Close Your Eyes and See: Stroke Sequelae versus Functional Neurological Disorder in a Physician

The first author is a left-handed, 51-year-old nephrologist who experienced a neurologic event. She underwent neurosurgery complicated by hemorrhage. Postoperatively, she developed persistent vertigo and unilateral tongue pain which persisted for over 5 years. Early neuroimaging revealed expected encephalomalacia but no neuroanatomical basis for her symptoms. A functional neurological disorder was suspected, and she was seen by several psychiatrists and psychotherapists. However, she suspected a neuroanatomical lesion would better explain her unrelenting symptoms. After seeing many neurologists, a neuroanatomical diagnosis was finally made. The theory and practice of medicine mandate that subjective complaint guides the modality and interpretation of objective evidence. The final neurologist knew where on neuroimaging to look because she was guided by the patient's complaints - vertigo and unilateral tongue pain. In this case, detailed scrutiny of neuroimaging by a neurologist, after encephalomalacia and gliosis were fully completed, gave a more accurate neuroanatomical diagnosis and a more realistic prognosis.

On recovery: re-directing the concept by differentiation of its meanings

Recovery is a commonly used concept in both professional and everyday contexts. Yet despite its extensive use, it has not drawn much philosophical attention. In this paper, I question the common understanding of recovery, show how the concept is inadequate, and introduce new and much needed terminology. I argue that recovery glosses over important distinctions and even misrepresents the process of moving away from malady as "going back" to a former state of health. It does not invite important nuances needed to distinguish between biomedical, phenomenological, and social perspectives. In addition, I claim that there are many conditions where we are making use of the concept of recovery, although the person recovered from the condition in question, has not regained the same degree of soundness. I show how the concept of recovery leads to conceptual discrepancies that can result in worsening patients' conditions. To gain a fuller understanding, I propose to rethink the direction of the process in question. I define the process of moving away from malady as a move forward towards a new state of soundness. I also suggest three terms, corresponding to different perspectives, to describe this movement forward: 'curing' (biomedical perspective), 'healing' (first-person perspective), and 'habilitating' (social perspective). This new terminology provides a more nuanced understanding of the states of both malady and soundness and an attentiveness as to how they differ and relate.

Experiential knowledge in clinical medicine: use and justification

Within the evidence-based medicine (EBM) construct, clinical expertise is acknowledged to be both derived from primary experience and necessary for optimal medical practice. Primary experience in medical practice, however, remains undervalued. Clinicians' primary experience tends to be dismissed by EBM as unsystematic or anecdotal, a source of bias rather than knowledge, never serving as the "best" evidence to support a clinical decision. The position that clinical expertise is necessary but that primary experience is untrustworthy in clinical decision-making is epistemically incoherent. Here we argue for the value and utility of knowledge gained from primary experience for the practice of medicine. Primary experience provides knowledge necessary to diagnose, treat, and assess response in individual patients. Hierarchies of evidence, when advanced as guides for clinical decisions, mistake the relationship between propositional and experiential knowledge. We argue that primary experience represents a kind of medical knowledge distinct from the propositional knowledge produced by clinical research, both of which are crucial to determining the best diagnosis and course of action for particular patients.

Last Laughs: Gallows Humor and Medical Education

This paper argues that "backstage" gallows humor among clinical mentors not only affects medical students' perceptions of what it means to be a doctor but is also symptomatic and indicative of a much larger problem in medicine-namely, the failure to attend fully to the complexity and profundity of the lived experiences of illness, suffering, and death. Reorienting the discourse surrounding gallows humor away from whether or in what context it is acceptable and toward the reasons why doctors feel the need to use such humor in the first place addresses this issue in a more illuminating way.