research is important to delimit a class of activities which we might be morally obliged to promote, we observe that the class of activities which are regarded as subject to ethical regulation is not exhausted by research activities. We argue that, whether they be research or not, all the activities that are likely to affect the rights and interests of the individuals involved and impact on the rights and interests of other individuals raise ethical issues and might be in need of ethical regulation.