Age-consistent phenomenological experience in remembering the past and imagining the past and the future

We investigated age differences in mental time travel by comparing young, middle-aged and older adults, with equal number of participants in each age decade, from age 22 to 79. Participants generated and phenomenologically rated one experienced and one imagined past event, and two imagined future events. The results showed event type effects with richer phenomenology for experienced than imagined events, but no age group differences. Specifically, experienced events were more vivid, detailed, and were re-lived in the mind more than the other event types. All events were highly central to life, revealing no event type effects on centrality. For both past events, older age groups generated more distant events. There were no age group differences for temporal distance for the two future events. Both future events were from a near future. The results suggest that for events that are central to life, phenomenological experience may be similar across the adulthood.

Memory control immediately improves unpleasant emotions associated with autobiographical memories of past immoral actions

The ability to stop unwanted memories from coming to mind is theorised to be essential for maintaining good mental health. People can employ intentional strategies to prevent conscious intrusions of negative memories, and repeated attempts to stop retrieval both reduces the frequency of intrusions and improves subsequent emotions elicited by those memories. However, it is still unknown whether memory control can improve negative emotions immediately, at the time control is attempted. It is also not clear which strategy is most beneficial for emotion regulation; clearing the mind of any thoughts of negative memories via direct suppression, or substituting memory recall with alternative thoughts. Here, we provide novel evidence that memory control immediately regulates negative emotions associated with autobiographical memories of morally wrong actions. Repeated control significantly improved negative emotions over time, regardless of the strategy used to implement control. Thought substitution involving either positive diversionary thinking or counterfactual thinking both induced positive feelings, whereas direct suppression neutralised emotions, regardless of whether memories were positive or negative. These empirical findings have implications for clinical practice as they indicate that memory control strategies could be effective emotion regulation methods for real-world intrusive memories.

The asymmetric impact of decision-making confidence on regret and relief

When individuals make uncertain decisions, they often evaluate the correctness of their choices in what is referred to as decision-making confidence. The outcomes of such decision-making can lead to counterfactual thinking wherein alternative possible outcomes are contemplated. This, in turn, can elicit counterfactual emotions including upward and downward counterfactual thinking, which, respectively, refer to regret and relief. Decision-making confidence and counterfactual emotions have key effects on how individuals learn from the past and prepare for the future. However, there has been little understanding of how these experiences are related. For this study, 98 total adults were recruited with the goal of assessing the connections between decision-making confidence and sensations of regret and relief when completing a card-based gambling task. The results of this study suggest that decision-making confidence may reduce the intensity of relief while increasing the degree of regret experienced. These findings thus emphasize the important effect that decision confidence has on emotional processing.

'My child could have died': counterfactual thoughts and psychological distress in parents of trauma survivors

Background: After exposure to a potentially traumatic event, survivors may experience thoughts about 'what could have happened', referred to as counterfactual thoughts (CFTs). CFTs have been found to have a negative impact on survivors' mental health. This is the first study to investigate whether parents of trauma survivors experience CFTs and the association with psychological distress in this group.Objective: The main aim of the present study is to investigate CFTs in parents of trauma survivors and the relationship between the frequency and vividness of CFTs and psychological distress.Method: The participants (N = 310, 191 females) were parents of the youths targeted in the terror attack on Utøya island, Norway, in 2011. Frequency and vividness of CFTs, posttraumatic stress reactions (PTSR), and symptoms of anxiety and depression were measured 8.5-9 years post-terror.Results: The majority of the parents (74%) reported having experienced CFTs at some time point since the attack. For almost one-third of the parents, CFTs were still present more than eight years after the attack. Higher frequency and vividness of CFTs were uniquely associated with higher levels of PTSR, anxiety, and depression.Conclusion: The present findings suggest that frequent and vivid CFTs may contribute to mental health problems in parents of trauma survivors and should be addressed in therapy.

Young children experience both regret and relief in a gain-or-loss context

Recent research has provided compelling evidence that children experience the negative counterfactual emotion of regret, by manipulating the presence of a counterfactual action that would have led to participants receiving a better outcome. However, it remains unclear if children similarly experience regret's positive counterpart, relief. The current study examined children's negative and positive counterfactual emotions in a novel gain-or-loss context. Four- to 9-year-old children (N = 136) were presented with two opaque boxes concealing information that would lead to a gain or loss of stickers, respectively. Half of the children chose between two keys that matched each box, whereas the other half were compelled to select one box because only one of the two keys matched. After seeing inside the alternative, non-chosen box, children were significantly more likely to report a change in emotion when they could have opened that box than when they could not have. The effects were similar for children who lost stickers and won stickers, and neither effect varied with age. These findings suggest that children may become capable of experiencing regret and relief around the same time, although their expression of these counterfactual emotions may vary with actual and counterfactual gains and losses.

Counterfactual imagination impairs memory for true actions: EEG and behavioural evidence

Imagined events can be misremembered as experienced, leading to memory distortions. However, less is known regarding how imagining counterfactual versions of past events can impair existing memories. We addressed this issue, and used EEG to investigate the neurocognitive processes involved when retrieving memories of true events that are associated with a competing imagined event. Participants first performed simple actions with everyday objects (e.g., rolling dice). A week later, they were shown pictures of some of the objects and either imagined the same action they had originally performed, or imagined a counterfactual action (e.g., stacking the dice). Subsequent tests showed that memory for performed actions was reduced after counterfactual imagination when compared to both veridical imagination and a baseline condition that had not been imagined at all, providing novel evidence that counterfactual imagination impairs true memories beyond simple forgetting over time. ERPs and EEG oscillations showed evidence of separate processes associated with memory retrieval versus post-retrieval processes that were recruited to support recall of memories that were challenging to access. The findings show that counterfactual imagination can cause impairments to sensorimotor-rich event memories, and provide new evidence regarding the neurocognitive mechanisms that are recruited when people need to distinguish memories of imagined versus true events.

An exploratory study on counterfactual thinking in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis

Objectives

This study aimed at exploring (1) the motor and non-motor correlates of counterfactual thinking (CFT) abilities in non-demented amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) patients and (2) the ability of CFT measures to discriminate these patients from healthy controls (HCs) and patients with and without cognitive impairment.

Methods

N = 110 ALS patients and N = 51 HCs were administered two CFT tasks, whose sum, resulting in a CFT Index (CFTI), was addressed as the outcome. Patients further underwent an in-depth cognitive, behavioral, and motor-functional evaluation. Correlational analyses were run to explore the correlates of the CFTI in patients. Logistic regressions were performed to test whether the CFTI could discriminate patients from HCs.

Results

The CFTI was selectively associated (p ≤ 0.005) with fluency and memory subscales of the Edinburgh Cognitive and Behavioral ALS Screen (ECAS), but not with other variables. CFTI scores discriminated patients from HCs (p < 0.001) with high accuracy (82%), but not patients with a normal vs. defective performance on the ECAS-Total.

Conclusion

CFT measures in non-demented ALS patients were associated with verbal fluency and memory functions, and they were also able to discriminate them from HCs.

Impact of Actor's Initial State of Engagement in a Course of Action on Judgements of Post-decisional Regret and Joy: Revisiting Kahneman and Tversky (1982)

According to the phenomenon commonly known as action effect and vastly replicated across the judgment and decision-making literature, more regret is associated with decisions resulting from action than inaction. Action vs. inaction, however, might either refer to change vs. no change or doing something vs. not doing something. The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of this variation in operationalization of action-inaction on the strength of action effect, for both positive and negative outcomes, across four different domains of employment, finance, education, and health. This was an experimental scenario-based study (N = 215) with four between-subjects conditions varying in outcome valence and the actor's initial state as either engaged or non-engaged in a particular course of action. Action effect was found to be stronger with respect to the initially engaged than the initially non-engaged decision-maker (ηp2 = .04), indicating that action as change results in a stronger action effect than action as doing something. The effect of the initial state was also moderated by domain. In addition, we both replicated and went beyond prior empirical literature regarding the effect of outcome valence and domain on action effect, with our findings being mostly consistent across joy and regret. Findings are discussed in light of the norm theory and its key concept of normality and contribute to the literature on moderators of action effect.

The Effect of Counterfactual Potency on Behavioral Intentions

This research examines how counterfactual potency (CP), the multiplicative effect of the likelihoods of the "if" and "then" clauses of counterfactuals, determines the effects of counterfactuals on behavioral intentions. In Study 1, we found that participants who read highly (vs. minimally) mutable vignettes perceived the counterfactuals as more likely and endorsed relevant intentions more. However, CP did not mediate the effect of mutability on intentions. In Studies 2 and 3, we found that CP directly affected intentions and also mediated the effects of mutability on intentions when mutability was specifically manipulated via controllability (Study 2) or norm violation (Study 3). Finally, Study 4 used archival reaction time data to show that more concrete counterfactuals were perceived as more likely and subsequently facilitated intentions. Taken together, the current research provides evidence that more likely counterfactuals facilitate behavioral intentions.

A mixed-method analysis of counterfactual thinking, negative event themes, and the transtheoretical model in a community sample of smokers

The transtheoretical model has been used as a model of behavior change for tobacco users. However, it does not account for perceptions of past behavior that may provide additional guidance toward smoking cessation. No studies have examined associations between the transtheoretical model, content themes of smoking experiences, and counterfactual thoughts (i.e. "If only. . .then. . ."). Mturk participants (N = 178; 47.8% female) completed measures of smoking attitudes, behavior, and stage and processes of change use. Participants described a past negative smoking event and an event-related counterfactual thought-listing task. Participants in the precontemplation stage endorsed fewer processes of change. Also, participants in the action stage reported significantly more counterfactuals about cravings (e.g. If only I could have controlled my urge to smoke. . .) inferring that they may be identifying cravings or urges as relevant barriers toward smoking cessation. Identifying these self-relevant thoughts may provide additional ways to address and overcome barriers toward achieving long-term smoking cessation.

The Spontaneous Counterfactual Inference Task: Misremembering What Might Have Been

Counterfactuals, thoughts about "what might have been," play an important role in causal judgment, emotion, and motivation, and spontaneously arise during daily life. However, current methods to measure spontaneous counterfactual thinking are cumbersome and subjective. The current research adapts a paradigm from the Spontaneous Trait Inference literature to develop the Spontaneous Counterfactual Inference measure (SCFI), which uses false recognition of counterfactual statements as a measure of spontaneous counterfactual thought. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that the SCFI is sensitive to precursors of counterfactual thinking: norm violation and counterfactual closeness. Study 2 demonstrates that the SCFI converges with the generation of counterfactual statements in an open-ended writing task. The SCFI also predicts two important consequences of counterfactual thought, blame (Study 3), and intention endorsement (Study 4). The SCFI thus offers a new tool for researchers interested in counterfactual thinking.

Counterfactual thinking elicits emotional change in young children

Adults often reason about what might have happened had they chosen an alternative course of action in the past, which can elicit the counterfactual emotion of regret. It is unclear whether young children's emotions are similarly impacted by counterfactual thinking about past possibilities. In this study, 4- to 9-year-old children (N = 160) opened one of two boxes, which concealed small and large prizes, respectively. Some children had the means to open either box, whereas other children only had the means to open one box. After seeing that the prize they did not obtain was larger than the one they did obtain, children were significantly more likely to report a negative change in emotion when the non-obtained prize had been a straightforward counterfactual possibility than when it had not. This shows that even young children experience counterfactual emotions following choices, which may ultimately drive them to make better choices in the future. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Polarized imagination: partisanship influences the direction and consequences of counterfactual thinking

Four studies examine how political partisanship qualifies previously documented regularities in people's counterfactual thinking (n = 1186 Democrats and Republicans). First, whereas prior work finds that people generally prefer to think about how things could have been better instead of worse (i.e. entertain counterfactuals in an upward versus downward direction), studies 1a-2 find that partisans are more likely to generate and endorse counterfactuals in whichever direction best aligns with their political views. Second, previous research finds that the closer someone comes to causing a negative event, the more blame that person receives; study 3 finds that this effect is more pronounced among partisans who oppose (versus support) a leader who 'almost' caused a negative event. Thus, partisan reasoning may influence which alternatives to reality people will find most plausible, will be most likely to imagine spontaneously, and will view as sufficient grounds for blame. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Decision Reversibility and Satisfaction: The Mediating Role of Counterfactual Thinking and Anticipated Regret

Purpose

Extensive research has shown that reversible decisions yield lower post-decision satisfaction than irreversible decisions. However, to date, little is known about how decision reversibility affects post-decision satisfaction. Based on regret theory, this study aimed to examine the mediating role of counterfactual thinking and anticipated regret in the association between decision reversibility and satisfaction.

Methods

In this study (130 participants), participants were randomly assigned to two personnel decision situations with reversible and irreversible decision outcomes, and all participants completed questionnaires during the process of completing the decision task. The questionnaires used included the Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale, Anticipated Regret Scale, and satisfaction questionnaire. Finally, the data were statistically analyzed using the base package in R and PROCESS 3.5.

Results

The results show that (1) Compared to irreversible decisions, reversible decisions have a significant negative impact on satisfaction. (2) Counterfactual thinking plays a mediating role between decision reversibility and satisfaction. (3) Compared with irreversible decisions, reversible decisions further lowered the level of post-decision satisfaction through the chain mediating effects of counterfactual thinking and anticipated regret.

Conclusion

People's lowered levels of post-decision satisfaction in the reversible decision condition relate to increased levels of counterfactual thinking and anticipated regret. In addition, counterfactual thinking can play a mediating role alone, indicating that this variable may be critical in understanding the mechanisms by which decision reversibility affects satisfaction. This knowledge may be used to help people optimize their decision-making behavior.

How Duty-Free Policy Influences Travel Intention: Mediating Role of Perceived Value and Moderating Roles of COVID-19 Severity and Counterfactual Thinking

Counterfactual thinking is presumed to play a preparatory function in promoting people's behavioural intentions. This study specifically addresses the impacts of COVID-19 severity, tourists' counterfactual thinking about the pandemic, and tourists' perceived duty-free consumption value on the effect of a duty-free policy on travel intentions. Four hundred and ten participants took part in this study, which involved a 2 (duty-free policy: absent vs. present) × 2 (COVID-19 severity: high vs. low) design. Results reveal the following patterns: (a) compared to the absence of a duty-free policy in tourist destinations, enactment of a duty-free policy leads to stronger visit intentions through greater perceived value and (b) the effect of a duty-free policy on travel intention is moderated by tourists' counterfactual thinking and COVID-19 severity.

The Bidirectional Relation Between Counterfactual Thinking and Closeness, Controllability, and Exceptionality

In four experiments, we explored the inferences people make when they learn that counterfactual thinking has occurred. Experiment 1 (N = 40) showed that knowing that a protagonist had engaged in counterfactual thinking (compared to no counterfactual thinking) resulted in participants inferring that the past event was closer in time to the protagonist, but there was no difference in inferring how close the past event was between knowing that a protagonist made many or a single counterfactual statement(s). Experiment 2 (N = 80) confirmed that participants were not affected by the number of counterfactual statements they read when inferring temporal closeness. Experiment 3 (N = 49) demonstrated that participants who learned that a protagonist had engaged in counterfactual thinking were more likely to infer that the protagonist experienced the controllable event. Experiment 4 (N = 120) indicated that participants who learned that a protagonist had engaged in counterfactual thinking were more likely to infer that the protagonist experienced the exceptional event. We concluded that the existence (but not the number) of counterfactual thoughts can lead people to infer that events were close, exceptional, and controllable, which suggests that the relations between closeness/controllability/exceptionality and counterfactual thinking are bidirectional. These results showed that as well as making inferences based on facts about the real world, people also make inferences about the real world based on hypothetical worlds.

The Efficacy of Downward Counterfactual Thinking for Regulating Emotional Memories in Anxious Individuals

Aversive autobiographical memories sometimes prompt maladaptive emotional responses and contribute to affective dysfunction in anxiety and depression. One way to regulate the impact of such memories is to create a downward counterfactual thought-a mental simulation of how the event could have been worse-to put what occurred in a more positive light. Despite its intuitive appeal, counterfactual thinking has not been systematically studied for its regulatory efficacy. In the current study, we compared the regulatory impact of downward counterfactual thinking, temporal distancing, and memory rehearsal in 54 adult participants representing a spectrum of trait anxiety. Participants recalled regretful experiences and rated them on valence, arousal, regret, and episodic detail. Two to six days later, they created a downward counterfactual of the remembered event, thought of how they might feel about it 10 years from now, or simply rehearsed it. A day later, participants re-rated the phenomenological characteristics of the events. Across all participants, downward counterfactual thinking, temporal distancing, and memory rehearsal were equally effective at reducing negative affect associated with a memory. However, in individuals with higher trait anxiety, downward counterfactual thinking was more effective than rehearsal for reducing regret, and it was as effective as distancing in reducing arousal. We discuss these results in light of the functional theory of counterfactual thinking and suggest that they motivate further investigation into downward counterfactual thinking as a means to intentionally regulate emotional memories in affective disorders.

Unintentional Inception: When a Premium Is Offered to Unintentional Creations

Creations can be fundamentally intended or unintended from their outset. Past work has focused on intentional creations, finding that people place a premium on effort. We examine the role of unintentionality in the inception of creations in six studies using a variety of stimuli (N = 1,965), finding that people offer a premium to unintentional creations versus otherwise identical intentional creations. We demonstrate that the unintentionality involved in the inception of a creation results in greater downward counterfactual thought about how the unintentional creation may have never been created at all, and this in turn heightens perceptions that the creation was a product of fate, causing people to place a premium on such creations. We provide evidence for this causal pathway using a combination of mediation and moderation approaches. Further, we illuminate that this premium is not offered when a negative outcome is ascribed to an unintentional creation.

A Review of Functions of Speculative Thinking

Speculative thinking refers to thinking about past or future possibilities; it includes counterfactual thinking, prefactual thinking, and other types. In this narrative review, we discuss the traditional function of speculative thinking in improving future performance (i.e., the preparatory function). We also explore several non-preparatory functions of speculative thinking that have not been widely covered, namely the functions of conveying information and of supporting lying. In addition, we address temporal asymmetry; one perspective focuses on psychological distance in speculative thinking about the past and future, while another focuses on temporal asymmetry and reality/hypothetical differences in the preparatory function of speculative thinking. Overall, this review suggests that a broader functional theory is needed to address non-preparatory functions and the traditional preparatory function. Such a theory should cover all speculative thinking about the past and future rather than simply counterfactual thinking.

Guilt and Shame of What Might Have Been in Optimistic Offender Drivers

Habitual offender drivers are required to recover points lost on their driving license by attending reeducation courses, an experience that may, upon reflection of the incident in question, induce feelings of guilt or shame for the infractions they committed. A simulated driving task studied optimistic offender drivers to analyze the extent to which the controllability of the situational context influenced their use of internal and external factors in counterfactual thoughts and emotions such as guilt and shame. The study involved 160 drivers, of whom 54 were categorized as repeat offender drivers while 106 drivers attended courses for advanced professional driving licenses. The participants drove along a route in a driving simulator, which had been previously adjusted for the difficulty to generate a perception of high or low control. Based on the outcome obtained by the participants in this stage, each driver had to report which resources they required to improve their outcomes. Different factor ANOVAs were used to analyze our findings. The results indicated that optimistic offenders, unlike other groups (i.e., optimistic non-offender and pessimistic non-offender), thought that their results could have been better if external factors had been present (i.e., upward counterfactuals), both under conditions of high and low control. They believed their results would have been worse had it not been for their internal resources (i.e., downward counterfactuals), especially under conditions of low control. Concerning emotions of guilt and shame, offender optimists had the lowest values in both conditions compared with the other groups. We may contend that optimistic offender drivers thought they could have obtained better outcomes if external factors had been involved. In the low control condition, they justified that if it were not for such internal skills, their results could have been worse. When they generated such thoughts, the emotions of guilt and shame were minimal.

Modulating OFC Activity With tDCS Alters Regret About Human Decision-Making

Regret is a common emotion in daily life. Humans always regret their decision-making choices if the chosen outcome is bad. Neuroscientific studies suggest that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) influences feelings of regret. We used a transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) device to study the role of regret in participants' decision-making by modulating the activity of the OFC. The two-wheel-of-fortune gamble task was used in our experimental design, and we asked the participants to rate their feelings of regret after the computer presented the obtained and unobtained outcomes. The experimental results revealed that the effect of stimulation type was significant, which indicated that the influence of the OFC in regret was modulated by tDCS. Furthermore, based on post hoc analyses (Bonferroni), regret was lower in those who received left anodal/right cathodal stimulation than in those who received sham stimulation, which revealed that modulating the activity of the OFC reduced the emotional intensity of regret. In addition, an inverted U-shaped curve characterized the mean ratings of regret over time.

Counterfactual Thinking Among Victims of Sexual Assault: Relationships With Posttraumatic Stress and Posttraumatic Growth

Counterfactual thinking is thinking of alternatives to events that have already occurred. The purpose of this quantitative study was to investigate the relationships between counterfactual thinking and both posttraumatic stress and posttraumatic growth among undergraduate women who identified as having been sexually assaulted (N = 199). Participants who identified as sexual assault victims completed measures of posttraumatic stress, posttraumatic growth, and counterfactual thinking online. Upward counterfactual thinking-that is, thinking of preferable alternative outcomes-specific to sexual assault was associated with greater posttraumatic stress and greater posttraumatic growth, while downward counterfactual thinking-that is, thinking how things could have been worse-was associated with lower posttraumatic stress. Women endorsed approximately equal levels of upward and downward counterfactual thinking. The results suggest that the way individuals cognitively process sexual assault may play a role in long-term trauma and recovery.

Opposites in Reasoning Processes: Do We Use Them More Than We Think, but Less Than We Could?

Our aim in this paper is to contribute toward acknowledging the general role of opposites as an organizing principle in the human mind. We support this claim in relation to human reasoning by collecting evidence from various studies which shows that "thinking in opposites" is not only involved in formal logical thinking, but can also be applied in both deductive and inductive reasoning, as well as in problem solving. We also describe the results of a series of studies which, although they have been developed within a number of different theoretical frameworks based on various methodologies, all demonstrate that giving hints or training reasoners to think in terms of opposites improves their performance in tasks in which spontaneous thinking may lead to classic biases and impasses. Since we all possess an intuitive idea of what opposites are, prompting people to "think in opposites" is something which is undoubtedly within everyone's reach and in the final section, we discuss the potential of this strategy and suggest possible future research directions of systematic testing the benefits that might arise from the use of this technique in contexts beyond those tested thus far. Ascertaining the conditions in which reasoners might benefit will also help in terms of clarifying the underlying mechanisms from the point of view, for instance, of analytical, conscious processing vs. automatic, unconscious processing.

Acute stress amplifies experienced and anticipated regret in counterfactual decision-making

Previous research has shown that stress can affect emotion processing in a variety of settings. However, little attention has been paid to the effects of stress on emotional decision-making. The present study addressed this question by exposing healthy young participants either to a stressor (n = 30)-socially evaluated cold pressor task- or a non-stressful control task (n = 30). Subsequently, participants completed a computerized decision-making task in which they could compare the obtained factual outcome with a non-obtained counterfactual outcome. Saliva samples were taken at four time points over the course of the experiment and used to analyze cortisol levels. Results revealed that acute stress induced reliable salivary cortisol increase over the experimental task. At the outcome delivery stage, acute stress amplified negative emotions induced by the counterfactual comparison. At the choice stage, under stress, participants were more likely to make regret-averse decisions. The findings that acute stress amplifies both experienced and anticipated regret is consistent with dual process frameworks such that stress tilts decision-making toward more emotional and intuitive processing.Lay summaryStress is thought to affect emotional processing. The present study investigated the effects of acute stress on emotional decision making using a typical counterfactual decision making task. Acute stress amplified both experience and anticipation of regret, consistent with the dual process frame that stress tilts decision-making toward more emotional and intuitive processing.

Using counterfactual thinking theory to change alcohol protective behavioural strategy use intentions

OBJECTIVES

Despite numerous drinking interventions, alcohol use among college students remains a significant problem. Typically activated after negative events, counterfactual thinking is a cognitive process that contrasts reality with an imagined better alternative. As a result, counterfactual thinking highlights potential causal links between problematic behaviours and negative outcomes, which can strengthen intentions to change behaviour. Recent research has found that modifying behavioural intentions to engage in protective behavioural strategies (PBS) has led to increased PBS use and reduced alcohol outcomes. The current study evaluated counterfactual thinking as a way to increase PBS use intentions.

DESIGN

Intervention US study with college student drinkers.

METHODS

A sample of college students (n = 466) completed a web-based assessment of demographics, drinking, alcohol consequences, and PBS use. Those who endorsed an adverse drinking event were randomly assigned to an intervention condition (Control, Negative event only, Negative event with description, or Negative event with counterfactual). Following the intervention, participants reported intentions to engage in each PBS subtype over the next week.

RESULTS

Relative to control, the counterfactual condition resulted in greater PBS use intentions across all subtypes. Neither the negative event only nor the negative event with description resulted in higher PBS use intentions, relative to control. Importantly, the control group did not report whether they experienced a negative event; thus, we cannot definitively determine the effect this may have on the data.

CONCLUSIONS

This study provides a new theory-driven avenue for alcohol use interventions utilizing counterfactual thinking to enhance safe drinking intentions.

A Dilemma of Dogma: Specifying the Personality Root of Sexual Prejudice

The current study integrated prior research demonstrating 1) a mediational process by which the Five-Factor Model personality factor Openness to Experience, transmitted through right-wing authoritarian ideology, predicts sexual prejudice and 2) that the Five-Factor Model personality facet Openness to Values may be the more precise personality root of this process. Participants were 79 college students who completed a comprehensive measure of Five-Factor Model personality factors and facets and other relevant measures. Results supported hypotheses. In particular, facet-level Openness to Values accounted for comparable unique variance in sexual prejudice as factor-level Openness, and analyses of direct and indirect effects and overall model fit supported Openness to Values as the precise source predictor of the mediational pathway. Discussion focuses on preliminary evidence that Openness (and perhaps its facets) may be cultivated, and sexual prejudice reduced, by contact interventions. I emphasize in particular the promise of contact interventions that avoid frustration of the dogmatic personality by enhancing the experiential processing mode, including encouraging mental simulation of alternate social values.

I'd do much better, if only … counterfactual comparisons related to traumatic life events

The association between posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and counterfactual comparisons (CFC) is poorly understood and CFC-measures are missing. We developed and applied the Posttraumatic Counterfactual Comparisons Scale (P-CFC-S), which measures frequency, intensity and affective impact of trauma-related CFC. We further measured trauma history, PTSD symptoms, probable PTSD diagnosis, posttraumatic cognitions, satisfaction with life and basic sociodemographic information. The sample consisted of 556 adults (62.95% female) who had all experienced at least one potentially traumatic event and of whom 15.29% fulfilled a probable PTSD diagnosis. The P-CFC-S yielded adequate internal consistency and a one-factor structure in the explorative factor analysis. CFC were common, and about two-fold more common in individuals with probable PTSD compared to those without. In hierarchical regression analyses, the frequency and intensity in CFC explained a significant amount of variance in PTSD symptoms when potentially confounding variables (i.e. age, gender, posttraumatic cognitions and counterfactual thinking) were accounted for. Our findings suggest that CFC may be an active ingredient in PTSD maintenance. Longitudinal research is needed to examine the dynamics between CFC and PTSD and the hypothesis that CFC is related to cognitive avoidance and/or maladaptive appraisals of trauma meaning.

If only… a systematic review and meta-analysis of social, temporal and counterfactual comparative thinking in PTSD

Comparative thinking is ubiquitous in human cognition. Empirical evidence is accumulating that PTSD symptomatology is linked to various changes in social, temporal and counterfactual comparative thinking. However, no systematic review and meta-analysis in this line of research have been conducted to this date. We searched titles, abstracts and subject terms of electronic records in PsycInfo and Medline from inception to January 2019 with various search terms for social, temporal and counterfactual comparative thinking as well as PTSD. Journal articles were included if they reported a quantitative association between PTSD and social, temporal and/or counterfactual comparative thinking in trauma-exposed clinical or sub-clinical samples. A total of 36 publications were included in the qualitative synthesis. The number of publications on the association between PTSD and social and temporal comparative thinking was too scarce to warrant a meta-analytic review. A narrative review of available literature suggests that PTSD is associated with distortions in social and temporal comparative thinking. A meta-analysis of 24 independent samples (n = 4423) assessing the association between PTSD and the frequency of counterfactual comparative thinking yielded a medium to large positive association of r =.464 (p <.001, 95% CI =.404; .520). Higher study quality was associated with higher magnitude of association in a meta-regression. Most studies collected data cross-sectionally, precluding conclusions regarding causality. Overall, study quality was found to be moderate. More longitudinal and experimental research with validated comparative thinking measures in clinical samples is needed to acquire a more sophisticated understanding of the role of comparative cognitions in the aetiology and maintenance of PTSD. Comparative thinking might be a fruitful avenue for a better understanding of posttraumatic reactions and improving treatment.

Counterfactual Thinking-Related Emotional Responses in Patients With Major Depressive Disorder

Objective: To explore the emotional characteristics of counterfactual thinking (CT)-related emotion responses in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) via the "counterfactual thinking gambling task (CTGT)." Method: Twenty-five patients with MDD (the MDD group) and twenty-five healthy controls (the HC group) with matched demographic features were included. The 17-item Hamilton Depression Scale (HAMD) and the 14-item Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale (HAMA) were used to assess the severity of depression and anxiety symptoms. The counterfactual thinking gambling task was applied to assess the situation-focused- and behavior-focused-CT-related emotion responses in the MDD group and the HC group. Results: There was no significant difference in general demographic data between the two groups (p > 0.05). Compared with the HC group, the MDD group experienced higher levels of "disappointment" and lower levels of "joy" in the situation-focused CT paradigm (p < 0.05). However, the experience of "regret" and "relief" in the behavior-focused CT paradigm were not significantly different between the two groups (p > 0.05). Conclusions: MDD is associated with an impaired situation-focused-CT-related emotion responses, and is often accompanied by increased disappointment and decreased joy; however, behavior-focused-CT-related emotion responses are not significantly affected in MDD. This pattern may represent the characteristic CT-related emotion responses of MDD.

Temporal Junctures in the Mind

Humans can imagine what happened in the past and what will happen in the future, but also what did not happen and what might happen. We reflect on envisioned events from alternative timelines, while knowing that we only ever live on one timeline. Considering alternative timelines rests on representations of temporal junctures, or points in time at which possible versions of reality diverge. These representations become increasingly sophisticated over childhood, first enabling preparation for mutually exclusive future possibilities and later the experience of counterfactual emotions like regret. By contrast, it remains unclear whether non-human animals represent temporal junctures at all. The emergence of these representations may have been a prime mover in human evolution.

What if I had not fallen from grace? Psychological distress and the gap between factual and counterfactual subjective social status

The aim of this work was to test the hypothesis that the discrepancy between factual and counterfactual subjective social status (DCS) relates to psychological distress beyond the effect of current (i.e., factual) subjective and objective social status. Participants were 124 single mothers (Study 1) and 310 persons who have become unemployed (Study 2). In both samples, higher DCS was related to more severe symptoms of stress and depression beyond the effect of current subjective and objective social status. Upward counterfactual thinking might be an additional psychological factor in the relationship between social inequality and health in socially deprived individuals.

If I knew then what I know now: Advice to my younger self

If we could go back and give ourselves advice to keep from making a mistake, most of us would probably take that opportunity. Using self-discrepancy theory as a theoretical framework, US workers on Amazon's Mechanical Turk, who were at least 30 years of age, indicated in two studies what their advice to their younger selves would be, what pivotal event was influential for them, if they had regrets, and if following this advice would bring them closer to their ideal or ought self. Across both studies, most of the advice fell into the domains of relationships, education, and selfhood. Participants said following the advice would bring them more in line with their ideal than their ought self. Following the advice also led to more positive perceptions of the current self by the high school self. Ages at which pivotal events occurred provided strong support for the reminiscence bump.

Too Imperfect to Fall Asleep: Perfectionism, Pre-sleep Counterfactual Processing, and Insomnia

Previous research suggests that certain dimensions of perfectionism are associated with insomnia. However, the exact processes whereby perfectionism may influence sleep have as yet remained unexplored. The present study tested the hypothesis that perfectionistic individuals are particularly prone to engage in counterfactual thinking and to experience counterfactual emotions (regret, shame, and guilt) at bedtime, which have been shown to impair sleep. One hundred eighty university students completed questionnaires on perfectionism, counterfactual processing, and insomnia severity. Analyses revealed that three dimensions of perfectionism were significantly related to insomnia severity: Concern over mistakes and doubts about action showed positive correlations, whereas organization showed a negative correlation. Moreover, the frequency of counterfactual thoughts and emotions at bedtime largely mediated the effects of these dimensions of perfectionism on insomnia severity. These findings highlight how personality-related patterns of behavior may translate into affective arousal at bedtime, thereby increasing the risk of insomnia.

Imagining What Could Have Happened: Types and Vividness of Counterfactual Thoughts and the Relationship With Post-traumatic Stress Reactions

A growing body of research suggests that counterfactual thinking after traumatic events is associated with post-traumatic stress reactions. In this study we explored frequency of upward and downward counterfactuals in trauma-exposed individuals, and how trauma-related counterfactuals were represented in terms of vividness. We examined the relationships between vividness and frequency of counterfactual thoughts and post-traumatic stress reactions in two groups who had experienced different types of traumatic exposure, namely survivors and bereaved from the fire on the ferry Scandinavian Star in 1990. Even after 26 years, both survivors and bereaved reported that they currently entertained thoughts about what could have happened during the fire on Scandinavian Star. Survivors reported more downward counterfactuals than the bereaved, whereas the bereaved reported more upward counterfactuals than the survivors did. Vividness of counterfactual thoughts, as well as reported frequency of upward and downward counterfactuals, were associated with post-traumatic stress reactions. Our results suggest that both upward and downward counterfactuals can be harmful, and that vivid counterfactuals about a traumatic event might play a similar role in post-traumatic stress as trauma memories. Therefore, traumatized individuals who entertain counterfactual thoughts may benefit from interventions that target these thoughts specifically.

On the Counterfactual Nature of Gambling Near-misses: An Experimental Study

Research on gambling near-misses has shown that objectively equivalent outcomes can yield divergent emotional and motivational responses. The subjective processing of gambling outcomes is affected substantially by close but non-obtained outcomes (i.e. counterfactuals). In the current paper, we investigate how different types of near-misses influence self-perceived luck and subsequent betting behavior in a wheel-of-fortune task. We investigate the counterfactual mechanism of these effects by testing the relationship with a second task measuring regret/relief processing. Across two experiments (Experiment 1, n = 51; Experiment 2, n = 104), we demonstrate that near-wins (neutral outcomes that are close to a jackpot) decreased self-perceived luck, whereas near-losses (neutral outcomes that are close to a major penalty) increased luck ratings. The effects of near-misses varied by near-miss position (i.e. whether the spinner stopped just short of, or passed through, the counterfactual outcome), consistent with established distinctions between upward versus downward, and additive versus subtractive, counterfactual thinking. In Experiment 1, individuals who showed stronger counterfactual processing on the regret/relief task were more responsive to near-wins and near-losses on the wheel-of-fortune task. The effect of near-miss position was attenuated when the anticipatory phase (i.e. the spin and deceleration) was removed in Experiment 2. Further differences were observed within the objective gains and losses, between "clear" and "narrow" outcomes. Taken together, these results help substantiate the counterfactual mechanism of near-misses.

Symptomatic Remission and Counterfactual Reasoning in Schizophrenia

Counterfactual thinking (CFT) is a type of conditional reasoning involving mental representations of alternatives to past factual events that previous preliminary research has suggested to be impaired in schizophrenia. However, despite the potential impact of these deficits on the functional outcome of these patients, studies examining the role of CFT in this disorder are still few in number. The present study aimed to extent previous results by evaluating CFT in the largest sample to date of schizophrenia patients in symptomatic remission and healthy controls. The relationship with symptomatology, illness duration, and sociodemographic characteristics was also explored. Methods: Seventy-eight schizophrenia patients and 84 healthy controls completed a series of tests that examined the generation of counterfactual thoughts, the influence of the "causal order effect," and the ability to counterfactually derive inferences by using de Counterfactual Inference Test. Results: Compared with controls, patients generated fewer counterfactual thoughts when faced with a simulated scenario. This deficit was negatively related to scores on all dimensions of the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale-PANNS, as well as to longer illness duration. The results also showed that schizophrenia patients deviated significantly from the normative pattern when generating inferences from CFT. Conclusions: These findings reveal CFT impairment to be present in schizophrenia even when patients are in symptomatic remission. However, symptomatology and illness duration may have a negative influence on these patients' ability to generate counterfactual thoughts. The results might support the relevance of targeting CFT in future treatment approaches, although further research is needed to better describe the relationship between CFT and both symptomatology and functional outcome.

Individual Differences in Subjective Utility and Risk Preferences: The Influence of Hedonic Capacity and Trait Anxiety

Individual differences in decision-making are important in both normal populations and psychiatric conditions. Variability in decision-making could be mediated by different subjective utilities or by other processes. For example, while traditional economic accounts attribute risk aversion to a concave subjective utility curve, in practice other factors could affect risk behavior. This distinction may have important implications for understanding the biological basis of variability in decision-making and for developing interventions to improve decision-making. Another aspect of decision-making that may vary between individuals is the sensitivity of subjective utility to counterfactual outcomes (outcomes that could have occurred, but did not). We investigated decision-making in relation to hedonic capacity and trait anxiety, two traits that relate to psychiatric conditions but also vary in the general population. Subjects performed a decision-making task, in which they chose between low- and high-risk gambles to win 0, 20, or 40 points on each trial. Subjects then rated satisfaction after each outcome on a visual analog scale, indicating subjective utility. Hedonic capacity was positively associated with the subjective utility of winning 20 points but was not associated with the concavity of the subjective utility curve (constructed using the mean subjective utility of winning 0, 20, or 40 points). Consistent with economic theory, concavity of the subjective utility curve was associated with risk aversion. Hedonic capacity was independently associated with risk seeking (i.e., not mediated by the shape of the subjective utility curve), while trait anxiety was unrelated to risk preferences. Contrary to our expectations, counterfactual sensitivity was unrelated to hedonic capacity and trait anxiety. Nevertheless, trait anxiety was associated with a self-report measure of regret-proneness, suggesting that counterfactual influences may occur via a pathway that is separate from immediate counterfactual processing biases. Taken together, our results show that hedonic capacity but not trait anxiety affects risk-taking through a mechanism that appears independent of the shape of the subjective utility curve, while hedonic capacity and trait anxiety do not affect the influence of counterfactual outcomes on subjective utility. The results have implications for understanding the underlying mechanisms of variable decision-making and for developing interventions to improve decision-making.

Counterfactual Reasoning in Non-psychotic First-Degree Relatives of People with Schizophrenia

Counterfactual thinking (CFT) is a type of conditional reasoning that enables the generation of mental simulations of alternatives to past factual events. Previous research has found this cognitive feature to be disrupted in schizophrenia (Hooker et al., 2000; Contreras et al., 2016). At the same time, the study of cognitive deficits in unaffected relatives of people with schizophrenia has significantly increased, supporting its potential endophenotypic role in this disorder. Using an exploratory approach, the current study examined CFT for the first time in a sample of non-psychotic first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients (N = 43), in comparison with schizophrenia patients (N = 54) and healthy controls (N = 44). A series of tests that assessed the "causal order effect" in CFT and the ability to generate counterfactual thoughts and counterfactually derive inferences using the Counterfactual Inference Test was completed. Associations with variables of basic and social cognition, levels of schizotypy and psychotic-like experiences in addition to clinical and socio-demographic characteristics were also explored. Findings showed that first-degree relatives generated a lower number of counterfactual thoughts than controls, and were more adept at counterfactually deriving inferences, specifically in the scenarios related to regret and to judgments of avoidance in an unusual situation. No other significant results were found. These preliminary findings suggest that non-psychotic first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients show a subtle disruption of global counterfactual thinking compared with what is normally expected in the general population. Due to the potential impact of such deficits, new treatments targeting CFT improvement might be considered in future management strategies.

The effects of belief in good luck and counterfactual thinking on gambling behavior

BACKGROUND AND AIMS

One's belief in good luck, and belief that it is a personal trait, could play a crucial role in gambling behavior, and can lead gamblers to have an irrational anticipation to win and to over-generalize their subjective sense of control. And upward counterfactual thinking has been considered to be a factor that offsets those irrational beliefs. This study examined the effects of belief in good luck and of upward counterfactual thinking on gambling behavior.

METHODS

The subjects of the study were 52 college students who had been classified as non-problematic and non-pathological gamblers. They were assigned into one of two groups, distinguished by having either high (n = 25) or low (n = 27) levels of self-perception of luck, as determined by their scores on the Belief in Good Luck (BIGL) Scale. The subjects were assigned to different groups according to their reported experience of upward counterfactual thinking.

RESULTS

We found that those who had high BIGL scores spent more money on gambling than those who had low BIGL scores. Moreover, after taking into account the upward counterfactual thinking, the subjects with high BIGL scores showed a dramatic decrease in their expectations of winning.

DISCUSSION

The results indicate that to perceive luck as a personal and internal trait could affect gambling, which is one of the cognitive errors for gambling addiction. On the other hand, given that upward counterfactual thinking plays an important role in reducing cognitive errors, it could act as a protective factor against gambling addiction.

Styles of Counterfactual Thoughts in People with and without Signs of Depression

People in a depressive state frequently believe that things could have happened differently in their lives, which is regarded as counterfactual thought. This study aimed to investigate whether the styles of counterfactual thought shown by people with indicating signs of depression and by people without any of those signs are different. Study participants were 42 adults divided into two groups: those with signs of depression and those without signs of depression. Five stories taken from newspapers and magazines and fictional scenarios were presented to the participants. After reading such stories, participants had to answer questions about how the narrated facts could have been different from what they actually were. Results indicated similar counterfactual thought styles in both groups (with and without depression signs). Most of the thoughts found were categorized as upward, subtractive, self-referent and that modified an aspect referred to action/inaction. A few significant differences between groups were observed, and most of them were obtained through directed modifications, in the last three stories. Some tendencies were shown in the group of people with signs of depression, such as those found for the subtractive category, t(40) = 2.33, p < .05, which can indicate a trend of possible failure in the preparatory function of CT, and in the hetero-referral function, t(40) = 1.97, p < .05, indicating a difficulty in thinking of different forms of action in the future. The removal of negative events may indicate that these experiences are not beneficial to people's survival. These results may indicate some tendencies about how people in depressive states think about past events.

Mechanism of bystander-blaming: defensive attribution, counterfactual thinking, and gender

Contemporary victimology recognizes that an understanding of the mechanism of blaming requires a comprehensive approach that includes the victim, the offender, and the bystander. However, most of the existing research on blaming focuses on the victim and the offender, ignoring the issue of bystander-blaming. This study highlights the bystander and investigates bystander-blaming by exploring some theoretical explanations, including counterfactual thinking, defensive attribution, and gender differences. The study included 363 young male and female participants, who read vignettes describing the behavior of the victim and the bystander in a rape scenario and answered questions regarding bystander-blaming. The results show that both counterfactual thinking and defensive attribution play a role in bystander-blaming. This article addresses the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.

The making of might-have-beens: effects of free will belief on counterfactual thinking

Counterfactual thoughts are based on the assumption that one situation could result in multiple possible outcomes. This assumption underlies most theories of free will and contradicts deterministic views that there is only one possible outcome of any situation. Three studies tested the hypothesis that stronger belief in free will would lead to more counterfactual thinking. Experimental manipulations (Studies 1-2) and a measure (Studies 3-4) of belief in free will were linked to increased counterfactual thinking in response to autobiographical (Studies 1, 3, and 4) and hypothetical (Study 2) events. Belief in free will also predicted the kind of counterfactuals generated. Belief in free will was associated with an increase in the generation of self and upward counterfactuals, which have been shown to be particularly useful for learning. These findings fit the view that belief in free will is promoted by societies because it facilitates learning and culturally valued change.

Counterfactual thinking in patients with amnesia

We often engage in counterfactual (CF) thinking, which involves reflecting on “what might have been.” Creating alternative versions of reality seems to have parallels with recollecting the past and imagining the future in requiring the simulation of internally generated models of complex events. Given that episodic memory and imagining the future are impaired in patients with hippocampal damage and amnesia, we wondered whether successful CF thinking also depends upon the integrity of the hippocampus. Here using two nonepisodic CF thinking tasks, we found that patients with bilateral hippocampal damage and amnesia performed comparably with matched controls. They could deconstruct reality, add in and recombine elements, change relations between temporal sequences of events, enabling them to determine plausible alternatives of complex episodes. A difference between the patients and control participants was evident, however, in the patients' subtle avoidance of CF simulations that required the construction of an internal spatial representation. Overall, our findings suggest that mental simulation in the form of nonepisodic CF thinking does not seem to depend upon the hippocampus unless there is the added requirement for construction of a coherent spatial scene within which to play out scenarios. © 2014 The Authors. Hippocampus Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Pitfalls of counterfactual thinking in medical practice: preventing errors by using more functional reference points

Background

Counterfactual thinking involves mentally simulating alternatives to reality. The current article reviews literature pertaining to the relevance counterfactual thinking has for the quality of medical decision making. Although earlier counterfactual thought research concluded that counterfactuals have important benefits for the individual, there are reasons to believe that counterfactual thinking is also associated with dysfunctional consequences. Of particular focus is whether or not medical experience, and its influence on counterfactual thinking, actually informs or improves medical practice. It is hypothesized that relatively more probable decision alternatives, followed by undesirable outcomes and counterfactual thought responses, can be abandoned for relatively less probable decision alternatives.

Design and Methods

Building on earlier research demonstrating that counterfactual thinking can impede memory and learning in a decision paradigm with undergraduate students, the current study examines the extent to which earlier findings can be generalized to practicing physicians (N=10). Participants were asked to complete 60 trials of a computerized Monty Hall Problem simulation. Learning by experience was operationalized as the frequency of switch-decisions.

Results

Although some learning was evidenced by a general increase in switch-decision frequency across block trials, the extent of learning demonstrated was not ideal, nor practical.

Conclusions

A simple, multiple-trial, decision paradigm demonstrated that doctors fail to learn basic decision-outcome associations through experience. An agenda for future research, which tests the functionality of reference points (other than counterfactual alternatives) for the purposes of medical decision making, is proposed.

Counterfactual thinking: an fMRI study on changing the past for a better future

Recent studies suggest that a brain network mainly associated with episodic memory has a more general function in imagining oneself in another time, place or perspective (e.g. episodic future thought, theory of mind, default mode). If this is true, counterfactual thinking (e.g. 'If I had left the office earlier, I wouldn't have missed my train.') should also activate this network. Present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study explores the common and distinct neural activity of counterfactual and episodic thinking by directly comparing the imagining of upward counterfactuals (creating better outcomes for negative past events) with the re-experiencing of negative past events and the imagining of positive future events. Results confirm that episodic and counterfactual thinking share a common brain network, involving a core memory network (hippocampal area, temporal lobes, midline, and lateral parietal lobes) and prefrontal areas that might be related to mentalizing (medial prefrontal cortex) and performance monitoring (right prefrontal cortex). In contrast to episodic past and future thinking, counterfactual thinking recruits some of these areas more strongly and extensively, and additionally activates the bilateral inferior parietal lobe and posterior medial frontal cortex. We discuss these findings in view of recent fMRI evidence on the working of episodic memory and theory of mind.

Woulda, coulda, shoulda: the evaluation and the impact of the alternative outcome

The alternative outcome refers to the outcome of the unselected option in decision-making tasks, which has significant influence on the chosen outcome evaluation. Most paradigms have presented the alternative outcome either after or simultaneous with the chosen outcome, which complicates the observation on the brain activity associated with the alternative outcome. To circumvent this perceived shortcoming, we modified the classic paradigm designed by Yeung and Sanfey (2004) such that the alternative outcome was presented before the chosen outcome in each trial while an electroencephalogram was recorded. The feedback-related negativity (FRN) elicited by the positive alternative outcome was larger than that elicited by the negative alternative outcome, suggesting that the participants evaluated the positive alternative outcome as negative feedback. Moreover, the FRN and the P3 elicited by the chosen outcome were influenced by the valence of the alternative outcome. The current study reveals that the alternative outcome is treated as important information even though it is economically neutral.

Amygdala involvement in self-blame regret

Regret-related brain activity is dependent on free choice, but it is unclear whether this activity is a function of more subtle differences in the degree of responsibility a decision-maker exerts over a regrettable outcome. In this experiment, we show that trial-by-trial subjective ratings of regret depend on a higher subjective sense of responsibility, as well as being dependent on objective responsibility. Using fMRI we show an enhanced amygdala response to regret-related outcomes when these outcomes are associated with high, as compared to low, responsibility. This enhanced response was maximal in participants who showed a greater level of enhancement in their subjective ratings of regret engendered by an objective increase in responsibility. Orbitofrontal and cingulate cortex showed opposite effects, with an enhanced response for regret-related outcomes when participants were not objectively responsible. The findings indicate that the way the brain processes regret-related outcomes depends on both objective and subjective aspects of responsibility, highlighting the critical importance of the amygdala.

The bright side of being blue: depression as an adaptation for analyzing complex problems

Depression is the primary emotional condition for which help is sought. Depressed people often report persistent rumination, which involves analysis, and complex social problems in their lives. Analysis is often a useful approach for solving complex problems, but it requires slow, sustained processing, so disruption would interfere with problem solving. The analytical rumination hypothesis proposes that depression is an evolved response to complex problems, whose function is to minimize disruption and sustain analysis of those problems by (a) giving the triggering problem prioritized access to processing resources, (b) reducing the desire to engage in distracting activities (anhedonia), and (c) producing psychomotor changes that reduce exposure to distracting stimuli. As processing resources are limited, sustained analysis of the triggering problem reduces the ability to concentrate on other things. The hypothesis is supported by evidence from many levels-genes, neurotransmitters and their receptors, neurophysiology, neuroanatomy, neuroenergetics, pharmacology, cognition, behavior, and efficacy of treatments. In addition, the hypothesis provides explanations for puzzling findings in the depression literature, challenges the belief that serotonin transmission is low in depression, and has implications for treatment.